I've been reading about free will and stumbled across the following in Wikipedia:
This problem is related to the Aristotelian problem of the sea battle: tomorrow either there will or will not be a sea battle. If there will be sea battle, then it seems that it was true even yesterday that there would be one. Thus it is necessary that the sea battle will occur. If there will not be one, then, by similar reasoning, it is necessary that it will not occur. That means that the future, whatever it is, is completely fixed by past truths: true propositions about the future (a deterministic conclusion is reached: things could not have been any other way).
How does fit with the Biblical view of free will?
Thanks.
Norm
This problem is related to the Aristotelian problem of the sea battle: tomorrow either there will or will not be a sea battle. If there will be sea battle, then it seems that it was true even yesterday that there would be one. Thus it is necessary that the sea battle will occur. If there will not be one, then, by similar reasoning, it is necessary that it will not occur. That means that the future, whatever it is, is completely fixed by past truths: true propositions about the future (a deterministic conclusion is reached: things could not have been any other way).
How does fit with the Biblical view of free will?
Thanks.
Norm