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The set of even numbers has an infinite amount of numbers in it, but it excludes all odd numbers. Saying that God can do an infinite number of things isn't the same as saying God can do any thing.The article says that God can do an infinite number of things, that is false. God cannot go against His nature or against logic and there may even be other things He cannot do that we dont know about.
I just thought this was worth revisiting, to clear up.
Silmarien, you are free to describe theism in any terms you choose. But if you do so, you must say "To me, theism means such-and-such". If, as you did, you say "Theism means that reality is subjective," you must expect to cause confusion.
What do you mean we can't discuss whether God exists without talking about what God means? Of course we can. Once you have demonstrated that the Christian religion is correct about there being an all-powerful entity that created the universe and inspired the stories of the Bible, then we could have a huge and complex discussion about the nature of this entity, how it works and what it means to be God. But the fact of God's existence - does He exist or not - is a fairly easy question to discuss.
Well, I'm not all that good myself at discussing these types of arguments (the ones which look to me like algebra, I mean).
However, i did find this article, refuting Gale-Pruss:
- the dance of reason: The Gale-Pruss cosmological argument for the existence of God
If you'd like to discuss it more, please can you put the argument in your own words.
Intellectual pride? Perhaps. I think you just over-complicate things more than they warrant. Calling it a sin might be going too far, though.
I agree. And, to quote Christopher Hitchens, what can be asserted without evidence can also be dismissed without evidence.
That sounds an extremely illogical thing to do.
But they were told they were going about it the right way. Effectively, then, what you are saying is "It must have been the wrong way, because it didn't work". But this, of course, is illogical, a form of special pleading. It could be applied to anything at all and, therefore, is meaningless.
That's not at all what @cvanwey and others like him do. They aren't blaming God, because they don't think God exists.
Completely illogical. Do you think it would make sense if I said:
"If you really go down the mystic's path and seek with the whole of your being, then you're going to end up so madly in love with the Flying Spaghetti Monster that you would wait your whole life for a response."
You may be aware that the FSM was invented by atheists as a humorous way of pointing out the enormous logical hole in Christians' arguments - including the one that you just used.
This suggests a poor understanding of what Aquinas is actually arguing. The way this is phrased suggests that the author thinks Aquinas is talking about an accidentally ordered series of causes -- that is, one extending back in time -- rather than an essentially ordered series of causes. I believe that Aquinas even grants that it would be hypothetically possible for there to be a series of temporal causes stretching back to infinity, and it still wouldn't do much to exactly what he's arguing.The response can simply be quoted from the article: Unmoved Mover - Daylight Atheism
Aquinas’ objection to the possibility of an infinite regress is also poorly founded. He claims that an infinite regression of causes could not exist because there would be no first cause, but this shows a failure to understand the notion of an infinite series. In such a series, every individual event would have a perfectly good cause: the event preceding it.
Given the notion of God here as an unactualized actualizer, as purely actual with no potential, outside of time, immaterial, purely simple, etc., these questions don't really make much sense.Alternatively, if we accept Aquinas’ logic on this point, we can then ask, how many thoughts did God have before creating the universe? Every thought God had must have been caused by another thought preceding it, since Aquinas claims nothing can be its own cause.
See, yeah, I don't think Aquinas actually argued that an infinite temporal sequence was necessarily impossible. He was talking about hierarchical, simultaneous series of potentials being actualized.But since by Aquinas’ argument an infinite beginningless series is impossible, God must have had a single thought preceding all others – i.e., there must have been a point at which God came into existence. We can then ask the cause of this initial thought, and so on ad infinitum.
Well if we granted the existence of an unmoved mover/unactualized actualizer/first cause/what have you, the next step would be to start discussing exactly what sorts of attributes this thing would have. It's at that point that one could start drawing out the divine attributes that would lead one to call this thing "God".There is one final attack on the classic cosmological argument. Say for the sake of argument that we ignore the above difficulty and grant this argument everything it asks – then it still does nothing to establish the existence of God. Even if we accept this argument’s logic, all it proves is that there was a first cause. It does not prove that this first cause still exists today; it does not prove that this first cause has any interest in or awareness of human beings; it does not prove that this first cause is omnipotent or omniscient or benevolent. It does not even prove that the first cause is conscious or a person. An atheist could accept this entire chain of logic and then posit that the first cause was a purely natural phenomenon.
Why is there a God instead of nothing?
I actually already asked it earlier. Most of the time when apologists bring up "Why is there something instead of nothing" they mean to imply "why is there a universe instead of no universe" so that they can say Goddidit. That's what the apologist meant when I asked earlier, so he didn't have an answer at all. I was betting on you having something more substantial to say since you like the PSR so much.This is quite possibly the best question in the thread.
I see a huge jump in logic right here at the beginning. Why is nothing an impossible state of affairs? And then there's no answer to "why must something exist?" You assume that something must, and then try to figure out what that might be. Your reasoning isn't necessarily faulty, but it is missing some very important steps.1) Why is there something instead of nothing?
2) Because nothing is an impossible state of affairs. Something must necessarily exist.
3) Why must something exist? What is a good candidate for the sort of thing that must necessarily exist?
What does it mean that something has to exist? What type of attributes might something have that would make it the sort of thing that would exist by its very nature? This is the sort of question that shoves us right into Ontological Argument territory. This line of reasoning is often criticized for effectively defining God into existence, but the underlying problem is that if there is something that necessarily exists, then we are looking at the sort of thing that practically does exist by definition. This opens up a whole separate line of theological inquiry, and we have to wonder what sort of thing might actually exist by definition.
It leaves us with ideas like Anselm's "that which nothing greater can be conceived," which has always been strange and controversial, but I think is at the very least the appropriate direction to move on when really focusing on the question of why there is something instead of nothing.
I actually already asked it earlier. Most of the time when apologists bring up "Why is there something instead of nothing" they mean to imply "why is there a universe instead of no universe" so that they can say Goddidit. That's what the apologist meant when I asked earlier, so he didn't have an answer at all. I was betting on you having something more substantial to say since you like the PSR so much.
I see a huge jump in logic right here at the beginning. Why is nothing an impossible state of affairs? And then there's no answer to "why must something exist?" You assume that something must, and then try to figure out what that might be. Your reasoning isn't necessarily faulty, but it is missing some very important steps.
To quote Aquinas:
Objection 2. Further, those things are said to be self-evident which are known as soon as the terms are known, which the Philosopher (1 Poster. iii) says is true of the first principles of demonstration. Thus, when the nature of a whole and of a part is known, it is at once recognized that every whole is greater than its part. But as soon as the signification of the word "God" is understood, it is at once seen that God exists. For by this word is signified that thing than which nothing greater can be conceived. But that which exists actually and mentally is greater than that which exists only mentally. Therefore, since as soon as the word "God" is understood it exists mentally, it also follows that it exists actually. Therefore the proposition "God exists" is self-evident.Secondly, if by "definition" we are talking about an essence rather than a merely stipulative description it is still unclear that one could, in that case, comprehend the definition of God (ST Ia, Q. 12, A. 7). The question is clear: how does one arrive at such a definition or essence?
Reply to Objection 2. Perhaps not everyone who hears this word "God" understands it to signify something than which nothing greater can be thought, seeing that some have believed God to be a body. Yet, granted that everyone understands that by this word "God" is signified something than which nothing greater can be thought, nevertheless, it does not therefore follow that he understands that what the word signifies exists actually, but only that it exists mentally. Nor can it be argued that it actually exists, unless it be admitted that there actually exists something than which nothing greater can be thought; and this precisely is not admitted by those who hold that God does not exist.
-ST Ia, Q. 2, A. 1
I was wondering if I was going to draw some Thomistic ire here.
Despite my quote from Anselm, my starting point when it comes to the Ontological Argument is more Hegelian in nature--I find his response to Kant interesting, where it seems to be our very ability to conceptualize the notion of something being unconceptualizable which leads to our being able to know Truth. What is the mind, and to what extent is it capable of grasping genuine truths on the order of something like theism? Is it our most abstract, least physically beholden concepts, like what we mean by the Good, the ones that actually match up best to ultimate reality?
I think "Necessary Being" is the sort of thing that the human mind can grasp, if just barely, so to a certain extent, it seems that we can comprehend something that lies pretty close to the heart of what God is thought to be. I think it's valid to ask why it's the case that something must necessarily exist, why there could not have been nothing, and I'm not aware of any other line of thought that really heads in that direction, aside from... your traditional Franciscan enemies.
I find the axiomatic angle interesting. The ultimate good must exist because it's ultimately good... you can't really say that the physical must exist because it's physical, or even that awareness must exist because it's awareness, but is the Good something that could potentially exist simply because it's good that it exists? I find it a fascinating rabbit hole to explore.
No ire, just a nudge to answer the basic objections.
This is Hegel responding to Kant's objection to the Ontological Argument? What you say sounds interesting, but I'm not really familiar with the argumentation. It vaguely sounds like Transcendental Thomism and and the Kantian transcendental apperception.
I don't find the concept of necessary being incomprehensible, but as a concept it is severed from existence via Aquinas' retort. Aquinas himself argues for a necessary being, but by means of a cosmological rather than ontological/axiomatic argument.
Perhaps... I like to start with Aquinas because he is rational in the mundane sense. What you say here borders on the mystical, which brings with it a strong element of incommunicability.
I said, "Theism means that reality is subjective (i.e., that it is personal)," which I thought would have cleared up what I meant by the word "subjective." That was where the confusion was, so I don't see how specifying that it was a personal definition would have made any difference in clarity. You would have still misinterpreted me.
This is false. Christianity is a subset of theism, but the truth value of theism is an independent issue than the truth value of Christianity. Jews, Muslims, some Hindus, and various deistic belief systems all believe in something that can be described as God, so there's no reason to start with revelation. That is a secondary concern, not the primary one here.
Do you think the refutation succeeds, and if so, why?
I am not personally a proponent of the logic this type of argument relies upon. I think it's a useful conceptual tool in clarifying what we mean by necessity, but I am not convinced that it can appropriately be used to prove that 1+1 necessarily equals 2, much less the existence of God.
How so? Pride is traditionally considered a serious sin, and the intellectual and moral varieties above others.
People who focus on the historicity of the Resurrection don't assert it without evidence. I don't think the evidence is conclusive, but it is existent, and cannot rationally be dismissed out of hand.
Are you not familiar with game theory? It is actually an extremely logical style of reasoning built around the analysis of potential gains against potential losses.
(1) The Christian God desires relationship with all people.
(2) Relationship requires awareness of God.
(3) There are people who seek God earnestly and do not seem to find him.
(4) These people cannot enter into relationship with the Christian God, who desires relationship with all people.
(5) Therefore, the Christian God does not exist.
I'm not engaging in special pleading. I am challenging the validity of this line of reasoning, since it hinges upon a variety of issues, including what we understand earnestly seeking God to entail. Given the complication surrounding the concept of earnest seeking, we cannot actually know whether there are people who seek God earnestly and fail to find him. Therefore, the argument does not succeed.
"You probably don't exist, and if you do, then it's your fault I don't believe in you" is effectively blaming God for one's own lack of belief. We are capable of reasoning in conditionals and counterfactuals.
If you would like to use the words "Flying Spaghetti Monster" as a stand-in for what we mean by the word God, i.e., the transcendentally good grounds of being, then yes, a mystic could fall madly in love with the Flying Spaghetti Monster.
As I have pointed out multiple times, this is why it is important to first define the term "God." If atheists wish to caricaturize things that they don't understand, they are well within their rights to do so, but they just make themselves look like idiots.
This suggests a poor understanding of what Aquinas is actually arguing. The way this is phrased suggests that the author thinks Aquinas is talking about an accidentally ordered series of causes -- that is, one extending back in time -- rather than an essentially ordered series of causes. I believe that Aquinas even grants that it would be hypothetically possible for there to be a series of temporal causes stretching back to infinity, and it still wouldn't do much to exactly what he's arguing.
Given the notion of God here as an unactualized actualizer, as purely actual with no potential, outside of time, immaterial, purely simple, etc., these questions don't really make much sense.
Well if we granted the existence of an unmoved mover/unactualized actualizer/first cause/what have you, the next step would be to start discussing exactly what sorts of attributes this thing would have. It's at that point that one could start drawing out the divine attributes that would lead one to call this thing "God".
This is quite possibly the best question in the thread.
Unfortunately, it also highlights why I think we go about these arguments incorrectly about 90% of the time, since we start with a predefined concept of God and don't stop to examine what we mean by the word. I'm going to skip rigorous argumentation, but for me, in all my Platonic glory, a potential line of reasoning to start building to a concept of God would look like this:
1) Why is there something instead of nothing?
2) Because nothing is an impossible state of affairs. Something must necessarily exist.
3) Why must something exist? What is a good candidate for the sort of thing that must necessarily exist?
4) It doesn't appear to be physical entities, since they are characterized by properties that could have failed to hold true. The physical universe does not appear to be the sort of thing that is what it is through metaphysical necessity.
5) The "something" that must necessarily exist appears to be non-physical in nature, perhaps abstract. Are things like mathematical facts necessary truths?
6) Even if they are, can abstract truths give rise to a physical universe? It seems like you would need some sort of "actualizer" to make the abstract real.
7) For the sake of convenience, and so I can demonstrate to others in the thread why definitions matter, let us call this necessarily existing, non-physical actualizer the Flying Spaghetti Monster.
What does it mean that something has to exist? What type of attributes might something have that would make it the sort of thing that would exist by its very nature? This is the sort of question that shoves us right into Ontological Argument territory. This line of reasoning is often criticized for effectively defining God into existence, but the underlying problem is that if there is something that necessarily exists, then we are looking at the sort of thing that practically does exist by definition. This opens up a whole separate line of theological inquiry, and we have to wonder what sort of thing might actually exist by definition.
It leaves us with ideas like Anselm's "that which nothing greater can be conceived," which has always been strange and controversial, but I think is at the very least the appropriate direction to move on when really focusing on the question of why there is something instead of nothing.
Interesting thread, especially the last several pages. Wanted to chime in here, though.
This suggests a poor understanding of what Aquinas is actually arguing. The way this is phrased suggests that the author thinks Aquinas is talking about an accidentally ordered series of causes -- that is, one extending back in time -- rather than an essentially ordered series of causes. I believe that Aquinas even grants that it would be hypothetically possible for there to be a series of temporal causes stretching back to infinity, and it still wouldn't do much to exactly what he's arguing.
Given the notion of God here as an unactualized actualizer, as purely actual with no potential, outside of time, immaterial, purely simple, etc., these questions don't really make much sense.
See, yeah, I don't think Aquinas actually argued that an infinite temporal sequence was necessarily impossible. He was talking about hierarchical, simultaneous series of potentials being actualized.
Well if we granted the existence of an unmoved mover/unactualized actualizer/first cause/what have you, the next step would be to start discussing exactly what sorts of attributes this thing would have. It's at that point that one could start drawing out the divine attributes that would lead one to call this thing "God".
Funny. Over a hundred pages on this thread so far, and none of the arguments for God have managed to make their case yet. Either they're comically misplaced (gradyll, Ed) or they avoid actually saying what they think, preferring to dance around the meanings of words.Good points! Unfortunately the distinction between a per se and a per accidens causal series is going to fly a few miles above the heads of most CF posters. You'll find that most atheists in these parts haven't actually read the arguments and theologians they purport to disagree with. Basically they are just playing a big game of "telephone," and even the initial message comes from people with a remarkably superficial understanding of theism and God (e.g. Dawkins, Hitchens, etc.). Strange, but true.
Silmarien, theism actually means “people believing in a God or gods.” That’s what the word means. If you had, however, specified that this was a personal definition of your own, then we could have discussed your reasons for thinking that, instead of wasting time.
Although there are many different gods and goddesses and ideas about what “god” means in different religions, “God” is a thing with a well-understood meaning. Again, all we need to do is check a dictionary. A god is “the Being perfect in power, wisdom, and goodness who is worshipped as creator and ruler of the universe”.
Definition of GOD
I’m not particularly convinced by this argument for God. Not being familiar with this way of forming an argument I can’t say for certain; but the refutation sounds plausible. It would certainly follow the pattern for other apologetics arguments of trying to define God into existence, and failing due to a logical fallacy.
It’s true, there is “evidence”, technically. There are oral history stories. There are accounts in the Bible. There is corroboration of some of the events in the story. But these are very weak forms of evidence, which Christians themselves routinely dismiss when they appear in non-Christian religions, and so non-Christians can dismiss them in the Jesus story. Would you believe, for example, that a Greek god brought a worshipper back to life, just because an ancient historian recorded it as having happened?
I’m not. But I am familiar with Pascal’s Wager and its many flaws.
Perhaps you ought to clarify: what do you mean when you say you accepted Pascal’s Wager, and why did you do so?
That sounds reasonable. Wouldn’t that be your reaction if you were told that there was someone who you couldn’t see, but who loved you and wanted to talk to you, and who could hear all the things you said to him…but who never answered you?
Wouldn’t you, at this point, think “Maybe the reason I can’t see him and he never answers my calls is that he doesn’t exist.”
In order to say that, you have to accuse cvanwey of being a liar. He told you that he had been seeking earnestly, and had failed to find God, but you say “we cannot know if this is true”.
If God existed, then you’d be correct. And cvanwey would be in good company, if you’ve ever read what Bertrand Russell said he would say if he met God.
But if you’re using “blame” in the emotional sense, saying that cvanwey is angry or bitter against God, then I can’t understand you. He’s already told you he isn’t. Don’t you believe him?
I’ll add my voice to his. I don’t blame God for not giving me evidence of his existence, any more than I blame Darth Vader for destroying Alderaan. Of course, if I did die and meet God, then I would consider him to blame for my not knowing He existed. But that's not what we’re talking about, is it?
No, they don’t. It’s not the atheists who end up looking silly here.
I’d better explain the purpose of the FSM.
And so, if you think that’s ridiculous – and you should, it is – then show me how. Prove that the FSM did not create the universe. Take the cosmological argument, and prove that the FSM could not have been the thing that caused the universe to begin. Because pasta can’t create universes? Ah, but this is magical pasta. Because the FSM was invented only a few years ago? That’s what people think, but I tell you that I’ve talked to Him, and feel the truth in my heart. Because most people don’t believe in the FSM? So you’re saying that if lots of people did believe in Him, you would too? Because it’s not up to you to disprove the FSM, it’s up to me to prove it? Strange, you didn’t say that when you thought the cosmological argument proved God.
1) Why is there something instead of nothing? I don’t know. And until you have some evidence to back up your answer, I suggest you not invent answers.
Now it looks like I’m spoiling your party, interrupting your philosophical musings with an irreverent and ridiculous fairy tale about a plate of flying pasta. But that’s the point. The FSM could be the answer, and you can’t prove that He couldn’t, because the logic that you use works just as well for Him as it does for God. Or for an infinite number of other possible causes.
And that is why the arguments for God fail.
What you said doesn’t make much sense. How does a creature exist outside of time? How would it be able to do anything without time to act in? How could it have one thought after another? And is it possible to exist if you are immaterial? Is there a difference between immaterial and nonexistent?
I find myself drawn to Christianity for a variety of reasons, not all of which are relevant to this thread. But I have found the arguments compelling, especially since I've gotten a better idea of what those arguments actually are.I see. So do you believe the cosmological argument for God is sound – and, if so, how would you make it?
As Silmarien said, God isn't a "creature" that exists in the way you or I do.What you said doesn’t make much sense. How does a creature exist outside of time? How would it be able to do anything without time to act in?
It wouldn't, at least not in the way you and I do.How could it have one thought after another?
Are you an eliminativist?And is it possible to exist if you are immaterial? Is there a difference between immaterial and nonexistent?
Your FSM posting isn't as poignant as you might think. Supposing you wanted even a half-hearted response to it, I'd point out that the FSM is composite in a way that classical theism supposes God is not and could not be, and would thus require further explanation.No, to the Flying Spaghetti Monster. Isn’t it perfectly clear that He is the one who made the universe? See my answer to Silmarien on this.
The OP-er is 'Christian'. Furthermore, you are in a Christian based apologist's arena. What I believe @InterestedAtheist is presenting, is that all such arguments presented, thus far, are meant to start pointing to the Abrahamic God. In which case, we have a 'definition' of this 'god', and it's defined in the human written book - the Bible.
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