- Aug 13, 2016
- 2,921
- 1,244
- Country
- United States
- Gender
- Male
- Faith
- Non-Denom
- Marital Status
- Married
- Politics
- US-Libertarian
Craig is suggesting that he does not use, nor do Davis, Wright, or Hale us the strong version of PSR that Van Inwagen inveighs against.The Principle of Sufficient Reason and modal collapse is an issue for theism that I find particularly interesting. If all things that come into being have a reason for their existence, and the ultimate reason is God, then if God has the choice between our universe (A) and an alternative universe (B), why did God choose A instead of B? Either there is no reason, and the Principle of Sufficient Reason is false, or there is something about A that made it the optimal choice, and the possibility that our universe could exist collapses into the necessity that it would exist, leaving us effectively at Spinoza.
My understanding of the PSR is that we can intuit that a necessary being is required as an explanation of a series of contingent facts. Inwagen is suggesting that necessary beings produce necessary facts not contingent ones so in a sense cannot be used for explaining contingent facts. I don't see why God doesn't possess the agency to choose to create various worlds. So Inwagen's premise constraining a eternal separation between contingent facts and necessary causes seem counter-intuitive.
Nevertheless
1. Anything that exists has an explanation of its existence (either in the necessity of its own nature or in an external cause).
2. If the universe has an explanation of its existence, that explanation is God.
3. The universe exists.
4. Therefore, the universe has an explanation of its existence. (from 1, 3)
5. Therefore, the explanation of the existence of the universe is God. (from 2, 4)
About 1, Craig states, that he holds to a weaker view than Leibniz (who held every fact must have an explanation). Quoting from Craig's book in, "Reasonable Faith," Craig states he, “merely requires any existing thing to have an explanation of its existence. This premise is compatible with there being brute facts about the world” (p. 107). He goes on to claim, "My version of the Principle denies that there are beings which exist without any explanation. That’s all I need for the argument to go through."
I don't let people drag me into the weeds by forcing me to use the stronger PSR.
Secondly, it is PSR that is central to much scientific inquiry and discovery. Often people will use the PSR, informally, unwittingly, and ironically, to try and defeat my premise about PSR. (Not implying you are doing that here).
So to Inwagen's complaint I am saying of course there are brute facts. The point is that I don't need an account of every contingent fact to suggest that whatever exists needs an explanation.
I claim that the weaker version ("existing things" not "all facts") is self-evidently true.
For more see: http://alexanderpruss.com/papers/LCA.html
Last edited:
Upvote
0