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That's my point; one can argue that all moral views agreed by a group (that don't just emerge from individual imagination) are objective in that sense.At the core, I think basic morals are almost completely universal.
But there's also all kinds of culturally or geographically contingent morality also in play, a level or two up from the basics. But even that doesnt just emerge out of the individual subjective imagination. I think there's reasons that are objectively demonstrable, in principle at least.
Absolutely there are these differences between societies. But it seems almost preposterous that they emerged from coincidence of individual subjective whim with each society.Sure, there are some basic universals for which you can make such objective arguments (e.g. the sense of fairness seems to be a feature of cognitively sophisticated social mammals). But the differences in moral views seem to be in the practical application of these universals - e.g. exactly what do we mean by murder? when is it permissible to kill? etc. There are many variations of interpretation & application that don't inherently destabilise societies yet are sufficiently different for them to cause deep animosity between societies.
Well, axioms aren't proven true, correct. But they're still the sort of thing that is either true or false, aren't they? a=a For instance. A subjective opinion (chocolate ice cream is tasty) isn't the sort of thing that can be evaluated in the same manner.Technically axioms aren't true or false, and truth and falsity are considered functions of a logical system, including functions of its axioms. This is at least how it is understood in mathematical logic. In any case I'm not sure you actually disagree with what Frumious said.
I argued that people would like making the pact. If you want to take it to the next step and argue that people "should" honor the pact, I would instead argue that one would not like the consequences of violating it. You don't need to argue that people should do what they like, and shouldn't do what they don't like, people are going to do what they're motivated to do whether they "should" or not. But I honestly think that finagling a "should" into an argument can't be done without accepting a base axiom like Frumy said, but I find that wholly unnecessary.How does making an agreement to not-steal eliminate "shoulds" and "oughts"? Rather, it seems to establish them.
Are we correct to like personal security?1 Humans naturally like personal security.
...(objective fact)
2 Neighbors murdering each other hinders that and renders society unstable.
...(objective fact)
3 Therefore we develop the social rule "dont murder your neighbor"
...(reasonable to argue this objectively happened)
4 We call it "bad" and build up myths around it so it lives in the individual's subjectively experienced conscience.
Seems like those who think morality is subjective only appreciate step 4. But I find the whole basis for not murdering your neighbor to be completely objective.
Even individual subjective opinion is (arguably) the result of prior real-world causal sequences...Absolutely there are these differences between societies. But it seems almost preposterous that they emerged from coincidence of individual subjective whim with each society.
My sense is these differences arose in response to varying social or natural conditions. For example certain societies exist side by side in agrarian situations, leading to more cooperation as a deep value. Maybe other conditions for other societies demands a warrior ethos, in which slightly different values prevail, trickling down into a variety of moral rules. Either way, the basis is real world conditions, and not individual subjective opinion.
Then we generally agree. It can be done that way, but you said (at first) it's the only way to make it work. I think it works just fine without it.What I meant was that it seems that the closest you can get to objectivity in a moral framework is to build it on axiomatic moral principles, i.e. principles taken to be self-evidently true (as the article suggested). Given those axioms, it should be possible, in principle, to build an 'objective' moral framework as a formal system. I said it was a pity there were no examples because I have doubts about its feasibility in practice.
Well, axioms aren't proven true, correct. But they're still the sort of thing that is either true or false, aren't they? a=a For instance. A subjective opinion (chocolate ice cream is tasty) isn't the sort of thing that can be evaluated in the same manner.
I argued that people would like making the pact. If you want to take it to the next step and argue that people "should" honor the pact, I would instead argue that one would not like the consequences of violating it. You don't need to argue that people should do what they like, and shouldn't do what they don't like, people are going to do what they're motivated to do whether they "should" or not. But I honestly think that finagling a "should" into an argument can't be done without accepting a base axiom like Frumy said, but I find that wholly unnecessary.
Atheism isn't a thing.Some religious people claim that atheism, which is defined as a lack of belief in deity or deities, is inherently nihilistic.
As do theists as well.Since atheists come from all nationalities, races, socio-economic backgrounds,
I'd say that a large number of atheists probably don't know what "nihilism" meansand indeed all walks of life, it is reasonable to say that making such a sweeping generalization of all atheists isn’t fair.
Most don'tHowever, many atheists spend an inordinate amount of time criticizing religion.
Do theists on theist sites post positive articles about lack of faith?Visit any atheist blog on the internet, and there you won’t find one positive article on faith.
People typically focus on issues, things that are dangerous. Just watch the news, mostly about issues, not many feel good articles.It seems like everything they post is hostile towards religion.
How many posts are there on theistic sites talking about atheists that give money to the poor or being good people in general?You’ll never see them post a link to a news story about Christians feeding the poor or being good people in general.
These are two people, they don't represent all atheists. I think Dawkins books on biology and evolution are fantastic. I haven't read his atheist or anti-theist books.The same can be said about atheist books: read any book from renowned atheists such as Richard Dawkins or Sam Harris, and all they have to say about religion is bad.
I haven't read this book, but I do see there is a lot of bad that theism does bring into the world. For example their insistence on having the right to discriminate.In fact, the world's most famous blasphemy advocate Christopher Hitchens even wrote a book called How Religion Poisons Everything.
This is not true.Since it seems like almost all atheists are hostile towards religion, particularly Christianity,
I don't agree with much of this.which is an inherently peaceful faith that improves morals and provides eternal salvation for all believers,
You haven't yet addressed what nihilism means or why an atheist should subscribe to nihilism.wouldn’t it make sense to think that atheism is inherently nihilistic?
We aren't a theism or Christian appreaciation group. If that is what you are hoping for.It’s not like you ever see atheists praising religion and talking about how good it is. If that is what they believed, they probably wouldn’t be atheists in the first place.
We naturally like personal security. Its a natural fact about the human organism.Are we correct to like personal security?
Yeah if we drill in we could probably blow up the subjective / objective distinction at some deep level.Even individual subjective opinion is (arguably) the result of prior real-world causal sequences...
Eh... it isn't necessarily a threat. The consequences might be that society will have you locked up, sure. On the other hand, if people don't agree to a no-stealing pact then other folks have no motivation to not steal from you. Society would be of the type that security in possessions doesn't exist, and that would be a consequence that people don't like, but I'm not threatening you with it.The problem is that your system is no better at solving the problem, since you are apparently relying on the principle that agreements should be honored. To say that, "One would not like the consequences of violating it," is a threat, not an agreement. You can threaten people in order to force them to do your will, but that is very different from establishing a common moral system. Even a community which enforces agreements by force is establishing an axiom and punishing the denial of the axiom. The axiom is that one should not renege on an agreement.
All moral systems require imperatives whether they are categorical or hypothetical. A system that is based only on hypothetical imperatives may technically be based on arbitrarily-imposed consequences rather than strict normativity, but practically speaking it amounts to the same thing. Technicalities aside, there is very little difference between, "Convert or die," and "You ought to convert."
To say that a base axiom is unnecessary because threats will suffice seems strange to me. Certainly it is, "might makes right," but it also carries with it the strange idea that the hypothetical imperatives established by the ruling class are arbitrary, with no extra-mental connection to reality. As Durangodawood pointed out, that leaves us with some pretty amazing coincidences. Even your claim, "One would not like the consequences of violating it," is either normative or a claim based on human nature. That is, it seems to say, "One should not like the consequences of violating it." Else if you want to be consistent you should use "might" rather than "would." It is impossible to control behavior without some notion of normativity.
That doesn't answer my question. Are we correct to like personal security?We naturally like personal security. Its a natural fact about the human organism.
It's an amazing coincidence that many values are so incredibly intersubjective in the same way that it's an amazing coincidence humans have opposable thumbs.As Durangodawood pointed out, that leaves us with some pretty amazing coincidences.
Eh... it isn't necessarily a threat. The consequences might be that society will have you locked up, sure. On the other hand, if people don't agree to a no-stealing pact then other folks have no motivation to not steal from you. Society would be of the type that security in possessions doesn't exist, and that would be a consequence that people don't like, but I'm not threatening you with it.
I will concede though, that "one might not like the consequences". Especially in the realm of subjectivity there are going to be exceptions.
It's an amazing coincidence that many values are so incredibly intersubjective in the same way that it's an amazing coincidence humans have opposable thumbs.
I don't think it's reasonable to form a no-stealing pact, I think human motivations are predictable. I think my arguments for any given moral are a little too darn close to being outright appeals to emotion, but I'm fine with that because they can affect the change I want. Let's face it, fallacious appeals to emotion are the most persuasive arguments for the vast majority of people; validity and soundness are important less-so.You seem to want to accept Hume's dichotomy and also do away with "ought" altogether, but it's curious that your arguments here look very similar to natural law arguments for objective morality. For example, you seem to think that it is inherently reasonable for a society to form a no-stealing pact. That's pretty darn close to establishing objective morality on the basis of natural reason.
You seem to be saying, "Given the constraints that reality imposes on us, moral action, such as not-stealing, is naturally incentivized." Again though, incentivization and preference at the level of species is still a substantial form of normativity. It is precisely that sort of normativity that natural objective morality is based on.
I thought about our previous more heated exchanges when I wrote that too, and that's why I was happy to concede my wording needed to be changed to reflect the lack of strength of my statement.If there are exceptions, there are rules.
I missed this somehow. It looks like you recognize that it's an absurd question, but that's my point. If we aren't correct to believe that personal security is good, then it isn't objectively true. It's an absurd question to ask because it isn't the sort of thing that is correct/incorrect like my other post about ice cream flavor.Is it correct for geese to migrate?
I don't think it's reasonable to form a no-stealing pact, I think human motivations are predictable. I think my arguments for any given moral are a little too darn close to being outright appeals to emotion, but I'm fine with that because they can affect the change I want. Let's face it, fallacious appeals to emotion are the most persuasive arguments for the vast majority of people; validity and soundness are important less-so.
The nature of what morality is is interesting and all, but what's important to me is whether I can persuade people to feel the way I do, not whether or not I'm correct to feel one way or another. Can people be persuaded via emotional manipulation to feel differently about how they should behave? Of course, and that's all it really takes to make a moral system. It doesn't matter if it's a farce, it doesn't matter if people recognize it as a farce, people are still going to do what they desire to do.
I thought about our previous more heated exchanges when I wrote that too, and that's why I was happy to concede my wording needed to be changed to reflect the lack of strength of my statement.
It's an amazing coincidence that many values are so incredibly intersubjective in the same way that it's an amazing coincidence humans have opposable thumbs.
Not as long as emotions are being manipulated it isn't reasonable. I don't see reasonable as a spectrum. Just like an argument is either sound or unsound. If just one premise isn't true, then it isn't reasonable. It isn't reasonable to do what you desire to do. "I want to therefore I should"? Why should you do what you want to do? Because it will make you happy to have done it? Why should you strive to do what will make you happy? People will do what makes them happy, but that doesn't make it reasonable.So you try to persuade people to feel the way you do. Say you try to persuade people that they ought to enter into your no-stealing pact. Are you telling me that you try to persuade them to enter into a pact, and yet you don't think entering into the pact is reasonable? Perhaps human motivations are predictable, but doesn't reason take into account human motivations? Further, if human motivations are predictable, doesn't that mean that we are all motivated by similar things, such as pleasure and security? If, say, most humans are motivated by security and you provide a mechanism for improving security with your no-stealing pact, wouldn't it be reasonable for most humans to enter into your pact?
Our emotions are are easy to manipulate en masse and we have a hard time distinguishing between them and facts all the time so we base our beliefs all too often on what we feel is true. That's a far cry from objectivity.The very fact that humans are persuadable en masse is evidence of moral, behavioral, and rational notions that are more than merely subjective.
It's an objective fact that we value things, just like it's an objective fact that we have thumbs. If there are things we should value, then should we have thumbs? Our biologically ingrained propensity for cooperation is just a novel trait we developed through evolution no different than opposable thumbs because they've both aided in our survival and the continuation of our species. Or rather I should say that at a minimum, it doesn't need to be anything more than that.I think so too, except I don't declare moral values subjective and thumbs objective.
Not as long as emotions are being manipulated it isn't reasonable.
I don't see reasonable as a spectrum.
It isn't reasonable to do what you desire to do.
Why should you strive to do what will make you happy?
It isn't reasonable to do what you desire to do. "I want to therefore I should"? Why should you do what you want to do?
Because it will make you happy to have done it? Why should you strive to do what will make you happy?
People will do what makes them happy, but that doesn't make it reasonable.
You're better at forming syllogisms than me, we've talked about that before. So maybe you can explain to me how to insert a "should" into a syllogism. In order for there to be a "should" in the conclusion, there needs to be a "should" in a premise, right? But how do you get a "should" in a premise and that premise be true?
Our emotions are are easy to manipulate en masse and we have a hard time distinguishing between them and facts all the time so we base our beliefs all too often on what we feel is true. That's a far cry from objectivity.
My wife hates chocolate. The first time she told me that my immediate response was, "What are you nuts? Chocolate is soooo good!" And as I said it I meant it; she must not be reasonable to not agree that chocolate is tasty. It felt true. Have you ever done that: felt something so strongly it seemed factually true? But then you look back and think about it reasonably, and of course that wasn't true.
It's an objective fact that we value things, just like it's an objective fact that we have thumbs. If there are things we should value, then should we have thumbs? Our biologically ingrained propensity for cooperation is just a novel trait we developed through evolution no different than opposable thumbs because they've both aided in our survival and the continuation of our species. Or rather I should say that at a minimum, it doesn't need to be anything more than that.
Not according to dictionaries it's not. You're not talking about morality; you're talking about a kind of expediency towards arbitrary goals.
Let me just highlight some of the contradictory languages that points to this same conclusion...
No, you should have said, "It's only because we choose to live," not "It's only because we must choose to live..." On your view we need not choose to live. "Must, must, must," is categorical language. All you're describing is doing things for ends. That's just planning, not morality.
Whoa, where did I say this? I said that the choice to live or not is pre-moral which means its outside of the realm of morality. Morality begins with the commitment to live, which means to take such actions that your nature requires if you want to continue living. The choice to live is just that, a choice. It won't give you the values your life requires. That requires thinking, judging, making logical connections, planning, discovering causal connections, and all of the things that you must do to live.You say that your actions matter and yet you think it is equally moral to commit suicide as to live your life. How is it that life matters if, "The choice to live or die is pre-moral"?
Life is a value. In fact it is the ultimate value. Life is the only value that is an end in itself. It is the source of values, so how could it not be a value? But nothing forces you to live and if you don't want to live, no action on your part is required and there's no standard by which to judge such choices. I call it pre-moral because to do otherwise would be to make use of stolen concepts. A rational morality does not permit one to drop context or to steal concepts. I'm simply remaining true to reason by doing it.Apparently what you mean is that your actions have consequences, but since there are no inherently good or evil consequences there are also no good or evil actions. If dying is as good as living, then your actions don't matter.I never said that dying is as good as living.
I gave it above but I'll do it again here: morality is a code of values to guide one's thinking and actions, which actions determine the course of one's life.And it makes a difference to my life whether I grow a beard or shave. What does this have to do with morality? Can you give a definition of morality?
I don't think you even believe in good and bad. If you're not willing to say that death is bad, then what is?
Because one wants to live. Hopefully, after the above, you know that it is not the case that I "don't think life is good". I love life, life is wonderful and rich. I want to live it fully and to the marrow. That is precisely why I need a rational code of values.Why care about the "project of living?" I agree with you that eating food causes us to live longer, but you don't even think life is good; so why would eating food be good?
It's individual actions in response to the facts that are moral or immoral.
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