Only until 1997, the IAEA made inspections all the way until 2003 showing that Iraq wasn't trying to working on WMDs. IAEA managed to correctly assess that situation.
Albright was part of that IAEA team as I said already. I have copied and pasted portions of a testimony of Albright before congress in April 2017. This was from a pdf to my iPhone & awkward but connected & I have the 12 page report linked.
As far as problems from Iran with the JCPOA:
Testimony of David Albright,
President of the
Institute for Science and International Security,
before the House Subcommittee on National Security,
Committee of Oversight and Government Reform
Assessing the Iran Deal: Examining Iranian Non-Compliance with the Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action and United Nations Security Council
Resolution 2231
April 5, 2017
From this testimony:
Iran continues to test ballistic missiles that are inconsistent with or in violation of UN Security
Council resolution 2231. Iran’s ongoing development of missiles capable of carrying nuclear
weapons is a direct threat to the nuclear deal and cannot be treated as somehow unrelated to the
JCPOA.
Heavy Water
Iran has twice had more than its heavy water limit of 130 metric tonnes inside Iran, as has been
noted by the IAEA in its quarterly reports. As it was approaching its second violation, the IAEA
warned Iran that it would soon reach the cap. Instead of stopping heavy water production or
blending down some heavy water into normal water, Iran knowingly violated the 130 metric
tonnes cap
One of the most serious compliance issues concerns Iran’s on-going refusal to allow the IAEA to
access military sites and interview personnel…………
Because of fears that such access requests could torpedo the JCPOA, the IAEA and
the Obama administration resisted pushing Iran to allow access to military sites. Therefore, the
JCPOA remains largely unverified by the IAEA on the nuclear weapons development side…….
In addition, fear of derailing the JCPOA negotiations or the agreement itself led to a poorly
designed arrangement between Iran and the IAEA on investigating and drawing conclusions
about alleged nuclear weapons-related high explosive work at a site at the Parchin military
complex. Not surprisingly, this weak arrangement in which the IAEA was limited in its visits
and sample taking at the site, failed to resolve the issue. Moreover, it put the IAEA in a weaker
position to access the Parchin site in the future to resolve this issue, which includes making sense
out of uranium particles detected by environmental sampling taken the one time the IAEA visited
the site. The presence of these particles combined with many previous, suspicious site
alterations by Iran are dramatic evidence that Iran likely conducted secret nuclear weapons
activities at Parchin, despite Iran’s on-going denials. However, the IAEA has not been able to
make that conclusion.
Inhibition of Investigation into Iran’s Past Military Nuclear Program.
…..
To this day, the IAEA has not been able to state that
Iran has addressed its concerns and questions about past nuclear weapons activities or to
determine the exact status of what Iran achieved and may have hidden away
Natural Uranium Imports. The Procurement Working Group recently allowed Iran to acquire
149 metric tonnes of natural uranium in payment for Iranian heavy water exported to Russia
instead of cash. The receipt of this uranium, which contributes to building Iran’s nuclear
capability, is an added benefit Iran did not deserve. Iran’s nuclear chief proclaimed that this
decision would allow Iran to have 60 percent more stockpiled uranium than it did prior to the
JCPOA. Ali Akbar Salehi, the head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, was quoted by
the semi-official Fars News Agency stating that Iran would receive a final batch of 149 metric
tonnes of natural uranium, in addition to 210 metric tonnes already delivered since early 2016.
The 149 metric tonnes of uranium were received instead of a cash payment for part of its cache
of heavy water in Oman, heavy water that should have instead been blended down into normal
water, if the deal had been seriously enforced. Interestingly, the caching of heavy water in Oman
and the decision to approve sending natural uranium to Iran were considered secret by the Joint
Commission and the Obama administration. These 149 metric tonnes, if enriched to weapon-
grade uranium, would be enough for over 15 nuclear weapons.
Export Controls
According to the JCPOA, “Iran intends to apply nuclear export policies and practices in line with
the internationally established standards for the export of nuclear material, equipment and
technology (emphasis added).”12 Iran has not committed to do so, and Tehran could interpret
this condition far differently than the United States
