Desire as Depravity

[Received]

With desire one slips into a future-based existence, thus not technically existence if you understand existence to be constituted by the moment. Desire is thus evidence of depravity -- meaning here, simply put, being eclipsed when it need not be so. But not necessarily: via the will to power, desire can be evidence of a goal that, in being conquered, allows the individual to consummate his own overcoming. Moreover, the desire for sexual attractiveness can lead an individual to sharpen himself to the point of having the widened possibility of sexuality at his doorstep. But why should we listen to power or sex? One may play his cards of happiness an entirely different way; and if so -- if one can successfully exist, be happy, or what have you, without such things, how is desire not superfluous?

Detachment is thus the higher ideal; preference is detachment; preference is good. But not absolute detachment -- only insofar as desire is concerned. All positive emotions are good; all negative emotions need to be rooted out.

In relation to boredom, nevertheless, desire has the potentiality to be a good thing: desire prompts an individual to action; action implies the possibility for self-transcendence, and this is the essence of happiness. But boredom is a problem only to those who live aesthetically; if we transcend this sphere, desire remains depravity. Yes nadroj, I have been reading Either/Or.

Cheers.

 

[Danhalen]

I do not see how detachment from desire is necessarily a good thing.

 

[billwald]

One problem with detatchment from desire is that the human race would still be living in tents.

 

[sparklecat]

One may play his cards of happiness an entirely different way; and if so -- if one can successfully exist, be happy, or what have you, without such things, how is desire not superfluous?

Do you think everyone can be happy with such a way?

 

[Received]

Sure, in possibility.

 

[exploring]

Hello Received
I am interested to know how you square christianity with what you say. Surely christianity is an object example of avoidabled future-based existence.

 

[elman]

With desire one slips into a future-based existence, thus not technically existence if you understand existence to be constituted by the moment. Desire is thus evidence of depravity -- meaning here, simply put, being eclipsed when it need not be so. But not necessarily: via the will to power, desire can be evidence of a goal that, in being conquered, allows the individual to consummate his own overcoming. Moreover, the desire for sexual attractiveness can lead an individual to sharpen himself to the point of having the widened possibility of sexuality at his doorstep. But why should we listen to power or sex? One may play his cards of happiness an entirely different way; and if so -- if one can successfully exist, be happy, or what have you, without such things, how is desire not superfluous?

Detachment is thus the higher ideal; preference is detachment; preference is good. But not absolute detachment -- only insofar as desire is concerned. All positive emotions are good; all negative emotions need to be rooted out.

In relation to boredom, nevertheless, desire has the potentiality to be a good thing: desire prompts an individual to action; action implies the possibility for self-transcendence, and this is the essence of happiness. But boredom is a problem only to those who live aesthetically; if we transcend this sphere, desire remains depravity. Yes nadroj, I have been reading Either/Or.

Cheers.

Being tempted is not evil. That is the desire. The evil is acting on the desire, giving in to the temptation.

 

[Received]

exploring,

Yes, Christianity does have an aspect based in the afterlife; and yes, there are historical examples of people speaking of desiring this afterlife -- but this doesn't make it good. I think the euphoria involved with hope doesn't necessarily need to initiate a desire; if anything, geniune hope would rather negate any negative emotions -- desires included -- that are afflicting the individual in the present. After all, isn't that why one hopes?

But I by no means think Christianity is soteriologically based in the future; I think that salvation is very much something present-centered, something that must be "worked out in fear and trembling," as Paul has perhaps hyperbolically expressed. Indeed, the etymology of the word suggests it: salvation: from "salve": "wholeness" or "healing".

 

[Received]

elman,

Agreed. But I still think the desire involved with temptation is stretching the individual to a point where he doesn't need to be, and that's my whole point. The "depravity" is perhaps better understood as an intentional overstatement.

 

[elman]

elman,

Agreed. But I still think the desire involved with temptation is stretching the individual to a point where he doesn't need to be, and that's my whole point. The "depravity" is perhaps better understood as an intentional overstatement.

I agree one can chose to be tempted sometimes or at least position oneself in such a way as to be tempted when it could have been avoided and should have been avoided. Being tempted or have a desire is not always due to making bad choices, but it can be due to that.

 

[muffler dragon]

Personally, I find desire to be a "good" thing. But that's just a difference in perspective.

 

[Received]

It might seem that way because desire is so subtely drawn together with its fulfillment that we confuse the fulfillment with the desire, thus incorrectly calling the desire good. That is just a theory. It also might be the case where we juxtapose desire with preference, and again consider the one to be the other. I consider preference to be what is left when desire is stripped to nothing. Desire is bad, but the consummation of desire is good; and so far as I'm thinking, the both are dialectic opposites that, when added together, equal zero. But desire necessarily outweighs its fulfillment, and herein is the problem.

It's virtually impossible, as elman pointed out, to escape from desire in this life, for temptation entails it. But I think drawing attention to the futility involved with it will precipitate a magnified consiousness of our actions as they relate to setting ourselves up to the various desires we encounter -- towards the opposite sex: that, of course, is the one that springs first to mind; but also the desire to be ahead, the desire to win, the desire to control, the desire to -- do nothing. Even where temptation reveals itself, we have the power to negate desire by fiat and reduce it to preference -- "I would like to do this," rather than, "I want to do this."

 

[muffler dragon]

This is simply a matter of perspectives.

I have adopted the Judaic POV when it comes to desire (or for me - "inclination").

In Judaism, there are two "inclinations": yetzer hara (evil/bad) and yetzer tov (good). These two inclinations are what present "choices" in given circumstances.

I view desire/inclination as good for two reasons:

1) it was given to me by G-d, and I consider that a gift.
2) Both "good" and "bad" inclinations can be used for positive or negative. It's a matter of making the correct choice. Therefore, I consider the inclination/desire innocuous, but find fault in the end result.

 

[Received]

Mmmmm, I really don't think we're disagreeing. I do believe that desire is necessary to actualize choice; and I do believe that everyone is placed in the position, constantly, of making choices. But the immediate desire here is different than the superfluous desire I have in mind. A man may find himself contemplating a choice for an entire day -- thus there is a sense of desire there that perpetuates the choice in contradistinction with ideality (for choice is grounded in the contradiction of desire and ideality); but surely this is different than a person who, by virtue of a choice, voluntarily allows himself to be haggled by desire all day. A man may choose continually to allow his sexual impulses to ride him -- this is much different than when he is in view of the choice itself.

 

[Received]

Interestingly enough, where there lies the negation of choice there lies the negation of possibility; possibility is synonymous with freedom; where there is no freedom there is no assertion of the will; where this happens, there is, existentially speaking, no self. I do not believe that the desire inherent to choice should be rooted out; but I do believe it is possible to live in such a way where choice, and the desire with it, becomes a footnote in one's existential repertoire. Buddhists call this the supreme good, and through such the eradication of the self is negatively actualized; Western theists typically do not. Kierkegaard called it "spiritlessness", and viewed it extremely negatively. It's interesting how subtlely my views come to Buddhism, but still infinitely different from them despite the external appearance of such subtlety.

 

[muffler dragon]

Good points and posts, Received.

We may very well not be disagreeing. But then again, how pedantic do you and I want to get over these things?

It appears that you're talking about degrees. Does said person experience desires constantly, intermittently, periodically... so on and so forth. Then compound this issue of degrees with type of desire. Don't get me wrong, I don't believe that each and every desire that someone has is "good"; however, I can't take the leap of making a blanket statement that all desire is "bad". It's a matter of finding the point on the pendulum swing when there is balance.

 

[nadroj1985]

I consider preference to be what is left when desire is stripped to nothing.

What does this mean? I don't understand preference as anything without desire: desire is what makes us want, and preference is a kind of wanting, isn't it? I think your definition of "desire" might be useful to clear up a lot of misunderstanding.

Basically, I see "I would like to do this" as merely a quantitatively smaller version of "I want to do this." You seem to be saying that they're qualitatively different in some way (i.e. the former is a negation rather than a diminishment of desire), and I'm curious as to what that is.

Desire is bad, but the consummation of desire is good; and so far as I'm thinking, the both are dialectic opposites that, when added together, equal zero. But desire necessarily outweighs its fulfillment, and herein is the problem.

How can one dialectical opposite outweigh the other?

 

[Received]

Yeah, it's just that my weakness in presenting my ideas in this instance prevented me from speaking what I completely believe: there is a desire that brings about choice, such being necessary; and there is a desire that stems from choice, as it were, such not being necessary. It's non-necessary choice I label superfluous, I label thus as bad. And honestly I don't think I would call it desire in both instances; I'm not quite sure. Better to speak like a madman: one is desire-towards-resolution (from choice), the other desire-in-itself. Yup, I totally beat you in the pedantic olympics. : )

 

[Received]

Hey Jordan (and as a side note, have you seen Brick? Omigash!!!)

What does this mean? I don't understand preference as anything without desire: desire is what makes us want, and preference is a kind of wanting, isn't it? I think your definition of "desire" might be useful to clear up a lot of misunderstanding.

I consider preference to be related to ideality: I prefer something because I know it to be better than something else, not because I feel it to be. Desire, on the other hand, is the feeling; and desire is blind qualitatively, for it reaches for the expedient, not the best path.

How can one dialectical opposite outweigh the other?

I didn't mean to imply that. What I mean by the last sentence in your quote is that, as it relates to life, desire outweighs its fulfillment, not in relation to the dialectic. Another way of saying it is that in an ideal world where all desires are fulfilled, the end result would be zero; but we do not live in an ideal world, for desire hardly ever has an authentic fulfillment.

Dude, are you still on AIM, or any other messenger?

 

[ReluctantProphet]

Not to imply that it can't be done, but how do you separate "desire" and "good"?

You have implied that desire is not good. Soooo... how do you determine "good" without desire?

The Buddhist generally agrees with what you have said. But I contend that they left something significant out of the bigger picture.