I've reached a conclusion that there are different ontological domains. Like the kinaesthetic, the eurythmic, good taste of food, the bad taste of food, physical science, social science, religion, etc.
Its possible each one has a specific and proper set of epistemic virtues. So there is possibly epistemological pluralism, many ways off knowing. Physical science is not necessarily the paradigm for the chef, nor the dancer.
I agree that there are different ways of knowing commensurate with the domain in reference. In my twenties I was a telephone lineman. Aerial telephone line construction is a specialized activity with specialized tools and it requires specific abilities. In some ways, it is not wholly unlike stretching barbed-wire fencing, but only in a general sense. An observer, with enough time could grasp the general understanding of how it is done. But, simple observation is not going to give them the "know-how" knowledge that usually only comes with practice. So, along with epistemological pluralism, I would also point out there is a distinction between "know-that" and "know-how." You can learn all kinds of things about a religion, i.e. "know-that," but you won't have "know-how" until you begin to immerse yourself in the practices and live according to the precepts, etc.
Each context and ontological domain having a proper set of epistemological virtues.
A good psychologicist will need different mental skills to a good mathematician.
A mystic may seem like a philosophical deviant to the scientist, and the scientist a totalitarian to the mystic. East is East and West is West.
Agreed.
Wittgenstein said philosophy problems can arise when "language goes on holiday". Maybe, to some degree, when epistemology goes on holiday too? i.e. when the virtues of the empirical sciences are imported into religious discussions. When at times they're unnecessary baggage?
Again, I agree. We must have went to different schools together.
Somewhat related to Wittgenstein's "language games," one of the recent discussions in epistemology is "epistemic contextualism." Roughly, the idea is that "knows p" means different things in different contexts. If I walk up to a person on the street and ask them, "Do you know if you have hands?" they will probably look at me like I'm crazy because in that context there is no reason for them to doubt that they do. However, if they are sitting in an epistemology class discussing whether our not we are "brains in vats" then the context allows for the appropriate skepticism and therefore the question makes sense.
Epistemic Contextualism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
Maybe something similar is happening in some religious discussions. From a Muslim/Jewish/Christian perspective, questions such as "Do you have evidence for God" don't even make sense given that from these perspectives "God" is a limiting concept, i.e. God is the creator of the observable world and not an object within the world that can be observed or evidenced. From those perspectives, such questions make about as much sense as asking me to observe my eye with my own, unaided, eyeball. It simply can't be done.
A fair analogy could be Logical Positivism. Ultra empiricist, it classed religion as nonsense, or akin to poetry at best. Take again the example as truth as "corresponsence between statement and fact" - that's ok when its a matter of fact (i.e. empirical appearance) one is relating to.
But one can relate to unseen things like God. Maybe religion has a different form(s) of epistemology. If a scientist were to use it, he would be mocked, but that's no reason to insult the faithful. They're not equivalent domains.
Imagine a scientist asked me what it would take for her to come to faith and I responded, "Okay, come by tomorrow and bring your microscope, test tubes, and all the other apparatus that you use because that is what we also use to come to faith. See you tomorrow." That would make about as much sense as if I asked a scientist, "How do I do science?" And they responded, "Okay, first you must spend time in prayer, then study the scriptures. Also, take up some spiritual practices like fasting (because that helps prayer) and contemplation, silence, simplicity. If you do these things with faith, then you will be doing science. In fact that is exactly how we developed the vaccine for Coronavirus!"
Rerouting the discussion to a definition of knowledge as something like "true, justified belief" will likely just take us back to empiricism and correspondence.
Technically, JTB shouldn't necessarily take us back to empiricism and correspondence. But, depending on who you're talking to, it too often does.
And a scientific angle. As Balthasar would note, "kneeling science" is impossible, but "sitting science" - i.e. the academic - is possible if not necessary. Whereas Balthasar described himself as a a kneeling theologian. One engaged in contemplative prayer.
Hans Urs von Balthasar - Wikipedia
Love this. I'm a huge Balthasar fan.
Maybe, for religion we could reroute from "correspondence models of truth" and have something like "warranted assertibility" as a model for epistemology? I'm thinking one can assert a with warrant different from direct factual evidence and what can be derived deductively from it...
I can go along with this. Maybe, warranted assertability coupled with coherence as a model for religious epistemology. Most people's hang-up with coherence theories is that they aren't necessarily grounded in observables and publicly verifiables, like a correspondence theory presumably could be (actually, correspondence has it's own epistemic demon to deal with in the noumena/phenomenon distinction). But, going back to the idea that God is a limiting concept, I don't know that a religious epistemology can avoid this. In other words, there's just no way to avoid faith.