The Kalm cosmological argument

[KCfromNC]

Apparently the only quality this first cause has in common with other causes is that it possesses causal power.

Well, that, and that they have the same name. That makes it very easy to equivocate.

 

[Ripheus27]

Those are still just hypothesises. The Big Bang is the furthest we can go back and be quite sure of.

Granted. I just meant to outline the fact that, conceptually-speaking, modern physics doesn't require a beginning for the world in time. So if we're going to go back to before the Big Bang (as traditional theists would), the options aren't confined to "God did it" or "it just happened," but an infinite series of causes and effects of which the Big Bang itself was rather just another successor.

 

[Paradoxum]

Granted. I just meant to outline the fact that, conceptually-speaking, modern physics doesn't require a beginning for the world in time. So if we're going to go back to before the Big Bang (as traditional theists would), the options aren't confined to "God did it" or "it just happened," but an infinite series of causes and effects of which the Big Bang itself was rather just another successor.

How can there be can infinite series of causes? Infinite regression, etc?

 

[Ripheus27]

How can there be can infinite series of causes? Infinite regression, etc?

Well, my argument is just Kant's, so the regress is not an actually infinite past series, only a potentially infinite one (that is, it is indefinite, for time in itself is not an object, and accordingly has no definite magnitude). The argument that the conditions of a fact must be completely given for that fact to be given is as follows:

If the conditioned is given, then the whole series of conditions, a series which is therefore itself absolutely unconditioned, is also given.
Objects of the senses are given as conditioned.
Consequently, the entire series of all conditions of objects of the senses is already given.
​

But the counterargument goes:

There are a number of problems with this argument, according to Kant. Obviously, one problem is located in the major premise, in the assumption that the unconditioned is “already given.” The problem, maintains Kant, is that such a totality is never to be met with in experience. The rational assumption that the total series of all conditions is already given would hold only for things in themselves. In the realm of appearances, the totality is never given to us, as finite discursive knowers. The most we are entitled to say, with respect to appearances, is that the unconditioned is set as a task, that there is a rational prescription to continue to seek explanations (A498/B526-A500/B528). As finite (sensible) cognizers, however, we shall never achieve an absolute completion of knowledge. To assume that we can do so is to adopt the theocentric model of knowledge characteristic of the dreaded transcendental realist. ("Kant's Critique of Metaphysics," sec. 4.1, in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

 

[Paradoxum]

Well, my argument is just Kant's, so the regress is not an actually infinite past series, only a potentially infinite one (that is, it is indefinite, for time in itself is not an object, and accordingly has no definite magnitude). The argument that the conditions of a fact must be completely given for that fact to be given is as follows:

So what does a potentially infinite series actually mean? What do you think it happening 'before' the Big Bang?

I'm still saying there can't be an infinite regress, since I have no idea what your point it. There will be an end to the explanation of everything. You need to explain yourself better.

 

[Ripheus27]

There will be an end to the explanation of everything.

I'm sure it may seem intuitive that we must be able to explain everything. However, since I myself can't explain everything, I'm not sure that my intuition (such as it is) that I can do so is correct. I'm not eternal; so how can I prove the nature of things from eternity?

 

[Paradoxum]

I'm sure it may seem intuitive that we must be able to explain everything. However, since I myself can't explain everything, I'm not sure that my intuition (such as it is) that I can do so is correct. I'm not eternal; so how can I prove the nature of things from eternity?

I'm also not sure we can explain everything, but I see no reason to think we can't.

What I am even more unsure of, is why you think infinite regress is possible. Obviously if time goes infinitely back, then you will never get to the present.

I think I might know vaguely what point you are trying to make, but I was you to say it in straightforward terms.

 

[FatalHeart]

But it must be a mind, and I'll show; truth must always exist. To say it does not is to say it does in the sense that it does not. To say it only has to exist at a certain time or state is to state a truth outside of that time and state that governs it. "There was a time when time was not," is an absurd thought. So truth must always exist and so time is forever because always means always. Now, logic is all we need to lead to the conclusion of God, because it is clear that truth exists, but the form that truth takes also has no real qualifier. What governs logic other than that it must be? Definitions only come from minds. Specifics are results of principles, not chaos. To say something can come from chaos is to denote laws of what chaos is and what can come from it i.e. something. It's like saying the universe began. We have to define what a universe is and what this whole beginning thing means. But because these denotations have physical power, one must ask why. You see, we can believe in a complete universe that always existed in the form of truth and logical principles without cause but self existent and self defined, but that's God... What is the origin of origin? The denotation of denotation? The definition of definition? All these things are very ordered and designate themselves in ordered ways, and seeing as there was never a time for them to originate, but that they existed in such character from the beginning, it is clear that God is not only a perfectly rational idea, but more plausible than evolution. For if a whole universe can exist by virtue, so can a person. After all, infinity has already taken place, meaning that, from an evolutionists point of view, the fact that we die is more troubling than that we are born, because if this was a blind system, since there has already been an infinite past, there should have already been a removal of that which ends. Meaning, whatever is is a part of something infinite; for the rational mind to have been born and die means there is something greater still that governs its existence, and, seeing as the universe is self-defined in this way taking form where there is no reason for form, before order and before chaos, as nothing can be without first being, the self definition of the universe needing to exist, one must wonder how anything can define and govern itself without first having a soul...

 

[WilbertK]

This is an incomplete summation

I thank you for taking the time to answer my question so thoroughly. You've responded to a lot more than I was actually trying to get a response to. Most of the 'arguments', if you can call them that, that I brought up in my original post were meant to illustrate the possible things that could go wrong if you weren't clear on the definition of 'beginning to exist'. I see that you're specifying what you mean with the phrase quite precisely, and that changes a lot. Also, I think your objections to what I bring up about quantum mechanics are at least partially caused by a different interpretation of the word 'cause'. I'm willing to use your definitions, because you are defending the argument. But I don't think it's conducive to the discussion if I comment on whether or not I grant you the premises before I'm sure I understand your definitions. So if you forgive me, I'll only respond to your definition of 'beginning to exist' for now.

The kalam cosmological argument uses the phrase “begins to exist.” For those who wonder what that means I sometimes use the expression “comes into being” as a synonym. We can explicate this last notion as follows:

for any entity e and time t,
e comes into being at t if and only if (i) e exists at t, (ii) t is the first time at which e exists, (iii) there is no state of affairs in the actual world in which e exists timelessly, and (iv) e’s existing at t is a tensed fact.

[ ... ]

The reality of tensed facts therefore entails a tensed theory of time, usually called an A-Theory of time in the philosophical literature. One of the implications of an A-Theory of time is the objective reality of temporal becoming. Things come into and go out of existence. Things that are real exist wholly in the present and endure through time from one present moment to the next. Thus, on an A-Theory of time there is a dynamism about reality, a constant becoming of reality in time.

I don't think I understand what you think could be a 'tensed fact'. I can't post links yet, as I'm too new. But I want to check this:
1) Do you think the wikipedia article called "A-series and B-series" is an accurate representation of A-theory and B-theory?
2) Does A-theory need to be correct in order for anything to be included in your definition of what 'begins to exist'?
3) Can you give me some examples of tensed facts?

I was originally trying to respond to a lot more, but I find myself stumbling to write something coherent, because I don't see what the argument applies to, if it only applies to what you call 'tensed facts'.

Again, thank you very much for taking the time to respond so thoroughly.

 

[Ripheus27]

What I am even more unsure of, is why you think infinite regress is possible. Obviously if time goes infinitely back, then you will never get to the present.

That's the other half of the dilemma. If the infinite regress is given actually instead of potentially, and if the regress (finite or infinite) is given as an object in itself, then we face the impossible situation of the number of moments in time being able to be assigned a specific numeral (requiring other objects to pop into existence from a void), or being assigned the symbol for infinity (and so, as you say, no amount of time could have passed from past to present whereby the past could catch up to the present). So time is not in itself an object; it is a subjective part of a certain class of objects (us). Or so the Kantian thesis runs.

But to be honest, my intuition (in the form of my ability to imagine the passage of time in itself) has trouble with the above thesis. That is, I'm not entirely convinced of it... It just seems closer to reality than anything else I've come across yet.

 

[Elioenai26]

M-theory has as much explanatory power as the cosmological argument, it seems to me. That is, both are "purely theoretical," no?

No Ripheus, this is incorrect. And I will supply the reasons why I say this.

M-theory, in non-technical terms, presents an idea about the basic substance of the universe. It is purely theoretical and is one of several different speculative metaphysical theories being studied by theoretical physicists. Hawking and Mlodinow appeal to M-theory as their explanation for what generated their hypothetical "World Ensemble" of universes exhibiting various values for the constants of nature.

This "world ensemble", which is purely theoretical and speculative, is their answer to the seemingly inexplicable fine tuning observed in our universe. Since the odds of our universe’s being fine-tuned for intelligent life are so incomprehensibly remote, Hawking and Mlodinow appeal to the Many Worlds Hypothesis to augment one’s probabilistic resources to the extent that it becomes inevitable that a finely tuned universe will appear by chance somewhere in the World Ensemble or multiverse. If there are an infinite number of randomly ordered universes in the Ensemble, then a finely tuned universe will appear somewhere in the Ensemble by chance alone. This is their reasoning and their explanation regarding why we indeed live in a universe that exhibits fine-tuning which is so clearly undeniable as to require some sort of explanation.

The question that they must answer is this:

Why does our universe present us with this particular set of physical constants and quantities rather than some other set of physical constants and quantities?

Now, there are only three possible answers to this question:

1. Physical necessity
2. Chance
3. Design

Hawking and Mlodinow reject the hypothesis of physical necessity stating: “It appears that the fundamental numbers, and even the form, of the apparent laws of nature are not demanded by logic or physical principle” (p. 143 of The Grand Design).

Not wanting to appeal to a Cosmic Designer no doubt because of its theistic implications, Mlodinow and Hawking are left with only one option: Chance. Hawking and Mlodinow appeal to the Many Worlds Hypothesis to augment one’s probabilistic resources to the extent that it becomes inevitable that a finely tuned universe will appear by chance somewhere in the World Ensemble or multiverse.

Now, I will not address the fundamental problems with this completely speculative theory for the sake of space. If you would like me to I will however, in a different post.

Turning now to the Kalam Cosmological Argument. The Kalam Cosmological Argument is a variation of the cosmological argument that argues for the existence of a first cause for the universe. Proponents of the argument maintain that a conceptual analysis of the necessary attributes of this first cause are best explained as being the attributes of a creator God.

The argument is simply a logical syllogism which consists of two premises and a conclusion. The argument in fact is not even used as an explanatory tool whatsoever. It simply argues that there is a cause of the universe. Its rather cut and dry, and that is as far as the argument itself goes. It does not attempt to "explain" anything. It just points to the conclusion that the universe has a cause.

So you see, when you say that m-theory, and the Kalam are purely theoretical and have explanatory power, you are placing the two in the same category as being theoretical explanations and the Kalam is not a theoretical explanation of anything at all! You essentially are comparing apples and oranges here.

I'm guessing you've never read the Critique of Pure Reason and the rest of the relevant philosophical tradition.

That depends on what you consider "relevant". Relevant to you, or relevant to philosophy? I have addressed Kant in my Apologia of the Cosmos which is provided in a link in my first reply to you.

The argument leverages the meaning of the word 'cause',

You have used this phrase "leverages the meaning" several times and I am not quite sure what you mean. What are you trying to say?

but excises it from the very context

What context are you referring to?

Proponents appeal to the concept 'cause' that we use daily, but then modify it to include all sorts of exotic qualities that make this particular cause completely unlike any other known cause -- qualities such as spacelessness, timelessness, immateriality, and so on.

Cause as used in the argument simply means that the universe has a creative cause. If you will recall, I already went over this in my Apologia.

Aristotle’s tells us there are two types of causes:

1. efficient causes
2. material causes

An efficient cause is something that produces its effect in being; a material cause is the stuff out of which something is made. Michelangelo is the efficient cause the statue David, while the chunk of marble is its material cause.

Therefore Archaeopteryx, when the argument states that the universe has a cause, that simply means that the universe has an efficient cause for its existence.

You accuse me for dishonestly and deceptively modifying this understanding of an efficient cause to include all sorts of exotic qualities that make this particular cause completely unlike any other known cause -- qualities such as spacelessness, timelessness, immateriality, and so on.

But you see sir, this is not so much an objection as it is a complaint. You are complaining that this cause sounds too much like a theistic creator God. But this is not an objection, it is a complaint. The truth is sir, is if you conduct a conceptual analysis of what this "Cause" of the universe MUST be, it MUST be at the very least, non-spatial, timeless, and immaterial. It cannot be anything other than that. I have already explained why this MUST be.

You object by saying well this cause would be unlike any other known cause. Well.........okaaaaay.... All you are doing is stating the obvious!

Of course the cause of ALL matter cannot be material.
Of course the cause of ALL space cannot exist in space.
Of course the cause of time must exist outside of time or timelessly.

What efficient causes are you familiar with? People? Statues are made by sculptors, cars are made by car designers. Are you expecting the cause of the universe to be a man or something? Or a machine maybe? How would a man create the universe? How would a machine create the universe? And if you think about it, men do not literally "create" things anyway. They take things that already exist and put them together to make things.

So this complaint of yours is just that, a complaint.

They must ascribe these qualities to the cause if they are going to argue that it is a supernatural cause.

Incorrect again.

We ascribe these qualities to the cause because that is what they by necessity must be.

However, what they don't explain is how it is even possible for a cause to be unlike any other cause and yet still remain causally efficacious.

Philosopher's of science recognize that in order to recognize an explanation (x) as the best explanation, YOU DO NOT HAVE TO HAVE an explanation of the explanation (x).

The point of the matter is that we do not have to explain how it is possible for the Cause of the universe to be unlike any other cause and still remain causally efficacious.

This is the objection that Richard Dawkins raised. This again, is not an objection, but a complaint. Why think you should be able to explain how, an immaterial, non-spatial, timeless entity could remain causally efficacious? Just because we cannot explain how this is possible does not mean you eliminate is as an explanation when it is the inference to the best explanation for the data.

If scientists were to actually think the way you are thinking, then it would lead to an infinite regress of explanations, which would completely destroy science. You would never have an explanation for ANYTHING!

Why?

Because for any set of data, you would have to have an explanation of that data. But in order for that explanation to be valid, you would have to have an explanation of that explanation. For that explanation to be valid, you would have to have an explantion of the explanation of the explanation!!!! And so on to infinity!!!!

Apparently the only quality this first cause has in common with other causes is that it possesses causal power.

Apparently you say.....Hmm, well okaaay..

What other attribute would a cause have, other than causal power? Having causal powers simply means one has the ability to produce an effect.

Once again, if something caused the universe to exist, then of course it is not wholly unreasonable to think that it would be in at least one way unlike the universe. So what is the problem? Once again this seems to be more of a complaint.

From where does it obtain this mysterious, even mystical, causal power to cause (i.e create) everything from nothing? The blanks apparently aren't so important to the proponent as the conclusion that the cause must be God.

One does not need to know or explain how the Cause has causal powers in order to recognize that this Cause is the best explanation for the existence of the universe. Once again YOU DO NOT NEED TO HAVE AN EXPLANATION FOR THE EXPLANATION, in order to recognize it as the best explanation. This is fundamental philosophy of science were are dealing with here.

The blanks are not important when determining if God is the best explanation for the existence of the Universe. Once again, you are seeming to insinuate that one must be able to explain completely every detail of an explanation in order for it to be valid. This is wrong wrong wrong and you will have to abandon this way of thinking if you are to engage in serious metaphysics.

I will show you why:

Lets suppose the mars rover thingy is rolling around on mars and suddenly sends video back to the NASA folks of this large metallic sphere with what appears to be engravings and drawings on it sitting in a carved out section of mountain rock. This sphere is hundreds of feet in diameter and is polished so smooth that it looks like a pearl almost.

What do you think the scientific community would say the best explanation for the existence of this sphere was?

I guarantee you at the very least you would have every scientist on TV saying "It is definitely a sign that some extraterrestrial life has been here at one point in time."

They would say that at the very least Archaeopteryx.

They WOULD NOT sit around and twittle their thumbs and say: "Well guys, we simply cannot say that this large polished sphere with engravings and drawings on it is best explained by intelligent extra-terrestrial life. We know nothing about these E.T.s at all! We do not know how they got the equipment to polish this thing, or how they could have drawn and written these things on its surface. Or even how they could have put it in this carved out rock cave!

LOL imagine if they went on world wide TV and gave the following report:

"Men and women of earth, us scientists have come to the conclusion that we simply cannot say that the best explanation for this thing is intelligent extra terrestrial life. The reason is because we know nothing about these E.T.s".....

You see how ridiculous this reasoning would be?

Sir, clearly this large polished sphere with engravings on it is the result of some intelligence. We do not have to know all about the E.T.s to recognize this as the best explanation! But that is what you are suggesting. It simply is wrong thinking. No scientist conducts their research with that mindset.

I keep asking him whether he has read any philosophers beyond the snippets he has seen quoted on Reasonable Faith. He doesn't answer.

Yes I have.

 

[Ripheus27]

This "world ensemble", which is purely theoretical and speculative, is their answer to the seemingly inexplicable fine tuning observed in our universe. Since the odds of our universe’s being fine-tuned for intelligent life are so incomprehensibly remote, Hawking and Mlodinow appeal to the Many Worlds Hypothesis to augment one’s probabilistic resources to the extent that it becomes inevitable that a finely tuned universe will appear by chance somewhere in the World Ensemble or multiverse. If there are an infinite number of randomly ordered universes in the Ensemble, then a finely tuned universe will appear somewhere in the Ensemble by chance alone. This is their reasoning and their explanation regarding why we indeed live in a universe that exhibits fine-tuning which is so clearly undeniable as to require some sort of explanation.

If God can be conscious without depending on the parameters of physical reality, I daresay other configurations of basic parameters could yield conscious existences of some kind. Of course life as we know it can only exist in the world as we know it, and so our world might be thought of as "fine-tuned" to support such life. But whether other forms of life could exist in other forms of worlds is not thereby decided.

Hawking and Mlodinow reject the hypothesis of physical necessity stating: “It appears that the fundamental numbers, and even the form, of the apparent laws of nature are not demanded by logic or physical principle” (p. 143 of The Grand Design).

I agree that physical laws are not based on laws of formal logic. But there might be metaphysical laws, between the logical and the nomological planes of existence as it were, that determine how physics must go. Or, if time can be traced indefinitely backwards, then maybe the modern-day laws of physics were caused by earlier laws, themselves caused by earlier laws, and so on and so forth. (Of course, all this depends on there being physical laws at all. Physics without laws is a distinct metaphysical possibility, or so it has been argued.)

The argument is simply a logical syllogism which consists of two premises and a conclusion. The argument in fact is not even used as an explanatory tool whatsoever. It simply argues that there is a cause of the universe. Its rather cut and dry, and that is as far as the argument itself goes. It does not attempt to "explain" anything. It just points to the conclusion that the universe has a cause.

Now some might define explanation in terms of showing causes, though.

I have addressed Kant in my Apologia of the Cosmos which is provided in a link in my first reply to you.

I missed the link, so I'll go check it out.

 

[Elioenai26]

I thank you for taking the time to answer my question so thoroughly. You've responded to a lot more than I was actually trying to get a response to.

I appreciate it so much man, and hey, I've always wanted to vist the Netherlands!

Check out my response to Ripheus and Archaeopteryx. You may find some stuff in there you like.

Most of the 'arguments', if you can call them that, that I brought up in my original post were meant to illustrate the possible things that could go wrong if you weren't clear on the definition of 'beginning to exist'.

Ok.

I see that you're specifying what you mean with the phrase quite precisely, and that changes a lot. Also, I think your objections to what I bring up about quantum mechanics are at least partially caused by a different interpretation of the word 'cause'. I'm willing to use your definitions, because you are defending the argument. But I don't think it's conducive to the discussion if I comment on whether or not I grant you the premises before I'm sure I understand your definitions. So if you forgive me, I'll only respond to your definition of 'beginning to exist' for now.

Ok.

I don't think I understand what you think could be a 'tensed fact'. I can't post links yet, as I'm too new. But I want to check this:
1) Do you think the wikipedia article called "A-series and B-series" is an accurate representation of A-theory and B-theory?

Its a general summation of the theories and yes it is sufficient for a basic understanding of what philosophers of time mean when they speak of A-Theory and B-theory.

2) Does A-theory need to be correct in order for anything to be included in your definition of what 'begins to exist'?

In response to this, I am going to point you to the work of Dr. Craig who may be the one most responsible for the resurgence of the Kalam in the past several decades. He defends the A-Theory of time and uses it in his work regarding the Kalam.

Dr. William Lane Craig, American analytic philosopher, theologian, and Christian apologist known for his work in the philosophy of religion, philosophy of time, and the defense of Christian theism who is notable for reviving interest in the Kalām cosmological argument with his 1979 publication of The Kalām Cosmological Argument, received a Bachelor of Arts degree in communications from Wheaton College, Illinois, in 1971 and two summa cum laude master's degrees from Trinity Evangelical Divinity School in Deerfield, Illinois, in 1975, in philosophy of religion and ecclesiastical history. He earned a Ph.D. in philosophy under John Hick at the University of Birmingham, England, in 1977 and a Th.D. under Wolfhart Pannenberg at the University of Munich in 1984. From 1980 to 1986 he was an assistant professor of philosophy at Trinity Evangelical Divinity School. He briefly held the position of associate professor of religious studies at Westmont College in Santa Barbara, California, from 1986 to 1987. From 1987 to 1994 Craig pursued further research at the University of Louvain, Belgium. Since 1996 he has held the position of research professor of philosophy at Talbot School of Theology, Biola University in La Mirada, California. *Wikipedia*

Craig defends the A-Theory or A-Series of time. He rejects J. M. E. McTaggart's famous argument against it, describing it as "an engaging and recalcitrant brain teaser that no one takes seriously," but also argues against hybrid A-B theorists because they are all refuted by McTaggart's paradox. He argues that McTaggart's objection does not succeed as it employs an incoherent combination of a B-theoretical ontology with A-theoretical temporal becoming. According to Craig, if one adopts a neo-Lorentzian interpretation of special relativity, the A-theory can be reconciled with the theory of relativity.

Now, Dr. Craig has authored two books specifically dealing with this subject. They are:

God, Time, and Eternity (Kluwer, 2001) and in Time and Eternity (Crossway, 2001)

In an article, Dr. Craig responds to a dilemma which is listed below. In his answering of this dilemma, he explains why A-theory or tensed time is the preferrable view.


Some propose a dilemma and it goes like:

“God (a) cannot create the universe because a timeless being cannot ‘create’ (‘create’ is a temporal action).”

As medieval philosophers loved to point out, we must distinguish two very different senses of this claim:

1. Not-possibly (God is timeless & God creates the universe)
and
1.´ God is timeless & not-possibly (God creates the universe)

The ambiguity in the first horn of your dilemma is like the ambiguity of the sentence “It is not possible for the white house to be brown”—do we mean “It is not possible that the house be both white and brown” or that “It is not possible for the white house to become brown”? Understood in the first sense the sentence is true, but understood in the second sense it is false.

So think about (1). Whether you think it is possible for God both to be timeless and to create the universe will depend, I am convinced, upon your theory of time.

According to the so-called tensed or A-Theory of time, temporal becoming is a real and objective feature of the world, as things come into and go out of being. But on a tenseless or B-Theory of time, all events and moments of time are equally real, and temporal becoming is an illusion of human consciousness. Now on a B-Theory of time I think it’s easy to see how God can create the universe in the sense that the universe contingently depends upon God for its being. The whole four-dimensional spacetime manifold just exists as a block on this view, and God exists “outside” the block and sustains it in being. On this view creating is not necessarily a temporal action; God can create timelessly. So (1) is false.

Now WilbertK, he speaks about what we really want to understand...

On the other hand, if you adopt an A-Theory of time, as I am strongly inclined to do, then (1) is true. For at the first moment of its existence the universe quite literally comes into being. God’s real causal relation to that event will be new to God at that moment, and therefore God must be temporal at that moment. On this view creating truly is, as you say, a temporal action and therefore in creating the universe God must be temporal.

So on an A-theory, (1) seems to be true.

But what about (1´) on an A-Theory of time? If God is timeless, is He incapable of creating a universe? Is He somehow imprisoned in timelessness, frozen into immobility? I see no reason to think so. The claim that if God is timeless, it is impossible for Him to create the universe is based upon the assumption that timelessness is an essential, rather than contingent, property of God. But as in the case of the color of the house, I see no reason to think that God’s being timeless or temporal cannot be a contingent property of God, dependent upon His will. Existing timelessly alone without the universe, He can will to refrain from creation and so remain timeless; or He can will to create the universe and become temporal at the first exercise of His causal power. It’s up to Him.

So on the view I propose, God exists timelessly without the universe with a timeless intention to create a universe with a beginning. He exercises His causal power, and time as a result comes into being, along with the first state of the universe, and God freely enters into time. It all happens co-incidentally, that is, together at once. This is, I own, a mind-boggling conclusion, but makes better sense to me than the alternatives.

God, Time, and Creation | Reasonable Faith

And to sum it up he states:

The kalam cosmological argument presupposes from start to finish an A-theory of time. Things do not come into being without a cause. If the universe is finite in the past, then it began to exist in the sense that it came into being. The first moment of creation is not a tenseless instant at the head of a four-dimensional block but an evanescent moment that came to be and has passed away.

Read more: Beginning to Exist | Reasonable Faith

3) Can you give me some examples of tensed facts?

Sure.

The information conveyed by a tensed sentence concerns not just tenseless facts, but also tensed facts as well, facts about how something is related to the present. Thus, what is a fact at one moment may not be a fact at another moment. It is now a fact that the U.S. is at war in Afghanistan; but in a few years that may no longer be a fact. Thus the body of tensed facts is constantly changing.

Also...

Now if there are tensed facts, then time itself is tensed. That is to say, the moments of time are really past, present, or future, independently of our subjective experience of time. Tense is not merely a feature of human language and experience but is an objective feature of reality. It is an objective fact, for example, that Columbus’ voyage in 1492 is over; it’s past. Therefore, 1492 is itself past, since the voyage was located at that time. The reality of tensed facts therefore entails a tensed theory of time, usually called an A-Theory of time in the philosophical literature. One of the implications of an A-Theory of time is the objective reality of temporal becoming. Things come into and go out of existence. Things that are real exist wholly in the present and endure through time from one present moment to the next. Thus, on an A-Theory of time there is a dynamism about reality, a constant becoming of reality in time.

Read more: Beginning to Exist | Reasonable Faith

I was originally trying to respond to a lot more, but I find myself stumbling to write something coherent, because I don't see what the argument applies to, if it only applies to what you call 'tensed facts'.

Again, thank you very much for taking the time to respond so thoroughly.

My pleasure. You are one of the few here who I have actually had a delightful, pleasurable exhange with. I thoroughly enjoy it!

 

[Elioenai26]

I missed the link, so I'll go check it out.

My bad man. Here is the [thread=7674415]Thread[/thread]

That thread was a thread I started a while back on the Kalam. In the first couple of posts you will see the argument.

 

[Ripheus27]

Now that I think of it, isn't saying, "The universe has a cause," like saying, "The Law of Causality has a cause"? For the universe might just be defined as "the set of all causes and effects."

Now as far as Elionenai26's take on Kant goes...

Kant's agnosticism

Kant's views are even more incredible than Hume's. Kant maintained that it was not possible to know the world as it really is. According to Kant, the structure of your senses and your mind forms all sense data, so that you never really know the thing in itself. You only are able to know the thing to you after your mind and senses form it. Therefore according to Kant we are locked in complete agnosticism about the real world. However, like Hume, Kant violates the Law on Noncontradiction. He contradicts his own premise by saying that no one can know the real world while he claims to know something about it, namely that the real world is unknowable! In effect, he says that the truth about the real world is that there are no truths about the real world. He even goes a step beyond Hume and committs the "nothing but" fallacy which implies that he has "more than" knowledge. Kant says he knows the data that gets to his brain is nothing but phenomena, but in order to know this, he would have to be able to see more than just the phenomena. In order to differentiate between the two (the phenomena and noumena), you have to be able to perceive where one ends and the other begins. If there is no way to determine between the two, and you can't see how they might differ, then it makes much more sense to assume that they are the same! In other words that the idea in your mind accurately represents the thing in the noumena or the real world.

This is a very weak interpretation of transcendental idealism. Anyone wishing to truly understand Kant's theories would do a better job by reading the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy articles "Kant's Critique of Metaphysics," for one, and then "Kant and Hume on Causality," "View of Mind and Consciousness of Self," etc. As it stands, the above quote is barely better than Ayn Rand's anti-Kant tripe. (Now I actually admire Rand; I just think she might've had a lot of English-as-a-second-language issues when it came to understanding what she read about other philosophers. For example, when she has John Galt diss Descartes' "I think therefore I am," she seems to interpret that saying as "I think, and thinking causes me to exist," which of course is not what Descartes meant at all.)

 

[Elioenai26]

Now that I think of it, isn't saying, "The universe has a cause," like saying, "The Law of Causality has a cause"?

No.

For the universe which is all space-time, all matter and all energy is categorically different from the Law of Causality. The Law of Causality or Causality is simply a concept dealing with a relationship between a cause and its effect. In other words, causality is an abstract concept, not a concrete reality which is what the universe is, which makes the two categorically different.

Saying the universe has a cause is like saying that the statue David has a cause. We are primarily concerned with efficient cause in this context.

But how could it be rationally stated that the concept of a relationship between a cause and its effect has a cause? I think it would be more appropriate to state that Causality is a self-evident truth, rather than something which is "created".

For the universe might just be defined as "the set of all causes and effects."

This would be an incorrect, non-standard redefining of the word. For if we understand that the universe itself has a cause, then the universe itself cannot possibly be the set of all causes and effects. If it were it would not have to have a cause independent of itself, but we have seen that it indeed does have to have a cause independent of itself, unless you want to posit that the universe created itself, which is obviously irrational, and incoherent.

Now as far as Elionenai26's take on Kant goes...

This is a very weak interpretation of transcendental idealism. Anyone wishing to truly understand Kant's theories would do a better job by reading the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy articles "Kant's Critique of Metaphysics," for one, and then "Kant and Hume on Causality," "View of Mind and Consciousness of Self," etc. As it stands, the above quote is barely better than Ayn Rand's anti-Kant tripe. (Now I actually admire Rand; I just think she might've had a lot of English-as-a-second-language issues when it came to understanding what she read about other philosophers. For example, when she has John Galt diss Descartes' "I think therefore I am," she seems to interpret that saying as "I think, and thinking causes me to exist," which of course is not what Descartes meant at all.)

The writing I supplied on Kant was not my own, but a reference of some of Dr. Norman Geisler's work. Dr. Geisler holds a Ph.D. in philosophy from Loyola University. Geisler is well known for his scholarly contributions to the subjects of Christian apologetics, philosophy, and is the author, coauthor, or editor of over 60 books and hundreds of articles. Geisler's education includes a diploma (1955) and Th.B. (1964) from William Tyndale College, B.A. in philosophy (1958) and M.A. in theology (1960) from Wheaton College, and a Ph.D. in philosophy from Loyola University. He had additional graduate work at Wayne State University, the University of Detroit, and Northwestern University in Evanston, Illinois.http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Norman_Geisler#cite_note-4

Now, Geisler was not directly addressing transcendental idealism, but specifically Kant's most well known ideas.

 

[Davian]

Nice wall of text. Paragraph, anyone?

But it must be a mind, and I'll show; truth must always exist. To say it does not is to say it does in the sense that it does not. To say it only has to exist at a certain time or state is to state a truth outside of that time and state that governs it. "There was a time when time was not," is an absurd thought. So truth must always exist and so time is forever because always means always. Now, logic is all we need to lead to the conclusion of God, because it is clear that truth exists, but the form that truth takes also has no real qualifier. What governs logic other than that it must be? Definitions only come from minds.

Definitions are descriptive, not proscriptive. They come about from how we use words, and change over time.
The only "minds" that science is aware of are emergent properties of brains. If you are using the word for something else, you will need to explain yourself.

Specifics are results of principles, not chaos. To say something can come from chaos is to denote laws of what chaos is and what can come from it i.e. something. It's like saying the universe began. We have to define what a universe is and what this whole beginning thing means.

The universe is the set of all things.

The beginning part, still up for grabs.

But because these denotations have physical power, one must ask why.

You can ask, but that does not necessarily make it a valid question.

You see, we can believe in a complete universe that always existed in the form of truth and logical principles without cause but self existent and self defined, but that's God...

In the context of the KCA, no, it isn't. It doesn't even need to be a "god" at all, at this point. Even Elioenai has to admit that.

What is the origin of origin? The denotation of denotation? The definition of definition? All these things are very ordered and designate themselves in ordered ways, and seeing as there was never a time for them to originate, but that they existed in such character from the beginning, it is clear that God is not only a perfectly rational idea, but more plausible than evolution.

Just not in any way that you can demonstrate.

For if a whole universe can exist by virtue, so can a person.

On the other hand, if your deity can be self-existing, why not the universe?

After all, infinity has already taken place, meaning that, from an evolutionists point of view, the fact that we die is more troubling than that we are born, because if this was a blind system, since there has already been an infinite past, there should have already been a removal of that which ends.

Are you going to prove to us that "evolution is not true"?

Meaning, whatever is is a part of something infinite; for the rational mind to have been born and die means there is something greater still that governs its existence,

You have a problem of infinite regression there (undoubtedly followed by special pleading).

and, seeing as the universe is self-defined in this way taking form where there is no reason for form, before order and before chaos, as nothing can be without first being, the self definition of the universe needing to exist, one must wonder how anything can define and govern itself without first having a soul...

What is this "soul" that you speak of?

 

[Davian]

<snip>
This would be an incorrect, non-standard redefining of the word. For if we understand that the universe itself has a cause, then the universe itself cannot possibly be the set of all causes and effects. If it were it would not have to have a cause independent of itself, but we have seen that it indeed does have to have a cause independent of itself, unless you want to posit that the universe created itself, which is obviously irrational, and incoherent.
...

Who promised you that everything about the universe, and its origins, must be appear to be rational and coherent?

 

[Ripheus27]

For the universe which is all space-time, all matter and all energy is categorically different from the Law of Causality. The Law of Causality or Causality is simply a concept dealing with a relationship between a cause and its effect. In other words, causality is an abstract concept, not a concrete reality which is what the universe is, which makes the two categorically different.

Okay, but when we got to the question of proving the Law of Causality...

But how could it be rationally stated that the concept of a relationship between a cause and its effect has a cause? I think it would be more appropriate to state that Causality is a self-evident truth, rather than something which is "created".

And there's the thing. "Every event has a cause," is not self-evident.

The writing I supplied on Kant was not my own, but a reference of some of Dr. Norman Geisler's work. Dr. Geisler holds a Ph.D. in philosophy from Loyola University. Geisler is well known for his scholarly contributions to the subjects of Christian apologetics, philosophy, and is the author, coauthor, or editor of over 60 books and hundreds of articles. Geisler's education includes a diploma (1955) and Th.B. (1964) from William Tyndale College, B.A. in philosophy (1958) and M.A. in theology (1960) from Wheaton College, and a Ph.D. in philosophy from Loyola University. He had additional graduate work at Wayne State University, the University of Detroit, and Northwestern University in Evanston, Illinois.

Now, Geisler was not directly addressing transcendental idealism, but specifically Kant's most well known ideas.

Transcendental idealism is Kant's most well-known idea. Or rather, it is the sum of all his most well-known ideas.

Kant is actually very useful for defending versions (however unorthodox) of various tenets of the Christian religion. His notion of original sin, for instance, is extremely plausible. If it weren't for Kant, in other words, I wouldn't even be a Christian.

 

[Archaeopteryx]

No.

For the universe which is all space-time, all matter and all energy is categorically different from the Law of Causality. The Law of Causality or Causality is simply a concept dealing with a relationship between a cause and its effect. In other words, causality is an abstract concept, not a concrete reality which is what the universe is, which makes the two categorically different.

Saying the universe has a cause is like saying that the statue David has a cause. We are primarily concerned with efficient cause in this context.

But how could it be rationally stated that the concept of a relationship between a cause and its effect has a cause? I think it would be more appropriate to state that Causality is a self-evident truth, rather than something which is "created".

If Causality is simply a concept dealing with the relationship between things (i.e. causes and effects), then logically, that concept can only come into meaningful usage when there are things. Causality, as a concept, works when we are speaking of things existing in space and time. To borrow from Wittgenstein, "the engine is idling" when we use that concept to refer to "things" that do not exist in space and time.

This would be an incorrect, non-standard redefining of the word.

The argument itself seems to redefine the word by taking it out of the context in which it finds meaning and uses it in an entirely unfamiliar way.

For if we understand that the universe itself has a cause, then the universe itself cannot possibly be the set of all causes and effects. If it were it would not have to have a cause independent of itself, but we have seen that it indeed does have to have a cause independent of itself, unless you want to posit that the universe created itself, which is obviously irrational, and incoherent.

Why would that be irrational? To use your words, "it is in the pool of live options" being considered.