Well, look at that, another abortion thread.
This one is different though!
I thought it would be good to have a neutral debate about abortion in purely non-religious terms. That doesn't mean you have to be an atheist to post, but I think it's rather obvious that quoting large chunks of biblical text about the sanctity of life at atheists isn't going to be a very productive discussion.
So, Christians (I'm actually making a rather false generalisation that Christians will be "pro-life" here), see this as a chance to try to have a rational debate with atheists on a level that you can both relate to. Non-Christians, see this as a way to think about abortion without the many dogmas and labels that yes, even non-religious people have become used to when discussing this topic.
I think it's a great pity that the debate about abortion has become so wrapped up in religious prejudices. "Pro-choice" people see "pro-life" as a religious position, and vice versa, and I think this is a mistake. I think there are perfectly rational ways that an atheist can consider abortion wrong, and similarly there are plenty of convincing arguments that can make a Christian believe it to be allowed (I don't think many people go so far to say that abortion is actually desirable, only that it is not undesirable).
Anyway, enough introduction. Let's get to the matter at hand.
The debate around abortion seems to me to be very simple.
I am going to make the assumption that we all agree that murder is wrong.
Murder I shall define as the ending of the life of another person.
So, the question is this: is abortion murder? If it is, then it is wrong, if it isn't, then it is not.
That question boils down to this: is a foetus a person? If a foetus is a person then terminating it is murder. If a foetus is not a person that terminating it is not.
So all questions around abortion come to this. What is a person? By what characteristics do we demarcate personhood? The question of whether a foetus is a person cannot be answered until we know what a person is, and thus the question of the morality of abortion is in the same position.
There are a number of obvious answers that come to mind but they all seem problematic. Let's go through a few of them.
Consciousness (by which I mean being self aware).
I think we can rather easily say that consciousness is not what makes a person, otherwise we would consider it okay to kill sleeping people or those in comas.
Intelligence.
Again, this is problematic, and linked with consciousness. A sleeping person displays no intelligence. Moreover, if intelligence became the factor that makes a person a person, then what is the status of mentally disabled people? Are they suddenly not people any more?
You could say that it is not intelligence/consciousness but potential or future intelligence/consciousness, which would get around the sleeping person and coma objections.
Given that a foetus will also possess potential/future consciousness, deciding this as your defining characteristic of personhood means that a foetus would count as a person.
Some of you may think that potential/future consciousness is the answer, but I suspect that many of you will find it an unsatisfying one, like myself, so lets keep looking.
Biological configuration.
This seems unlikely, as we still consider those with disfigurations people.
Genetic material.
A single skin cell has human genetic material yet is not a person. Further, if we allow ourselves a thought experiment, we can say that we might consider an alien a person, yet they would have different genetic material.
Human interaction
We could say that people are those who take part in human social activity and interaction. But what about a hermit? What about people who are disabled such that they can't socially interact? What about coma patients? We still consider these people.
Again you could bring in the idea of potential and say that it's potential human interaction, but the moment you have the word potential in there you make the debate moot as you've included foetuses in your definition.
Those are most of the obvious possible defining characteristics I can think of, and as you can see none of them are really satisfactory. We could say that it is not any one characteristic that makes us people, but rather a combination of them, but this makes the problem worse, not better, as if you start having multiple requirements for personhood then the concept becomes even more exclusive and suddenly we have all these things we consider people that don't fit the definition.
So how are we to define personhood? It seems like a problem indeed. If you have any ideas you are welcome - indeed encouraged - to put them forward. That is the central question of this discussion.
However, I will now move on to suggest one possible answer.
The clue to this is actually in the argument above. With each characteristic I proposed there would be a problem roughly in the form "yet X doesn't possess characteristic Y and we consider them a person, so Y is not the characteristic that defines personhood".
This type of objection clearly shows that we think we already possess some kind of correct intuition about what is a person and what is not. When we are looking to define personhood we are not just looking for something to tell us what a person is or isn't, but also something that defines what we already feel we know about personhood. The ultimate authority in these matters seems to be this intuition. It is not the case that we say "intelligence is the requirement of personhood; screw all the stupid people!". Rather the fact that we consider stupid people as people is seen as evidence that intelligence is not the requirement of personhood.
From this we can form some sort of quasi-defintion about personhood. I say "quasi-" because it is an entirely unsatisfactory one which does not solve the debate at all, but instead leaves it wide open and apparently with no solution.
A thing is a person if we as a society collectively believe it to be so.
The controvosy and endless nature of the abortion debate is rather neatly explained by this, because foetuses are clearly a case of where society is split. This split seems to me, from the above ramblings, to be really based on mostly unjustified opinion. Both sides are guilty of deciding that a foetus is/is not a person without any real justification.
There are three ways that we could go from here.
Firstly, we could continue the endless arguments and hope that one day a concensus is reached.
Secondly we could decide to "play it safe" and say abortion is wrong (or, if you want a weaker statement, should be discouraged), as we don't know if foetuses are people or not, and thus, just in case they are, we shouldn't abort them.
Conversely we could adopt the scientific position of doubt (think of Bertrand Russell's intergalatic teapot) and say that foetuses aren't people until it is shown that they are. Of course it seems to me that we could equally say that foetuses are people until it is shown that they aren't.
Somehow I get the feeling we're going to be doing the first.
This one is different though!
I thought it would be good to have a neutral debate about abortion in purely non-religious terms. That doesn't mean you have to be an atheist to post, but I think it's rather obvious that quoting large chunks of biblical text about the sanctity of life at atheists isn't going to be a very productive discussion.
So, Christians (I'm actually making a rather false generalisation that Christians will be "pro-life" here), see this as a chance to try to have a rational debate with atheists on a level that you can both relate to. Non-Christians, see this as a way to think about abortion without the many dogmas and labels that yes, even non-religious people have become used to when discussing this topic.
I think it's a great pity that the debate about abortion has become so wrapped up in religious prejudices. "Pro-choice" people see "pro-life" as a religious position, and vice versa, and I think this is a mistake. I think there are perfectly rational ways that an atheist can consider abortion wrong, and similarly there are plenty of convincing arguments that can make a Christian believe it to be allowed (I don't think many people go so far to say that abortion is actually desirable, only that it is not undesirable).
Anyway, enough introduction. Let's get to the matter at hand.
The debate around abortion seems to me to be very simple.
I am going to make the assumption that we all agree that murder is wrong.
Murder I shall define as the ending of the life of another person.
So, the question is this: is abortion murder? If it is, then it is wrong, if it isn't, then it is not.
That question boils down to this: is a foetus a person? If a foetus is a person then terminating it is murder. If a foetus is not a person that terminating it is not.
So all questions around abortion come to this. What is a person? By what characteristics do we demarcate personhood? The question of whether a foetus is a person cannot be answered until we know what a person is, and thus the question of the morality of abortion is in the same position.
There are a number of obvious answers that come to mind but they all seem problematic. Let's go through a few of them.
Consciousness (by which I mean being self aware).
I think we can rather easily say that consciousness is not what makes a person, otherwise we would consider it okay to kill sleeping people or those in comas.
Intelligence.
Again, this is problematic, and linked with consciousness. A sleeping person displays no intelligence. Moreover, if intelligence became the factor that makes a person a person, then what is the status of mentally disabled people? Are they suddenly not people any more?
You could say that it is not intelligence/consciousness but potential or future intelligence/consciousness, which would get around the sleeping person and coma objections.
Given that a foetus will also possess potential/future consciousness, deciding this as your defining characteristic of personhood means that a foetus would count as a person.
Some of you may think that potential/future consciousness is the answer, but I suspect that many of you will find it an unsatisfying one, like myself, so lets keep looking.
Biological configuration.
This seems unlikely, as we still consider those with disfigurations people.
Genetic material.
A single skin cell has human genetic material yet is not a person. Further, if we allow ourselves a thought experiment, we can say that we might consider an alien a person, yet they would have different genetic material.
Human interaction
We could say that people are those who take part in human social activity and interaction. But what about a hermit? What about people who are disabled such that they can't socially interact? What about coma patients? We still consider these people.
Again you could bring in the idea of potential and say that it's potential human interaction, but the moment you have the word potential in there you make the debate moot as you've included foetuses in your definition.
Those are most of the obvious possible defining characteristics I can think of, and as you can see none of them are really satisfactory. We could say that it is not any one characteristic that makes us people, but rather a combination of them, but this makes the problem worse, not better, as if you start having multiple requirements for personhood then the concept becomes even more exclusive and suddenly we have all these things we consider people that don't fit the definition.
So how are we to define personhood? It seems like a problem indeed. If you have any ideas you are welcome - indeed encouraged - to put them forward. That is the central question of this discussion.
However, I will now move on to suggest one possible answer.
The clue to this is actually in the argument above. With each characteristic I proposed there would be a problem roughly in the form "yet X doesn't possess characteristic Y and we consider them a person, so Y is not the characteristic that defines personhood".
This type of objection clearly shows that we think we already possess some kind of correct intuition about what is a person and what is not. When we are looking to define personhood we are not just looking for something to tell us what a person is or isn't, but also something that defines what we already feel we know about personhood. The ultimate authority in these matters seems to be this intuition. It is not the case that we say "intelligence is the requirement of personhood; screw all the stupid people!". Rather the fact that we consider stupid people as people is seen as evidence that intelligence is not the requirement of personhood.
From this we can form some sort of quasi-defintion about personhood. I say "quasi-" because it is an entirely unsatisfactory one which does not solve the debate at all, but instead leaves it wide open and apparently with no solution.
A thing is a person if we as a society collectively believe it to be so.
The controvosy and endless nature of the abortion debate is rather neatly explained by this, because foetuses are clearly a case of where society is split. This split seems to me, from the above ramblings, to be really based on mostly unjustified opinion. Both sides are guilty of deciding that a foetus is/is not a person without any real justification.
There are three ways that we could go from here.
Firstly, we could continue the endless arguments and hope that one day a concensus is reached.
Secondly we could decide to "play it safe" and say abortion is wrong (or, if you want a weaker statement, should be discouraged), as we don't know if foetuses are people or not, and thus, just in case they are, we shouldn't abort them.
Conversely we could adopt the scientific position of doubt (think of Bertrand Russell's intergalatic teapot) and say that foetuses aren't people until it is shown that they are. Of course it seems to me that we could equally say that foetuses are people until it is shown that they aren't.
Somehow I get the feeling we're going to be doing the first.