Thanks again, for your response!
Lots of things to say – I´ll use the quote/response approach, and at the same time will try not to lose your general train of thought.
Since you're neither theist nor spiritual, I'll leave that side out of it entirely.
I appreciate that very much. However, we can talk about that aspect separately if you wish.
In practical terms, disbelieving choice, whether acknowledging the consequences of actions or not, leads to a feeling of powerlessness: *I* can't change, I am nothing more than the consequence of the multicausal universe. No matter what I think, believe, attempt, or strive for, the outcome is determined not by my actions but by the overall sweep of history. In cultural terms, this kind of thinking can tend to lead to fatalistic thinking. (But not always, see discussion of calvinism, above.)
I would have to disagree. Firstly because it simply doesn´t match my experience, and secondly because I see logical flaws in this analysis.
1.
- I
don´t experience a feeling of powerlessness.
- I
am experiencing myself as changing, striving and improving.
2.
- How exactly is choice a prerequisite for change?
- The outcome of my action is determined – among all other factors involved – by my action, too. Likewise, my action co-determines a countless number of other events. There is a frightening lot of outcome (co-)determined by my actions. I have at least as much power as you.
- The fact that my ways are determined by all factors involved, does not exclude striving, beliefs etc. nor does it make them pointless. It´s just that my striving, beliefs etc are determined, too.
I would like to keep the issue to what thinking a theory
can possibly lead to(particularly if this thinking is based on a misunderstanding of this theory) out of the discussion. I am almost sure that you agree with me that pointing to such possibilities is not an argument against its validity nor coherence.
In essence, a deterministic worldview in which we are all choiceless agents, observers rather than participants in the unfolding of time, is contrary to all forms of morality or ethics which are conditional on there being the possibility of choosing one course of action or another and thus influencing the choice. The ideal of wisdom is meaningless -- since choice is illusion so is the notion that one choice is better than another.
I agree in that this view puts a big question mark behind very long existing and extremely widely spread paradigms of ethics and morality. However, I do not see the fact that a theory is comparably new and possibly would hardpress us to rethink old concepts as a valid argument against it. Moreso, since these notions have been held for so long, I would expect it to be easy an easy task to bring arguments for it, that do not merely come down to „It´s new“.
I don´t agree with the idea that not being the determining agent of our actions makes us mere observers and not participants. I have no idea how that would follow.
Assuming that you don´t think that animals have „freewill“ (correct me if I am wrong): Would you say they are „observers rather than participants in the unfolding of time“? I definitely wouldn´t.
Now, you may define a worldview in which all is determined by a rigorous causality, and yet you acknowledge that cause has consequence: so I say you live as though you had choice because you evaluate the potential consequences of action and then act in a manner to bring about the best possible outcome. Do you play chess? Then you evaluate numerous choices at every move, making the best move you see at each turn; or perhaps for strategic purposes, making a less-than-best but unexpected move.
I am a poor chess player, but I play it occasionally. A good example, I think.
I do all those things (on a very low strategic level, admittedly), but I do them because this is the necessary result of all (zillions of) factors involved.
I think it is necessary to acknowledge that certain words have different meanings in everyday life, or when used in a theory about the human condition. Granted, I use „ choice“ and „decision“ in everyday life, but the meaning of the words in this context do not at all have the meaning that they have when used to describe the condition humaine. I notice that you – I guess inadvertantly – use the word „choice“ in a question begging manner, e.g. you say „you evaluate numerous choices“, whilst the very subject of our discussion is whether these are choices or not. Don´t get me wrong: this is not meant as a reproach, I guess it could even happen to me, simply because it is common use to say „choice“ when we actually see options.
Bottom line, we have to be careful not to trap ourselves in a false equivocation.
We both agree that in the mathematical domain it is almost certainly true that the causal chains that connect information inputs, algorithms of thinking, sparks of creativity, extents of imagination, all work together to form what is probably an illusion of choice, given our best understanding of the physical universe.
Ok.
However, I claim that none of that is actually relevant because when playing chess you *could* sacrifice the knight in a risky gambit to trap the queen, *or* you could play a solid defence and keep your pawn chain together. You do make that decision, and you live all your life, not just your chess games, as though the decisions were real.
I am slowly beginning to feel like a freak or something, but no, I don´t live my life like that. I do what seems best to me in any given moment, but I am convinced that I am not the determining agent. If I would be the determining agent for these actions, I would have to make them randomly (which, I think, even on the emotional level is not a more tempting idea than them being determined
). Needless to say, all those thoughts as to what I
could do are also a necessary result of all factors involved.
On a sidenote: Although „choice“, „decision“ and „freewill“ are not among them, I admit that I use a lot of helpful but quite obviously inaccurate thoughts and concepts to get through my life. This use is limited to certain practical purposes, but in case someone would present them as elements of the human condition, I would vehemently contradict him.
Even
if using concepts like choice etc. for pragmatic purposes, on the level of philosophy and description of the human condition they will lead to completely different implications.
„I make this choice“ and „man has choice“ are two statements of such different quality and implications, that I don´t see how it´s legitimate to conclude one from the other; they point to diff
Thus, whilst I have no problem with people using the word „choice“ to signify the (valid) concept A, I won´t conclude that „choice“ (as in concept B) is therefore valid, too.
I also say „the sun rises“ to the girl beside me, but when it comes to astronomy, I would insist that this is a completely inaccurate concept.
You get the idea.
Sorry, that was probably confusing: it was meant to illustrate that some philosophical ideas are rendered moot by the fact of human experience. It didn't work for you, so let's move on.
Ah, now I understand your intention for giving this example!
Right: the philosophy 101 rejection of human choice is the simple: "I could not have chosen other than the way I chose as proved by the fact that I chose it." (Ie., I had eggs for breakfast. To say I could have chosen to have french toast is meaningless because it is a point of fact that I had eggs.)
Yes, or – as I think – more to the point: It is impossible to demonstrate that I could have done differently. There is no basis whatsoever (in our experience, if you will) for that assumption.
I already mentioned it also. We agree on this point: being determined by rigorous causality or being determined by random quantum flux are philosophically identical for purposes of free will.
I´m not sure we are talking about the same idea here. What I meant to say was: If something is assumed to be the determing agent (as is a human in the concept of freewill), it cannot be determined by something else, hence the only possible basis for its actions is random.
The actual distinction is between living as though one has choice at all and living as though actions have consequences. Certainly any determinist would agree that actions have consequences because that is, in fact, what determinism is all about. But I say that human experience is that we have choice; we make choices every day; and while it may or may not be true that this is all illusion and the essential self is nothing more than an electrochemical phenomenon that watches the ineluctable procession of causality, the fact is we continue to make choices.
Sorry, pneo, but I meant to ask for an explanation or examples for what this actual distinction is.
What practical difference makes „living as though I am the determining agent of my actions“ and „living in the awareness that my actions have consequences“ make. I honestly don´t see it (except for the judging of persons – as opposed to the mere judging of actions -, that the first one allows, as I have already mentioned).
We've spoken a lot about determinism. Here's a little more about free will:
Free Will is typically defined as action without constraint. If you push me off a cliff, then I am not falling of my own free will. I did not intend it, I did not act to initiate it, I did not choose it. I may or may not want it.
If I throw myself off a cliff, then I am falling of my own free will. I did intend it, I did initiate it, I did choose it. I may or may not want it.
I do understand how „freewill“ makes sense in the way it is used in the societal context:
I am free of the intentional constraint by another person. It is useful for the purpose of saying that there was no action of another person that had an immediate impact on my action. No single action of another person can be tracked down to be a particular strong determining factor for my action.
That´s all „freewill“ tells me in this context, and I find that a meaningful distinguishing concept, although „freewill“ appears to be a misnomer, and – more important – it allows no statement whatsoever about the human condition in general.
(There are lots of middle grounds and grey areas that philosophers love to discess. I'll skip that for now.)
Oh yes. „freewill“ as a concept in human interaction raises a lot of interesting questions, but that would be an entirely different concept than the one we are actually discussing: is man the determining agent of his actions?
In the latter scenario, the proponent of free will might define the choice thusly: it is an act of free will if I could have chosen to walk away from the cliff. This captures the notion of constraint: nothing forced me to jump off the cliff, it was my choice. In the first example, I didn't have the choice of walking away from the cliff because forces outside my control (you) pushed me.
The determinist says, "Woah, wait a minute, I see the difference between these two scenarios, but if you jumped off the cliff then, buddy, you couldn't have walked away."
I hope the above said explains why I would not at all say this. It would be mingling two completely different concepts. The particularities of this situation (although no doubt an interesting topic on its own) have nothing to do with „freewill“ as opposed to determinism.
The proponent of free will replies, "If I couldn't have walked away, then I was constrained -- constrained by forces less visible than the jerk pushing me off, but constrained nonetheless. I may have had the experience of choosing to jump off the cliff, but that was illusion."
Yes, but that´s still merely based on the equivocation of two essentially different concepts.
So here's the question for you: do you live as though we are constrained by causality, and the reality of human experience is that we are simply watching our the unfolding of highly constrained causal interplay; or do you live as though choice is not just an illusion but a fact? I argue that everyone lives as though choice is real and unconstrained, whatever we believe about the nature of causality (or theology).
In order to understand this, I would have to repeat my question what makes the difference between the two. I not only live my life as though choice is but an illusion, but as though I have no choice. To be honest, I still have no clue what might be the landmarks of living one´s life as though there is no choice. I move along, I see options, and I observe myself doing that which my current reasoning abilities, feelings, thoughts, concepts, emotions, physical properties etc. etc. determine me to do. None of those lie within my current control or are subject to my choice.
I don´t see, how I practically lead my life fundamentally different from those who believe they have choice. I don´t understand the question.
It's a long, long time since I've been in the field; the only name I recall is A.J. Ayers, and I didn't much care for his work. You can probably google for more contemporary names and works as well as I can.
Thanks!
No? Not if that script is written in mathematical notation and defines the velocity and mass of every particle? Not if it defines the frequency and amplitude of every wave? Not if it perfectly describes the mysterious action of every quark and boson?
We may have misunderstood each other. I don´t see any reason to assume there to be a script, in the first place (a script would imply some sort of author, after all), I merely acknowledge the absolute necessity with which happens what happens.
Man, it´s almost 3 a.m.!
Thanks for giving me the opportunity to become even more aware of my convictions and axioms. You are a great conversation partner.
