The missing link/intelligent design

[Wiccan_Child]

Read the second article by Pym van Lommel, on this blog:

The Bridge: A Science and Spirituality Resource: Mysticism

I can barely tell where the second article begins. Can you give me the short version?

 

[Davian]

I can barely tell where the second article begins. Can you give me the short version?

I think it said, NDE... therefore our brains are like TV sets.

 

[Received]

Perhaps you should restate that to say that falsifiability destroys the possibility of something ever, with *absolute* certainty, being known as true.

Well, maybe. Problem is, I don't know what "absolute" certainty means. I know what certainty means: the feeling or intuition of veracity being attained completely (note the emphasis on feeling or intuition); if this is a good definition, then adding "absolute" is unnecessary, IMO.

Take the scientific theory of evolution; How much uncertainty do you think there is that one day there might be found fossilized rabbits in the precambrian?

I don't think that would undermine evolution so much as throw a big wrench into speciation. But let's stick with this as if it applies to evolution as a whole: I do not want to live in a world where I'm forced to titrate my certainty below anything that's basically 100% (or 99.9%). I'm confident enough to say that I know evolution is true, that evolution is in fact something that actually happened, and not "just" something that I'm feeling 99.9% certain about and by definition open to falsifiability and therefore because of this can't claim that I "know" that evolution is true. The 99.99% certainty part is supplied by science; the "I know this is true" part is inductively ascertained by me. That is, science can only aim at probabilities and therefore can't technically make claims of knowledge, because knowledge implies truth; but I can aim at knowledge and truth, precisely because I'm a human being, and because of such I'm not limited just to the scientific method.

 

[Wiccan_Child]

I think it said, NDE... therefore our brains are like TV sets.

Can I change the channel?

 

[Wiccan_Child]

I don't think that would undermine evolution so much as throw a big wrench into speciation. But let's stick with this as if it applies to evolution as a whole: I do not want to live in a world where I'm forced to titrate my certainty below anything that's basically 100% (or 99.9%). I'm confident enough to say that I know evolution is true, that evolution is in fact something that actually happened, and not "just" something that I'm feeling 99.9% certain about and by definition open to falsifiability and therefore because of this can't claim that I "know" that evolution is true. The 99.99% certainty part is supplied by science; the "I know this is true" part is inductively ascertained by me. That is, science can only aim at probabilities and therefore can't technically make claims of knowledge, because knowledge implies truth; but I can aim at knowledge and truth, precisely because I'm a human being, and because of such I'm not limited just to the scientific method.

How can it be knowledge if it's wrong?

 

[Received]

If what's wrong?

 

[Loudmouth]

Whoa, wait, I'm only comparing the two (evidence qua empiricism and evidentialism) to make a point against conflating the two, like evidentialists do. I'm not saying they're the same, and in putting them in my first premise I'm simply stating what evidentialism holds. What I'm telling others not to do is conflate evidence understood empirically (which I understand to be different than evidentialism, in that the latter makes claims like the first premise) with evidentialism (i.e., scientific evidence is the limitation of truth).

Your entire syllogism is based on the conflation between empiricism and evidentialism. Look at the second premise:

"Evidentialism has no evidence."

What do you mean by "evidence"? This again goes back to the first premise where you define evidence as coming from the natural sciences.

Please let me know if this tete-a-tete is confusing to you, because it took me five minutes to understand what we're saying on this point. Could it be that (because or the convoluted nature of this discussion, I take credit) that you've misperceived my point?

Your point seems to change from post to post.

I'm just saying I don't know what "absolute" (contra "relative") truth means.

Absolute truth means proven, as in 2+2=4 is absolutley true within the epistemology of math.

That's fine, but 1) so long as the other standard is truth, which can be ascertained by reason, we're fine, and 2) what works "best" doesn't at all mean that because it works best, that this should be the defined limitation of our epistemology.

Surely you want to use the best epistemology for gathering knowledge, do you not? Or do you want to use an epistemology where something dreamt up at the drop of a hat has the same weight as a scientific theory supported by 150 years of scientific discovery?

I'm saying you're arbitrarily and authoritatively setting up a standard that what works best should be used to the disposal of reason, intuition, and other standards

False on all accounts. I am not arbitrarily choosing standards. I am using proven track records. That is not arbitrary.

Second, I am saying that if you want to convince ME that you are right, then I need to see evidence. It just so happens that a lot of other people use the same standard for the same reasons, not because I tell them to, but of their own free will.

We should keep to empiricism.

Why?

Because it works the best.

Why should something be kept as the limitation of our knowledge because it works the best?

Because it works the best.

If you can't name a better standard, then what exactly are you complaining about? ALL epistemologies limit what can and can't be counted as evidence. ALL epistemologies set out a method for determining what is and is not knowledge.

I'm saying you're arbitrarily and authoritatively setting up a standard that what works best should be used to the disposal of reason, intuition, and other standards;

Empiricism and the scientific method apply reason. It is not being disposed of. And again, it is not arbitrary.

and I'm saying that my appeal to reason and intuition are not even set up or handed down by me, but are intrinsic to our very psychology.

Bias is intrinsic to our psychology, and bias leads us to false answers. That is why empiricism is such a powerful method because it removes a lot of human bias from the process.

"I have an intuition that the Sun orbits the Earth."

Does the Sun suddenly start orbiting the Earth? No. Intuition fails.

Empricism may work best, but it's a small sphere compared to reason (another sphere),

Empiricism includes reason. Empiricism runs counter to Rationalism. I think you may be confusing the two.

Again (and this might be seen as the summary of my entire position with this debate): empiricism has philosophical presuppositions which are based in premises that are in turn the conclusions of reasoning from other premises. And these premises (based on previous conclusions) are also based on intuitive, "just feels right" beliefs, like the existence of the external world, uniformity in nature, and the reality of inductive reasoning (on which the scientific method rests). We call these intuitive deals axioimatic truths; Bertrand Russell called them "instinctive beliefs". So given that empiricism has philosophical presuppositions, these very reason- and intuition-based presuppositions mean that reason and intuition are "deeper" than empiricism, precisely because they are the content of these presuppositions.

I think we already knew that an epistemology has philosophical presuppositions and axioms.

Disagree to infinity. We don't "claim" axioms; evolutionary psychologists say that these axioms, which underlie our philosophies (including empiricism) and reason itself, are instinctual. IOW (and this is a science-revealed statement, BTW), unless we had instinctual axioms that underlay our philosophies, we would never get off the ground. We need axioms to even make our philosophies intelligible and agreed upon, or else it's all about an authority that gives down whichever standard. And if it's not authority, it's pure caprice, where we choose our standards for truth like we do our fashion of clothes. You want to talk about relativism, well...

You are confusing instincts and axioms.

Begging the question: "we need to trust evidence because you need to supply evidence." And notice the "I do" here and its implications. Okay, you can demand evidentialism as a standard, which is fine, so long as you realize it's an assumed standard.

In order to convince ME, you need to supply evidence to support your claims. It just so happens that a lot of other people have the same requirement.

To limit yourself just to science as a means of ascertaining truth (without implementing it with, say, reason, or other truth-attaining means) would mean you technically can't know anything at all, given that falsifiability destroys the possibility of something ever with certainty being known as true.

It means that you can not know anything with absolute certainty, but you already agree that this is the case, so why is this a problem?

 

[Wiccan_Child]

If what's wrong?

If you 'know' a statement is true, but that statement is actually incorrect, how can you have 'known' it was true?

 

[Received]

Your entire syllogism is based on the conflation between empiricism and evidentialism. Look at the second premise:

"Evidentialism has no evidence."

What do you mean by "evidence"? This again goes back to the first premise where you define evidence as coming from the natural sciences.

I mean by evidence as defined by the natural sciences, and my entire premise is based on the confusion evidentialists have with assuming that everything that can be proven can be proven through evidentialism; so I guess you could say that it doesn't speak of empiricism at all. The problem is that if you define things this way, you're shooting yourself in the foot, because:

Only things that can be evidenced (i.e., through the natural sciences) can be considered true (evidentialism).

Evidentialism has no evidence.

Therefore, evidentialism can't be true.​

IOW, I'm still not getting your point, apparently.

Absolute truth means proven, as in 2+2=4 is absolutley true within the epistemology of math.

Then I would just stick with "proven" and "not proven", and not "absolute" truth.

Surely you want to use the best epistemology for gathering knowledge, do you not?

"best epistemology" -- let's skip this as irrelevant. Let's just go with: I want to use a standard of knowledge that actually helps me know things. But I don't want to limit my knowledge just to this standard, without appealing to other standards like reason and intuition.

Or do you want to use an epistemology where something dreamt up at the drop of a hat has the same weight as a scientific theory supported by 150 years of scientific discovery?

That is an epic leap: "do you want to be down with science, or magical fairy land?" I want to be down with science, and me allowing other standards means I'm not twisting science into a magical fairy land where only what is known can be known through science, which is a self-negating statement, sorta like fairies.

False on all accounts. I am not arbitrarily choosing standards. I am using proven track records. That is not arbitrary.

But it is begging the question: I'm using what works. Why use what works? Because it has the best track record (i.e., because it works).

Second, I am saying that if you want to convince ME that you are right, then I need to see evidence. It just so happens that a lot of other people use the same standard for the same reasons, not because I tell them to, but of their own free will.

That's fine. All I'm asking is you're holding this standard from a type of assumption, even if this assumption is "it appears to work best for me." But that's problematic, IMO, because it relativisizes our standards, sort of like making our standards for truth comparable to picking out clothes we think are good.

If you can't name a better standard, then what exactly are you complaining about? ALL epistemologies limit what can and can't be counted as evidence. ALL epistemologies set out a method for determining what is and is not knowledge.

Better, best, works, better, best, works. Yes, all epistemologies do as you say; yes, all epistemologies set out a method for determining as you say. What I'm saying, though, is that we don't need to divide these things into independent epistemologies, but can integrate them into one epistemology. And I even think it's the case (which can be complicatedly made) that science, reason, intuition, experience, etc., all fit together *by definition*. Hence my appeal to "spheres", where science is the smallest one (that probably works best, yes), which is contained in a bigger sphere of reason, followed by a bigger sphere of intuition (which validates our use of reason and therefore science), the latter two of which both contain science, given that science is essentially a type of philosophy with its own philosophical presuppositions, and in turn these philosophical presuppositions can't be known without reason and without intuition saying "yes!" to our use of reason as well as our basic assumptions about the world -- cf. Russell's "instinctive beliefs."

Anyways, I see the rest as basically a restatement of what I've addressed so far.

 

[Loudmouth]

I mean by evidence as defined by the natural sciences, and my entire premise is based on the confusion evidentialists have with assuming that everything that can be proven can be proven through evidentialism; so I guess you could say that it doesn't speak of empiricism at all.

So your syllogism is focused on evidence as defined by the natural sciences, but you don't speak of empiricism at all? You are contradicting yourself.

Evidentialism has no evidence.

Evidence is evidence. That is where your syllogism breaks down.

Then I would just stick with "proven" and "not proven", and not "absolute" truth.

Proven and absolute truth are one in the same.

"best epistemology" -- let's skip this as irrelevant.

Let's not.

Let's just go with: I want to use a standard of knowledge that actually helps me know things. But I don't want to limit my knowledge just to this standard, without appealing to other standards like reason and intuition.

Why intuition?

That is an epic leap: "do you want to be down with science, or magical fairy land?" I want to be down with science, and me allowing other standards means I'm not twisting science into a magical fairy land where only what is known can be known through science, which is a self-negating statement, sorta like fairies.

Show us how these other standards improve knowledge.

But it is begging the question: I'm using what works. Why use what works? Because it has the best track record (i.e., because it works).

Why do you put gasoline in the tank of your car? Because it works. Same logic here. It isn't begging the question. It is pointing to the ability of the method to produce real knowledge.

That's fine. All I'm asking is you're holding this standard from a type of assumption, even if this assumption is "it appears to work best for me." But that's problematic, IMO, because it relativisizes our standards, sort of like making our standards for truth comparable to picking out clothes we think are good.

Why shouldn't we compare our hypotheses to the world around us? What should we compare them too, and why?

What I'm saying, though, is that we don't need to divide these things into independent epistemologies, but can integrate them into one epistemology.

How? Give us an example.

 

[Davian]

Well, maybe. Problem is, I don't know what "absolute" certainty means. I know what certainty means: the feeling or intuition of veracity being attained completely (note the emphasis on feeling or intuition); if this is a good definition, then adding "absolute" is unnecessary, IMO.

Certainty: the quality or state of being certain especially on the basis of evidence; Certainty - Definition and More from the Free Merriam-Webster Dictionary

It would appear that it is still open to future falsification, unless you add the 'absolute' qualifier.

I don't think that would undermine evolution so much as throw a big wrench into speciation. But let's stick with this as if it applies to evolution as a whole: I do not want to live in a world where I'm forced to titrate my certainty below anything that's basically 100% (or 99.9%).

I am sure that the universe has taken your 'wants' under careful consideration.

I'm confident enough to say that I know evolution is true, that evolution is in fact something that actually happened, and not "just" something that I'm feeling 99.9% certain about and by definition open to falsifiability and therefore because of this can't claim that I "know" that evolution is true. The 99.99% certainty part is supplied by science; the "I know this is true" part is inductively ascertained by me. That is, science can only aim at probabilities and therefore can't technically make claims of knowledge, because knowledge implies truth; but I can aim at knowledge and truth, precisely because I'm a human being, and because of such I'm not limited just to the scientific method.

You can aim for this 'truth' of yours, but tell me: how are you going to know when you hit it, and how are you going to convey that to me?

Referring to your earlier post, why, specifically, is this uncertainty a problem? What do you need to be shown as an absolute certainty?

 

[Davian]

Can I change the channel?

No, lol. The analogy only works, it seems, when describing a broken or malfunctioning TV.

Perhaps you could try again, Steve.

 

[Received]

So your syllogism is focused on evidence as defined by the natural sciences, but you don't speak of empiricism at all? You are contradicting yourself.

Please explain, in as much detail as you think is necessary, what you mean here. I just don't understand what you're saying. How is not speaking of empiricism a contradiction, when I'm speaking of evidentialism (which is different than empiricism) and the self-negating statements it holds.

Evidence is evidence. That is where your syllogism breaks down.

How?

 

[Received]

If you 'know' a statement is true, but that statement is actually incorrect, how can you have 'known' it was true?

Technically it can't. I understand a difference between "technical" and how we actually use the word. IOW, I basically equate something with a high probability but is falsifiable (the limits of science) with something that is true and is therefore known (going beyond science, being a human being with other faculties).

Otherwise knowledge is an illusion. And I'm fine with that, but I'm not fine with knowledge being an illusion only if we have to know completely and totally that something isn't false.

And if you go down this road, then we're really back to solipsism or worse: we can't "know" with complete and utter certainty that the external world actually exists (rather than being a Matrix-like deal), that other people exist, or even (let's just say it) that I even exist. I don't know with complete and utter certainty what my "I" even is. And if we go down this road, well...

We wouldn't even be able with any rational justification to open the refrigerator door.

 

[Loudmouth]

Please explain, in as much detail as you think is necessary, what you mean here. I just don't understand what you're saying. How is not speaking of empiricism a contradiction, when I'm speaking of evidentialism (which is different than empiricism) and the self-negating statements it holds.

Then I don't know what you are saying since you consistently conflate the two (empiricism and evidentialism).

How?

You are trying to make the evidence go away, and yet it remains. You might as well argue that facts don't exist because factualism isn't a fact. You are twisting in the wind trying to make the importance of evidence go away.

 

[Received]

Then I don't know what you are saying since you consistently conflate the two (empiricism and evidentialism).

How am I conflating the two? That's what I'm asking.

And I'm intending to ask nicely. Please help me understand your perspective.

You are trying to make the evidence go away, and yet it remains.

Fallacy. If you want to make imaginary intentions, that's fine. Just don't do it here.

You might as well argue that facts don't exist because factualism isn't a fact. You are twisting in the wind trying to make the importance of evidence go away.

This does tell me something, but not about the argument per se. It sounds like you're thinking my very attempt to reveal the self-negating nature of hermetically sealed philosophies is just plain stupid. And your first sentence here indicates that you see it this way.

But be sure and say that I'm just trying to escape from things and wishing evidence away.

 

[Loudmouth]

How am I conflating the two? That's what I'm asking.

Right here:

"Only things that can be evidenced (i.e., through the natural sciences) can be considered true (evidentialism)."

This does tell me something, but not about the argument per se. It sounds like you're thinking my very attempt to reveal the self-negating nature of hermetically sealed philosophies is just plain stupid.

No, I think your continued use of meaningless phrases like "hermetically sealed philosophies" is stupid. Just say what you mean to say. You don't need to use such klunky phrases.

But be sure and say that I'm just trying to escape from things and wishing evidence away.

Then what is the point of arguing against the use of evidence?

 

[Received]

Right here:

"Only things that can be evidenced (i.e., through the natural sciences) can be considered true (evidentialism)."

Again, you're stating just what I said without offering the needed interpretation that I'm asking. What about this stated phrase is problematic to you? Please, please spell it out for me.

No, I think your continued use of meaningless phrases like "hermetically sealed philosophies" is stupid. Just say what you mean to say. You don't need to use such klunky phrases.

You don't need to use words like "stupid". See what I'm talking about? Look, I know this is an Internet board, and I know communication means, well, communicating. But I also have my own style of communicating -- I really like words, and I like that phrase "hermetically sealed philosophy" -- and I've defined (in previous posts) what this phrase in particular means. Klunky to you (that's understandable), stupid to you (not so understandable), but I have the same preferences with communication although they're aesthetically and stylistically different. That's that.

Then what is the point of arguing against the use of evidence?

I've made this point before in a previous post on this very thread:

I'm not arguing against the use of evidence.

Again:

I'm not arguing against the use of evidence.

 

[Loudmouth]

Again, you're stating just what I said without offering the needed interpretation that I'm asking. What about this stated phrase is problematic to you? Please, please spell it out for me.

I think it clearly speaks for itself. You directly compare the natural sciences to evidentialism.

You don't need to use words like "stupid".

"This does tell me something, but not about the argument per se. It sounds like you're thinking my very attempt to reveal the self-negating nature of hermetically sealed philosophies is just plain stupid."--Received

You don't need to use words like "stupid". See what I'm talking about? Look, I know this is an Internet board, and I know communication means, well, communicating. But I also have my own style of communicating -- I really like words, and I like that phrase "hermetically sealed philosophy" -- and I've defined (in previous posts) what this phrase in particular means.

Perhaps you should use English instead of Received-ese. Just sayin'.

I'm not arguing against the use of evidence.

"Therefore, evidentialism can't be true."--Received

 

[Received]

I think it clearly speaks for itself. You directly compare the natural sciences to evidentialism.

No, it doesn't speak for itself. Your interpretation of what I'm saying speaks for itself to YOU, but not to me. I am not you, Loudmouth, so that mean it doesn't speak for itself. Which is why I'm asking for what your interpretation is.

Please note I've asked this a good many times on this specific point, keeping to courtesy.

"This does tell me something, but not about the argument per se. It sounds like you're thinking my very attempt to reveal the self-negating nature of hermetically sealed philosophies is just plain stupid."--Received

Yes, me rephrasing what I'm interpreting you to be saying isn't a contradiction of your actually saying it. Especially given that, you know, you did in fact say it.

Perhaps you should use English instead of Received-ese. Just sayin'.

Uh, I kinda can't help but speak in Received-ese, given that, you know, I'm Received. You shouldn't speak in Loudmouth-ese, Loudmouth. Stop being who you are and speak in some vague impersonal way.

"Therefore, evidentialism can't be true."--Received

So I know you can imagine a time when you wanted to know what someone meant about something you said. Imagine how you felt if every time you were like, "Hey, could you explain what you think about what I said?" and the person repeated the exact thing you said over again.