Skeptical theism and the evidential problem of evil

public hermit

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Do you know any non-weaker argument for an omnimax god than this one is against it ? If so, please present it. If not, do you dismiss all the argments in support of an omnimax god ?

I am aware of a couple main PoE arguments. If you would like to create a thread in regards to one other than this, I will take a look at it.

That you cannot see something does not imply it does not exist. Perhaps you have not thought it through or perhaps you don't want to see it.

I was arguing that I see no reason why a finite, limited being could know the mind of God. I am confident in this assertion simply because a finite mind cannot know all that is known by an omniscient Mind. Do you disagree?

The second premise asserts that there are evils for which God could have no good reason, which is tantamount to asserting that one knows all the possible reasons God might have and none of them are sufficient. When you say, "That you cannot see something does not imply it does not exists" you are using the same argument the skeptical theist is using against Rowe (see "noseeum" inference in the OP). So, which is it? Are there gratuitous evils or no? If there are, then show how you know that. If you respond that there might be, then you are no longer in line with Rowe's argument, which is fine. I already stated that I am no longer assuming you are committed to it. And yet, you keep responding, so maybe you are?

You seem to be saying that we can debate reason and debate about Hulk because of the similarity Hulk has with us. I don't see why that would need to be the case and neither do Christians, for they reason, debate and draw conclusions about God like there is no tomorrow.

Your opinion about how some Christians might misemploy an analogy is irrelevant to this argument. And, yes, an analogy is a comparison between things that are comparable (similar) in some significant aspect(s).

If one assumes God exists, then it is reasonable to believe that he may have reasons for allowing evil.

Then you are not in agreement with Rowe. Rowe is presenting an evidential PoE, which argues that the presence of gratuitous evil is such that it makes the existence of God improbable. But, if (as you say) God may have reasons for allowing evil then said evil is no longer gratuitous. Obviously, if you are going to argue God's reasons for allowing such evil is that God does not care, then you have rejected the first premise and are still not in line with Rowe's argument.

The simplest explanation for why such evicence is not publically available is that it doesn't exist

Assuming God exists (which is what Rowe's argument assumes as the antecedent of the 1st premise), then one viable explanation for why we don't know God's reasons is that God has reasons we are not aware of, i.e. in our ignorance there are just some things we don't know. Again, for a skeptic, like yourself, to claim one should know all the reasons for why God does x is odd.

Skeptical theists who believe in an omnimax god are dogmatic, for they hold on to the belief of God's omnibenevolence despite evidence to the contrary, namely the gratuitous evil.

1) Now that you say you have evidence for the existence of gratuitous evil, I must take it you are now in support of the second premise? Please, do me a favor before we go any further. Do you hold to premise #2 or no?

2) The skeptical theist is dogmatic in that she believes (i.e. has faith) that God exists and that God is tri-omni. You may disagree with her belief, but she is not the one presenting evidence and an argument to the contrary, the atheist is. That means, the onus of proof in this scenario is the atheist who claims to have a proof. If the atheist presents an argument against what the theist believes, and within said argument the theist raises a question about a premise (i.e. in this case premise 2), then it is on the atheist to show that God cannot have reasons for the evil that occurs. So, the theist who dogmatically believes is not the one needing to prove anything.

In this argument that Rowe presents, he is the one upon whom the onus of proof rests. Why? Because he is the one setting out to prove something.

They wouldn't rejecting the second premise for that reason alone. They probably also want to believe God is omnibenevolent.

So?

[27] It only makes sense if what one is interested in what people believe in stead of in reality. The attributes of a real god do not depend of what people associate with the divine. Only te attributes of an invented god do.
[28] Indeed. To my knowledge, no one has yet been able to come up with an explanation able to reconcile the evidence with the hypothesis on an omnimax god.

These statements have nothing to do with Rowe's argument.

I hope I have made it clear that the problems are easy to mend.

You haven't made anything clear. I'm not even sure if you support Rowe's argument or not, which is what this thread is about.

Agreed. The absense of an omnimax god is the best hypothesis we have so far, but in order to make that a fact we would need additional evidence. The problem is that if one extends the possible worlds to the supernatural, evidence is hard to interpret, as there always might be an alternative explanation. That would make it almost impossible to say anthing sensible with reasonable degree of certainty about deities. That doesn't stop Christians though, who keep making claims about God, oblivous to the fact that they might be wrong, and that's an euphemism.

You must be responding to a different thread. Please see the OP.

If God exists, no. What about you ?

Like I said, we agree.

I am afraid that if one is consistently so strict, that one wouldn't be able to say anything about such god with reasonable certainty.

That is why it is called "faith." You may not like that, but most theists worth their salt are very candid about this. I, for one, am certainly not presenting proofs for God's existence or for God's attributes. I willingly admit that I am a person of faith when it comes to God.

It is the atheist who is presenting an argument to prove God's non-existence. And, it is the atheist who, in presenting a proof, is implicitly demanding strict consistency. So, the atheist can't now complain if he or she is held to the strict limitations being used in their own proof.
 
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jayem

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I don't have any comment, just wanted to highlight this and let it sink in for anyone watching this thread.

That’s the point of my post. To challenge ingrained assumptions and stimulate thinking outside the box of traditional religious dogma. And there’s nothing wrong with that. If you believe God gave you a brain, then it seems logical to me that he intends you to use it.
 
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Amoranemix

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public hermit 41 said:
Amoranemix 40 said:
[22] Do you know any non-weaker argument for an omnimax god than this one is against it ? If so, please present it. If not, do you dismiss all the argments in support of an omnimax god ?
[23] It is reasonable to assume that some instances of apparent gratuitous evil aren't, but all of them ? There is no compelling evidence to support that.
[24] That you cannot see something does not imply it does not exist. Perhaps you have not thought it through or perhaps you don't want to see it.
[22] I am aware of a couple main PoE arguments. If you would like to create a thread in regards to one other than this, I will take a look at it.
Since you failed to answer the questions, I will answer them for you :
No, you do not know an argument for an omnimax god that is not weaker than the PoE argument presented by Rowe.
No, there are weaker arguments for an omnimax god that you do not dismiss.
Hence, the best evidence we have about whether an omnimax god exists, undermines its existence.
Hence, you are biased in favour of evidence for an omnimax god and biased against evidence against it. That mindset is not conducive to reaching dependable conclusions about reality in general and an omnimax god in particular.

public hermit 41 said:
[24] I was arguing that I see no reason why a finite, limited being could know the mind of God. I am confident in this assertion simply because a finite mind cannot know all that is known by an omniscient Mind. Do you disagree?

The second premise asserts that there are evils for which God could have no good reason,[25] which is tantamount to asserting that one knows all the possible reasons God might have and none of them are sufficient.[26] When you say, "That you cannot see something does not imply it does not exists" you are using the same argument the skeptical theist is using against Rowe (see "noseeum" inference in the OP). So, which is it?[27] Are there gratuitous evils or no?[28] If there are, then show how you know that. If you respond that there might be, then you are no longer in line with Rowe's argument, which is fine. I already stated that I am no longer assuming you are committed to it. And yet, you keep responding, so maybe you are?
[24] I agree you were arguing that or something like that. I do not know what you are confident in, but that you do not see such reason seems plausible.
[25] That is not what it states. The evil being gratuitous means that there is no justification or compensation for the evil, not that there is no reason for it and even less so that there could be no reason for it.
[26] It is much easier to come up with reasons that are insufficient than reasons that are.
[27] You may have noticed that I have used that argument several times already to support conclusions that are inconvenient to Cristians. Here I have used a stronger version.
Which is what ? Do you dispute my argument and thereby the argument skeptical theists use against Rowe ?
[28] My position hasn't changed from post 24, where I stated that there is probably gratuituous evil and I know that by gathering information about information about the world, including via interaction with Christians. I even believe it is very probable. You on the other hand provided no reason to believe that God has good reason for allowing evil.
Can one know anything ? If so, how ?

public hermit 41 said:
Amoranemix 40 said:
You seem to be saying that we can debate reason and debate about Hulk because of the similarity Hulk has with us. I don't see why that would need to be the case and neither do Christians, for they reason, debate and draw conclusions about God like there is no tomorrow.
Your opinion about how some Christians might misemploy an analogy is irrelevant to this argument. And, yes, an analogy is a comparison between things that are comparable (similar) in some significant aspect(s).
You have failed to provide support for your claim that one needs to know God exists in order to reason about him. You have also failed to support your claim that in order to use Hulk in an analogy, one needs to have certain similarities with him. It is therefore reasonable to assume that these claims merely reflect your personal opinion and not reality.

public hermit 41 said:
Amoranemix 40 said:
If one assumes God exists, then it is reasonable to believe that he may have reasons for allowing evil.
Then you are not in agreement with Rowe. Rowe is presenting an evidential PoE, which argues that the presence of gratuitous evil is such that it makes the existence of God improbable.[30] But, if (as you say) God may have reasons for allowing evil then said evil is no longer gratuitous.[31] Obviously, if you are going to argue God's reasons for allowing such evil is that God does not care, then you have rejected the first premise and are still not in line with Rowe's argument.[32]
[30] Just improbable ? Your objection to the argument has until now been based on the interpretation that the argument relied on the second premise being certain. Since that is not the case, the conclusion is not certain, which according to you was reasonable ground for dismissing the argument altogether.
[31] I disagree. Evil that has a (bad) reason may still be gratuitous.
[32] Even i I were to argue that, I don't see how that would constitute a rejection of the first premise.

public hermit 41 said:
Amoranemix 40 said:
The simplest explanation for why such evicence is not publically available is that it doesn't exist.
Assuming God exists (which is what Rowe's argument assumes as the antecedent of the 1st premise), then one viable explanation for why we don't know God's reasons is that God has reasons we are not aware of, i.e. in our ignorance there are just some things we don't know. Again, for a skeptic, like yourself, to claim one should know all the reasons for why God does x is odd.[33]
Whether something is viable depends on what it is meant to be used for. If the goal is to promote god-belief, then it is indeed viable. If the goal is to learn about reality, then it is unlikely to be viable. Hence, on top of being the simplest, the skeptics explanation is also viable.
[33] You phrased that incorrectly. When referring to a hypothetical situation you should use the conditional tense. Otherwise people could misunderstand that I actually claim one should know all the reasons why God does x.

public hermit 41 said:
Amoranemix 40 said:
Skeptical theists who believe in an omnimax god are dogmatic, for they hold on to the belief of God's omnibenevolence despite evidence to the contrary, namely the gratuitous evil.
1) Now that you say you have evidence for the existence of gratuitous evil, I must take it you are now in support of the second premise? Please, do me a favor before we go any further. Do you hold to premise #2 or no?
My position still hasn't changed. Like I said in post 30 : “Premise two is also probably true, but that doesn't mean I can prove it.”

public hermit 41 said:
2) The skeptical theist is dogmatic in that she believes (i.e. has faith) that God exists and that God is tri-omni. You may disagree with her belief, but she is not the one presenting evidence and an argument to the contrary,[34] the atheist is. That means, the onus of proof in this scenario is the atheist who claims to have a proof. If the atheist presents an argument against what the theist believes, and within said argument the theist raises a question about a premise (i.e. in this case premise 2), then it is on the atheist to show that God cannot have reasons for the evil that occurs.[35] So, the theist who dogmatically believes is not the one needing to prove anything.[36]
Perhaps some atheists have faith that if there could be good reasons for an omnimax god to allow all the existing evil, someone would come up with them. If these atheists were to dismiss evidence to the contrary (that as far as I know, does not exist), their beliefs would probably also be dogmatic.
[34] A wise decision of the skeptical theist, as presenting the evidence to support her belief would allow comparison.
[35] Suppose someone presents an argument that relies on the premise that Donald Trump is a human president. Suppose I dislike the conclusion of that argument. I notice that Donald Trump might be an alien imposter. After all, we humans can't possibly know what aliens can or would do. Hence, the premise is questionable. Is the onus on the adherents of that argument to prove that Donald Trump is human ?
[36] Perhaps not in this instance, but theists make many claims and they are bad at supporting them and hopeless at proving them, even though I don't hold them to such high standards. If there were an argument that strong for the existence of Yahweh, I would probably be Christian.

public hermit 41 said:
Amoranemix 40 said:
They wouldn't rejecting the second premise for that reason alone. They probably also want to believe God is omnibenevolent.
So?
So they are doing more then simply admitting they are not in an epistemic position to know God's reasons.

public hermit 41 said:
Amoranemix 40 said:
[27] It only makes sense if what one is interested in what people believe in stead of in reality. The attributes of a real god do not depend of what people associate with the divine. Only te attributes of an invented god do.
[28] Indeed. To my knowledge, no one has yet been able to come up with an explanation able to reconcile the evidence with the hypothesis on an omnimax god.
These statements have nothing to do with Rowe's argument.
[27] I was disputing your claim. In addition, Rowe's argument is trying to demonstrate an attribute of reality.
[28] You are mistaken. That claim is related to the second premise.

public hermit 41 said:
Amoranemix 40 said:
I hope I have made it clear that the problems are easy to mend.
You haven't made anything clear. I'm not even sure if you support Rowe's argument or not, which is what this thread is about.
What part of my clarification have you failed understand ?

public hermit 41 said:
Amoranemix 40 said:
[32] If God exists, no. What about you ? [Are you in an epistemic position to know all God's thoughts and reasons?]
Like I said, we agree.
You already admitted your beliefs are dogmatic, so why evade the question ?

public hermit 41 said:
Amoranemix 40 said:
[33] That depends on how high you place the bar, how strict you are in evaluation of premises and deductions for arguments for an omnimax god as well. I am afraid that if one is consistently so strict, that one wouldn't be able to say anything about such god with reasonable certainty. I have asked you for an argument for comparison. We shall see how that goes.
That is why it is called "faith."[34] You may not like that, but most theists worth their salt are very candid about this.[35] I, for one, am certainly not presenting proofs for God's existence or for God's attributes. I willingly admit that I am a person of faith when it comes to God.
[34] All right. Hence, no matter how bad Rowe's PoE argument may be, it remains true that the skeptical theist's belief in an omnimax god is not rationally tenable.
[35] That is debatable, but I agree that if skeptical theists are claiming ''We believe an omnimax god exists. The evidence does not support it, but we believe it anyway.” and then an atheist responds that he can disprove that belief with the Rowe's PoE argument, the theist could rightfully expect support the second premise.

public hermit 41 said:
It is the atheist who is presenting an argument to prove God's non-existence. And, it is the atheist who, in presenting a proof, is implicitly demanding strict consistency. So, the atheist can't now complain if he or she is held to the strict limitations being used in their own proof.
I am rarely getting consistency from Christians when debating them. Maybe the atheist is too.
It is probably possible to provide some support by trying to exclude reasons God might have by taking advantage of the limitation posed on those reasons by the requirement of omnibenevolence.
 
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public hermit

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Just improbable ? Your objection to the argument has until now been based on the interpretation that the argument relied on the second premise being certain. Since that is not the case, the conclusion is not certain, which according to you was reasonable ground for dismissing the argument altogether

Yes. Unlike the logical PoE, the evidential PoE is arguing for a weaker conclusion, i.e. that God's existence is improbable, as stated in the OP. Nonetheless, in order to reach that conclusion the second premise needs to be certain, not probable. The second premise is the evidence. In other words, there must be instances of gratuitous evil for the conclusion to follow. If the second premise is put into question, then the conclusion is not granted. Or, no evidence, no argument.
 
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cvanwey

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Yes. Unlike the logical PoE, the evidential PoE is arguing for a weaker conclusion, i.e. that God's existence is improbable, as stated in the OP. Nonetheless, in order to reach that conclusion the second premise needs to be certain, not probable. The second premise is the evidence. In other words, there must be instances of gratuitous evil for the conclusion to follow. If the second premise is put into question, then the conclusion is not granted. Or, no evidence, no argument.

May I play?

Am I 'correct' to understand that 'sin', in the Christian view, is classified as anything that God does not like; or maybe agree with? Hence, 'sin' might be, in part anyways, synonymous with 'evil'?
 
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public hermit

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May I play?

Am I 'correct' to understand that 'sin', in the Christian view, is classified as anything that God does not like; or maybe agree with? Hence, 'sin' might be, in part anyways, synonymous with 'evil'?

I hope you are well, CV.

I wouldn't agree with how you've "classified" sin, but I doubt that matters much. I would agree that sin and evil are, in part anyways, synonymous.
 
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cvanwey

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I hope you are well, CV.

I wouldn't agree with how you've "classified" sin, but I doubt that matters much. I would agree that sin and evil are, in part anyways, synonymous.

I hope you and your loved ones are as well. :)

Let's go back to the OP.

I would assume we both agree to premise one? (i.e.):

"If an omniscient, omnibenevolent, and omnipotent God exists, there should be no gratuitous evil"


Assuming this answer is yes? Let's move to premise two.

"There exists instances of gratuitous evil"


What does God define as, or consider, "evil"?

Random 'google' search...:

"In the Old Testament, evil is understood to be an opposition to God as well as something unsuitable or inferior"


Let's start here... (IF YOU AGREE). If not, please intervene accordingly.

Assuming we agree, as above, would you also agree that God allows for the continued actions of humans, for which He is in direct opposition to?

If so, then we must re-evaluate premise one. Namely...

"If an omniscient, omnibenevolent, and omnipotent God exists, there should be no gratuitous evil"


Going a step ahead... If we are to assume that anything God does is 'good', this must mean it is good for humans to do things, in direct opposition to God's will, because God does not stop such acts. Because, as premise one suggests, God has the power to intervene.

If He does not, then the 'freewill' argument immediately gets placed to the forefront. Which, in all honestly, opens another can of worms; at least for me.

I'll stop here :)



 
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public hermit

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Assuming this answer is yes? Let's move to premise two.

"There exists instances of gratuitous evil"


What does God define as, or consider, "evil"?

Random 'google' search...:

"In the Old Testament, evil is understood to be an opposition to God as well as something unsuitable or inferior"


Let's start here... (IF YOU AGREE). If not, please intervene accordingly

Let's not start here. The argument is universal, i.e. Rowe is not targeting a specific religion, he is targeting theism, in general. Or, specifically, he is targeting any theism that admits to belief in a tri-omni God. Certianly, that might include the three Abrahamic religions, but it would also include the so-called "God of the philosophers." The scriptural reference you pulled is not needed, and only clouds the argument.

If so, then we must re-evaluate premise one. Namely...

"If an omniscient, omnibenevolent, and omnipotent God exists, there should be no gratuitous evil"

No, we don't need to re-evaluate the premise. It is sufficient.

Going a step ahead... If we are to assume that anything God does is 'good', this must mean it is good for humans to do things, in direct opposition to God's will, because God does not stop such acts. Because, as premise one suggests, God has the power to intervene.

If He does not, then the 'freewill' argument immediately gets placed to the forefront. Which, in all honestly, opens another can of worms; at least for me.

I think you're right. The idea is there is some good reason for God's allowance of evil. Rowe wants to say there are evils for which there is no good reason that God could have. The skeptical theist is arguing that we are not in the position to know such a thing. God may have reasons that are beyond us. If that is a live possibility, then the second premise doesn't hold.
 
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cvanwey

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Let's not start here. The argument is universal, i.e. Rowe is not targeting a specific religion, he is targeting theism, in general. Or, specifically, he is targeting any theism that admits to belief in a tri-omni God. Certianly, that might include the three Abrahamic religions, but it would also include the so-called "God of the philosophers." The scriptural reference you pulled is not needed, and only clouds the argument.



No, we don't need to re-evaluate the premise. It is sufficient.



I think you're right. The idea is there is some good reason for God's allowance of evil. Rowe wants to say there are evils for which there is no good reason that God could have. The skeptical theist is arguing that we are not in the position to know such a thing. God may have reasons that are beyond us. If that is a live possibility, then the second premise doesn't hold.

Fair enough, to a degree...

But I would like to again, place to the forefront, Christianity. In this example, we have, documented, a 40 author, 66 Chapter Book. In this Book, exists many claims, many assertions, many promises, many pieces to claimed wisdom, etc; well above and beyond the departure of a 3 premise hypothetical....

This Book goes well above and beyond a generic hypothetical 3 premise proposition. In the case for Jesus, apparently, we can ask Him - according to Biblical verse(s).

Heck, many pray for knowledge/wisdom/etc. Anything under the sun really. If God has the ability to convey His presence, His knowledge, His guidance, etc, seems plausible He can answer this, what might seem to be, a very easy question for someone like God. Further, I would trust God could convey His rationale to us humans, in a way we can understand. If not, then maybe you (do) need to go back to premise one :)
 
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public hermit

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If not, then maybe you (do) need to go back to premise one :)

I understand. It is limiting, I know. But there is a reason why, when professional philosophers who are theists and atheists get together to discuss these things, they choose a premise much like the antecedent of Rowe's first premise. The reason is, because there is not much else upon which they will be able to agree.

You and I have discussed enough to know the same is true for us. I am not going to agree with the way you handle the Christian scriptures. Don't feel bad. I don't agree with the way a good number of Christian fundamentalists handle the scriptures. Your approach to atheistic apologetics works best with fundamentalists. That's just how it is. I also know, you are not going to accept the way I handle the scriptures. So, there is no use for the two of us to go down that road. We will not agree.

What we can agree on, for the sake of argument, is the tri-omni God, perhaps.
 
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cvanwey

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I understand. It is limiting, I know. But there is a reason why, when professional philosophers who are theists and atheists get together to discuss these things, they choose a premise much like the antecedent of Rowe's first premise. The reason is, because there is not much else upon which they will be able to agree.

You and I have discussed enough to know the same is true for us. I am not going to agree with the way you handle the Christian scriptures. Don't feel bad. I don't agree with the way a good number of Christian fundamentalists handle the scriptures. Your approach to atheistic apologetics works best with fundamentalists. That's just how it is. I also know, you are not going to accept the way I handle the scriptures. So, there is no use for the two of us to go down that road. We will not agree.

What we can agree on, for the sake of argument, is the tri-omni God, perhaps.

Again, fair enough. But as I'm sure you know, my point to this exercise appears simple. Once you plug in "Christianity", the exercise fails.


Going back to the generic premises, I don't find much difference really. Based upon the little discussed, thus far, let's explore :)

The basics...

- Omnipotence means "the quality of having unlimited power, within the confines of logic"
- Omnibenevolence means "infinite 'goodness'. And by goodness, meaning whatever this agent deems 'good'."
-Omniscience means "knows everything"

These are not 'hard and fast' definitions. But I trust they at least tickle your liking? Meaning, you at least somewhat agree?

You state that humans are limited in their ability to understand some things. So the very first question begged might be...

Does this tri-omni agent have the ability to communicate with humans? If not, then again, go back premise one (i.e.) omnipotence. If yes, then again, go back to premise one. Why? Because again, this agent would have the power to instill such knowledge into the requesting human's inquiry.

I'll stop here for now :)
 
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public hermit

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Does this tri-omni agent have the ability to communicate with humans? If not, then again, go back premise one (i.e.) omnipotence. If yes, then again, go back to premise one. Why? Because again, this agent would have the power to instill such knowledge into the requesting human's inquiry.

I think it's safe to say an omnipotent Being would have the power to communicate with humans. I think the question then becomes, is this tri-omni Being obligated to communicate all of the reasons for why things happen the way they do, even upon request? I'm not sure why that would be so. For all we know, there might be very good reasons for why God has not communicated the answers to all our questions, or the reasons for all that God does or allows.
 
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cvanwey

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I think it's safe to say an omnipotent being would have the power to communicate with humans. I think the question then becomes, is this tri-omni Being obligated to communicate all of the reasons for why things happen the way they do, even upon request? I'm not sure why that would be so. For all we know, there might be very good reasons for why God has not communicated the answers to all our questions, or the reasons for all that God does or allows.

I would assume this tri-omni agent deems itself 'good', right? And part of this tri-omni agent's characteristics is to have vast wisdom, complete knowledge, etc. So if this agent has the ability to communicate with humans, and chooses not to share this one piece of wisdom with the requesting human, isn't this tri-omni agent applying a double-standard for 'good'? What if the human wants this piece of knowledge? Wouldn't it be considered 'good' for this human to know, just like the tri-omni agent? Especially when asked upon? If not, then we may have issue(s) abound?
 
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I would assume this tri-omni agent deems itself 'good', right?

An omnibenevolent Being would be good, not consider itself good.

So if this agent has the ability to communicate with humans, and chooses not to share this one piece of wisdom with the requesting human, isn't this tri-omni agent applying a double-standard for 'good'?

Presumably not. But, for the sake of argument, we can think analogously between the obligations that a limited, finite being has in relation to a tri-omni Being. But, there is a point where the analogy breaks down and we have to admit to a certain amount of inscrutability in regards to the later. That doesn't prove such a Being actually has good reasons, nor the contrary. It simply admits to the limits. I imagine that would be a comfortable space for a skeptic.
 
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cvanwey

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An omnibenevolent Being would be good, not consider itself good.

According to what standard? "Might makes right"? :)

This reminds me of the Euthephro dilemma... Even theistic philosophers seem to reconcile that, even though this is not a 'true dilemma', they cannot come up with a third option. Hence, they resort to regurgitating A. (i.e.)

A. Whatever God does is good
B. God does something because it is good.

God considers Himself 'good'. 'If you don't agree, too bad.' Ala --> "might makes right."


Presumably not. But, for the sake of argument, we can think analogously between the obligations that a limited, finite being has in relation to a tri-omni Being. But, there is a point where the analogy breaks down and we have to admit to a certain amount of inscrutability in regards to the later. That doesn't prove such a Being actually has good reasons, nor the contrary. It simply admits to the limits. I imagine that would be a comfortable space for a skeptic.

Not so fast... :)

Your argument is essentially, 'we don't understand this agent's ways'. And, 'why must this agent be obligated?'

You do understand anyone can use this same blanket argument for ghosts, fairies, Santa Claus, etc etc etc

Let's explore...

- Such an agent has the ability to communicate with humans (check)
- Such an agent has the ability to communicate in a way humans can understand (check)
- Such an agent has vast wisdom, and vast wisdom is good (check)
- This agent is good

But such an agent chooses not to impart such wisdom upon the human. Nor, is he obligated.

Can I argue for the existence of all the above mentioned now? Or do you have more to add first?
 
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According to what standard? "Might makes right"? :)

This reminds me of the Euthephro dilemma... Even theistic philosophers seem to reconcile that, even though this is not a 'true dilemma', they cannot come up with a third option. Hence, they resort to regurgitating A. (i.e.)

A. Whatever God does is good
B. God does something because it is good.

God considers Himself 'good'. 'If you don't agree, too bad.' Ala --> "might makes right."

The dilemma is false because it assumes God and Goodness are two different things. The third option is that God and Goodness are synonymous. Ontologically identical. Once that is allowed, it is seen that both horns of the so-called dilemma become superfluous. Or, maybe better, tautologous? Whatever, there are more than two possibilities.

Your argument is essentially, 'we don't understand this agent's ways'.

My argument is that we are not in a position to claim to know all the reasons, or justifications, for this Being's ways. We may know some, but certainly not all. How could we?
 
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The dilemma is false because it assumes God and Goodness are two different things.

Disagree. The dilemma is false because a true dilemma is (A, and not A). Hence, it might be better to be labelled "Euthephro's problem."

Your assumption requires proof, that God and goodness are not separate. A creator being does not necessarily need to be anything other than a creator being. Maybe this agent actually is not tri-omni. But if God is tri-omni, then we are right back to the OP, and my follow up posts.

You must first demonstrate existence of this God, or any god. And once you have established this, I won't hold my breath in the mean time, you must then demonstrate your assertion, that God/good are one -- verses, God merely proclaiming goodness - (synonymous).


My argument is that we are not in a position to claim to know all the reasons, or justifications, for this Being's ways. We may know some, but certainly not all. How could we?

Because:

- Such an agent has the ability to communicate with humans (check)
- Such an agent has the ability to communicate in a way humans can understand (check)
- Such an agent has vast wisdom, and vast wisdom is good (check)
- This agent is good

So unless we wish to explore the double-standard, that God chooses not to impart such wisdom, even upon repeated requests for millennia, then it seems logical one must ignore/remove some logic?
 
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You must first demonstrate existence of this God, or any god.

Not in this argument. In this argument the non-existence of God is the conclusion. The existence of God is assumed as the antecedent of the 1st premise. Keep in mind, Rowe is not a theist trying to prove God's existence. He is an atheist trying to disprove God's existence. I, on the other hand, am not trying to prove anything. So, no, it is not true that I must first demonstrate the existence of this God, or any god.

So unless we wish to explore the double-standard, that God chooses not to impart such wisdom, even upon repeated requests for millennia, then it seems logical one must ignore/remove some logic?

Why? What does logic have to do with whether or not we should have access to all the possible reasons available to a tri-omni God? There is nothing illogical about the possibility that a tri-omni God would not reveal to us all the reasons for all that is, including that which appears to us as gratuitous.
 
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Not in this argument. In this argument the non-existence of God is the conclusion. The existence of God is assumed as the antecedent of the 1st premise. Keep in mind, Rowe is not a theist trying to prove God's existence. He is an atheist trying to disprove God's existence. I, on the other hand, am not trying to prove anything. So, no, it is not true that I must first demonstrate the existence of this God, or any god.

But in this specific case/argument here, we are referring to the 'Euthephro problem', not Rowe :)

Again, my claim, as mention prior, in ultimate conclusion to this 'problem'... 'Might makes right'.

I gave one distinct example thus far. (i.e.):

" 'X' is bad. If you disagree, tough luck. And if you never agree, I might decide to punish you for doing/choosing otherwise. "

Your move :)


Why? What does logic have to do with whether or not we should have access to all the possible reasons available to a tri-omni God? There is nothing illogical about the possibility that a tri-omni God would not reveal to us all the reasons for all that is, including that which appears to us as gratuitous.

Now we are back to Rowe.

Do I really have to re-list my reasons, or can you just provide direct rebuttal to my prior points accordingly?
 
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But in this specific case/argument here, we are referring to the 'Euthephro problem', not Rowe :)

Haha. :) Persistence is your gift.

Do I really have to re-list my reasons, or can you just provide direct rebuttal to my prior points accordingly?

We might be at a standoff. There are worse things. :)
 
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