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Transcript said:Here's an idea: Fictional objects "EXIST" and Harry Potter can show us how.
So last week we talked about fictional objects. And you don't need to watch last week's episode to understand this one, but it certainly wouldn't hurt. We talked about
The London in War of the Worlds, Alien Invaders, Tom Cruise the Dock Worker and Orson Welle's "broadcast" of an alien invasion on Grover's Mills New Jersey. And how all of those things qualify as fictional objects or entities.
We also talked about what those things, might BE, beyond the umbrella term of fictional entities.
The creation of someone's mind, objects and people in other possible worlds, things that-regardless of their existence-have their own properties...
And it's that last bit, about existence, that we're gonna talk more about.
For the sake of argument last week I said that because fictional objects have properties , that qualifies as a KIND of existence.
Like. Here's Harry Potter. I can point at him or when I say Harry Potter there's a part of your brain, probably, that shows you Daniel Radcliffe or the books or your own special mental image of Nerdy Glasses McBoltscar.
BBUUUUUTTTTT real talk! Let's shed some light on whether or not THAT really qualifies as "existence"... Lumos!
Sort of like in our "Is Math Real?" episode, this question seems binary. And generally, there ARE fictional realists, those saying that fictional entities have an EXISTENCE somewhere-- and fictional anti-realists, who say that all of your favorite characters and places are about as real as wizarding itself, literally.
Now, there are more ways to arrive at either of these positions than we'd EVER have time for, so I'll put a reading list in the doobly-doo if you wanna do some diggin'.
But the basis of many anti-realist positions says that when we claim Harry Potter exists... when we use the name "Harry Potter" to reference one particular young man - we are doing something which, logically, is either impossible or just simply untrue. We are referencing something without an actual referent, or saying something that is distinctly false.
To say, for instance, "Voldemort then turned his wand on Harry...", what we are actually saying is something along the lines of:
"A-specific-wizard-who-we-all-generally-understand-has-a- name-that-is-not-normally-spoken turned his magic-casting-implement onto another-specific-wizard-who-we-all-generally-understand-has-a-lightning-bolt-scar-on-his-forehead..."
But in our world, being what it is--free of both magic and wizards - the three elements of that sentence - the 2 wizards and the 1 magical object--have no ACTUAL referent.
Sure there is a sense of what we're talking about, there's the idea "wizards" and the very well described enmity between these two particular wizards - but as far as denoting a thing which is verifiable outside of it's own fictional setting--there's zilch, except for us talking about it. Which'll become very important in a minute.
But basically: No wizard can ever point a magic thingy at another wizard because none of that stuff exists.
Philosopher Saul Kripke boils this down one way by saying "the name ... doesn't really have any referent, it has a pretended referent."... "The propositions that occur in the story ... are not genuine propositions saying something about some particular person; they are merely pretended propositions."
However, at least as far as Kripke is concerned, this doesn't really put the basilisk fang through the heart of "existence", rather it describes how, or really *to what degree*, fictional things exist, independent of the truth of their reference.
To look at it another way: when wondering about the existence of Hogwarts, Harry, Hermione or Hedwig are we asking if there is a physical, actual person whose properties exactly or sufficiently match those of the boy from the story, ...or are we asking, "Is there a concept, an entity of some kind, somewhere, that we all might generally agree "is" Harry Potter, regardless of its physical presence?
Some fictional realists say that fictional entities exist not *physically* but only insofar as they are the concern of actual people, most potently their creator.
Kripke, again, says "The fictional character can be regarded as an abstract entity that exists in virtue of the activities of human beings, in the same way that nations are abstract entities that exist in virtue of the activities of human beings and their interrelations."
Other realists, very much related to Meinong from last week go even farther, and say that simply discussing things like Rubeus Hagrid and a tree which really likes to wallop things is to commit oneself, at least partially, to their existence.
They respond to the "empty reference" complaint from earlier by claiming that when we say saomething like "at the very center of the table, sat Professor Dumbledore, his sweeping hair and beard shining in the moonlight...." it is implied that what we REALLY mean is "ACCORDING TO THE FICTIONAL STORY HARRY POTTER, at the very center of the table, sat Professor Dumbledore..."
Essentially: in talking about fictional entities, we always implicitly announce their pretendy-pretense, and so are protected from ever REALLY claiming that these things are FOR REAL.
Others still say, much more unapologetically, that fictional entities, capital E, exist. We spent most of last week talking about those ideas, so we won't dwell on them now except to say the following:
We tend to think of things, especially people, that "exist" as having a singular referent, one form in one place. Mike, Host of Idea Channel, is one person and has to be both Mike AND the Host of Idea Channel.
If there was someone else who was EXACTLY like me in every way, or if I didn't host Idea Channel, would I still be me? If I were a blonde guy who was a professional skateboarder that didn't host Idea Channel, would that Mike Rugnetta still be me?
Most people would probably say "uuuhhh...nuhuh". And this is where some of fictionalism's stances on existence get really fun. Because if Harry didn't cast spells, if didn't have a lightning bolt scar - if he sold shoes at the mall, drove a Prius and had a Swedish accent--would he still be Harry Potter?
When saying "Harry Potter exists", if that means we're choosing as an archetypal Harry Potter that one particular gent created by JK Rowling - And it doesn't have to mean that! it just... tends to - then who is the Harry Potter from the Methods of Rationality, a rationalist parallel universe HP fanfic where Harry is raised by Scientists and self identifies as such? Is he ALSO an existing Harry Potter?
What about fan fics where Hermione is a dancer, Snape is Harry's Father, or where everyone is a PONY.
It would seem as though the existence of these other Harry Potters complicates matters; when we say "Harry Potter..." - and if we think of all possible Potters as "existing" - our dear hero, dear reader, and the names of all his friends, now refer simultaneously to wizards and scientists and dancers, humans and ponies, male and female expressions of themselves all out there ... somewhere in the fictional aether.
Do multiple, mutually-exclusive Harry Potters prove that the reference really is, like we said at the beginning of the episode, essentially "empty"? If ANYTHING can be Harry Potter... doesn't that make the reference useless?
Or! If we do claim that each is equally Harry Potter in its own context and pretense, do we somehow diminish the importance of the beloved, nervous seeker who started it all? Maybe.
Or maybe it's up to us to manage all those possible worlds, to sort out each reference and context and pretense for each community we inhabit, for every Harry Potter there is... all of which exist just as much as the last, even if that fact makes it feel as though someone has cast CONFUNDO right between your eyes.
What do you guys think? Do fictional entities exist?
Does Harry Potter exist? And if so, how?
Sorry for the giant OP - it's a long video and I supplied the transcript for those who either don't care to watch it or can't.
I figured this might be a juicy topic to discuss - especially with a mix of atheists and theists. The video focuses primarily on Harry Potter, but I expect we'll be discussing a lot of mythology on this discussion.
Do fictional entities exist in some way, shape, or form?
I would argue that fictional entities exist outside our tangible world in the world of thoughts and beliefs, and that those abstract entities, although outside our tangible world, can effect changes in our tangible world through the people through the minds of people - that we (collectively) are the physical proxies of the abstract fictional entities we interact with.
I would argue that fictional entities exist outside our tangible world in the world of thoughts and beliefs, and that those abstract entities, although outside our tangible world, can effect changes in our tangible world through the minds of people - that we (collectively) are the physical proxies of the abstract fictional entities we interact with.
Well, in a way there would be a contention between me and others, in that I´d prefer to say "the belief in him/his existence has..." rather than "he effected...".Let's try applying this to Jesus.
Whether you believe Jesus existed or not, or whether you believe he was a God or not, there is one point on which there is no contention between atheists and Christians about Jesus:
- A lot of real people have acted in the world (for better or worse) in the name of Jesus, or at least as a follower of him. Their actions were guided by their beliefs about him. Even if he never physically existed, he has effected large measurable changes in the world.
Fictional things don't exist. The writing exists, and the idea in the mind exists, but idea's aren't the things they refer to. eg: If I imagine an elephant, an elephant doesn't pop into existence inside my head, killing me. Also, if I write down a description of an elephant, that piece of paper doesn't walk around, eat, poop, and literally become an elephant.
I'm not really sure how people can think fictional things actually exist. Ideas exist, but ideas aren't the thing that they refer to.
While I agree with you that calling fictional things "existing" is just the attempt to do away with an important distinction, I think there is a valid question in there:Fictional things don't exist. The writing exists, and the idea in the mind exists, but idea's aren't the things they refer to. eg: If I imagine an elephant, an elephant doesn't pop into existence inside my head, killing me. Also, if I write down a description of an elephant, that piece of paper doesn't walk around, eat, poop, and literally become an elephant.
While I agree with you that calling fictional things "existing" is just the attempt to do away with an important distinction, I think there is a valid question in there:
Do we ever react to things or entities, or isn´t it more like we always react to our own ideas or concepts (of them)? In which latter case their existence or non-existence is pretty irrelevant.
That sounds like the premise of a Lovecraftian horror story. I might have to write a story about a world where this sort of thing does happen.Fictional things don't exist. The writing exists, and the idea in the mind exists, but idea's aren't the things they refer to. eg: If I imagine an elephant, an elephant doesn't pop into existence inside my head, killing me. Also, if I write down a description of an elephant, that piece of paper doesn't walk around, eat, poop, and literally become an elephant.
I'm not really sure how people can think fictional things actually exist. Ideas exist, but ideas aren't the thing that they refer to.
Yes. The question, however, is: Is it necessary for a mental construct to have an outside referent, in order to make us react to it?Well we react to the mental representation of outside objects.
Well, "doesn´t matter" was not my choice of words, and not what I meant to say.If outside existence doesn't matter, then close your eyes, imagine no cars, and cross the road.
Undoubtedly.The existence of external objects affects us.
What if our reaction to mental constructs is pretty much the same - no matter if there exists an external referent to it or not?Also, mental representations aren't completely divorced from the external world like fictional imaginations are. Mental representations are generally created through our senses. Perhaps we could say that we indirectly react to external objects.
While I agree with you that calling fictional things "existing" is just the attempt to do away with an important distinction, I think there is a valid question in there:
Do we ever react to things or entities, or isn´t it more like we always react to our own ideas or concepts (of them)? In which latter case their existence or non-existence is pretty irrelevant.
Yes, so I better had asked "In which way is it relevant, and for what?", and worded my hypothesis "It may be less relevant and relevant for fewer intents and purposes than we like to think.", or vice versa: "the power of our concepts and imaginations may be more relevant than we like to think."If we react differently to ideas or concepts about things with an external existence than we do to things without one, then the difference is relevant.
Yes, it depends on a lot of things.The exact answer to your question is going to depend on the situation.
I´m not a scientist, but I find it hard to believe that a reactive movement can be performed before the stimulus reaches the brain - I was under the impression that it´s the brain that controls our movements?For example, if you touch a hot stove you react before the sensations reach your brain, so you're not reacting to your brain's conception of the heat.
I´m not a scientist, but I find it hard to believe that a reactive movement can be performed before the stimulus reaches the brain - I was under the impression that it´s the brain that controls our movements?
But maybe you meant "before the sensations reach our consciousness/awareness"? In which case I agree: Some reactions are beyond/before our conscious control, so that the question "Does the stimulating cause exist or not?" doesn´t even enter the picture in the process - i.e. is irrelevant for our reaction.
That sounds like the premise of a Lovecraftian horror story. I might have to write a story about a world where this sort of thing does happen.
Yes. The question, however, is: Is it necessary for a mental construct to have an outside referent, in order to make us react to it?
Well, "doesn´t matter" was not my choice of words, and not what I meant to say.
Anyway, since imagining a "no..." is pretty hard (and since we are discussing the effect of fictional objects and not that of fictional non-objects): Whenever I am about to cross a street I am looking if a car is approaching. I do that even when the imagined car doesn´t exist and no car is coming. My behaviour is not directed at an outside referent.
What if our reaction to mental constructs is pretty much the same - no matter if there exists an external referent to it or not?
This is a much better way to phrase the question.Yes. The question, however, is: Is it necessary for a mental construct to have an outside referent, in order to make us react to it?
If written descriptions take physical form when read, then books become potentially the most dangerous thing in the world.A story of people's heads exploding with elephants, or of paper coming to life?
This is an important observation. We've been discussing the existence imagined tangible objects like imagined cars or imagined elephants."EXIST" is too weak a word for all the different concepts its trying to carry.
Its like "LOVE".
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