Free will and determinism

[eleos1954]

I'm not saying that we don't make choices. We obviously do. But the decisions we make are determined by prior conditions. Run the film again and you'll make exactly the same decision every time.

If you only find out why you made a decision after you made it then that can hardly be described as free will. And this happens a lot more than people realise. A decision will be made unconsciously (there's no 'you' making it) and then you'll convince yourself that it was what 'you' wanted to do post fact.

'Jonathan Haidt of New York University has shown that often, cognitions are post-hoc justifications for feelings and intuitions, to convince ourselves that we have indeed rationally put our finger on why.' Why Your Brain Hates Other People

They way our brains work is an amazing phenomenon.

Run the film again and you'll make exactly the same decision every time.

Don't believe this ...

Determinism entails that, in a situation in which a person makes a certain decision or performs a certain action, it is impossible that he or she could have made any other decision or performed any other action. In other words, it is never true that people could have decided or acted otherwise than they actually did.

If physical determinism (humans are physical objects) is true then the person arguing for it has no choice (choice is freedom) as to whether he believes in physical determinism or not, nor whether he argues for determinism or not.

I do agree we make more unconscious decisions than we are aware of.

The unconscious is the vast sum of operations of the mind that take place below the level of conscious awareness. The conscious mind contains all the thoughts, feelings, cognitions, and memories we acknowledge, while the unconscious consists of deeper mental processes not readily available to the conscious mind.

Our brains are very complex for sure ... we are free thinkers.

 

[Bradskii]

Free will applies only to moral acts.

You don't consider choosing cereal over bacon and eggs to be a free will choice?

For instance, at one time my affection for people of Irish descent is negative, my attitude toward them is biased (they are all lazy drunkards), and I publicly berate a particular Irishman who is begging in public. I see the effect: by my act the man is humiliated and departs empty-handed. I learn later that the man was begging in order to feed his children. I freely change my prior affection, my prior attitude changes, and my future behaviors change. So, yes -- all human acts are determined by prior events but that does not negate free will.

So you accept that circumstances, prior events, resulted in you changing your mind. That they were the direct cause. And if those prior events had not taken place then you wouldn't have changed your mind.

 

[Bradskii]

My actions were determined...

Whatever comes next is irrelevant. Those 4 words encompass exactly what I mean.

 

[Bradskii]

I have not been reading other posts so perhaps you have covered this "objection": Could it not be the case that "human agency", floating freely from the rest nominal set of physical law, contributes causally to the actions we take? Stated otherwise, what solid arguments are there that exclude the possibility of an "I" inside each of us that is not slavishly obedient to the presently known laws of physics? Note that I am fully aware that we have causal mechanistic explanations for how neuronal activity in the brain is connected to what we do. But is it clear that there is not something else at work?

So the argument then runs: 'I see what you're saying. It sounds logical. But I just know that I have free will. Look, I'll raise my arm to prove it! So there must be something that we can't detect that isn't connected to a physical reality that operates at a level that we don't understand.'

Well, yeah. That get-out-of-jail card comes in handy. It can be used to reject anything at all. So I have no problem in discounting it completely. Which might prompt the accusation that 'hey, then you're just a materialist'. Well...yeah again.

 

[Bradskii]

Don't believe this ...

Then I'd like you to show me a decision that wasn't determined by prior conditions.

Determinism entails that, in a situation in which a person makes a certain decision or performs a certain action, it is impossible that he or she could have made any other decision or performed any other action. In other words, it is never true that people could have decided or acted otherwise than they actually did.

If physical determinism (humans are physical objects) is true then the person arguing for it has no choice (choice is freedom) as to whether he believes in physical determinism or not, nor whether he argues for determinism or not.

Exactly right. Conditions were such that many years ago I thought we definitely had free will. The conditions have changed over time and I have now determined that we don't.

I do agree we make more unconscious decisions than we are aware of.

The unconscious is the vast sum of operations of the mind that take place below the level of conscious awareness. The conscious mind contains all the thoughts, feelings, cognitions, and memories we acknowledge, while the unconscious consists of deeper mental processes not readily available to the conscious mind.

The unconscious is just us working on auto pilot. I don't think anyone would argue that an unconscious act is a free will act. The body acts without us realising what the decision process actually is. My point is that when we perform what we consider to be a free will act then the process is exactly the same. But because we are conscious of the process, it just feels like there's some 'me' doing the decision making.

 

[Niels]

There is no way that existence cannot be described other than determined.

If that's how you choose to describe it.

This debate is a bit like nature vs. nurture. The pragmatist in me says that reality takes a bit of both. Although there's a lot that we don't get to choose in life, there's much that we do. And for free will to exist, all it takes is a little. Deciding how we respond to an insult, for instance. To hold a completely deterministic view strikes me as fatalistic and counterproductive. I neither believe in The Fates nor concepts like luck. Why even bother getting out of bed in the morning if it was all done before? Determinism deprives the individual of agency. Moral and otherwise. As one who values concepts like autonomy and creativity, the deterministic position looks like a mixture of self-fulfilling prophecy and death. Not useful to me beyond differentiating what I can change from what I can't.

Which isn't to say that I'm wholly in the free will camp. Free will and determinism are each partially correct to varying degrees. We are born or thrust into circumstances, but we act and build on top of what comes before us.

The sailor doesn't simply travel where the winds and waves go. The sail's position can be adjusted and the rudder can be turned.

 

[Occams Barber]

Why even bother getting out of bed in the morning if it was all done before? Determinism deprives the individual of agency. Moral and otherwise. As one who values concepts like autonomy and creativity, the deterministic position looks like a mixture of self-fulfilling prophecy and death. Not useful to me beyond differentiating what I can change from what I can't.

The fact that you are uncomfortable with the idea of free will being non-existent does not automatically mean free will must exist. I accept the idea that free will does not exist. I have not lost agency nor am I about to die.

Free will and determinism are each partially correct to varying degrees.

Rubbish. In the ultimate sense free will and determinism are mutually exclusive.

OB

 

[Bradskii]

Why even bother getting out of bed in the morning if it was all done before?

If existence is deterministic, it doesn't mean it's predictable. For the want of a nail, the shoe was lost. And then the horse. Then the fight, the battle, the war and the empire. You can work that sequence backwards and you'll find some utterly inconsequential event that has the most far reaching consequences. But you can't start with a loose nail and predict forwards to the fall of an empire.

So getting out of bed and all that happens from that moment on is an unknown. You have no real idea of how the day will turn out. And what happens will change you to some extent.

As @o_mlly said, if you discover that a homeless guy was in that situation through no fault of his own (and 'fault' is a tricky concept when there is no free will) and deserved sympathy then hopefully you become a better person.

It's worth getting out of bed.

 

[Bradskii]

Rubbish. In the ultimate sense free will and determinism are mutually exclusive.

The afore mentioned Dan Dennet (rip) was a compatabilist. I've read a lot of what he's written, and a lot of it made sense to me. But that position seemed to be completely bizarre. And I've listened to him in discussions with Sam Harris and Robert Sapolski on the subject and he comes nowhere in justifying it.

 

[Occams Barber]

The afore mentioned Dan Dennet (rip) was a compatabilist. I've read a lot of what he's written, and a lot of it made sense to me. But that position seemed to be completely bizarre. And I've listened to him in discussions with Sam Harris and Robert Sapolski on the subject and he comes nowhere in justifying it.

One of the problems in the free will argument is that the argument is highly dependent on context.

As an example:
On a day-to-day level I would entirely agree that we have (apparent) free will while I am quite convinced that it does not exist at an ultimate level. I can reach a different conclusion depending on the context.

Compatabilism often arises where the context of the argument becomes confused. This contextual confusion is often the genesis of the 'quid each way' compatibilist argument. You will also see it running through this thread.

This is the reason I use the physical law argument I raised earlier in the thread. Using a physics based argument defines an ultimate context and minimises confusion if it is adopted as the basis for the discussion. It rarely is.

The free will I talk about is an 'ultimate' concept.

OB

 

[Bradskii]

On a day-to-day level I would entirely agree that we have (apparent) free will while I am quite convinced that it does not exist at an ultimate level. I can reach a different conclusion depending on the context.

And I agree that we have apparent free will all the time. It's virtually impossible to think that we don't. It appears that we are hard wired to think of ourselves, and others, as being responsible for our actions. I can't blame the lightning strike from killing me but I can hold the person who shoots at me as being responsible. Unless...he is mentally ill. That is, if there is physical problem with his brain. Which then prompts thoughts about what else caused the guy to end up in a position where he's pulling the trigger. Parents, genetic make up, social life, education, hormone levels...none of which were really under his control. If I had his physiology, his biology, his upbringing, the exact same circumstances woukd result in me being the one holding the gun.

On most things I always suggest that there may be a grey area, that things are rarely black and white. But this is like being a little bit pregnant. You either are...or you are not. And there is no way that sometimes you can have a little bit of free will and other times not. If you did have it then you wouldn't necessarily use it all the time. But it would always be there on call.

Compatabilism often arises where the context of the argument becomes confused. This contextual confusion is often the genesis of the 'quid each way' compatibilist argument. You will also see it running through this thread.

If you mean when the context is such that a decision is almost a coin toss, then extremely inconsequential conditions like an interrupted sleep or the meal you ate a couple of hours ago or even the weather might determine your actions. And if it's truly a coin toss then it's random.

 

[Mark Quayle]

Run the film again and you'll make exactly the same decision every time.

Only in theory. The film is never the same. You can't run it again.

 

[Occams Barber]

If you mean when the context is such that a decision is almost a coin toss, then extremely inconsequential conditions like an interrupted sleep or the meal you ate a couple of hours ago or even the weather might determine your actions. And if it's truly a coin toss then it's random.

I have a bit of trouble explaining this in spite of thinking it through for years.

The compatibility position would be that some behaviour is a consequence of free will while other behaviour is deterministic depending on context.

Some of the variations in compatibilistic thinking include different contexts:

• conscious decisions/behaviour may be based on free will while unconscious decision/behaviour are not
• Involuntary (coerced) actions may be deterministic while voluntary (not coerced) actions derive from free will
• Automatic bodily functions (digestion for example) are not subject to free will and are therefore deterministic while non auto functions are deterministic
• Moral decisions are based on free will while other actions may be deterministic
• Actions based on reasoning indicate free will while unconsidered actions derive determinism

Each of these scenarios is a context within which free will might be considered. The particular context you're applying will determine your view of what is and is not free will.

My own view is that ultimately NO decisions, actions, functions etc. are the result of free will since all decisions/actions etc are ultimately derived from the actions and reactions of particles, forces and energy. We are each the product of physics. Since we are not able to control physics we cannot exercise free will.

Physics is the ultimate context for examining free will.

OB

 

[Bradskii]

Only in theory. The film is never the same. You can't run it again.

It's a hypothetical. Michael kills Fredo however many times you run the film. Run your own film and all your actions were are likewise determined. You have as much free will as the cinematic Michael.

 

[Bradskii]

Involuntary (coerced) actions may be deterministic while voluntary (not coerced) actions derive from free will.

This is the position that Dennett takes. Which is nothing more than 'It's not deterministic in such and such a case. I made a free will decision therefore it can't be deterministic.' I'm nonplussed that such a dumb position can be put forward by such a smart man.

My own view is that ultimately NO decisions, actions, functions etc. are the result of free will since all decisions/actions etc are ultimately derived from the actions and reactions of particles, forces and energy. We are each the product of physics. Since we are not able to control physics we cannot exercise free will.

I'd add chemistry, biology, evolution and any number of other contributing factors. Your mother's diet, your neighbourhood, your culture, your health...they are all in some way deterministic from a few seconds before a decision is made, to a few hours, to years and even hundreds of years prior.

 

[Mark Quayle]

Bradskii said:
If you mean when the context is such that a decision is almost a coin toss, then extremely inconsequential conditions like an interrupted sleep or the meal you ate a couple of hours ago or even the weather might determine your actions. And if it's truly a coin toss then it's randomI have a bit of trouble explaining this in spite of thinking it through for years.

The compatibility position would be that some behaviour is a consequence of free will while other behaviour is deterministic depending on context.

Some of the variations in compatibilistic thinking include different contexts:

• conscious decisions/behaviour may be based on free will while unconscious decision/behaviour are not
• Involuntary (coerced) actions may be deterministic while voluntary (not coerced) actions derive from free will
• Automatic bodily functions (digestion for example) are not subject to free will and are therefore deterministic while non auto functions are deterministic
• Moral decisions are based on free will while other actions may be deterministic
• Actions based on reasoning indicate free will while unconsidered actions derive determinism

Each of these scenarios is a context within which free will might be considered. The particular context you're applying will determine your view of what is and is not free will.

My own view is that ultimately NO decisions, actions, functions etc. are the result of free will since all decisions/actions etc are ultimately derived from the actions and reactions of particles, forces and energy. We are each the product of physics. Since we are not able to control physics we cannot exercise free will.

Physics is the ultimate context for examining free will.

OB

I'm beginning to find this very remarkable: Two reasonably reasonable men, both claiming atheism, who naturally consider "free will" to be as the name implies to most users —uncaused. When I discuss free will with Christian believers, it is like pulling teeth to get them to admit that they mean "uncaused". I have to be very specific, usually resorting to a common term, "libertarian free will", before they will begin to argue actual facts, rather than to rant, if they will at all even then.

Also, I think it is rather humorous that what (I assume) both of you seem to be showing, that the law of causation (all effects are caused) is altogether reliable, and EVERYTHING is an effect, (except for, and unless, 'first cause' can be demonstrated). The believer usually has no problem admitting the same, until they realize that this touches on the question of first cause, at which point they quickly invoke chance, randomness, or worse, the possibility of effects such as humans, not being caused, because they want to separate God from any appearance of evil.

Corollary to the notion of first cause having begun all things, is the depth of irony of our enormous ego in assuming our arrangements of our thoughts to be of some actual substance!

 

[Occams Barber]

I'd add chemistry, biology, evolution and any number of other contributing factors. Your mother's diet, your neighbourhood, your culture, your health...they are all in some way deterministic from a few seconds before a decision is made, to a few hours, to years and even hundreds of years prior.

Chemistry is physics with water added, while biology is just chemistry with a waste disposal system. I think we're on the same wavelength.

OB

 

[Mark Quayle]

I have a bit of trouble explaining this in spite of thinking it through for years.

The compatibility position would be that some behaviour is a consequence of free will while other behaviour is deterministic depending on context.

Some of the variations in compatibilistic thinking include different contexts:

• conscious decisions/behaviour may be based on free will while unconscious decision/behaviour are not
• Involuntary (coerced) actions may be deterministic while voluntary (not coerced) actions derive from free will
• Automatic bodily functions (digestion for example) are not subject to free will and are therefore deterministic while non auto functions are deterministic
• Moral decisions are based on free will while other actions may be deterministic
• Actions based on reasoning indicate free will while unconsidered actions derive determinism

Each of these scenarios is a context within which free will might be considered. The particular context you're applying will determine your view of what is and is not free will.

My own view is that ultimately NO decisions, actions, functions etc. are the result of free will since all decisions/actions etc are ultimately derived from the actions and reactions of particles, forces and energy. We are each the product of physics. Since we are not able to control physics we cannot exercise free will.

Physics is the ultimate context for examining free will.

OB

Don't know if you've thought of it this way or not, but the same logic of causation also applies to anything besides physics (naturalism). Metaphysics (if there is such a thing) still answers to causation.

 

[Occams Barber]

Bradskii said:
If you mean when the context is such that a decision is almost a coin toss, then extremely inconsequential conditions like an interrupted sleep or the meal you ate a couple of hours ago or even the weather might determine your actions. And if it's truly a coin toss then it's randomI have a bit of trouble explaining this in spite of thinking it through for years.

I'm beginning to find this very remarkable: Two reasonably reasonable men, both claiming atheism, who naturally consider "free will" to be as the name implies to most users —uncaused. When I discuss free will with Christian believers, it is like pulling teeth to get them to admit that they mean "uncaused". I have to be very specific, usually resorting to a common term, "libertarian free will", before they will begin to argue actual facts, rather than to rant, if they will at all even then.

Also, I think it is rather humorous that what (I assume) both of you seem to be showing, that the law of causation (all effects are caused) is altogether reliable, and EVERYTHING is an effect, (except for, and unless, 'first cause' can be demonstrated). The believer usually has no problem admitting the same, until they realize that this touches on the question of first cause, at which point they quickly invoke chance, randomness, or worse, the possibility of effects such as humans, not being caused, because they want to separate God from any appearance of evil.

Corollary to the notion of first cause having begun all things, is the depth of irony of our enormous ego in assuming our arrangements of our thoughts to be of some actual substance!

I read your post a couple of times but I'm still confused.

This thread was never about first causes and, as far as I can see, neither @Bradskii or myself have suggested anything related to a first cause.



OB

 

[o_mlly]

You don't consider choosing cereal over bacon and eggs to be a free will choice?

Depends. Did you deliberate before choosing? You really enjoy bacon and eggs and dislike cereal, but you just read your latest lipid panel. Against your sensitive appetite, you defer to your rational soul and freely choose the cereal (holding your nose).

So you accept that circumstances, prior events, resulted in you changing your mind. That they were the direct cause. And if those prior events had not taken place then you wouldn't have changed your mind.

Yes, but more precisely our ability as rational and willing beings to act against our bodily appetites or instinctive urges evidences our free will.

Both the vicious and virtuous man come to rely less and less on deliberation and act out of habit. For the vicious one, the habitual acts are primarily driven by his appetite for pleasure and aversion to pain. For the virtuous one, the acts are habitually driven by charity toward neighbor. The Christian or other religions that practice bodily mortification ,eg., fast and abstinence, endure those deprivations to achieve a mind over matter mentality that facilitate virtuous acts.

If there is no free will then what need is there for rehabilitation programs or even prisons. Only exile or life sentences in mental institutions would be in order.