Fr John Vesic Successfully Sued by His Mother In Court

Conclusion​

225. I have determined that Lillian should succeed against John in recovering the $25,000 which he failed to pay when she demanded it in mid-2015. However, the sum of $1,090 must be set off against that. I would therefore propose that judgment be entered for $23,910 plus interest at the rate prescribed under clause 2.1 of Schedule 2 to the Court Procedures Rules 2006 (ACT). I calculate that interest to be $7,744.45 (on the assumption that the outstanding balance should have been paid by John by no later than the end of 2015).​

226. Lillian’s claim against BAL must be dismissed.​

227. I will hear the parties as to costs.​

Orders of the Court​

228. The orders of the Court are:​

(1) Judgment for the plaintiff against the first defendant in the sum of $31,654.45.​

(2) Judgment for the second defendant.​

(3) The Notice claiming contribution or indemnity filed on 26 March 2021 and issued by the second defendant against the first defendant is dismissed​

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I couldn't be bothered trying to read the court transcript all the way through, but it appears to be a financial matter between family members due to a property or properties. It is not a religious issue.

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174. I propose to deal with each of the causes of action pressed by the plaintiff in turn. Her primary claim is for the Deed of arrangement to be set aside on the basis of unconscionable conduct on John’s part. Her secondary claim against John is for enforcement of the express provisions of the Deed. I will then turn to John’s set-off and counterclaim. Finally, Lillian claims damages against BAL on the bases as outlined by her counsel in opening.

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194. I reject Lillian’s claim that John acted unconscionably.

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202. In my view these findings enliven the power of the Court to remedy the situation created by Lillian’s conduct in accordance with the principles of Walton Stores Ltd v Maher (1988) 164 CLR 387 (see also Sidhu v Van Dyke [2014] HCA 19; 251 CLR 505). I conclude therefore that Lillian is estopped from relying on the apportionment provisions in the Deed. That estoppel is subject to John’s agreement in or about March 2016 to pay all of the rates and taxes in relation to the Phillip property (see paragraph 153 of Ex “D1-1”). I note that John took that step in an attempt to assist his parents given their difficult financial circumstances.

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224. I do not accept that submission. It is plain from the context, and Mr Morton’s explanation (see [163] above), which I accept, that he was addressing the issue which Lillian had raised as to whether there was a need for a deed at all, or whether the transaction could just be done with the conveyancing documents. There was nothing misleading or deceptive about the statement.

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169. Like Mr Morton, I formed the impression that Lillian is an intelligent and competent person. However, I have a number of concerns about the accuracy of her testimony. She tended to be garrulous and, as submitted by counsel for the defendants, her answers were often expansive, argumentative and self-serving. On a number of occasions under cross-examination, Lillian simply refused to make reasonable concessions. The most notable of these related to her claim that John was present at the 20 August 2014 meeting. Having regard to the contents of Mr Morton’s file notes, his evidence that he only met with her, and John’s evidence as to where he was on 20 August 2014, Lillian’s refusal to concede she was wrong about his presence at the meeting is very difficult to understand. I formed the distinct impression that Lillian saw it as important to her case against BAL that John was at that meeting and that her belief in that regard motivated that refusal.

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