Also from AI:
Cross reference feasibility of protecting Christians with possibility of increased access to oil supplies:
cross‑reference the feasibility ranking we made with each theatre’s realistic potential to increase US access to oil supplies. Below I give a compact 2×2 style assessment (Feasibility vs. Oil‑Supply Potential), a short ranked list combining both factors, and practical policy recommendations -- all with sources for the key energy facts.
Quick 2×2 snapshot (Feasibility vs. Oil‑supply potential)
— Quadrant axes:
Feasibility of effective US action (from our infographic) vs
Potential to improve US access to oil (commercially and strategically).
- Iraq / parts of Syria — High feasibility / Very high oil potential
— Iraq is one of the world’s largest holders of proven oil reserves and a major producer; it produced ~4 million b/d and aims to expand capacity toward ~6 million b/d by 2029. This makes Iraq the single largest oil prize among the candidate theatres. U.S. Energy Information Administration+1
- Nigeria (Middle Belt / coastal fields) — Medium‑High feasibility / High oil potential
— Nigeria is a major African oil producer (production in the 1–1.7 million b/d range in recent reporting) with large reserves and new refining capacity (Dangote), so stabilizing parts of Nigeria could meaningfully aid global supplies and commercial access—though logistics, security, and sovereignty complicate any security role. nuprc.gov.ng+1
- DRC / CAR / Sahel — Medium feasibility / Low-to‑medium oil potential
— DRC has some localized oil and substantial gas/methane resources in places like Lake Kivu but overall production is small relative to Iraq/Nigeria. CAR has effectively no commercial proven reserves. Sahel countries (Niger, Chad) have small-scale production that can be regionally useful but not transformational for global or US supply. Trade.gov+2TheGlobalEconomy.com+2
- Afghanistan (Taliban areas) — Low feasibility / Low-to‑medium
— Afghanistan has modest identified oil prospects and active deals with Chinese firms; it’s not a near‑term source for large volumes to the US market and political/operational constraints make any US security role infeasible. Voice of America+1
- Authoritarian states (North Korea, China, Eritrea) — Very low feasibility / Irrelevant or counterproductive for direct US oil access
— China is itself a major oil consumer and producer—but it is a great‑power actor where US military action is neither viable nor needed for oil access. North Korea and Eritrea are tiny or negligible oil sources for the global market. No military option makes sense here. (See OPEC and country profiles for comparative context). opec.org+1
Combined ranking — where US military action would both be feasible and help US oil access
- Iraq / parts of Syria -- best single match: high feasibility of limited partner‑based actions that can preserve/expand production capacity -- and very high oil potential. U.S. Energy Information Administration+1
- Nigeria -- second best: significant oil resource; US support could reduce disruptions locally, but political sovereignty and risk of empowering abusive actors are problems. nuprc.gov.ng+1
- DRC / selected Sahel states -- modest gains in oil potential but the terrain and governance limit how much US action could increase US commercial access. Trade.gov+1
- Afghanistan -- poor candidate for US access or intervention given existing Chinese commercial presence and the operational constraints. Voice of America+1
- Authoritarian, great‑power states -- not candidates.
Important caveats -- why “securing oil” and “protecting Christians” are poor reasons for large-scale military intervention
—
Mismatched objectives -- Stabilizing an oil field does not automatically protect vulnerable local communities and may even make those communities targets for retaliation. Military occupation to secure resources creates long-term governance responsibilities and moral hazards.
—
Commercial vs. state control -- Much oil development is run by international companies and state oil companies; the U.S. government’s lawful levers are diplomacy, sanctions, security assistance and commercial risk mitigation—not seizure or preferential allocation of a sovereign nation’s oil.
—
US energy context -- The U.S. has large domestic supplies, a Strategic Petroleum Reserve, and diversified suppliers; therefore, the strategic need to invade to secure oil is weak compared with less destructive policy tools. The SPR’s capacity and ongoing replenishment activities mean energy policy levers exist aside from force.
The Department of Energy's Energy.gov+1
Practical recommendations -- if the policy goal is both to protect persecuted Christians and improve US energy security
- Prioritize Iraq as a dual-focus theatre -- pursue multilateral security assistance that protects communities while helping keep production infrastructure secure — but limit direct kinetic roles to advise/ISR/targeted protection of critical civilian infrastructure under host‑nation consent. That preserves feasibility and taps Iraq’s large oil base. U.S. Energy Information Administration+1
- Engage Nigeria through diplomacy + capacity building -- increase ISR and law‑enforcement assistance to reduce attacks on oil infrastructure and communities; pair with conditional development aid and targeted sanctions to avoid empowering abusers. Support safe humanitarian corridors for displaced Christians rather than occupation. nuprc.gov.ng+1
- Use economic/energy tools before kinetic ones -- expand US refinery/petroleum diplomacy, commodity swaps, insurance and security guarantees for international oil companies, and SPR management — these can improve US access without war. The Department of Energy's Energy.gov+1
- Coordinate with partners and firms -- work with NATO, EU, African partners, and energy firms on protection of critical infrastructure and community protection programs — multilateral approaches reduce backlash and legal problems.
- Separate objectives publicly and legally -- don’t present resource access as a casus belli for humanitarian protection; instead emphasize protecting civilians, protecting infrastructure under international law, and supporting host‑nation sovereignty.
Sources for key energy claims
— Iraq — EIA country overview (Iraq’s proved reserves and production context).
U.S. Energy Information Administration
— Iraq production plans (Reuters reporting on Iraq’s plan to raise capacity toward >6 million b/d).
Reuters
— Nigeria — NUPRC 2024 figures and reporting on production / Dangote refinery effects.
nuprc.gov.ng+1
— DRC, CAR, Sahel — trade/industry and country profiles showing modest reserves and small production in DRC, negligible in CAR, limited production in Niger/Chad.
Trade.gov+2TheGlobalEconomy.com+2
— US energy tools — U.S. SPR facts and recent replenishment/budget activity.
The Department of Energy's Energy.gov+1
theonion.com
