- Jan 1, 2015
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What, if any, light can Godel's Incompleteness theorems shed on philosophy? Specifically we could discuss epistemology or even ontology? Other areas welcome too. I might not be able to pontificate like I normally enjoy doing on this specific subject and I'm putting my trust in the philosophy geeks and masterminds here to help me out. Math isn't my thing.
For those who don't know Godel's two famous mathematical theorems they can be explained as follows:
and
Now, one might think this could lead to nihilism but interestingly Godel was a strong Platonist of sorts. According to the philosophy professor dude I was listening to in a Podcast not too long ago Godel merely wanted to bring in a phenomenological approach to mathematics. Why, because like Plato he viewed numbers as real objects that one could come in contact with.
[in?]Sincerely , Aion Phanes, Your loony friend writing from the empty set that includes itself as well as all other possible and impossible sets.
For those who don't know Godel's two famous mathematical theorems they can be explained as follows:
1. Any effectively generated theory capable of expressing elementary arithmetic cannot be both consistant and complete.In particular, for any consistent, effectively generated formal theory that proves certain basic arithmetic truths, there is an arithmetical statement that is true,but not provable in the theory (Kleene 1967, p. 250)
and
2. For any formal effectively generated theory T including basic arithmetical truths and also certain truths about formal provability, if T includes a statement of its own consistency then T is inconsistent.
Now, one might think this could lead to nihilism but interestingly Godel was a strong Platonist of sorts. According to the philosophy professor dude I was listening to in a Podcast not too long ago Godel merely wanted to bring in a phenomenological approach to mathematics. Why, because like Plato he viewed numbers as real objects that one could come in contact with.
[in?]Sincerely , Aion Phanes, Your loony friend writing from the empty set that includes itself as well as all other possible and impossible sets.