A Modal Cosmological Argument

[Crandaddy]

Here's an admittedly crude formulation of a modal cosmological argument that has been bouncing around in my head for a while. I'd like to know what y'all think of it.

Consider the following statement:


There is a mountain of gold in my backyard.


As I'm sure you already suppose, this statement is false. In actual fact, there is no mountain made of gold in my backyard. But still, the statement makes sense to you. It seems to be perfectly coherent. You can easily conceptualize things like backyards, mountains, and objects that are made out of gold. Moreover, there seems to be no conceptual difficulty combining these things so that it does indeed seem that there might actually be (or have been, or be at some time in the future) a mountain that is made out of gold in a backyard somewhere. Perhaps it might even be that everyone in the entire world will suddenly decide to give me all their gold and I will choose to have it made into a mountain in my backyard. Okay, so that's highly unlikely to ever happen, but technically it does have a non-zero probability. (Hey, a guy can dream, can't he? ) So in order to make the above statement true, it seems we should change it to the following:


Possibly, there is a mountain of gold in my backyard.


Now consider this statement:


There is a Bradford pear tree in my backyard.


Unlike the first statement about my fictitious mountain of gold, this statement is true. If you were to come over to my house and look into my backyard, you would see that therein does indeed grow a real, living Bradford pear tree. You would be able to reach out and touch its trunk and feel the roughness of its bark. Were you to come in early March, you would be able to see its lovely white blossoms and smell their rather noxious odor. It's actually there. But it doesn't have to be there. I could remove it, so that it would no longer be there. Instead of a Bradford pear tree, whoever planted it might have decided that a maple would be preferable, or a pecan, or no tree at all. In fact, it seems to make perfect sense that there might not ever have been any Bradford pear trees, or any trees, or even any plants at all. We can go even further and say that there seems to be no trouble conceiving that there might never have been any plots of land that might be called backyards, or any human persons who might call them such. Indeed, it seems perfectly coherent to say that there might not ever have been any physical objects at all! For it seems that for any physical object whatsoever (and for argument's sake we may treat humans, animals, and any ETs there might be as purely physical objects as well; whether or not they really are is immaterial for our purposes [pun intended ]), we could, in principle, say of it that “that object does not exist,” and, though our statement would be false, it would make perfect sense. But if it makes sense to say of any physical object whatsoever that it doesn't exist, then what should prevent us from going ahead and making the stronger claim that:


Possibly, no physical objects exist.


So now we have that, while it is not actually the case that there is a mountain of gold in my backyard, it is possibly the case that there may be. And while it is in fact actually the case that there's a Bradford pear in my backyard, there doesn't have to be; it is possibly the case that that it isn't really there. Not only is it possible that the Bradford pear isn't there, but, as we've seen, it also seems to be possible that there aren't any physical objects at all.


Now, when we make existential statements, whether positive or negative, the truth conditions of these statements seem to be dependent upon whether or not there actually exist grounds that make them true. What I mean is that, e.g., for the statement “there is a Bradford pear tree in my backyard” to be true, it seems there must actually exist some state of affairs that satisfies the content of my claim. And when I say that “there is a mountain of gold in my backyard,” it seems the falsehood of my claim must depend on there not actually existing any such satisfying conditions. Satisfying conditions such as these that serve as the grounds for true existential statements are called truthmakers. But what about other types of statements? More specifically, what about modal claims, such as that “it is possible that [such and such] is the case”? I would say that these too must have truthmakers if they are to be true, and indeed, I think that for there to be any true proposition at all, then there must needs be a truthmaker for it. But if it is true, as I said above, that it is possible that there are no physical objects at all, then what might there be left over that would make such a statement true? Well, as we saw with our fictitious golden mountain, we can conceptualize things like backyards, mountains, and items of gold. We understand that these things have certain properties, like spatial and temporal extension, quantifiable relations to units of measure, or chemical properties (in the case of gold, anyway), but what all of these properties--and all properties, characteristics, or other attributes whatsoever, I would say--have in common is their abstract nature.


Now, what we abstract from in forming our concepts are physical objects. And when we say that a certain physical object exists, the truthmaker for our claim is just that physical object. But I would say that when we turn to alethic modal claims (i.e. that possibly or necessarily something or other is the case) regarding physical objects, we cease to talk about the physical objects by themselves (i.e. as concrete states of affairs) and begin to talk in abstraction about immaterial natures or essences that might or might not be concretely realized in actual, corporeal physical substance. So when we say that, possibly, it is the case that no physical objects exist, the truthmaker for our true claim would seemingly have to be an object that is not of a physical nature, but that is more closely related to our abstract conceptualizations.


But what of the modal status of this object? As I've tried to show, physical objects are modally contingent beings, meaning that it is possibly the case that they exist, but it is not necessarily the case that they exist (whether or not they actually exist is beside the point). But what of the modality of our truthmaker(s) for such modal claims? Might it (they) possibly not exist, just as physical objects might not exist? I think not. For by modal axiom 5 we can say that:


For any proposition p, if it is possibly the case that p, then it is necessarily possibly the case that p.


Assuming S5 modality, which allows mutual accessibility among all possible worlds, and applying this to our alethic modal claims regarding physical objects, we can see that in order for it to be true that it is possibly the case that no physical objects exist, it would have to be necessarily true (i.e. true in every possible world) that it is possibly the case that no physical objects exist. But if the latter statement is true, and if it is the case that this truth needs a truthmaker, then its truthmaker would seem to have to be a necessary being. For if it weren't a necessary being, then it could not serve as the truthmaker for this necessary truth in worlds where it does not exist, and it doesn't seem very plausible that non-indexical propositions can shift truthmakers.


To put this in syllogistic form, then:


1) Possibly, there are no physical objects. (premise)


2) For any proposition p, if it is possibly the case that p, then it is necessarily possibly the case that p. (premise, modal axiom 5)


3) It is necessarily possibly the case that there are no physical objects (by 1 and 2)


4) For any propostion q, if q is true, then q has a truthmaker. (premise)


5) 3 has a truthmaker. (by 3 and 4)


6) For any truthmaker t, if t is a truthmaker for a modally necessary proposition, then t is a modally necessary being. (premise)


Therefore,


7) The truthmaker for 3 is a modally necessary being. (by 3, 5, and 6)


So what are the implications of all this for theism?


Well, according to orthodox Christian theism, God is (among other things) 1) a necessarily existent being, 2) a necessarily omniscient being, and 3) is necessarily the creative cause of the physical (and otherwise contingent) order in this or any other possible world.


If the above argument is correct, then it shows that there exists at least one necessary being (i.e. a being that can't possibly not exist) that serves as the truthmaker for the proposition that “possibly, there are no physical objects,” and that this truthmaker must be non-physical (another characteristic I would say God necessarily has, in his essence at least). So item 1 is proven to exist.


Furthermore, as I briefly touched on earlier, it seems that this being (or perhaps beings [plural]) would need to have something very much like an abstract existence, since it seems that for an object to be concretely realized in physical substance, it must be coherently conceivable. It appears to be possible, for example, for a cube-shaped object to suddenly appear on my desk, but it does not appear to be possible for an object that is both cube-shaped and spherical at the same time to suddenly appear on my desk. I would say that this is largely (if not entirely) because such an object is not coherently conceivable. The close relationship there seems to be between pure possibilia and the abstractions we invoke in our alethic modal claims seems to suggest that these possibilia have something very much like a mental existence, themselves. Perhaps we might say that these are objects within the Divine Intellect, or perhaps they are just snapshots, as it were, of the Divine Intellect itself, as examined piecemeal by our own discursive, propositional, finite intellects. So while not proven in the strict sense, item 2 seems very plausible.


Item 3, however, is where things get a bit sticky. While it does seem that what we have here are either necessarily existent mental objects within the Divine Intellect or simply finite perspectives on the Divine Intellect itself, and while it is reasonably clear these objects are enfleshed, as it were, in physical substance, it is not quite so clear on the above argument that an act or acts of divine volition are what make up the difference. Still, I think a fairly strong analogy can be drawn from our own experience with volition. For example, it is actually the case that there is a book sitting on the floor to my right as I type this, and it is also true that, possibly, said book will be sitting on my desk at some time in the future by an act of my volition. Now, I know that in order for there to be an act of my own volition it is necessary for me to be able to understand, in abstracto, as possible the state of affairs I wish to accomplish and to understand that said state of affairs is actualizable in concreto. Now say that tomorrow it will happen that a huge mound of gold will suddenly pop into existence in my backyard, apparently ex nihilo. We already know that that mound of gold is possible, and now we know that tomorrow it will be actual. So far, the analogy holds. But in order for an act of my own volition to occur, another ingredient is required--the willful act itself, which is the (efficiently) causal principle of the book's finding its way onto my desk. And while I think it is quite plausible to believe (and in fact I do believe) that neither the mound of gold nor anything else can just pop into existence uncaused, further argumentation is required to show that this must be the case. So although I don't think that item 3 is quite as plausible as 2 (on the present argument, anyway), I still think it's pretty plausible, given the analogical argument. Still, however, I think the atheist might be within his rights to insist that stronger argumentation be given in support of it.


Thoughts?

 

[Eudaimonist]

Indeed, it seems perfectly coherent to say that there might not ever have been any physical objects at all!

Internally coherent, perhaps. But I'm not sure what to make of this "possibility" other than that it can be imagined. I don't know that this is actually possible in reality. It may actually be impossible.

Anyway, I still have to get through the rest of your post, but that is a stumbling block right there.


eudaimonia,

Mark

 

[quatona]

Now, when we make existential statements, whether positive or negative, the truth conditions of these statements seem to be dependent upon whether or not there actually exist grounds that make them true. What I mean is that, e.g., for the statement “there is a Bradford pear tree in my backyard” to be true, it seems there must actually exist some state of affairs that satisfies the content of my claim. And when I say that “there is a mountain of gold in my backyard,” it seems the falsehood of my claim must depend on there not actually existing any such satisfying conditions. Satisfying conditions such as these that serve as the grounds for true existential statements are called truthmakers. But what about other types of statements? More specifically, what about modal claims, such as that “it is possible that [such and such] is the case”? I would say that these too must have truthmakers if they are to be true, and indeed, I think that for there to be any true proposition at all, then there must needs be a truthmaker for it.

It seems to me that you are equivocating "truth" when making this step.
Furthermore, for an "it´s possible that..." statement all that´s required is: We see no logical grounds to exclude the possibility. It´s a statement about unfalsifiability - that´s a completely different category than existential statements, it´s a statement about a statement, not about reality.

 

[Paradoxum]

Even if I accept the syllogism and argument up to (7) it still has nothing to do with God. Also 'being' is probably the wrong word to use at that point.

In the omniscience argument you jump from having a necessary substance to saying it has an intellect when there is no need to say that. The reason there can't be a square circle is because there is a contradiction in it. The lines can't be both straight and curved. All we have to say is that the physical world is such that it at our level it doesn't allow contradictions or the illogical. It may be possible that the necessary substance is intelligent, but there is no reason to think it is probable.

The necessary substance may well be the logical cause of the universe. I don't really want to argue this as I think for you to say God exists you must prove it is intelligent, and that is the more important discussion.

 

[Elioenai26]

Here's an admittedly crude formulation of a modal cosmological argument that has been bouncing around in my head for a while. I'd like to know what y'all think of it.

Consider the following statement:


There is a mountain of gold in my backyard.


As I'm sure you already suppose, this statement is false. In actual fact, there is no mountain made of gold in my backyard. But still, the statement makes sense to you. It seems to be perfectly coherent. You can easily conceptualize things like backyards, mountains, and objects that are made out of gold. Moreover, there seems to be no conceptual difficulty combining these things so that it does indeed seem that there might actually be (or have been, or be at some time in the future) a mountain that is made out of gold in a backyard somewhere. Perhaps it might even be that everyone in the entire world will suddenly decide to give me all their gold and I will choose to have it made into a mountain in my backyard. Okay, so that's highly unlikely to ever happen, but technically it does have a non-zero probability. (Hey, a guy can dream, can't he? ) So in order to make the above statement true, it seems we should change it to the following:


Possibly, there is a mountain of gold in my backyard.


Now consider this statement:


There is a Bradford pear tree in my backyard.


Unlike the first statement about my fictitious mountain of gold, this statement is true. If you were to come over to my house and look into my backyard, you would see that therein does indeed grow a real, living Bradford pear tree. You would be able to reach out and touch its trunk and feel the roughness of its bark. Were you to come in early March, you would be able to see its lovely white blossoms and smell their rather noxious odor. It's actually there. But it doesn't have to be there. I could remove it, so that it would no longer be there. Instead of a Bradford pear tree, whoever planted it might have decided that a maple would be preferable, or a pecan, or no tree at all. In fact, it seems to make perfect sense that there might not ever have been any Bradford pear trees, or any trees, or even any plants at all. We can go even further and say that there seems to be no trouble conceiving that there might never have been any plots of land that might be called backyards, or any human persons who might call them such. Indeed, it seems perfectly coherent to say that there might not ever have been any physical objects at all! For it seems that for any physical object whatsoever (and for argument's sake we may treat humans, animals, and any ETs there might be as purely physical objects as well; whether or not they really are is immaterial for our purposes [pun intended ]), we could, in principle, say of it that “that object does not exist,” and, though our statement would be false, it would make perfect sense. But if it makes sense to say of any physical object whatsoever that it doesn't exist, then what should prevent us from going ahead and making the stronger claim that:


Possibly, no physical objects exist.


So now we have that, while it is not actually the case that there is a mountain of gold in my backyard, it is possibly the case that there may be. And while it is in fact actually the case that there's a Bradford pear in my backyard, there doesn't have to be; it is possibly the case that that it isn't really there. Not only is it possible that the Bradford pear isn't there, but, as we've seen, it also seems to be possible that there aren't any physical objects at all.


Now, when we make existential statements, whether positive or negative, the truth conditions of these statements seem to be dependent upon whether or not there actually exist grounds that make them true. What I mean is that, e.g., for the statement “there is a Bradford pear tree in my backyard” to be true, it seems there must actually exist some state of affairs that satisfies the content of my claim. And when I say that “there is a mountain of gold in my backyard,” it seems the falsehood of my claim must depend on there not actually existing any such satisfying conditions. Satisfying conditions such as these that serve as the grounds for true existential statements are called truthmakers. But what about other types of statements? More specifically, what about modal claims, such as that “it is possible that [such and such] is the case”? I would say that these too must have truthmakers if they are to be true, and indeed, I think that for there to be any true proposition at all, then there must needs be a truthmaker for it. But if it is true, as I said above, that it is possible that there are no physical objects at all, then what might there be left over that would make such a statement true? Well, as we saw with our fictitious golden mountain, we can conceptualize things like backyards, mountains, and items of gold. We understand that these things have certain properties, like spatial and temporal extension, quantifiable relations to units of measure, or chemical properties (in the case of gold, anyway), but what all of these properties--and all properties, characteristics, or other attributes whatsoever, I would say--have in common is their abstract nature.


Now, what we abstract from in forming our concepts are physical objects. And when we say that a certain physical object exists, the truthmaker for our claim is just that physical object. But I would say that when we turn to alethic modal claims (i.e. that possibly or necessarily something or other is the case) regarding physical objects, we cease to talk about the physical objects by themselves (i.e. as concrete states of affairs) and begin to talk in abstraction about immaterial natures or essences that might or might not be concretely realized in actual, corporeal physical substance. So when we say that, possibly, it is the case that no physical objects exist, the truthmaker for our true claim would seemingly have to be an object that is not of a physical nature, but that is more closely related to our abstract conceptualizations.


But what of the modal status of this object? As I've tried to show, physical objects are modally contingent beings, meaning that it is possibly the case that they exist, but it is not necessarily the case that they exist (whether or not they actually exist is beside the point). But what of the modality of our truthmaker(s) for such modal claims? Might it (they) possibly not exist, just as physical objects might not exist? I think not. For by modal axiom 5 we can say that:


For any proposition p, if it is possibly the case that p, then it is necessarily possibly the case that p.


Assuming S5 modality, which allows mutual accessibility among all possible worlds, and applying this to our alethic modal claims regarding physical objects, we can see that in order for it to be true that it is possibly the case that no physical objects exist, it would have to be necessarily true (i.e. true in every possible world) that it is possibly the case that no physical objects exist. But if the latter statement is true, and if it is the case that this truth needs a truthmaker, then its truthmaker would seem to have to be a necessary being. For if it weren't a necessary being, then it could not serve as the truthmaker for this necessary truth in worlds where it does not exist, and it doesn't seem very plausible that non-indexical propositions can shift truthmakers.


To put this in syllogistic form, then:


1) Possibly, there are no physical objects. (premise)


2) For any proposition p, if it is possibly the case that p, then it is necessarily possibly the case that p. (premise, modal axiom 5)


3) It is necessarily possibly the case that there are no physical objects (by 1 and 2)


4) For any propostion q, if q is true, then q has a truthmaker. (premise)


5) 3 has a truthmaker. (by 3 and 4)


6) For any truthmaker t, if t is a truthmaker for a modally necessary proposition, then t is a modally necessary being. (premise)


Therefore,


7) The truthmaker for 3 is a modally necessary being. (by 3, 5, and 6)


So what are the implications of all this for theism?


Well, according to orthodox Christian theism, God is (among other things) 1) a necessarily existent being, 2) a necessarily omniscient being, and 3) is necessarily the creative cause of the physical (and otherwise contingent) order in this or any other possible world.


If the above argument is correct, then it shows that there exists at least one necessary being (i.e. a being that can't possibly not exist) that serves as the truthmaker for the proposition that “possibly, there are no physical objects,” and that this truthmaker must be non-physical (another characteristic I would say God necessarily has, in his essence at least). So item 1 is proven to exist.


Furthermore, as I briefly touched on earlier, it seems that this being (or perhaps beings [plural]) would need to have something very much like an abstract existence, since it seems that for an object to be concretely realized in physical substance, it must be coherently conceivable. It appears to be possible, for example, for a cube-shaped object to suddenly appear on my desk, but it does not appear to be possible for an object that is both cube-shaped and spherical at the same time to suddenly appear on my desk. I would say that this is largely (if not entirely) because such an object is not coherently conceivable. The close relationship there seems to be between pure possibilia and the abstractions we invoke in our alethic modal claims seems to suggest that these possibilia have something very much like a mental existence, themselves. Perhaps we might say that these are objects within the Divine Intellect, or perhaps they are just snapshots, as it were, of the Divine Intellect itself, as examined piecemeal by our own discursive, propositional, finite intellects. So while not proven in the strict sense, item 2 seems very plausible.


Item 3, however, is where things get a bit sticky. While it does seem that what we have here are either necessarily existent mental objects within the Divine Intellect or simply finite perspectives on the Divine Intellect itself, and while it is reasonably clear these objects are enfleshed, as it were, in physical substance, it is not quite so clear on the above argument that an act or acts of divine volition are what make up the difference. Still, I think a fairly strong analogy can be drawn from our own experience with volition. For example, it is actually the case that there is a book sitting on the floor to my right as I type this, and it is also true that, possibly, said book will be sitting on my desk at some time in the future by an act of my volition. Now, I know that in order for there to be an act of my own volition it is necessary for me to be able to understand, in abstracto, as possible the state of affairs I wish to accomplish and to understand that said state of affairs is actualizable in concreto. Now say that tomorrow it will happen that a huge mound of gold will suddenly pop into existence in my backyard, apparently ex nihilo. We already know that that mound of gold is possible, and now we know that tomorrow it will be actual. So far, the analogy holds. But in order for an act of my own volition to occur, another ingredient is required--the willful act itself, which is the (efficiently) causal principle of the book's finding its way onto my desk. And while I think it is quite plausible to believe (and in fact I do believe) that neither the mound of gold nor anything else can just pop into existence uncaused, further argumentation is required to show that this must be the case. So although I don't think that item 3 is quite as plausible as 2 (on the present argument, anyway), I still think it's pretty plausible, given the analogical argument. Still, however, I think the atheist might be within his rights to insist that stronger argumentation be given in support of it.


Thoughts?

This work of yours is quite remarkable and fascinating to say the least.

It seems to me to be reminiscent of Plantinga's work with the Ontological argument.

I have given it a cursory examination and would like to discuss it further when time avails. I am at work now!

It is very encouraging to see another person utilizing this forum for in depth philosophical discussion. Keep up the good work!

 

[Gadarene]

Even if I accept the syllogism and argument up to (7) it still has nothing to do with God. Also 'being' is probably the wrong word to use at that point.

Pretty much this.

There are plenty of other posited gods that fit the description implied by the argument, and there is no reason why there couldn't be some necessary naturalistic being. Both are equally plausible given that we have no prior information or knowledge on either. As with many arguments for God, it oversteps the mark and becomes inconclusive.

 

[Wiccan_Child]

[snipped for brevity]

Still, however, I think the atheist might be within his rights to insist that stronger argumentation be given in support of it.

Indeed

To (over)simplify your argument, it concludes that there must be something, because something exists. This reveals next to nothing about what that 'something' might be - it might no longer be in existence, and it could be something as simple as a quantum wibble that caused the Big Bang.

Given such a nebulous conclusion, I don't think anyone could disagree with it.

However, the Cosmological Argument traditionally argues for the existence of God by using causality - everything that exists had a beginning, every beginning had a cause, the universe exists, thus it had a beginning, thus it had a cause, and that cause is God. Your argument concludes neither God nor uses causality; thus, calling it the Cosmological Argument seems misleading.

So I'm confused by your goal here. It's a good idea, but it doesn't really go anywhere exciting, least of all in the direction of theology. I also question the rigidity of some of the premises (namely (4) and (6)), but that's a minor dissent.

 

[Crandaddy]

It seems to me that you are equivocating "truth" when making this step.

I don't see the equivocation. When I say that "there's a Bradford pear tree in my backyard" and that "possibly, there's a Bradford pear in my backyard" are both true, I mean that they're both true in the same sense of "true." Now, I would say that I'm talking about different things--in the case of the former, simply the bare fact of the tree, while in that of the latter, the abstract nature or essence of the tree. But I don't mean any different sense of truth.

Furthermore, for an "it´s possible that..." statement all that´s required is: We see no logical grounds to exclude the possibility.

But in order for us to see no logical grounds to exclude the possibility of something, we need to have some idea of what it is for something to be possible in the first place, do we not?

It´s a statement about unfalsifiability - that´s a completely different category than existential statements, it´s a statement about a statement, not about reality.

I'm not entirely sure what you're trying to say here, but you seem to think that I'm making some sort of epistemological argument (i.e. about what we know or what we can know, in other words). I'm not making an epistemological argument. I'm making a metaphysical argument (i.e. about what actually is the case), and I'm claiming that it actually is the case that, possibly, no physical objects exist.

Even if I accept the syllogism and argument up to (7) it still has nothing to do with God.

Sure it does . See my item 1 immediately following. It proves that there is a necessary being that is non-physical. To be sure, the theistic God would have to be much more than that, but he would have to be at least that.

In the omniscience argument you jump from having a necessary substance to saying it has an intellect when there is no need to say that. The reason there can't be a square circle is because there is a contradiction in it. The lines can't be both straight and curved. All we have to say is that the physical world is such that it at our level it doesn't allow contradictions or the illogical.

But why doesn't the physical world allow there to be contradictions or illogical states of affairs, whether at our level or at any other? Might it be because it's just the nature of the physical world to be that way?

It seems to me to be reminiscent of Plantinga's work with the Ontological argument.

Well, Plantinga's ontological argument is also a modal argument, so it at least shares that much in common. However, my argument is cosmological and not ontological, as it takes as it's basis the worldly observation that physical objects don't have to be there. Ontological arguments work with some conception of God (as, e.g., the greatest conceivable being, a maximally excellent being, etc.), and they don't rely on worldly observations.

And thank you for the kind words, btw!

There are plenty of other posited gods that fit the description implied by the argument, and there is no reason why there couldn't be some necessary naturalistic being. Both are equally plausible given that we have no prior information or knowledge on either. As with many arguments for God, it oversteps the mark and becomes inconclusive.

I would say that necessarily there is only one God, but that's neither here nor there so far as the present argument is concerned. The important things to see are that there has to be at least one necessary being, that this being must be non-physical (non-contingent, really), and that it appears to be closely related to our abstract concepts.

And what do you mean by a "naturalistic" being?

To (over)simplify your argument, it concludes that there must be something, because something exists. This reveals next to nothing about what that 'something' might be - it might no longer be in existence, and it could be something as simple as a quantum wibble that caused the Big Bang.

My argument logically proves that that "something" both necessarily exists (i.e. can't possibly not exist) and that it is not of a physical nature. If you accept all of my premises, then you have to accept this.

However, the Cosmological Argument traditionally argues for the existence of God by using causality - everything that exists had a beginning, every beginning had a cause, the universe exists, thus it had a beginning, thus it had a cause, and that cause is God. Your argument concludes neither God nor uses causality; thus, calling it the Cosmological Argument seems misleading.

See my response to Elioenai26.

So I'm confused by your goal here. It's a good idea, but it doesn't really go anywhere exciting, least of all in the direction of theology.

It suggests that the world has something like a necessary mental existence that grounds all logically, and I would say metaphysically, possible worlds.

The main (syllogistic) argument doesn't show all that, but my preliminary argumentation in support of premise 1 is an attempt to show the mental character of pure possibilities.

 

[Crandaddy]

And thanks to everyone for their comments, btw!!!

 

[Elioenai26]

And thanks to everyone for their comments, btw!!!

Keep up the good work.

You seem to possess a strong command of the understanding of logical argumentation.

 

[quatona]

I don't see the equivocation. When I say that "there's a Bradford pear tree in my backyard" and that "possibly, there's a Bradford pear in my backyard" are both true, I mean that they're both true in the same sense of "true." Now, I would say that I'm talking about different things--in the case of the former, simply the bare fact of the tree, while in that of the latter, the abstract nature or essence of the tree. But I don't mean any different sense of truth.

A statement about a possibility (even though it in involves an object) is - a statement about the possibility, not about the nature or essence of the object (whatever that might mean, anyway).

But in order for us to see no logical grounds to exclude the possibility of something, we need to have some idea of what it is for something to be possible in the first place, do we not?

Not really. I think it´s the other way round. We have an idea what renders a hypothetical impossible, and going from there we decide that everything that we can´t exclude as being impossible is possible.

I'm not entirely sure what you're trying to say here, but you seem to think that I'm making some sort of epistemological argument (i.e. about what we know or what we can know, in other words). I'm not making an epistemological argument. I'm making a metaphysical argument (i.e. about what actually is the case), and I'm claiming that it actually is the case that, possibly, no physical objects exist.

When commenting I had no idea where your argument was going to go. I simply stopped at the first point that appeared to be questionable to me.

 

[Paradoxum]

Sure it does . See my item 1 immediately following. It proves that there is a necessary being that is non-physical. To be sure, the theistic God would have to be much more than that, but he would have to be at least that.

Why do you call it a being? It could just a necessary non-physical force or a law.

But why doesn't the physical world allow there to be contradictions or illogical states of affairs, whether at our level or at any other? Might it be because it's just the nature of the physical world to be that way?

It is just in the nature of the physical world not to allow those things. And the physical world springs from whatever non-physical law or state that preceded it.

 

[Wiccan_Child]

My argument logically proves that that "something" both necessarily exists (i.e. can't possibly not exist) and that it is not of a physical nature. If you accept all of my premises, then you have to accept this.

On the contrary, I have a number of objections to both your logic and your premises.

For instance, you ask, "But if it is true, as I said above, that it is possible that there are no physical objects at all, then what might there be left over that would make such a statement true?". You then infer that a) this truthmaker must be an actual entity, a coherent and discrete object, albeit one that is 'non-physical'. I disagree with that. The truthmaker could be more abstract. It could be a phenomenon that occurred simply because nothing was there to stop it: a quantum fluctuation. It could be something as simple as logical necessity: "Why did that first object exist instead of not exist? Because it couldn't do anything but exist (â la the Ontological argument)". Etc. Thus, while there may well be such a truthmaker, it's unproven that this truthmaker is an actual object that has existence.

You also leave aside the definition of 'physical', which is problematic: just how broad is your definition? What makes the mountain of gold 'physical' and your deduced truthmaker non-physical? It seems you're using it as a place-holder for 'anything that exists', thus placing the truthholder outside. But, what if all things which exist can't be treated in the same manner with regard to their origins? What if the truthmaker was itself a physical object, and your overarching definitions mean you gloss over that quite real possibility?

Which leads to another objection: you inferred, from the possibility of mountains of gold and so forth, that we can imagine the non-existence of all physical objects - "But if it makes sense to say of any physical object whatsoever that it doesn't exist, then what should prevent us from going ahead and making the stronger claim that: Possibly, no physical objects exist." I would say that no, we can't say that, since it has yet to be established that any and all physical objects are capable of not existing. You haven't proven that it is possible for there to have been no physical objects.

This ties into another of your comments: "So when we say that, possibly, it is the case that no physical objects exist, the truthmaker for our true claim would seemingly have to be an object that is not of a physical nature, but that is more closely related to our abstract conceptualizations." - you haven't yet proven that the truthmaker must be an object, and not something even more abstract like an absence of an object or a logical or physical law. Or, if your definitions of 'object' and 'exists' are sufficiently broad to include such possibilities, then your conclusion seems misleading.

See my response to Elioenai26.

Which neatly summarises my own long-winded objections above:

"However, my argument is cosmological and not ontological, as it takes as it's basis the worldly observation that physical objects don't have to be there."

Can you prove that physical objects don't have to be there?

It suggests that the world has something like a necessary mental existence that grounds all logically, and I would say metaphysically, possible worlds.

The main (syllogistic) argument doesn't show all that, but my preliminary argumentation in support of premise 1 is an attempt to show the mental character of pure possibilities.

The mental characteristic? As in, of or pertaining to a mind?

"The close relationship there seems to be between pure possibilia and the abstractions we invoke in our alethic modal claims seems to suggest that these possibilia have something very much like a mental existence, themselves." - isn't that just a bald assertion on your part?

"Perhaps we might say that these are objects within the Divine Intellect, or perhaps they are just snapshots, as it were, of the Divine Intellect itself," - we might say that, but why would we? Isn't the existence of a Divine Intellect what you're setting out to prove?

 

[Crandaddy]

A statement about a possibility (even though it in involves an object) is - a statement about the possibility, not about the nature or essence of the object (whatever that might mean, anyway).

But what is it to be possible, or to be a possibility? What do we mean? What are we talking about? If the statement is true, and if it has something that makes it true (a truthmaker), as I have argued, then what sort of thing might that truthmaker be? Now, you might deny my claim that such truths have truthmakers, but then what would you say makes them true? Could you put forward a positive theory? I have a positive theory--namely, that our abstract concepts have access to abstract natures that exist necessarily and determine all logical possibilities.

Not really. I think it´s the other way round. We have an idea what renders a hypothetical impossible, and going from there we decide that everything that we can´t exclude as being impossible is possible.

But "impossible" is a negative term; it negates possibility. I don't think we can have a concept of the negation of a term unless we first have some concept of the term itself.

Why do you call it a being? It could just a necessary non-physical force or a law.

Does it even make sense to talk about a force or law without some being to exert or obey it? Even if we could so make sense of them, I don't see how we could do it without reifying them into beings of some sort.

It is just in the nature of the physical world not to allow those things.

We agree!

And the physical world springs from whatever non-physical law or state that preceded it.

Still, we can deny the existence of those laws or states, and our denial is rationally coherent, is it not?

The truthmaker could be more abstract.

Abstractions occur in minds. "Abstractly comprehensible" is closer to what I think you're trying to say. I mention this because on first reading I thought you might actually be saying that these truthmakers might have something like an abstract existence themselves, which is pretty much what I'm saying!

It could be a phenomenon that occurred simply because nothing was there to stop it: a quantum fluctuation.

Note the use of "occurred" (past tense). If it's not still occurring, or if it's broadly logically possible (rationally coherent, basically) that it doesn't occur at or during whatever time, then it's not necessary. Therefore, per my argument, it's not our truthmaker.

It could be something as simple as logical necessity: "Why did that first object exist instead of not exist? Because it couldn't do anything but exist (â la the Ontological argument)".

Okay, but then what is logical necessity? Does it make sense to talk of logical necessity independently of any mental context?

You also leave aside the definition of 'physical', which is problematic: just how broad is your definition? What makes the mountain of gold 'physical' and your deduced truthmaker non-physical? It seems you're using it as a place-holder for 'anything that exists', thus placing the truthholder outside. But, what if all things which exist can't be treated in the same manner with regard to their origins? What if the truthmaker was itself a physical object, and your overarching definitions mean you gloss over that quite real possibility?

Admittedly, as I mentioned in my original post, I'm using "physical" rather loosely. Really, what I'm getting at is contingency and not physicality per se. The main thing to see is that for whatever object that has concrete existence in the natural world (including the universe, the multiverse, etc.), you could, in principle, conceptually isolate it and say of it that that object does not exist, and your statement, though false, would nevertheless be rationally coherent (unlike a square circle, for example). That's what I'm getting at.

I would say that no, we can't say that, since it has yet to be established that any and all physical objects are capable of not existing. You haven't proven that it is possible for there to have been no physical objects.

Well, can you name any concretely existing (or possibly concretely existing) object in the natural world whose existence it is rationally incoherent to deny? I can't.

[Y]ou haven't yet proven that the truthmaker must be an object, and not something even more abstract like an absence of an object or a logical or physical law.

An absence of anything without something else to go along it can't be a truthmaker or anything else; it's just nothing. As for logical and physical laws, how does it make sense to talk of the former except in the context of ideas or relations between ideas, or of the latter as really separable from the physical entities that follow them?

Can you prove that physical objects don't have to be there?

I don't think I have to. If every physical object we've ever encountered and every physical object that we can imagine might exist can be coherently conceived to not exist, then it seems the burden is on him who claims that some physical object is necessary to show why it is so.

The mental characteristic? As in, of or pertaining to a mind?

Or something analogous to a mind, yes.

"The close relationship there seems to be between pure possibilia and the abstractions we invoke in our alethic modal claims seems to suggest that these possibilia have something very much like a mental existence, themselves." - isn't that just a bald assertion on your part?

An assertion, to be sure, but hardly bald, methinks. I'd wager my mountain of gold that you won't ever in your life come across a quadrilateral triangle. That's not just because I can't conceive of such a thing; it's because I take my inability to conceive of it to be indicative of its absolute impossibility. I know that it's the essential nature of a triangle that it just can't be quadrilateral, and because of that I know that such a thing just can't be--not now or ever. But in order for me to know this, my mind must have some access to the world of essential natures independent of their concrete existence.

Now, if you'll grant, just for the sake of argument, that this is correct, then won't you say that these essential natures have the appearance of abstract objects in an eternal mind?

we might say that, but why would we? Isn't the existence of a Divine Intellect what you're setting out to prove?

No theistic argument sets out to prove the existence of God, fully formed and with all his attributes (not any good theistic argument, anyway). I maintain that my syllogism proves the existence of a necessarily-existent, non-physical being, and that my premise 1 is very plausible due to conceptual analysis of concrete natural objects, as well as that of incoherent (impossible?) objects such as quadrilateral triangles, as per the foregoing.

 

[quatona]

But what is it to be possible, or to be a possibility? What do we mean? What are we talking about?

Yes, I think that´s a very good question, as investigating it will keep us from losing ourselves in the contemplation of statements that don´t have any concepts attached to them.
What I am trying to express when saying "Yes, it´s possible that this idea corresponds to reality": I have no reliable basis for excluding this idea. As such, the statement "It´s possible" is not a statement about the subject/reality/the world but about my thinking or, hopefully, about thinking in general.
IOW: What I am trying to express when saying "Its possible" is "I am able to conceive of it being the case." Again: It´s not a statement about the the subject, it´s a statement about me.

If the statement is true, and if it has something that makes it true (a truthmaker), as I have argued, then what sort of thing might that truthmaker be? Now, you might deny my claim that such truths have truthmakers, but then what would you say makes them true?

What I seem to be denying, in the first place, is that "It´s possible/impossible" can be a "truth/untruth". Even though we can string together the statement "It´s true that it´s possible" I doubt that this is a meaningful statement (i.e. represents a concept), to begin with.
Above you thankfully reminded us to keep in mind the question "What do I mean when saying...", and in case of "It´s true that it´s possible" I have no idea what it might mean to communicate. To me it appears to be word salad. Look, we could add further introductions ("It´s possible that it´s true that it´s possible that it´s true" or "It´s (not) the case that it´s impossible that it´s true that it´s possible", and these statements may sound increasingly deep and offer us increasing opportunities for sophism wizardry, but it seems to me that they are increasingly losing the very property which both of us apparently value high: Being the result of an urge to express an idea. Our thinking gets lost in translation into words, and instead of concepts it´s words that take the lead in our thinking.

Could you put forward a positive theory?

A positive theory concerning what exactly?

I have a positive theory--namely, that our abstract concepts have access to abstract natures that exist necessarily and determine all logical possibilities.

I´m not sure I understand this. Is this merely a long-winded way of saying "logic is the inescapable basis of our thinking"?
Please don´t take it personally, but I always get suspicious when I hear stuff like "abstract natures" and "necessary existence". Reiterating your reminder from the beginning of your post: They don´t seem to point to any idea I might possibly want to express or even can conceive of.
Something exists or it doesn´t. "Necessary" is not a property of this "existing", in my understanding it is a statement about logic, about the way we think.
"Abstract ideas have access to abstract natures" appears to be the attempt to postulate entities external to our thinking where there´s absolutely no logical necessity to postulate such.
But I invite you to get me intrigued, and to tell me what idea you are trying to express when using such terms.

But "impossible" is a negative term; it negates possibility. I don't think we can have a concept of the negation of a term unless we first have some concept of the term itself.

While this observation is accurate concerining the technical part, the semantics part, I do not agree with the underlying assumption that semantics determine the way we think, or tell us anything about the method we use in order to arrive at a statement. It is entirely possible that the initial concept we have is "it´s impossible" (i.e. that "impossible", although the word is semantically a negation, is the actual concept, and "possible" is merely the negation of this concept).

Let me try to explain: In our development of cognition, there´s first a state where everything appears possible - we have no way of excluding anything from potentially happening (and since everything is possible, we don´t even have a concept of "possible"). It´s not until we experience that something is "impossible" to occur (i.e. we have acquired the concept "impossible") we will acquire the concept "possible" as the negation of "impossible".

See, you say "concept of the negation of a term", and from my understanding this is word salad again. We do not have "concepts of terms", terms are our signifiers that represent our concepts.
Words don´t determine concepts or conceptualization, and analysis of semantic technicalities doesn´t necessarily allow conclusions on the way we conceptualize.

To summarize: It seems to me that our conceptual method of arriving at an "It´s possible..." statement is searching for reliable reasons to reject the idea. If we can´t find any we are trying to express this mental state as "It´s possible...".
In again other words: It´s a way of expressing that we (must) remain open to the idea that it is true. It´s not a final judgement, it´s a way of expressing the withholding of a final judgement (upon further incoming information). That said, I find it somewhat absurd to try to attach a "truth/untruth" label towards a statement that merely expresses indecision, openness and the withholding of judgement.

As a practical example: I have absolutely no idea what "abstract natures" are supposed to be, I don´t even have a concept that these words point to. Consequently, I have no idea what might possibly exclude their existence. So - although not having any clue at all - I can (and must) say "Well, whatever, it´s possible there are such entities". This is not a statement about "abstract natures", though, it´s entirely a statement about me and my current state of mind.

 

[Crandaddy]

What I am trying to express when saying "Yes, it´s possible that this idea corresponds to reality": I have no reliable basis for excluding this idea. As such, the statement "It´s possible" is not a statement about the subject/reality/the world but about my thinking or, hopefully, about thinking in general.
IOW: What I am trying to express when saying "Its possible" is "I am able to conceive of it being the case." Again: It´s not a statement about the the subject, it´s a statement about me.

So, are you suggesting that when we say that "possibly, [something or other] is the case" we're talking about our ability to conceive of it being the case? If so, then I agree with you, but I think in some cases we mean something a bit stronger than that.

Take the quadrilateral triangle, for instance. It seems to me that when we say that it is not possible for there to be quadrilateral triangles, we're not simply saying that we can't imagine there being quadrilateral triangles. Rather, we're making the stronger claim that the properties of being quadrilateral and being triangular cannot coexist at the same time and in the same sense in the same individual object. So you see, we're talking about properties as they exist (in whatever sort of existence they might have) independently both of particular individual objects and of our minds. For even if all of us humans went extinct, it would still be the case that quadrilateral triangles can't exist.

What I seem to be denying, in the first place, is that "It´s possible/impossible" can be a "truth/untruth". Even though we can string together the statement "It´s true that it´s possible" I doubt that this is a meaningful statement (i.e. represents a concept), to begin with.
Above you thankfully reminded us to keep in mind the question "What do I mean when saying...", and in case of "It´s true that it´s possible" I have no idea what it might mean to communicate. To me it appears to be word salad. Look, we could add further introductions ("It´s possible that it´s true that it´s possible that it´s true" or "It´s (not) the case that it´s impossible that it´s true that it´s possible", and these statements may sound increasingly deep and offer us increasing opportunities for sophism wizardry, but it seems to me that they are increasingly losing the very property which both of us apparently value high: Being the result of an urge to express an idea. Our thinking gets lost in translation into words, and instead of concepts it´s words that take the lead in our thinking.

I do understand how those extra words might look like excessively verbose, perhaps even meaningless, word salad, but they do add content to the expression.

Consider the statement, "it's raining in Mawsynram." I've selected this Indian village because supposedly it holds the Guinness record for being the rainiest place on earth. Now, I don't know for a fact that it's raining in Mawsynram, but for all I know it's probably raining there. So, let's just say that the statement is true.

But right here we can see that there are two alternative ways to assert the same fact of it's raining in Mawsynram: We could simply say that "it's raining in Mawsynram," or we could say that "it's true that it's raining in Mawsynram." Both of these statements assert the fact of it's raining in Mawsynram, but they don't do so in the same way. If we let R stand for "it's raining in Mawsynram," the logical structure of the first statement is simply "R," but that of the second is "it's true that R." Notice that in the second statement we can separate out two distinct statements, namely "R" and "it's true that [fill in the blank]."

So what's the difference? Well, when we assert simply "R," we're simply asserting the content of the fact, so we're talking about facts and not statements. But when we assert that "it's true that R," we're not simply talking about facts anymore; rather we're talking about statements. We're asserting that the statement R has the property of being true, that it asserts the actual fact of it's raining in Mawsynram. So, while both statements ultimately assert the same fact, they go about it in different ways.

Words like possibly and necessarily, on the other hand, are not independent statements. If I just say "possibly" or "necessarily," I'm not expressing anything that has the logical structure of a complete statement. Rather, what these words (which are called modals) do is modify the statement. The important thing to see here is that the addition of a modal to a statement modifies the statement so that it no longer means quite the same thing as the bare assertion of the statement itself.

So, for instance, "Bradford pear trees don't exist" is false. However, it might be true that "possibly, Bradford pear trees don't exist," depending on what we mean by the statement.

A positive theory concerning what exactly?

I mean a positive theory of why statements such as "possibly, it's the case that..." or "necessarily, it's the case that..." are true. Does anything make them true? That's what I'm asking.

I´m not sure I understand this. Is this merely a long-winded way of saying "logic is the inescapable basis of our thinking"?
Please don´t take it personally, but I always get suspicious when I hear stuff like "abstract natures" and "necessary existence". Reiterating your reminder from the beginning of your post: They don´t seem to point to any idea I might possibly want to express or even can conceive of.
Something exists or it doesn´t. "Necessary" is not a property of this "existing", in my understanding it is a statement about logic, about the way we think.
"Abstract ideas have access to abstract natures" appears to be the attempt to postulate entities external to our thinking where there´s absolutely no logical necessity to postulate such.
But I invite you to get me intrigued, and to tell me what idea you are trying to express when using such terms.

What I'm suggesting is that the world does not simply consist of concrete, substantial objects, so that if we were to take all of them away there would be absolutely nothing left. I'm saying that even if all of those things were completely annihilated in their concrete substantiality (absolutely no trace of them left, whatsoever), then it still would not be the case that there is just simply, absolutely nothing at all.

The reason is that because even in a world completely devoid of any substantial objects, it would still have to be the case in that world that possibly there are substantial objects. There are no galaxies, stars, planets, plants, animals, or so on in that world, but still it is possible (in a broadly logical, rationally coherent sense) that these things might exist in that world.

But if this is true, then why is it true? Well, when we assert true statements about concrete substantial facts, such as that "there's a Bradford pear in my backyard," these statements have certain facts that make them true, so that in the absence of those facts our statements would not be true. Thus, were there not the fact of the Bradford pear growing in my backyard, the statement "there's a Bradford pear in my backyard" would be false.

Now, I say that when we make modal claims like "possibly, Bradford pear trees don't exist" in an absolute, broadly logical sense, these claims, if they are to be true, need to have truthmakers. However, these truthmakers can't be concrete substantial facts, since it might (again, in an absolute, broadly logical sense) be the case that none of them exist. Nor can it be human (or human-like) minds, since none of those might exist either. No, we're talking about pure possibilities, themselves, independent of any concrete substantial facts or minds, which in their concrete substantiality might not exist.

Therefore, when I say that "possibly, Bradford pear trees don't exist," I'm examining in abstraction the world of pure possibilities and declaring of the essential content of what I conceptualize as a Bradford pear tree that it might not be the case that it is concretely realized in actual, physical substance (that it actually exists, in other words).

While this observation is accurate concerining the technical part, the semantics part, I do not agree with the underlying assumption that semantics determine the way we think, or tell us anything about the method we use in order to arrive at a statement. It is entirely possible that the initial concept we have is "it´s impossible" (i.e. that "impossible", although the word is semantically a negation, is the actual concept, and "possible" is merely the negation of this concept).

What I think you're trying to say here is that the names we attach to our concepts in order to signify them don't determine the content of the concepts, themselves. The names that we give our concepts are merely arbitrarily assigned tags that we use in order to signify them, in other words. If this is what you mean, then I agree.

Let me try to explain: In our development of cognition, there´s first a state where everything appears possible - we have no way of excluding anything from potentially happening (and since everything is possible, we don´t even have a concept of "possible"). It´s not until we experience that something is "impossible" to occur (i.e. we have acquired the concept "impossible") we will acquire the concept "possible" as the negation of "impossible".

Well, I agree that in order to isolate a conceptual item in thought it is necessary to have a concept of the negation, or removal, of that concept for contrast. Applying this to our concepts of possible/impossible, I would say that it is necessary to have a coherent concept of some state of affairs. By contrast, whatever is not coherently conceivable is impossible.

Now, to be sure, there are a lot of things that I don't understand, and I don't doubt that a good many of them I can't understand. But still, I seem to be within my rights to call some things absolutely impossible in a sense stronger than simply my inability to understand how it could be so. That the law of non-contradiction, that something can both be and not be at the same time and in the same sense, might be false, for example. Some things we just can't relinquish on pain of undermining our basic rationality.

See, you say "concept of the negation of a term", and from my understanding this is word salad again. We do not have "concepts of terms", terms are our signifiers that represent our concepts.
Words don´t determine concepts or conceptualization, and analysis of semantic technicalities doesn´t necessarily allow conclusions on the way we conceptualize.

Okay, then. Replace it with "concept of the negation of a concept." We can't conceive of the negation of a concept until we first grasp the positive content of the concept. That's really closer to what I mean. Does it help?

To summarize: It seems to me that our conceptual method of arriving at an "It´s possible..." statement is searching for reliable reasons to reject the idea. If we can´t find any we are trying to express this mental state as "It´s possible...".
In again other words: It´s a way of expressing that we (must) remain open to the idea that it is true. It´s not a final judgement, it´s a way of expressing the withholding of a final judgement (upon further incoming information). That said, I find it somewhat absurd to try to attach a "truth/untruth" label towards a statement that merely expresses indecision, openness and the withholding of judgement.

So, what you're saying (I think) is that, on your understanding, when we say that "possibly, it is the case that [whatever]," what that amounts to is something like "as far as I know, it might or might not be the case that [whatever]."

If this is what you mean, then I would say that, yes, there is a sense in which a possibility statement might express something like that, but not all possibility statements express something like that. I think there's also a sense in which a possibility statement might express the absolute possibility of an abstractly conceived nature's being an actually existing concrete object.

Thus rendered, the statement that "possibly, there are triangles" is not expressing that "for all I know, there might or might not be triangular objects in the world," but rather something more like "it is the nature of the property of triangularity that it can be exemplified in physical objects."

As a practical example: I have absolutely no idea what "abstract natures" are supposed to be, I don´t even have a concept that these words point to. Consequently, I have no idea what might possibly exclude their existence. So - although not having any clue at all - I can (and must) say "Well, whatever, it´s possible there are such entities". This is not a statement about "abstract natures", though, it´s entirely a statement about me and my current state of mind.

I hope the foregoing will help you to better understand what I'm talking about.

*Note to all of my commenters*

I should perhaps mention that I expect my schedule to get much busier in the very near future, so don't expect these long-winded responses, or even responses at all on a daily basis. I'll try to answer sincere questions and respond to serious challenges, but don't think I'm ignoring you or not taking you seriously if I don't immediately respond or offer a much shorter response. I might be ignoring you or not taking you seriously, but I might also be too busy to offer more.

 

[quatona]

Hey Cranberry,

I highly appreciate your comments, explanations and elaborations, and I´d like to particularly commend you on the thoughtful, constructive, collaborative style you go on about the discussion. Very enjoyable!

Sorry to say that - as of now - I can´t respond to your post in the way it deserves because this morning I am leaving for a few days´ vacation. I´ll come back to this thread when I´m home again.

 

[Lord Emsworth]

Why do you call it a being? It could just a necessary non-physical force or a law.

The way I understand it, in an ontological argument the use of the term "being" is fairly broad. It could refer to anything that 'has existence', even non-physical forces or laws, and you could easily replace it by "entity".

Have a quick look here:
being - Wiktionary

 

[Crandaddy]

quatona,

Thank you for the kind words! I hope you have an enjoyable vacation!

Lord Emsworth,

Characteristic of ontological arguments is that they're not based on mundane facts or attributes. Typically, they rely on an abstract conception of God under some description or other and use that to argue for his actual existence.

But of course, this won't work with just anything (e.g. Gaunilo's island), so ontological arguments do tend to be helpful for showing that God, if he exists, can't have an existence like you or I or anything else that populates the natural order, all of which might not exist. On the contrary, God, if he exists, would have to be a necessarily existent being, so that if it could be shown that he's even possible, then it could be shown that he's actual, not only in this world but in every other as well. Thus, in order to work, ontological arguments rely on God's having a very different sort of existence from ordinary worldly things, which, to be sure, he must have if he is to be God.

 

[Crandaddy]

Okay, could someone please explain how this "reps" number thing works? Only two days ago I had only 10 of these "reps," and now (well, as of this last post) I have 37,985,797,230,893.