Free will again zzzzzz

[stan1980]

Okay, after a fair bit of reading, I think I can accept free will doesn't exist, we are all a product of our environment with no real choice how we turn out; we are who we are etc etc

The problem is, I can make efforts to change my outlook on life quite easily; for example, as a result of realising free will doesn't exist, I can now be a lot more understanding instead of critical of why a person has turned out the way they have. You could say I never really made a choice to change, it was environmental factors, i.e. the fine people on this forum , that partly made me realise free will doesn't exist. That is fine, I can accept that. But the question remains, why did it *feel* like it was my choice to accept that free will doesn't exist. Why does it *feel* like my decision to do anything? Why does it *feel* like I am in control of my own life when logic tells me everything I do is a result of environmental influences? Don't I have even a tiny bit of say of how I turn out?

 

[Washington]

Okay, after a fair bit of reading, I think I can accept free will doesn't exist, we are all a product of our environment with no real choice how we turn out; we are who we are etc etc

. . .But the question remains, why did it *feel* like it was my choice to accept that free will doesn't exist. Why does it *feel* like my decision to do anything? Why does it *feel* like I am in control of my own life when logic tells me everything I do is a result of environmental influences? Don't I have even a tiny bit of say of how I turn out?

Because our brains are incapable of keeping track and processing all the factors that go into the barrage of changes that take place every second in our lives. We don't have the equipment or the time to digest everything, so we simply assign the closest and most recent factor to an event as its sole cause. And if that factor happens to be ourself, then we say "I did it" and leave it at that, because in virtually all cases it isn't productive to investigate all the factors that led up to our participation in the event. So, we quickly develop the notion that our participation in an event is free of any other deciding factors. If nothing else, it's a perception born of expediency, which soon becomes "fact" to us. "I made the ball to go over the net. Not anybody or anything else." Our acts take on a certain aura of sole responsibility, which if bad, we may want to amend a bit, but if good, something we reinforce.

So we *feel* like we have free will because we have conditioned ourselves to perceive the interaction as such. We "freely" did X because we don't have any inclination to consider the other factors. So even though you may recognize that nothing you do is of a free will, it's much easier to go through life operating as if you do. Taking blame for the bad and taking credit for the good. All of which reinforces the feeling of sole responsibility, and ultimately the feeling of a will free of outside influence.

It's an illusion to be sure, but one that's pretty benign.

 

[stan1980]

Because our brains are incapable of keeping track and processing all the factors that go into the barrage of changes that take place every second in our lives. We don't have the equipment or the time to digest everything, so we simply assign the closest and most recent factor to an event as its sole cause. And if that factor happens to be ourself, then we say "I did it" and leave it at that, because in virtually all cases it isn't productive to investigate all the factors that led up to our participation in the event. So, we quickly develop the notion that our participation in an event is free of any other deciding factors. If nothing else, it's a perception born of expediency, which soon becomes "fact" to us. "I made the ball to go over the net. Not anybody or anything else." Our acts take on a certain aura of sole responsibility, which if bad, we may want to amend a bit, but if good, something we reinforce.

So we *feel* like we have free will because we have conditioned ourselves to perceive the interaction as such. We "freely" did X because we don't have any inclination to consider the other factors. So even though you may recognize that nothing you do is of a free will, it's much easier to go through life operating as if you do. Taking blame for the bad and taking credit for the good. All of which reinforces the feeling of sole responsibility, and ultimately the feeling of a will free of outside influence.

It's an illusion to be sure, but one that's pretty benign.

That all sounds reasonable. If we break it down, from the point of the big bang to now, we're all just part of a long chain of chemical reactions and stuff (to put it technically ) with no real choice of how things pan out. But have we really got no say in how the chemicals in our brain interact? If anything has a chance of having some say, it has to be life. Is it really that clear cut that we don't have choice or will, do we really have no more say in what happens in our brains than say, a steel rod has, or the sun or a star.

 

[Vigilante]

But have we really got no say in how the chemicals in our brain interact?

If "we":

a. "chemicals in our brain" + non-physical, volitional aspect

then maybe.

If "we":

b. "chemicals in our brain"

then maybe not.

 

[stan1980]

If "we":

a. "chemicals in our brain" + non-physical, volitional aspect

then maybe.

If "we":

b. "chemicals in our brain"

then maybe not.

So are you saying, if there is a some mysterious supernatural thing going on then maybe, if not, then likely not?

 

[Vigilante]

So are you saying, if there is a some mysterious supernatural thing going on then maybe, if not, then likely not?

Well, if you're saying something to the effect of, "Can we affect the chemicals in our brains?" then you're pretty much assuming that we means more than just the chemicals in our brains. If not, then the statement reduces to, "Can the chemicals in our brains affect the chemicals in our brains?" In which case the answer is obviously yes, but the same answer could be given to the question, "Can the chemicals in our pancreases affect the chemicals in our pancreases?" But notions of chemical reactions within the pancreas don't seem to offer any implications of 'free will' by themselves.

Now, just as obvious, the brain operates with vastly different processes than does the pancreas, and I'm no cognitive neuroscientist, so I won't claim that an ontological "we" cannot come from "chemicals in the brain." It just seems unlikely. To me.

So "we" then is likely one of two things:

1. More than just chemicals.
2. A term that we use to refer to the abstraction that the "chemicals in our brains" produce that is our consciousnesses.

If 1 (we've already dealt somewhat with 2), then we have to consider the "laws" by which the non-physical aspect of we operates by. But then we're assuming it does operate by constant laws. Both issues seem silly at face value simply because no one has any experience of this proposed non-physical aspect.

So who knows?

 

[quatona]

Okay, after a fair bit of reading, I think I can accept free will doesn't exist, we are all a product of our environment with no real choice how we turn out; we are who we are etc etc

The problem is, I can make efforts to change my outlook on life quite easily; for example, as a result of realising free will doesn't exist, I can now be a lot more understanding instead of critical of why a person has turned out the way they have. You could say I never really made a choice to change, it was environmental factors, i.e. the fine people on this forum , that partly made me realise free will doesn't exist. That is fine, I can accept that. But the question remains, why did it *feel* like it was my choice to accept that free will doesn't exist. Why does it *feel* like my decision to do anything? Why does it *feel* like I am in control of my own life when logic tells me everything I do is a result of environmental influences?

Why do you think things look as they look to you after your eyes and brain have processed them'?

Don't I have even a tiny bit of say of how I turn out?

Sure you have. But your say is determined.

What exactly do you mean when saying "I"?

 

[stan1980]

Well, if you're saying something to the effect of, "Can we affect the chemicals in our brains?" then you're pretty much assuming that we means more than just the chemicals in our brains. If not, then the statement reduces to, "Can the chemicals in our brains affect the chemicals in our brains?" In which case the answer is obviously yes, but the same answer could be given to the question, "Can the chemicals in our pancreases affect the chemicals in our pancreases?" But notions of chemical reactions within the pancreas don't seem to offer any implications of 'free will' by themselves.

Now, just as obvious, the brain operates with vastly different processes than does the pancreas, and I'm no cognitive neuroscientist, so I won't claim that an ontological "we" cannot come from "chemicals in the brain." It just seems unlikely. To me.

So "we" then is likely one of two things:

1. More than just chemicals.
2. A term that we use to refer to the abstraction that the "chemicals in our brains" produce that is our consciousnesses.

If 1 (we've already dealt somewhat with 2), then we have to consider the "laws" by which the non-physical aspect of we operates by. But then we're assuming it does operate by constant laws. Both issues seem silly at face value simply because no one has any experience of this proposed non-physical aspect.

So who knows?

Great post, if 1 that would seem to point to the realms of souls and such if I'm reading correctly, I don't think there is really way of putting it technically. 2 is more obvious and probably more likely, but still leaves problems and doesn't really make much sense to me

I think I'm way out of my depth even trying to think about it. Haha

 

[stan1980]

Why do you think things look as they look to you after your eyes and brain have processed them'?

Don't really know how to answer that. It's life, and it's just what happens.

Sure you have. But your say is determined.

You seem to be suggesting compatibilism there!

What exactly do you mean when saying "I"?

"I" is just my physical self along with my voices in my head

 

[quatona]

Don't really know how to answer that. It's life, and it's just what happens.

What I was trying to get at:
If going by our immediate perception and interpretation we often get ideas that we later have to abandon because they are illogical.
I don´t think that the idea that we have "freewill" is a unique example for that.

You are wondering why you feel like having "freewill" when you don´t, right? How do you think having no "freewill" would feel like?
You are making premeditations, you are considering options and you pick one of them. How do you think these processes would/should feel like if they were determined, and how would/should they feel if they were a product of your "freewill"?
An answer to this question would be the necessary prerequisite for saying " "I feel I have 'freewill'".

I guess one of the reasons why determinism is not really "experiencable" is the massive amount of determining factors, most of which we aren´t aware of, don´t and can´t even know about, and the sum of which results in an action.

You seem to be suggesting compatibilism there!

No. I am suggesting determinism, and I don´t even know what "freewill" is supposed to be. Since not understanding this term and the concepts to which people attach it I am using it merely as the opposite of determinism (i.e. the idea that not everything is determined).
However, being determined and having the feeling you are not determined apparently seem to be compatible.

 

[quatona]

You seem to be suggesting compatibilism there!

I didn´t even know what "compatibilism" was, so I looked it up on wikipedia.
Some thoughts:
I am convinced that determinism is compatible with a lot of unrelated ideas. Like, determinism is compatible with vegetarianism or capitalism.
The term "compatibilism" suggests that there is something remarkable about the compatibility of determinism with the idea that it is claimed to be compatible with.
And there I see a problem: Of course determinism (a statement about the human condition) is compatible with a certain view that uses "freedom" in a completely different meaning than "not determined", in a completely different context and for a completely different purpose.
Of course determinism is compatible with the acknowledgement that in some actions being held a gun to your head is not one of the determining factors, and in others it is.
This is a completely different question, though, and the answer in no way is a qualification of the statement that determinism makes.

 

[Washington]

I didn´t even know what "compatibilism" was, so I looked it up on wikipedia.
Some thoughts:
I am convinced that determinism is compatible with a lot of unrelated ideas. Like, determinism is compatible with vegetarianism or capitalism.
The term "compatibilism" suggests that there is something remarkable about the compatibility of determinism with the idea that it is claimed to be compatible with.
And there I see a problem: Of course determinism (a statement about the human condition) is compatible with a certain view that uses "freedom" in a completely different meaning than "not determined", in a completely different context and for a completely different purpose.
Of course determinism is compatible with the acknowledgement that in some actions being held a gun to your head is not one of the determining factors, and in others it is.
This is a completely different question, though, and the answer in no way is a qualification of the statement that determinism makes.

In looking up "compatabilism" I don't think you looked in the right place.

In the determinism/free will discussion, "compatabilism" refers to the recognition that while determinism is the ruling paradigm, individuals have free choice in the sense that nothing or no one is coercing them---forcing them to do what they don't want to. Another term for it is soft determinism.

 

[The Madcap]

Eh...I used to be gung ho on determinism, but then again quantum mechanics basically tells determinism to go **** itself.

 

[quatona]

In the determinism/free will discussion, "compatabilism" refers to the recognition that while determinism is the ruling paradigm, individuals have free choice in the sense that nothing or no one is coercing them---forcing them to do what they don't want to. Another term for it is soft determinism.

That doesn´t seem to change anything about my observation that these are two entirely different questions.
In regards to the second part: I would need to have a good definition of "coercing" and "forcing" in order to make such distinction using these terms. I´d also like to submit the caveat that what I want is typically the result of given conditions.
The typical scenario people think as of being "forced" is being held a gun to your head and being told "Do this, or else...". I do not even see how this "forces" me to do something. I can still do what I actually want - I will just have to take a (admittedly very strong) additional factor into my premeditations.
Another scenario: I want to buy a can of beer. The only shop within reach has run out of beer. This "forces" or "coerces" me completely into not doing what I want.
I find myself permanently forced and coerced into not doing what I want to do or doing something that I don´t want to do - due to overall or situational conditions. However, in reaction to this experience I find myself modifying my wants, depending on the options available. Having held a gun to my head isn´t essentially different in that respect. I´ll modify my wants in view of this unexpected additional condition.

 

[Washington]

Eh...I used to be gung ho on determinism, but then again quantum mechanics basically tells determinism to go **** itself.

Quantum indeterminacy also raised a question in my mind until I recognized that it only operates on the quantum, subatomic, level. On the atomic level and above everything is determined. QI operates as a probability distribution. "In the quantum mechanical formalism, for a given quantum state, each measurable value will be obtained non-deterministically in accordance with a probability distribution which is uniquely determined by the system state." In effect, it has no bearing on the ultimate nature of an atom. An atom of carbon will always be an atom of carbon regardless of the indeterminacy of its sub-atomic constituents, and it will always interact with an atom of oxygen in the same way. And because everything is composed of atoms, their nature is not affected by QI. Cause and effect remains a stable intractable condition of nature.

 

[Washington]

That doesn´t seem to change anything about my observation that these are two entirely different questions.

Not sure what these "two questions" are, but what ever.

In regards to the second part: I would need to have a good definition of "coercing" and "forcing" in order to make such distinction using these terms. I´d also like to submit the caveat that what I want is typically the result of given conditions.

And I would say it is always the result of the conditions.

The typical scenario people think as of being "forced" is being held a gun to your head and being told "Do this, or else...". I do not even see how this "forces" me to do something. I can still do what I actually want - I will just have to take a (admittedly very strong) additional factor into my premeditations.

This notion of "forcing" arises from the need for some people to hold onto the sentiment of free will. For whatever reason they are compelled to sugarcoat determinism with the term "free will" even though it has no meaning in the true sense of "freedom from." In effect they are saying, "Yeah determinism certainly controls everything, but ya know, we can use the term "free will" to describe what we do that is not subverted. If I decide to go to the store and there is no circumstance that operates against making this decision, then my decision was freely made. " I think it's a rather silly distinction, and the reason it is kind of hard to pin down, but never the less some people do make it.

 

[quatona]

This notion of "forcing" arises from the need for some people to hold onto the sentiment of free will. For whatever reason they are compelled to sugarcoat determinism with the term "free will" even though it has no meaning in the true sense of "freedom from." In effect they are saying, "Yeah determinism certainly controls everything, but ya know, we can use the term "free will" to describe what we do that is not subverted. If I decide to go to the store and there is no circumstance that operates against this decision, then my decision was freely made. " I think it's a rather silly distinction, and the reason it is kind of hard to pin down, but never the less some people do make it.

That´s how I understood "compatibilism" initially, and that´s why I said I wouldn´t know why to call it "compatibilism".
I suspect there was a misunderstanding. (?)

 

[Washington]

That´s how I understood "compatibilism" initially, and that´s why I said I wouldn´t know why to call it "compatibilism".
I suspect there was a misunderstanding. (?)

No doubt.