Wisconsin v. Mitchell (92-515), 508 U.S. 47 (1993).
But it is equally true that a defendant's abstract beliefs, however obnoxious to most people, may not be taken into consideration by a sentencing judge.
Dawson v.
Delaware, 503 U. S. ---- (1992). In
Dawson, the State introduced evidence at a capital sentencing hearing that the defendant was a member of a white supremacist prison gang. Because "the evidence proved nothing more than [the defendant's] abstract beliefs," we held that its admission violated the defendant's
First Amendment rights.
Id., at ---- (slip op., at 7). In so holding, however, we emphasized that "the Constitution does not erect a
per se barrierto the admission of evidence concerning one's beliefs and associations at sentencing simply because those beliefs and associations are protected by the
First Amendment."
Id., at ---- (slip op., at 5). Thus, in
Barclay v.
Florida,
463 U.S. 939 (1983) (plurality opinion), we allowed the sentencing judge to take into account the defendant's racial animus towards his victim. The evidence in that case showed that the defendant's membership in the Black Liberation Army and desire to provoke a "race war" were related to the murder of a white man for which he was convicted. See
id., at 942-944. Because "the elements of racial hatred in [the] murder" were relevant to several aggravating factors, we held that the trial judge permissibly took this evidence into account in sentencing the defendant to death.
Id., at 949, and n. 7.