That is quite a general question you are asking here...is there anything specific I can help you with?
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Guten Tag Freodin!
How are you?
Can you please tell me about the daily life in Ancient Germanic Tribal Germany, in Medieval Germany, and in Germany during the Renaissance please? Thanks so much! Peace!
Auf Wiedersehen!
That is quite a general question you are asking here...is there anything specific I can help you with?
The problem with such general questions is "where to start" and "where to end".Well...there is not really anything specific that you can help me but, thanks so much for offering. The reason why I asked you the general question about daily life in Ancient Germanic Tribal Germany, in Medieval Germany, and in Germany during the Renaissance is because I really wanted to test your knowledge in those areas in German history.
Again, a very general question and thus difficult to answer. Who do you want to compare?But, what you can help me with is how was daily life in Germany during those periods was different from the daily life in the rest of Europe during those same time periods.
Well, that question is rather simple to answer: they didn't.My biggest question is how come Medieval Germany adopted many of the social orders, the culture, and etc that the Normans "invented" or just "advanced" such as knights, feudlism, castles, and etc when the Normans almost never ever settled or conquered Medieval Germany in the first place so that the Normans could spread their ideas, culture, and their "inventions" to Medieval Germany? Just wondering! Thanks so much in advance!
Peace!
It is an interesting combination, the master artisan and (one of) his masterful tools. To shape history, it takes both.Yes the younger Moltke was not up to the quality of the elder. For all the talent that they had, it was a shame that happened.
I respect your opinion, and yes Bismarck was the driver. Moltke was superb at achieving the practical results after Bismarck set him up for success.
That's not quite correct. Yes, Germany was made through "iron and blood", but the unification was never "around" military goals. The military, the wars, were always a means to an end. Political unification against the dominant dualistic power system. Herding the German states towards a common goal. But the goal was never military domination.I agree with you that they could have used someone, even with 20% of the political capacity of Bismarck. It could be said that the post-Bismarck political failures had doomed the war before it had begun.
However I am hesitant to put much blame on the military. As you know, Germany was made through iron and blood, by unifying around military goals, in the name of a King. Ever since then, except for that one period that everyone talks about, it hasn't been much.
That's not quite correct. Yes, Germany was made through "iron and blood", but the unification was never "around" military goals. The military, the wars, were always a means to an end. Political unification against the dominant dualistic power system. Herding the German states towards a common goal. But the goal was never military domination.
The problem that the Bismarckian Empire was set up with was that due to the military's major involvement in its creation, it got to play a special role in its society. It got a social dominance that its real social power did not justify. During Bismarck's days, this was kept in check... but with a young, brush, simple minded new monarch, it run amok.
The mythical "Prussian militarism" wasn't some national brandenburg, prussian or german characteristic. It was an excess of the historical, social, political and diplomatic situation at the end of the 19th century.
Again, this is not quite correct. The southern german states - actually the four remaining german middle states left after the formation of the Northern German Federation and the exclusion of Austria from "Germany" - were already militarily allied, even subjected, to Prussia/NGF. After the German War of 1866 and the dissolution of the German Confederation, these states were left without alliance protections against foreign threats - most likely french - and were basically forced into prussian dominated alliances in the peace agreements. When France declared war in 1870, the southern states were required to join and fight under prussian leadershipThe Germans most certainly did unify around Prussia's military strength, around the military goal of defeating the French. The Franco-Prussian War was the reason that they unified. The Southern states would probably not have consented if not for the war fever.
They should have "let France off" even more easily. The annexation of Alsace-Lorraine was a burden on the Franco-German relations that was unnessecary. But hindsight and all that...Now, you might say, the Franco-Prussia War was not a military goal, just a means, but that could be said about any war. No, the goal was not military domination, which is one reason why they let France off more easily than they probably should have.
After 27 years of rule. Personal rule, dominated by his brash and militaristic personality, unbridled by adequate political oversight. A case of old dogs and new tricks.Although young at his accession, Wilhelm II was 55 years old in 1914.
Neither of these cases were different from their non-prussian counterpart. The Austrian military of Maria Theresia was formidable. Its forces had fought victoriously over Louis XIV's France and was the dominating force against the Ottomans.Now, Prussian militarism was far from a myth, as I'm sure that Maria Theresa, Napoleon I, and Napoleon III could all attest. I don't know why you put it at the end of the 19th century. Friedrich Wilhelm I Soldier King and Friedrich II the Great were 18th century.
Now you are getting polemic. Arminius was an example of "German militarism"... but the Roman wars that conquered the mediteranean world were not? Clovis and Charlemagne were "German militarists"... but not French ones?The Germans and militarism, however, finds its beginning with Herman at Teutoburg, then continues with Clovis and the Franks, then with Charles Martel, then with Charlemagne, etc.
But that simply isn't true.Okay, let's take these one at a time. In the first argument, you just proved my point, except in a different way. You just gave some more of the backstory as to why the Franco-Prussian War was the reason that the southern states unified. Of course, they had alliances with the NGF, but they would not have unified politically (given up their sovereignty) if not for the Franco-Prussian War. That is, unless there was another successful event, which there was not. All past events and efforts had failed.
That is what you, in a sort of roundabout way, admitted when you said, "When France declared war in 1870, the southern states were required to join and fight under prussian leadership". Then, in the aftermath of that, the political unification sentiment was strong enough that they gave up their sovereignty. That is a lot different than an alliance. Prussia had many alliances with many nations, but you did not see any other nation give up their sovereignty and form one nation. There is a big difference between having an alliance and forming a single nation.
You - "So basically, the Franco-Prussian war would not have changed anything. It wasn't "the reason" for the unification - just the opportunity to raise national feelings as pave the way for integration of the southern states."
Again, I am not saying that the war was a end to itself. That war, like all others, was rooted in political causes. However, you would not be wrong is saying that the Franco-Prussian War was the reason why the German states unified. That is about as true of a statement as can ever be made about German history. That war is what made the unification happen, the stimulus, the means, the cause, the reason. Of course, there are always underlying reasons behind a reason. You are making the mistake of denying a clear cause and effect, in deference to the cause of the cause. Consider that you can always add more causes that preceded the causes that you mentioned. That does not invalidate the later and more direct causes.
First of all, it is not correct that the southern states in the war "gave up their sovereignity". The subjected their fighting forces to Prussian high command... that's all. They were still sovereign states. Their situation after the victorious war was exactly the same as before the war.
The war created a climate better suited for the unificatio, but didn't provide "the stimulus, the means, the cause, the reason". Nothing about the war war relevant for the unification deals. Nothing about the questions the were part of the negotiations were in any way related to the war.
The unification, Bismarcks great project, had been in progress before the war, and included basically the same negotiations that happened during the war. Bismarck didn't wage this war to further the unification... he did it to remove France as a potential obstacle for the future process, however this might have been. He took the opportunity as it presented it... but he didn't try to create this opportunity.
The southern states did not want to join. They were extremely reluctant, and tried their best to gain as much advantages as they could. Basically they had to be bought off... won war or not. But they also knew that unification was basically inevitable. They had lost the support of Austria, they couldn't stay in the situation they were in - kind of second-tier Germans - and they couldn't rely on France as a reliable ally without pretentions.
It is definitly not that "All past events and efforts had failed.". The past events and efforts were still going on, and came to fruition with the help of the won war... but not because of it.
A slight misunderstanding, and I see where I should have phrased that differently and more in depth.I'm not at home with access to all of my primary sources, but let me post some relevant passages from some sources that I have access to digitally.
Okay, I hate to quote wiki but:
"Prussia and the other states in Northern and Central Germany united as a federal state, the North German Federation, on July 1, 1867. The Southern states Bavaria, Württemberg, Baden and Hesse-Darmstadt entered military alliances with Prussia. In the Franco-Prussian War of 1870–71, those states joined the North German Federation. It was consequently renamed to German Empire, and the parliament and Federal Council decided to give the Prussian king the title of German Emperor (since January 1, 1871). The new German Empire included 25 states (three of them, Hanseatic cities) and the imperial territory of Alsace-Lorraine. Within the empire, 65% of the territory and 62% of the population belonged to the state of Prussia."
States of Germany - Wikipedia
Yes, they were still states, but they had a new greater sovereign, Emperor Wilhelm I. Their situation after the victorious war was absolutely not like it was before. They were now part of the German Empire. They were now in a stronger commitment to Prussia and Wilhelm. They were part of an Empire, and not just an alliance.
How do you think the war would have done this? What reasons would it have give the southern states to unify with the the NGF?Yes, the war most certainly was "the stimulus, the means, the cause, the reason". There may have been other, of each item on that list, that were deeper (subjective) and earlier than each of those, but to deny that the war was not each of those things is not right.
That is much too simplified. The states already were "joined to defend / protect the Fatherland". That is what their defensive alliances were meant to do. It was what basically the old German Confederation was meant to do.Here is an outtake from Finnemore's History of Germany:
"During the course of the war a great step had been taken by Germany, a step to which her best thinkers and noblest patriots had looked forward for many, many years, the uniting of her states into a German nation. It was felt that as all the states were now joined in war to defend the Fatherland, so should they be joined in peace to protect it. In November 1870, while the siege of Paris was going on, Bismarck invited the representatives of other states to Versailles to confer on the subject of German union.
What this doesn't say is that Ludwig von Bayern didn't do this of his own accord, the letter was provided by Bismarck for Ludwig to send... and Ludwig was basically bribed to do it.An agreement was made, and on December 3 the King of Bavaria, the chief ruler of South Germany, proposed that the Imperial crown should be offered to the King of Prussia as head of the new German Empire. William I accepted the crown on January 18, 1871.
With tons of coercion, cajoling and shady deals behind the scenes.He did so at Versailles, in the great hall of the palace of Louis the Great, a hall hung with pictures of the victories of the mighty Napoleon, he who had destroyed the ancient empire, and amid the joyous shouts of princes who had but a few years since fought against Prussia : all were now united under one ruler and as members of one empire."
Again, a slight misunderstanding. What I should have said was, the situation would have been the same for all the sides after the victorious war. There were reasons to unite. There was reasons not to unite. None of these were changed by the war. All that did change was a kind of an atmosphere soaked in jingoistic euphoria.Yes, I think the war was the stimulus, means, cause, and reason. Yes, I don't think it was exactly the same for the states after that. This was pretty important, a turning point in their history, I think.
That is correct... but the reasons for Bismarck's politics are a little different. There was no reason for Bismarck to assume that a war against France would bring on the German unification... because no such reason existed. What kind of reason would that have been: "Hurray, we won against France, now let's bow to some other foreign monarch"?Bismarck had indeed dreamed of and had been planning for unification for a long time. Now, you and I will never know why he did what he did. We have his Memoirs, which I would like to review on this when I am home. It seems a logical conclusion to me if unification was his great project, and this war accomplished it, that he did not just luck into that in the process of acting solely to remove France. If that was his only goal, he should have hit them harder after the war than he did, not easier as you recommend, which we will have an argument on later.
I am sure you are familiar with the Ems Dispatch:
"Bismarck took it upon himself to edit the report, sharpening the language. He cut out Wilhelm’s conciliatory phrases and emphasized the real issue. The French had made certain demands under threat of war; and Wilhelm had refused them. This was no forgery; it was a clear statement of the facts.[7] Certainly the edit of the telegram, released on the evening of the same day (13 July) to the media and foreign embassies, gave the impression both that Benedetti was rather more demanding and that the King was exceedingly abrupt. It was designed to give the French the impression that King Wilhelm I had insulted Count Benedetti; likewise, the Germans interpreted the modified dispatch as the Count insulting the King.
Bismarck had viewed the worsening relations with France with open satisfaction. If war had to come, now was as good a time as any. His editing, he assured his friends, "would have the effect of a red rag on the Gallic [French] bull."[8] The edited telegram was to be presented henceforth as the cause of the war."
Ems Dispatch - Wikipedia
He created this situation - the game of chicken between France and Prussia, as the opportunity presented itself. But his goal was to beat France, reduce her potential influence in southern Germany and her involvement in the unification process. He did not incite the war to unify Germany.Since you are obviously very studied in German history (no sarcasm intended, you are impressive). Then, how can you say, "he didn't try to create this opportunity"? Do you deny the details of this incident as related above? I can say that I have read variations on it.
That now is a case where hindsight is rather an obstacle than an advantage. Our distance in time lead us to misjudge the timeline of the events.Yes, because of all this reluctance, if not for the war the unification would not have happened. That was their tipping point. It was finally enough to overcome the hindrances that had been plaguing unification what seemed like forever. Was it just a coincidence that it happened in January 1871, at that point in the war? If the southern states could have been bought off, war or not, what a coincidence that was.
Charlemagne was a Frankish king and a Roman Emperor. Both the later German as well as French historiography stylised him as the father of their respective nation - nationalistic 19th century historiography foremost. But he was neither. Both French and German nationalism comes from a later period, when the basic idea of "nation" was invented... and the idea of "nation state" was even later. In Germany, it continuously clashed with the universal imperial claim, and it could take hold only after this system had died.This is subjective. I guess you could say that Charlemagne's past efforts were still ongoing in their hearts in 1871.
Almost.At least you admit that your causes needed the war to help them get over the hump.
Take your time... I will be here.I will give you a reply to this. I want to consult and quote my better sources, and will be busy with other things for the next week or so. I will reply and am enjoying this discussion.
Sorry. English is not my native language, and some nuances might evade me. I meant it exactly as it should be, as far as I understand English: a comparison. I guess in Kardashian, it would have to be spelled "like, forever."Come on now though, you took my phrase "seemed like forever" and quoted "like forever" to make it seem like I spoke Kardashian?
But this is an unhistorical approach to this problem, based on our understanding of "nation", "country", "unified entity"... which is in turn based on the developement of these terms in the late 18th and 19th century.Anyway you state it though, German unification was an age-old problem. I am talking about how the German people were splintered from the time of Germanic tribes up to the German Empire/Kaiserreich. There was never a unified German entity until then, unless you count the Holy Roman Empire which, given the way you see things, I am nearly certain that you will not. Of course precisely speaking not even the Kaiserreich unified all of them, and here we get into the complex question of who is really Germanic and who is not. Of course, Austrians are just as German as Prussians. Well we will catch up later Freodin, and I look forward to continuing the discussion.
Wie war das mit, "Wir können alles. Außer Hochdeutsch"?Why do Bavarians not know how to speak proper German?
Is there a historical background for the lack of communication skills in Bavaria? (Maybe the daily amount of beer)
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Echt jetzt, euch verstehe keine Sau. Ihr seid schlimmer als die Ossis. Im Übrigen klingt Schwäbisch eh viel elitärer, gell.
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