Y'ever read my tagline? That's a pretty large mistake to make about this view.
"... not an unconcerned sitting of God in heaven, from which He merely observes the things that are done in the world; but that all-active and all-concerned seatedness on His throne above, by which He governs the world which He Himself hath made." John Calvin
Calvin isn't making sense here. He both supports the idea that the will of man is comprehensively predestined according to God's good pleasure and that God is emotionally divested in the fate of his creatures in a way that alternatively pleases and displeases Him. He is displeased with sin but is pleased to predestine man and his sin.
Bait & switch. Freedom isn't responsibility, though every free will viewpoint tries to identify one with the other. Therein lies the basic problem. It doesn't matter how pleasant the cat is, she's vicious around mice and birds. Yet her responsibility for viciousness is no less mitigated by that fact.
What conditions constitute freedom? Many Calvinists have said that freedom is present exclusively as freedom from sin, that is, as a predetermined state of godliness. When human responsibility is located in the will, regardless of whether we understand freedom as freedom from sin, we are confronted by the human will as being a predetermination of the divine will. It's simple. If responsibility is located in the will, then both man and God are responsible for sin. If responsibility is located in the will but God cannot sin or create sin, then the sinful operation of the human will necessarily resides outside of the divine will, and God's will is not the operating or animating principle of human will and is not responsible for man's sin. The point is driven home even more when one considers that, according to Calvinism, God comprehensively predetermined everything apart from man's involvement or even his existence. If responsibility resides in the will and not in its freedom, as Calvinists say, then the sole responsibility for every sin rests upon God's will since it was his will that created both the objects of creation and its entire course of history.
Clearly not since Calvinistic predestination says nothing of the sort.
It'd be a good idea to understand the position being challenged before attempting to challenge it.
I wasn't responding to the Calvinist position but what you seemed to infer. It sounds a lot like what you said:
Meanwhile, we're free to rape and pillage as we wish, commit the unpardonable sin, etc. After all, if God can't restrain us, why should we believe we could restrain ourselves? ... Doing that would put everyone in extreme danger and horror (even more than what's impacted you), and makes God a cruel Creator. He would have made us in a way that neither we nor He could restrain. The creation becomes so evil even God can't fix it.
I repeat that it seems, for you, that it would be a creative defect if man were created with a will that wasn't already determined by God's will.
Either Paul meant something or he meant nothing. I consider that Paul meant something.
For those whom he foreknew he also predestined to be conformed to the image of his Son, in order that he might be the firstborn among many brothers. And those whom he predestined he also called, and those whom he called he also justified, and those whom he justified he also glorified. Rom 8:29-30
Of course he meant something. We disagree on what he meant. I also disagree with you on what St. Paul meant in this passage. It doesn't entail your view, that God comprehensively predestined everything that shall come to pass.
Strawman characterization. When nothing can happen that God didn't cause, exactly how do you propose to get away from this fact?
God is the ultimate cause of created existence but as separate persons, we are the cause of our own actions. The fact that God created everything and that the Logos sustains the existence of the kosmos - existence itself - by the word of his power doesn't necessitate that he caused every human decision, especially those which are sinful.
It has zilch to do with manipulation. It's childish to think God would have to manipulate human beings. It has to do with God's actual nature, in knowing and moving to cause everything to happen, with no constraint on what He may create or cause to occur.
Your accusation that my point was a strawman is itself a strawman. Calvinists don't believe that God manipulates man against his will. Calvinists believe that man's will is determined by God's will in the first place. My very contention is that this is the problem, that man's will is a manifestation of God's will. That means that there is "no constraint on what He may create or cause to occur", including all sin. That's the problem.
Granted this attribute, you either have to conclude God is neglectful of us, or God isn't -- or assert an irrational refusal to say.
Calvin says He isn't.
God isn't neglectful of us. Your view maintains that everything bad that ever happens to anyone, even their eternal damnation, is a result of God's predetermination. Given this, it is quite inappropriate for you to talk about God as if he relates to us with some paternal instinct. Is he a loving father to the damned, when he preordained their damnation to show others and himself how great he is?
Try applying this concept to things created by you. You might find the clear difference between progeny of the same kind, and progeny of a lower kind.
We aren't God.
I believe I addressed this: "The problem with Calvinistic predestination is that God never relates to anyone in a way other than that of a user and his instrument. There is no personal, willful interaction because man's will is not coerced, but completely subsumed under the divine will, merely as an operation of his will."
anti-Calvinism says God abandoned those in the fire, knowing it would destroy them, but handing them the matches anyway.
No, more often than not, they start the fire themselves. When God lets people suffer the result of their own evil, that is when we say we don't understand the will of God, for his ways are higher than our ways. We don't attribute the predestination of all evil to him and then act like his ways are mysterious. Given that understanding, his ways are obviously not good in a way to which we could relate in any miniscule way. His commands, which we suppose are for our good, are unintelligible as such because he already predestines our response to them.
Calvinists attribute to God the ability to deal with human attributes in ways that allow for the will to act as it wishes, and yet to determine the outcome. God has a great deal of knowledge about His creation. He need not manipulate people like humans do to accomplish His predestination.
No, it is stock in trade for Calvinists to assert that God from all eternity, did, by the most wise and holy counsel of His own will, freely, and unchangeably ordain whatsoever comes to pass. How does he accomplish the ends without ever influencing the means? This is why Calvinists such as yourself simultaneously maintain that God predestines everything but without infringing on man's personal choice. Basically you're saying God predestines everything but doesn't predestine everything.
By not desiring evil for its own sake, but turning evil to accomplish good, God isn't the author of (the one responsible for) evil. Evil requires evil purpose. It's clear God doesn't have an evil purpose.
You're basically saying that the ends justify the means. If someone detonates enough nuclear warheads on earth to wipe out everyone, all for the sake of ending shoplifting, does that justify the means? Was that person committing evil, since he didn't necessarily have an evil motive?
In the case of the Calvinist understanding of God, he predestined all sin and every sinner's subsequent damnation for the sake of good. That either proves that the ends justify the most atrocious means or that evil is actually good.
Determinists the world over have a number of viable alternatives to libertarian free will. Just alleging "They never proved these accusations wrong" without seriously reviewing their case, doesn't carry your point. What's your response to the Institutes?
Better yet, what's your response simply to Spinoza?
What, exactly, in the Institutes or Spinoza are you referring to? I'm basing the belief in free will firmly in the scriptural tradition, since Holy Scripture is of the utmost authority. Starting from the tradition of Holy Scripture, I can confidently assert my view as a matter of faith. It is then up to the determinists to prove their view, as if they really could. Are you a determinist?
What are your viable alternatives to libertarian free will?