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Physical & Life Sciences
Freewill?
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<blockquote data-quote="FrumiousBandersnatch" data-source="post: 69099140" data-attributes="member: 241055"><p>What is meant by 'free choice' in this context?</p><p>For the sake of argument, yes.</p><p>Yes, you're right - my mistake; what I meant is that, even given indefinite precision, and complete knowledge of the starting conditions, there is no way to discover a future state other than running through the entire process up to the relevant point. Imagine someone predicted the result of the n'th iteration of a chaotic function, and on iterating it, you found they were correct and asked them how they knew; if they told you they'd done the same thing just before you arrived, I suspect you'd see it more as a post-diction than a prediction... but, whatever, that's an incidental.</p><p>I think the concept of being able to make a contrary choice is at the heart of the it, and at the heart of the popular conception of free will. When someone says they made a choice, and that it was an expression of free will, they usually mean that they <em>could</em> have made a different choice at that time. The (often unspoken) rider is, '<em>if they had wanted/been brave enough/been strong enough/etc., to</em>', in other words, if their state of mind had been different; or, more bluntly, if the circumstances had been different. This is correct, but misses the point, which is that <em>in the circumstances that held when they made that choice</em>, their state of mind was such that they made the choice they did; that's <em>why</em> they made that choice. By failing to include their own mental state in the circumstances of their choice, they miss the point and are effectively saying, 'if things (i.e. my state of mind) were different, I could have made a different choice', which resolves to the almost tautological, 'if things were different, things could have been different'.</p><p>What many people would grant isn't always a reliable guide, and we're talking about a system unimaginably more complex than a cog in a machine; but I don't know what you mean by, 'flowing authentically', and 'truly self-moving'. What makes the flow authentic? what distinguishes the <em>truly </em>self-moving, from the self-moving?</p><p></p><p>Perhaps if you walked through an example decision and pointed out where these elements are involved; i.e., the points where a deterministic explanation is insufficient?</p><p>You say there is an essential difference, but what might a highly advanced observer see, reviewing the pot?</p><p></p><p>Joe's arm muscles have moved the arm holding the cue, on signals from nerves leading from the motor cortex of his brain, which was stimulated, in turn, by the results of coordinated activity in numerous other parts of his brain - visual cortex, vestibular cortex, frontal cortext, etc., activity that could be traced back to his shot selection, based on his analysis of the current position, modeling of optimal future positions, his skill level, confidence level, experience of the way the table is playing, stored experience of similar situations, analysis of his opponent's strengths & weaknesses, etc. </p><p></p><p>It's a far more complicated causal sequence, involving many different elements, types of element, and levels of abstraction, and so it is qualitatively different in mechanism and complexity, but still looks like a (complex) sequence of simple causal events. It's understandable that it's seen as qualitatively different from a distance, but is it really, on close examination? If so, how, where?</p><p>Clearly not, the real world is as it is; what I'm saying is that I see no way that I, as an agent, can distinguish whether the universe is deterministic (leaving quantum mechanics to one side) or not, in respect of my choices and capability to choose. If you can suggest a way, I'm interested to hear it.</p><p>How do I know I'm not already hooked up, having artificially generated experiences, e.g. in the Matrix? We have to take the world as we find it. Personally, I don't think I'd choose the Experience Machine, but I'm not talking about having that choice here, I'm exploring the POV of an agent with experience of only that universe.</p><p>I'd rather not call it a deception here, as there is no deceiver; it's just a misinterpretation, an error. The agent finds himself in a universe in which he weighs up his options and makes choices that, as far as he can tell, are free; he can change his mind, and he sees others doing the same. So, from his POV, he has free will - that's how it feels. If you ask him whether he could have chosen differently on any particular occasion, he'd probably say, "Yes, <em>if I'd wanted to</em>." If you were to tell him that it wasn't <em>really</em> free will because, at the time, his mental state was such that he <em>didn't</em> want to make a different choice, what do you think he'd say?</p><p></p><p>Perhaps he'd say, "Ah, but the difference is that I'm truly self-moving, my choices flow authentically" <img src="" class="smilie smilie--sprite smilie--sprite2" alt=";)" title="Wink ;)" loading="lazy" data-shortname=";)" /></p><p>I'm open to suggestions for telling the difference.</p><p>There is no deception in the scenario I have in mind; just a deterministic world and an agent that interprets it. You could say he deceives himself, because what he sees is entirely consistent with a deterministic universe <em>without </em>free will, but - ironically - he has no choice but to act as if he does have free will; even if you tell him that he's a deterministic agent in a deterministic universe, he still has to make his choices, he still doesn't know all their determinants, and he still can't predict the future...</p><p></p><p>Believing in things that are false does not necessarily mean we've been deceived; we may just be wrong.</p><p>True; which is why, if nothing else, quantum mechanics makes our universe non-deterministic.</p></blockquote><p></p>
[QUOTE="FrumiousBandersnatch, post: 69099140, member: 241055"] What is meant by 'free choice' in this context? For the sake of argument, yes. Yes, you're right - my mistake; what I meant is that, even given indefinite precision, and complete knowledge of the starting conditions, there is no way to discover a future state other than running through the entire process up to the relevant point. Imagine someone predicted the result of the n'th iteration of a chaotic function, and on iterating it, you found they were correct and asked them how they knew; if they told you they'd done the same thing just before you arrived, I suspect you'd see it more as a post-diction than a prediction... but, whatever, that's an incidental. I think the concept of being able to make a contrary choice is at the heart of the it, and at the heart of the popular conception of free will. When someone says they made a choice, and that it was an expression of free will, they usually mean that they [I]could[/I] have made a different choice at that time. The (often unspoken) rider is, '[I]if they had wanted/been brave enough/been strong enough/etc., to[/I]', in other words, if their state of mind had been different; or, more bluntly, if the circumstances had been different. This is correct, but misses the point, which is that [I]in the circumstances that held when they made that choice[/I], their state of mind was such that they made the choice they did; that's [I]why[/I] they made that choice. By failing to include their own mental state in the circumstances of their choice, they miss the point and are effectively saying, 'if things (i.e. my state of mind) were different, I could have made a different choice', which resolves to the almost tautological, 'if things were different, things could have been different'. What many people would grant isn't always a reliable guide, and we're talking about a system unimaginably more complex than a cog in a machine; but I don't know what you mean by, 'flowing authentically', and 'truly self-moving'. What makes the flow authentic? what distinguishes the [I]truly [/I]self-moving, from the self-moving? Perhaps if you walked through an example decision and pointed out where these elements are involved; i.e., the points where a deterministic explanation is insufficient? You say there is an essential difference, but what might a highly advanced observer see, reviewing the pot? Joe's arm muscles have moved the arm holding the cue, on signals from nerves leading from the motor cortex of his brain, which was stimulated, in turn, by the results of coordinated activity in numerous other parts of his brain - visual cortex, vestibular cortex, frontal cortext, etc., activity that could be traced back to his shot selection, based on his analysis of the current position, modeling of optimal future positions, his skill level, confidence level, experience of the way the table is playing, stored experience of similar situations, analysis of his opponent's strengths & weaknesses, etc. It's a far more complicated causal sequence, involving many different elements, types of element, and levels of abstraction, and so it is qualitatively different in mechanism and complexity, but still looks like a (complex) sequence of simple causal events. It's understandable that it's seen as qualitatively different from a distance, but is it really, on close examination? If so, how, where? Clearly not, the real world is as it is; what I'm saying is that I see no way that I, as an agent, can distinguish whether the universe is deterministic (leaving quantum mechanics to one side) or not, in respect of my choices and capability to choose. If you can suggest a way, I'm interested to hear it. How do I know I'm not already hooked up, having artificially generated experiences, e.g. in the Matrix? We have to take the world as we find it. Personally, I don't think I'd choose the Experience Machine, but I'm not talking about having that choice here, I'm exploring the POV of an agent with experience of only that universe. I'd rather not call it a deception here, as there is no deceiver; it's just a misinterpretation, an error. The agent finds himself in a universe in which he weighs up his options and makes choices that, as far as he can tell, are free; he can change his mind, and he sees others doing the same. So, from his POV, he has free will - that's how it feels. If you ask him whether he could have chosen differently on any particular occasion, he'd probably say, "Yes, [I]if I'd wanted to[/I]." If you were to tell him that it wasn't [I]really[/I] free will because, at the time, his mental state was such that he [I]didn't[/I] want to make a different choice, what do you think he'd say? Perhaps he'd say, "Ah, but the difference is that I'm truly self-moving, my choices flow authentically" ;) I'm open to suggestions for telling the difference. There is no deception in the scenario I have in mind; just a deterministic world and an agent that interprets it. You could say he deceives himself, because what he sees is entirely consistent with a deterministic universe [I]without [/I]free will, but - ironically - he has no choice but to act as if he does have free will; even if you tell him that he's a deterministic agent in a deterministic universe, he still has to make his choices, he still doesn't know all their determinants, and he still can't predict the future... Believing in things that are false does not necessarily mean we've been deceived; we may just be wrong. True; which is why, if nothing else, quantum mechanics makes our universe non-deterministic. [/QUOTE]
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