Agere sequitur esse and the First Way

[public hermit]

If you are familiar with Aquinas's Five Ways, then you know the First Way is the argument from motion. To wit:

"The first and more manifest way is the argument from motion. It is certain, and evident to our senses, that in the world some things are in motion. Now whatever is in motion is put in motion by another, for nothing can be in motion except it is in potentiality to that towards which it is in motion; whereas a thing moves inasmuch as it is in act. For motion is nothing else than the reduction of something from potentiality to actuality. But nothing can be reduced from potentiality to actuality, except by something in a state of actuality...It is therefore impossible that in the same respect and in the same way a thing should be both mover and moved, i.e. that it should move itself. Therefore, whatever is in motion must be put in motion by another. If that by which it is put in motion be itself put in motion, then this also must needs be put in motion by another, and that by another again. But this cannot go on to infinity, because then there would be no first mover, and, consequently, no other mover; seeing that subsequent movers move only inasmuch as they are put in motion by the first mover; as the staff moves only because it is put in motion by the hand. Therefore it is necessary to arrive at a first mover, put in motion by no other; and this everyone understands to be God."

SUMMA THEOLOGIAE: The existence of God (Prima Pars, Q. 2)

In a recent article (and in other places), Edward Feser argues that one reading of the First Way is not just that God is the first cause in a chain of motion, but that "changing things could not even exist at any given moment if there were no divine cause keeping them in being" (see link below).

Feser says, "Recall the principle agere sequitur esse or “action follows being,”...the principle, together with other considerations raised by arguments like the argument from motion, entails a concurrentist account of God’s relationship to the world. Given that action follows being – that the way a thing operates reflects its mode of existing – we can conclude that a thing would have no causal efficacy at all without God’s cooperation or concurrence with its activity...For if a thing could act or operate apart from God’s action, then since the way a thing acts reflects its mode of being, it could also exist apart from God’s action."

I think a rough and ready way to think about the First Way is like a chain of dominoes. The last domino can't fall unless the one before it falls, and the one before it, and on back until you get to the first domino. The idea being that some Unmoved Mover must start the whole process rolling. The problem with this way of thinking about the First Way is that one could conclude that God starts the process rolling, but does not sustain it.

As far as I can tell, Feser is arguing that things must be preserved in existence in order for change from potency to actuality to even occur, i.e. agere sequitur esse entails divine concurrence. Whatever the case, arguments like the one Feser is trying to make are important in that they provide a possible response not only to claims of deism, but also to claims that an eternal universe would imply no Creator. In other words, even an eternal chain of events would need divine concurrence to sustain the eternal chain in being.

Thoughts?

Edward Feser: Agere sequitur esse and the First Way

 

[zippy2006]

If you are familiar with Aquinas's Five Ways, then you know the First Way is the argument from motion. To wit:

"The first and more manifest way is the argument from motion. It is certain, and evident to our senses, that in the world some things are in motion. Now whatever is in motion is put in motion by another, for nothing can be in motion except it is in potentiality to that towards which it is in motion; whereas a thing moves inasmuch as it is in act. For motion is nothing else than the reduction of something from potentiality to actuality. But nothing can be reduced from potentiality to actuality, except by something in a state of actuality...It is therefore impossible that in the same respect and in the same way a thing should be both mover and moved, i.e. that it should move itself. Therefore, whatever is in motion must be put in motion by another. If that by which it is put in motion be itself put in motion, then this also must needs be put in motion by another, and that by another again. But this cannot go on to infinity, because then there would be no first mover, and, consequently, no other mover; seeing that subsequent movers move only inasmuch as they are put in motion by the first mover; as the staff moves only because it is put in motion by the hand. Therefore it is necessary to arrive at a first mover, put in motion by no other; and this everyone understands to be God."

SUMMA THEOLOGIAE: The existence of God (Prima Pars, Q. 2)

In a recent article (and in other places), Edward Feser argues that one reading of the First Way is not just that God is the first cause in a chain of motion, but that "changing things could not even exist at any given moment if there were no divine cause keeping them in being" (see link below).

Feser says, "Recall the principle agere sequitur esse or “action follows being,”...the principle, together with other considerations raised by arguments like the argument from motion, entails a concurrentist account of God’s relationship to the world. Given that action follows being – that the way a thing operates reflects its mode of existing – we can conclude that a thing would have no causal efficacy at all without God’s cooperation or concurrence with its activity...For if a thing could act or operate apart from God’s action, then since the way a thing acts reflects its mode of being, it could also exist apart from God’s action."

I think a rough and ready way to think about the First Way is like a chain of dominoes. The last domino can't fall unless the one before it falls, and the one before it, and on back until you get to the first domino. The idea being that some Unmoved Mover must start the whole process rolling. The problem with this way of thinking about the First Way is that one could conclude that God starts the process rolling, but does not sustain it.

As far as I can tell, Feser is arguing that things must be preserved in existence in order for change from potency to actuality to even occur, i.e. agere sequitur esse entails divine concurrence. Whatever the case, arguments like the one Feser is trying to make are important in that they provide a possible response not only to claims of deism, but also to claims that an eternal universe would imply no Creator. In other words, even an eternal chain of events would need divine concurrence to sustain the eternal chain in being.

Thoughts?

Edward Feser: Agere sequitur esse and the First Way

I wrote a paper on this so I'm going to be nitpicky. Strange, I know.

Feser's argumentation here strikes me as muddled. His conclusions are right, but his inferential reasoning is sloppy. For example:

• The First Way implies concurrentism, but agere sequitur esse doesn't necessarily do so, especially if you haven't yet demonstrated that esse requires divine conservation (that our existence itself is due to God's constant power).
• Similarly, I don't think the First Way demonstrates that esse requires divine conservation. It isn't obvious that existence itself is a kind of motion or an actualized potential. Aquinas himself seems to think that additional argumentation is required for that claim.
• So a direct argument from the First Way to concurrentism seems cleaner and more effective.
• The weight that Feser expects the "agere sequitur esse" principle to bear seems like too much to me. Premises such as the necessity of act and potency or the existence of change are much stronger candidates.

All that said, I haven't read his most recent books on these topics.

I think a rough and ready way to think about the First Way is like a chain of dominoes. The last domino can't fall unless the one before it falls, and the one before it, and on back until you get to the first domino. The idea being that some Unmoved Mover must start the whole process rolling. The problem with this way of thinking about the First Way is that one could conclude that God starts the process rolling, but does not sustain it.

There are actually a number of issues at play here. What you describe in this quote is the distinction between per se and per accidens causality (incidentally, Feser addresses this in his book Aquinas). This is the biggest confusion with the First Way: the idea that it is like a chain of dominoes, falling down in temporal succession. Aquinas isn't talking about disjointed temporal causes, like when one domino falls, and then it hits another domino, and then that falls, and so on. ...Or how Abraham is born, and then he and Sarah give life to Isaac, and then Isaac and Rebecca give life to Jacob, and so on. Instead he is talking about a kind of direct cause, such as when your hand pushes a shuffleboard stick which is pushing a shuffleboard puck. That chain is instantaneous causality that is not temporally disjointed, and it is what Thomas has in mind in the First Way.

Concurrentism is a thesis in the realm of divine action. Conservationism or "Mere Conservationism" is the idea that everything in existence is held in existence by God at each point in time. But Conservationism is agnostic on the question of whether God has any role to play in bringing about or making possible actions of agents or substances. There are some theists who think God holds us in being but does nothing regarding the reality of our actions (that our actions are brought about entirely by ourselves). Concurrentism says God concurs in every action, and that without the divine power we could not act. So for the concurrentist, when I karate chop PH God is conserving my hand in being (conservationism) and he is also concurring in the action of the karate chop itself (concurrentism). The mere conservationist would say that he conserves my hand in being, but the chop is my business, not God's. (Occasionalism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy))

Agere sequitur esse is a bit more vague, but in general it attempts to draw a connecting link between one's actions and one's being. The idea of reasoning from effect to cause and believing that observing effects allows us to make inferences about the nature of the being/substance that is generating those effects is based on the principle of agere sequitur esse. The simple fact that there are "mere conservationists" who do not go as far as concurrentism proves that Feser's interpretation of agere sequitur esse is not universal.

Whatever the case, arguments like the one Feser is trying to make are important in that they provide a possible response not only to claims of deism, but also to claims that an eternal universe would imply no Creator. In other words, even an eternal chain of events would need divine concurrence to sustain the eternal chain in being.

I do think mere conservationism could be seen as a kind of refined deism. The eternal universe response is related to per se/per accidens causality. Concurrence isn't quite the same as conservation, and conservation suffices to dismiss the idea that an eternal universe needs no God.

A spectrum could be drawn:

Deism - Mere Conservationism - Concurrentism -< Occasionalism/Pantheism (one or the other)

I realize some are visual learners. TL;DR:

 

[public hermit]

o for the concurrentist, when I karate chop PH God is conserving my hand in being (conservationism) and he is also concurring in the action of the karate chop itself

Hahaha I wasn't quite clear on your point, but the visial helped.

This is a really helpful analysis. Question: was Aquinas's position conservationism given his distinction between God as primary cause and creatures as secondary? If so, isn't it odd that Feser, a Thomist, would argue for concurrence? Or, maybe he finds the tradeoff worth it, maybe?

 

[zippy2006]

Hahaha I wasn't quite clear on your point, but the visial helped.

Good.

This is a really helpful analysis. Question: was Aquinas's position conservationism given his distinction between God as primary cause and creatures as secondary? If so, isn't it odd that Feser, a Thomist, would argue for concurrence? Or, maybe he finds the tradeoff worth it, maybe?

Yeah, feel free to ask questions about that post because it's a bit confusing. First I should say that I don't quite understand your question in the context of primary vs. secondary causality. Are you thinking that someone who distinguishes God as the primary cause and creatures as secondary causes would have a reason to eschew concurrentism? (Secondary causality is certainly a big issue in concurrentism, but I just want to make sure I'm understanding your reasoning.)

Generally speaking Thomists are concurrentists, and concurrentists also affirm conservation, but not all conservationists affirm concurrentism. There are some debates about whether Thomas himself was a concurrentist, but I think the common consensus would be that he was. This issue never really came to a head in Thomas' time, so there is some leeway. I think that in time Thomists swerved from Suarez' qualified concurrentism into a more thoroughgoing concurrentism, so that nowadays you get qualified concurrentists who follow Suarez, like Alfred Freddoso, and throughgoing concurrentists who follow later Thomists. "Qualified concurrentism" is closer to mere conservationism than "thoroughgoing concurrentism" is.

Clear as mud?

 

[public hermit]

Generally speaking Thomists are concurrentists, and concurrentists also affirm conservation, but not all conservationists affirm concurrentism. There are some debates about whether Thomas himself was a concurrentist, but I think the common consensus would be that he was.

That's helpful. I guess I simply assumed Thomas was conservationist and the primary/secondary distinction was a way to seperate God from human sin and allow for human freedom so that when you karate chop PH it's not God who karate chops PH. So, yes I was thinking a Thomist would eschew concurrentism. But, clearly not.

 

[public hermit]

stead he is talking about a kind of direct cause, such as when your hand pushes a shuffleboard stick which is pushing a shuffleboard puck. That chain is instantaneous causality that is not temporally disjointed, and it is what Thomas has in mind in the First Way

Back to Thomas's First Way. The argument is about the "movement" from potentiality to actuality. Isn't every entity, except for God who is pure act, constantly involved in the movement from potentiality to actuality simply by existing? For some reason, I want to think of each finite, contingent entity as being sustained by God in this constant motion from potentiality to actuality, which is what existence is for a created entity. Does that sound right?

I'm not necessarily saying that is Thomas's argument, but that is how Feser wants to read it, maybe?

 

[zippy2006]

That's helpful. I guess I simply assumed Thomas was conservationist and the primary/secondary distinction was a way to seperate God from human sin and allow for human freedom so that when you karate chop PH it's not God who karate chops PH. So, yes I was thinking a Thomist would eschew concurrentism. But, clearly not.

Okay, I see what you're saying. Yeah, the problem of evil is easily one of the most difficult objections to concurrentism. I don't know if I should even try to answer... You should probably just go read de malo and then come back with a full quiver of objections.

I don't necessarily want to get too far into this, but the first thing the Thomist would say is that God can cause an act without causing the evil that ...guides... the act. They would follow Augustine in insisting that evil is a privation and therefore is not created by God. So the privative/evil aspect of some act is not "concurred with" by God's power, for only things that have positive existence can be created or concurred with by God. If you want to talk more about this I would probably need to refresh my memory with some old books.

Concurrentism is about all secondary causes, though. The early discussion focused on simple things like fire and its effect (i.e. heat or light). There were actually discussions about the three Hebrews and Nebuchadnezzar's fiery furnace, such as whether a protective barrier shielded them from the fire or God simply stopped concurring with the heat of the fire (or more precisely, whether the latter was a true possibility). The idea that God would have to fight with his own creation by erecting a barrier was rejected by the Thomists on what were essentially grounds of sovereignty. Of course free agents and sin raise some difficult objections that eventually had to be confronted, but that wasn't the original context of concurrentism.

Back to Thomas's First Way. The argument is about the "movement" from potentiality to actuality. Isn't every entity, except for God who is pure act, constantly involved in the movement from potentiality to actuality simply by existing? For some reason, I want to think of each finite, contingent entity as being sustained by God in this constant motion from potentiality to actuality, which is what existence is for a created entity. Does that sound right?

I'm not necessarily saying that is Thomas's argument, but that is how Feser wants to read it, maybe?

Yep, that's right. And Thomas believed that even if it wasn't his point in the First Way. Feser does seem to read the First Way along those lines, or at least he believes it is a legitimate interpretation. I don't think Aristotle believed this, which is why Aquinas doesn't seem to take it for granted.