Einstein vs Bohr parallels Calvinism vs Arminianism

[Roman57]

On the science front, Einstein believed in determinism while Bohr believed in randomness. On religion front, Calvinism believes in predestination while Arminianism believes in free will. So the two parallel each other.

I used to be an atheist before I was 22, and became Christian starting from the age of 22 onward. Back when I was an atheist. I was a strong believer in determinism. Even after I learned quantum mechanics, I used to believe that there are hidden variables that would ensure determinism even in that context. I was unaware of Calvinism, I assumed all Christians believed in free will. And, in fact, this was one of my reasons of rejecting Christianity.

Then, after I became a Christian I subscribed to free will belief (by default). I learned about Calvinism only few years later. And when I learned about it, it was very hard to swallow, because it seems unfair. Which is ironic: back when I was an atheist, I believed in determinism. But that is because, as an atheist, I didn't expect anything to be fair.

I imagine there are probably other atheists, who oppose Christianity on the different ground that I did. Namely, they might say Christians are Calvinist, which would make it unfair. I haven't met them (I mean I don't meet a lot of people in general) but it seems right up their alley, since in current discourse atheists accuse Christians of biggotry a lot, they just don't mention Calvinism as they do it.

So its rather interesting: atheists that are motivated by science (like I was) would probably oppose Arminian version of Christianity, while atheists that are motivated by fairness (like American leftists) would oppose Calvinist version of Christianity.

 

[trophy33]

On the science front, Einstein believed in determinism while Bohr believed in randomness. On religion front, Calvinism believes in predestination while Arminianism believes in free will. So the two parallel each other.

I used to be an atheist before I was 22, and became Christian starting from the age of 22 onward. Back when I was an atheist. I was a strong believer in determinism. Even after I learned quantum mechanics, I used to believe that there are hidden variables that would ensure determinism even in that context. I was unaware of Calvinism, I assumed all Christians believed in free will. And, in fact, this was one of my reasons of rejecting Christianity.

Then, after I became a Christian I subscribed to free will belief (by default). I learned about Calvinism only few years later. And when I learned about it, it was very hard to swallow, because it seems unfair. Which is ironic: back when I was an atheist, I believed in determinism. But that is because, as an atheist, I didn't expect anything to be fair.

I imagine there are probably other atheists, who oppose Christianity on the different ground that I did. Namely, they might say Christians are Calvinist, which would make it unfair. I haven't met them (I mean I don't meet a lot of people in general) but it seems right up their alley, since in current discourse atheists accuse Christians of biggotry a lot, they just don't mention Calvinism as they do it.

So its rather interesting: atheists that are motivated by science (like I was) would probably oppose Arminian version of Christianity, while atheists that are motivated by fairness (like American leftists) would oppose Calvinist version of Christianity.

What if its a false dilemma? It seems to me that in science, the quantum reality today is neither deterministic, nor random, but probabilistic.

Meaning, the more repetitions or the more particles, the more certain is the outcome.

Similarly in theology, for example Leibniz saw the predetermination in that way - God does not force us nor leaves it to randomness. He makes His decrees certain (based upon our inclinations and initial conditions), but not necessary (in an absolute, mathematical or logical way).

 

[Roman57]

What if its a false dilemma? It seems to me that in science, the quantum reality today is neither deterministic, nor random, but probabilistic.

By random I meant probabilistic. I mean, if by random you mean something completely random as in something that even lacks any probability at all, then we know that's not the case, since we already know what probabilities are. My problem was that, back when I was an atheist, I couldn't swallow any kind of violation of determinism, no matter how tiny.

But nowdays that I was faced with bigger problems, such as inability to visualize quantum field theory, or lack of fairness in Calvinism, the problems I used to have with lack of determinism dim in comparison.

 

[trophy33]

By random I meant probabilistic. I mean, if by random you mean something completely random as in something that even lacks any probability at all, then we know that's not the case, since we already know what probabilities are. My problem was that, back when I was an atheist, I couldn't swallow any kind of violation of determinism, no matter how tiny.

But nowdays that I was faced with bigger problems, such as inability to visualize quantum field theory, or lack of fairness in Calvinism, the problems I used to have with lack of determinism dim in comparison.

Well, Calvinism needs some fine tuning so that it does not fall into presenting God as a tyrant who ignores and tramples all our choices or efforts and does not care at all about anything than about Himself (and Calvinists sometimes slide this way in debates).

However, I think that most of their points are correct. They just need a better framework for them, which, it seems to me, Leibniz provided.

 

[Roman57]

Well, Calvinism needs some fine tuning so that it does not fall into presenting God as a tyrant who ignores and tramples all our choices or efforts and does not care at all about anything than about Himself (and Calvinists sometimes slide this way in debates).

However, I think that most of their points are correct. They just need a better framework for them, which, it seems to me, Leibniz provided.

If God is all-knowing then it has to be completely 100% deterministic. Which is the exact reason I wanted exact determinism as an atheist. The only difference is that, instead of wanting "all knowing God", I wanted "all knowing science", which is an interesting parallel. As soon as determinism lacks, it doesn't really matter if it is "almost deterministic except for one tiny bit" or whether it is "quite a bit non-deterministic". Its the very presence of deviation from determinism that is a problem, not its magnitude.

On the flip side, as far as fairness goes, if you say "God is almost deterministic except for a bit", it would still be unfair. In this case, I presume, you would still say God is deterministic when it comes to important things, such as who is saved and who isn't. He is just non-deterministic when it comes for tiny things, such as the exact number of steps you take to metro station. But then you get "the worst of both worlds". You both admit God is not all knowing (paradox number 1) and you admit God is not fair (paradox number 2).

I remember listening to one of John MacArthur's sermons, where he said he doesn't claim complete lack of freedom of will: the sinners that are predestined to damnation can still take their pick what exact sins to commit. My reaction was "wow; he didn't solve a problem, he just added a new one". God is still unfair because he predestined them to hell, but, in addition to that, he is not all knowing since he doesn't know the nature of the sins they will commit. I thought the reason for denying that God is fair is to enable him to be all knowing. But now that he is not all knowing anyway, then whats a point of denying his fairness? Conversely, the only point of denying that God is all knowing is to make him fair (by enabling people to make choices that would save them from hell). But if God is not going to be fair anyway (in John MacArthur's view), then whats the point of denying that He is all knowing?

In any case, I am not aware of Leibniz view about this (I only heard of Leibniz in the context of calculus). Can you summarize what it is?

 

[trophy33]

If God is all-knowing then it has to be completely 100% deterministic. Which is the exact reason I wanted exact determinism as an atheist. The only difference is that, instead of wanting "all knowing God", I wanted "all knowing science", which is an interesting parallel. As soon as determinism lacks, it doesn't really matter if it is "almost deterministic except for one tiny bit" or whether it is "quite a bit non-deterministic". Its the very presence of deviation from determinism that is a problem, not its magnitude.

On the flip side, as far as fairness goes, if you say "God is almost deterministic except for a bit", it would still be unfair. In this case, I presume, you would still say God is deterministic when it comes to important things, such as who is saved and who isn't. He is just non-deterministic when it comes for tiny things, such as the exact number of steps you take to metro station. But then you get "the worst of both worlds". You both admit God is not all knowing (paradox number 1) and you admit God is not fair (paradox number 2).

I remember listening to one of John MacArthur's sermons, where he said he doesn't deny complete lack of freedom of will: the sinners that are predestined to damnation can still take their pick what exact sins to commit. My reaction was "wow; he didn't solve a problem, he just added a new one". God is still unfair because he predestined them to hell, but, in addition to that, he is not all knowing since he doesn't know the nature of the sins they will commit. I thought the reason for denying that God is fair is to enable him to be all knowing. But now that he is not all knowing anyway, then whats a point of denying his fairness? Conversely, the only point of denying that God is all knowing is to make him fair (by enabling people to make choices that would save them from hell). But if God is not going to be fair anyway (in John MacArthur's view), then whats the point of denying that He is all knowing?

In any case, I am not aware of Leibniz view about this (I only heard of Leibniz in the context of calculus). Can you summarize what it is?

Regarding foreknowledge - it makes our future certain, but not necessary. If I put water before a very thirsty person, its certain the person will drink it, but its not necessary. God knows how events will follow each other, because He has all the information. It does not follow that He forces the future to be this way or that he forces the hands or will of men.

Regarding Leibniz - he wrote a book called Theodicy, which is a polemic with a Calvinist named Pierre Bayle:

I hope to remove all these difficulties. I will point out that absolute necessity, which is called also logical and metaphysical and sometimes geometrical, and which would alone be formidable in this connexion, does not exist in free actions, and that thus freedom is exempt not only from constraint but also from real necessity. I will show that God himself, although he always chooses the best, does not act by an absolute necessity, and that the laws of nature laid down by God, founded upon the fitness of things, keep the mean between geometrical truths, absolutely necessary, and arbitrary decrees; which M. Bayle and other modern philosophers have not sufficiently understood. Further I will show that there is an indifference in freedom, because there is no absolute necessity for one course or the other; but yet that there is never an indifference of perfect equipoise. And I will demonstrate that there is in free actions a perfect spontaneity beyond all that has been conceived hitherto. Finally I will make it plain that the hypothetical and the moral necessity which subsist in free actions are open to no objection, and that the 'Lazy Reason' is a pure sophism.

Likewise concerning the origin of evil in its relation to God, I offer a vindication of his perfections that shall extol not less his holiness, his justice and his goodness than his greatness, his power and his independence. I show how it is possible for everything to depend upon God, for him to co-operate in all the actions of creatures, even, if you will, to create these creatures continually, and nevertheless not to be the author of sin. Here also it is demonstrated how the privative nature of evil should be understood. Much more than that, I explain how evil has a source other than the will of God, and that one is right therefore to say of moral evil that God wills it not, but simply permits it. Most important of all, however, I show that it has been possible for God to permit sin and misery, and even to co-operate therein and promote it, without detriment to his holiness and his supreme goodness: although, generally speaking, he could have avoided all these evils.

Concerning grace and predestination, I justify the most debatable assertions, as for instance: that we are converted only through the prevenient grace of God and that we cannot do good except with his aid; that God wills the salvation of all men and that he condemns only those whose will is evil; that he gives to all a sufficient grace provided they wish to use it; that, Jesus Christ being the source and the centre of election, God destined the elect for salvation, because he foresaw that they would cling with a lively faith to the doctrine of Jesus Christ. Yet it is true that this reason for election is not the final reason, and that this very pre-vision is still a consequence of God's anterior decree. Faith likewise is a gift of God, who has predestinated the faith of the elect, for reasons lying in a superior decree which dispenses grace and circumstance in accordance with God's supreme wisdom.

You may read the whole book for free there: The Project Gutenberg eBook of Theodicy, by G. W. Leibniz

 

[FreeinChrist]

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[FutureAndAHope]

I would like to give my two cents.

The Early Church Fathers within the First and Second Century, stand firmly on the side of free will. I have written a free book on this at The Way and Free Will

Basically they state, regardless of any foreknowledge God may have man has genuine free will with regard to salvation.

Justin Martyr (110-165)

But lest some suppose, from what has been said by us, that we say that whatever happens, happens by a fatal necessity, because it is foretold as known beforehand, this too we explain. We have learned from the prophets, and we hold it to be true, that punishments, and chastisements, and good rewards, are rendered according to the merit of each man’s actions. Since if it be not so, but all things happen by fate, neither is anything at all in our own power. For if it be fated that this man, e.g., be good, and this other evil, neither is the former meritorious nor the latter to be blamed. And again, unless the human race have the power of avoiding evil and choosing good by free choice, they are not accountable for their actions, of whatever kind they be. But that it is by free choice they both walk uprightly and stumble, we thus demonstrate. We see the same man making a transition to opposite things. Now, if it had been fated that he were to be either good or bad, he could never have been capable of both the opposites, nor of so many transitions. But not even would some be good and others bad, since we thus make fate the cause of evil, and exhibit her as acting in opposition to herself; or that which has been already stated would seem to be true, that neither virtue nor vice is anything, but that things are only reckoned good or evil by opinion; which, as the true word shows, is the greatest impiety and wickedness. But this we assert is inevitable fate, that they who choose the good have worthy rewards, and they who choose the opposite have their merited awards. For not like other things, as trees and quadrupeds, which cannot act by choice, did God make man: for neither would he be worthy of reward or praise did he not of himself choose the good, but were created for this end; nor, if he were evil, would he be worthy of punishment, not being evil of himself, but being able to be nothing else than what he was made (Rev. Dods 1867, Justin Martyr - First Apology - Ch 43)

... Furthermore, I have proved in what has preceded, that those who were foreknown to be unrighteous, whether men or angels, are not made wicked by God’s fault, but each man by his own fault is what he will appear to be... (Rev. Dods 1867, Justin Martyr - Dialoque with Trypho, Ch 140)

I said briefly by anticipation, that God, wishing men and angels to follow His will, resolved to create them free to do righteousness; possessing reason, that they may know by whom they are created, and through whom they, not existing formerly, do now exist; and with a law that they should be judged by Him, if they do anything contrary to right reason: and of ourselves we, men and angels, shall be convicted of having acted sinfully, unless we repent beforehand. But if the word of God foretells that some angels and men shall be certainly punished, it did so because it foreknew that they would be unchangeably [wicked], but not because God had created them so. So that if they repent, all who wish for it can obtain mercy from God: and the Scripture foretells that they shall be blessed, saying, ‘Blessed is the man to whom the Lord imputeth not sin;’... (Rev. Dods 1867, Justin Martyr - Dialoque with Trypho, Ch 141)

Irenaeus [A.D. 120-202]

1. This expression [of our Lord], “How often would I have gathered thy children together, and thou wouldest not,” (Mat 23:37) set forth the ancient law of human liberty, because God made man a free [agent] from the beginning, possessing his own power, even as he does his own soul, to obey the behests (ad utendum sententia) of God voluntarily, and not by compulsion of God. For there is no coercion with God, but a good will [towards us] is present with Him continually. And therefore does He give good counsel to all. And in man, as well as in angels, He has placed the power of choice (for angels are rational beings), so that those who had yielded obedience might justly possess what is good, given indeed by God, but preserved by themselves. On the other hand, they who have not obeyed shall, with justice, be not found in possession of the good, and shall receive condign punishment: for God did kindly bestow on them what was good; but they themselves did not diligently keep it, nor deem it something precious, but poured contempt upon His super-eminent goodness. (Rev. Rambaut W. H. 1867, Against Heresies - Book 4 Ch 37)

This shows that the early church believed in genuine free will, the fact that God "may" have foreknowledge, does not negate free will in man. Genesis suggest that God does not have foreknowledge (in a Calvinistic sense):

Gen 6:5-7 Then the LORD saw that the wickedness of man was great in the earth, and that every intent of the thoughts of his heart was only evil continually. And the LORD was sorry that He had made man on the earth, and He was grieved in His heart. So the LORD said, "I will destroy man whom I have created from the face of the earth, both man and beast, creeping thing and birds of the air, for I am sorry that I have made them."


The BIble also shows us this free choice, men are given two path ways based upon their response to God:

And if they are bound in fetters, Held in the cords of affliction, Then He tells them their work and their transgressions—That they have acted defiantly. He also opens their ear to instruction, And commands that they turn from iniquity. If they obey and serve Him, They shall spend their days in prosperity, And their years in pleasures. But if they do not obey, They shall perish by the sword, And they shall die without knowledge. (NKJV, Job 36:8-12)