Free will and determinism

Bradskii · May 17, 2024

Halbhh said:
Ah, here you're helpfully laying out a basic concept of (one way of saying) what is determinism.

As regards what I mentioned above re libertarianism (free will in an indeterminate world), here's a few comments from Rob Kane, a leading libertarian. They are from here: https://iweb.langara.ca/rjohns/files/2016/10/KANE_fw_1.pdf

'We often act from a will already formed. But it is “our own free will” by virtue of the fact that we formed it by other self-forming choices or actions in the past (SFAs) for which we could have done otherwise.

If agents must be responsible to some degree for anything that is a sufficient cause or motive for their actions, an impossible infinite regress of past actions would be required unless some actions in the life histories of the agent (namely, SFAs) did not have either sufficient causes or motives.'

The requirement that agents be responsible by virtue of past voluntary actions for anything that is a sufficient ground or reason for their actions in the sense of a sufficient cause. Reflecting on this regress leads to the conclusion that some actions in the life histories of agents, if the agents are to be ultimately responsible, must be undetermined (must lack sufficient causes).'

Let's hold it there for a moment. He is saying that to be held responsible for any given decision, we must have made a choice in the past (which helped form our character which determined future choices) that didn't have a sufficient cause. If you had to read that a couple of times to make sure you had it right then I don't blame you. Some time in the past you made decisions for no good reasons and those choices helped form your character which then dictates your decisions. Hence free will.

Does that make any sense to you? Apart from suggesting that random decisions are somehow associated with free will, how could this possibly work? Well, he makes an attempt at explaining what he thinks could happen:

'...there is a kind of “stirring up of chaos” in the brain that makes it sensitive to micro-indeterminacies at the neuronal level. The uncertainty and inner tension we feel at such soul-searching moments of self-formation would thus be reflected in the indeterminacy of our neural processes themselves, so that what is experienced internally as uncertainty would correspond physically to the opening of a window of opportunity that temporarily screens off complete determination by influences of the past.'

You'll note that part of that statement was quoted earlier in a mention of quantum indeterminacy. I can only ask if it makes any sense to you, because it doesn't to me. And there is no explanation as to how this happens. No evidence for it at all. Which isn't surprising as he's a philosopher not a neurologist. But if you can find anyone expert in neurology or quantum mechanics who could back up his prospective 'stirring up of chaos' causing 'micro indeterminacies of our neural processes' then let's examine it. Otherwise I'm putting this down as woo.

And bear in mind, he's one of the leading lights in libertarianism. Unless you want to discuss this type of...philosophising then I suggest we stick to compatibilism or incompatibilism and accept a determinate world.

Edit: If you want to actually listen to Kane describing this himself, here's the guy talking at a free will conference: The point at which he covers this point is around the 29:00 minute mark. I have to say it makes as much sense as it it did above.

In passing, you might check out what he says about why we should be responsible for our actions. At around 21:00 he admits that we would automatically believe that someone who had committed a serious crime was culpable. But the more we learnt about his upbringing (very much like the hypothetical I gave upstream), the abuse, the lack of education etc, the less responsible we feel he might be. But Kane says that surely he was partly responsible for his own character. Surely his will could override the conditions of his life.

So he's actually saying that he must be responsible because he has free will to determine his own character. And if he has free will then he must be responsible.

Where's that face palm meme...

o_mlly · May 18, 2024

Bradskii said:
Him and many others. You should not be taking the position that 'This guy wrote a book and now we're supposed to believe that there's no free will'. That's a pretty narrow view of the discussion.

It's no narrower than the evidence you have brought to this thread. Do you have any peer reviewed papers not authored by Sapolsky that provide evidence that free will does not exist?

Bradskii said:
I'm afraid that's the only position you've presented so far so I haven't had much to argue against.

No, you have much to argue for. An extraordinary claim that a self-evident fact is false needs extraordinary evidence. You have not provided such evidence.

Bradskii said:
Oh, plus the risible 'you're an atheist so you must think there's no free will'. ... If you're going to make up what I've written then maybe you should write my posts for me. It'll save us some time.

You should take your own advice.

Bradskii said:
So let's do it. We'll use one of the links you gave to a paper that we can actually access: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/cogs.12372

Please let me know exactly what you think is in that paper that supports the position that free will exists.

? Again, (third time), the paper supports, as I claim, that the science on free will is far from settled. The paper does not make a case for free will. Rather it shows the incoherency of the compatibilist position.

The results support incompatibilism about choice.
The overall pattern of blame attribution vindicated neither compatibilism nor incompatibilism about blame.
The results support compatibilism about moral responsibility.
As in Experiment 3, the overall pattern was consistent with incompatibilism about choice, compatibilism about moral responsibility, and ambivalence about blame.

All compatibilists are, like you, determinists. They admit that at any given moment we have no real choice (because determinism holds), but then claim that in the past we could have made choices of what policies to adopt, which we can now be held responsible for. Compatibilists see the self-evident fact of free will in moral decisions and lamely attempt to unsuccessfully shoehorn that obvious fact into their preferred dogma.

Again, you have not shown any science that supports the non-existence of the self-evident fact of free will. So we still only have an op-ed piece form you on the matter.

Bradskii said:
No, I did not 'imply' any such thing. I ...

It was a question. All it needed was an answer. I'll dismiss the rest of the rant in the paragraph as a display of desperation at having been called out on an absurd claim of certainty.

Bradskii said:
Maybe you don't know what ego depletion is. ...

Oh, but I do know. Perhaps you do not know that the truth value of a claim can only be true if the contrapositive is also true. The paper shows that clearly is not the case.

o_mlly · May 18, 2024

Bradskii said:
Well, there's no evidence that they have evolved anywhere else. And we have them. So logic dictates...

Logic must follow the first principles of philosophy. The chimps cannot give to their descendants that which they do not possess themselves. So logic dictates ...

Bradskii said:
I believed that we had free will for decades. .... It appeared to be a common sense position.

It still is.

I addressed the possibility of confirmation bias in atheists and determinists in a previous post.

(Augustine did not deny free will. But that's interesting that you cite him. So, can you cite any Christian philosopher or scientist that denies free will? If not then that tends to support my contention of confirmation bias.)

Bradskii · May 18, 2024

o_mlly said:
It's no narrower than the evidence you have brought to this thread. Do you have any peer reviewed papers not authored by Sapolsky that provide evidence that free will does not exist?

In post 593 I actually gave you links to the arguments for and against one aspect of it.

o_mlly said:
No, you have much to argue for. An extraordinary claim that a self-evident fact is false needs extraordinary evidence. You have not provided such evidence.

Yes, it appears to be self evident. I'm so glad you just brought that up so that we all now know.

o_mlly said:
Again, (third time), the paper supports, as I claim, that the science on free will is far from settled.

You linked to five papers to show that the matter is far from settled? I think you could have saved yourself quite a lot of time if you had just asked 'Do you think the matter is settled'. You'd have got a most definite 'No'. I gave a short list of some of those in both the free will and no free will camps a long way back.

o_mlly said:
All compatibilists are, like you, determinists. They admit that at any given moment we have no real choice (because determinism holds), but then claim that in the past we could have made choices of what policies to adopt, which we can now be held responsible for. Compatibilists see the self-evident fact of free will in moral decisions and lamely attempt to unsuccessfully shoehorn that obvious fact into their preferred dogma.

Yeah. I completely agree. I don't get it either. So they're out of the picture. And we have incompatibilism, which you reject, so you are left with libertarianism. Which denies determinism. I'm losing count of the number of times I have asked this in the thread, but can you give me an event that has no cause?

o_mlly said:
Again, you have not shown any science that supports the non-existence of the self-evident fact of free will. So we still only have an op-ed piece form you on the matter.

Unless someone makes a scientific claim about part of the process, such as quantum indeterminacy, then all this is 'op'.

o_mlly said:
Oh, but I do know.

Then if the matter was hypoglycemia why on earth link to a paper that has nothing to do with it? Are you somehow denying the effects of low blood sugar? Why would you want to? We can most definitely go the science route on this if you like.

Bradskii · May 18, 2024

o_mlly said:
Logic must follow the first principles of philosophy. The chimps cannot give to their descendants that which they do not possess themselves.

Chimps don't have any evolutionary descendants. But if that was actually some way of saying that nothing evolves, then I'll give you the same advice I gave Steve. Skip evolution. You know less about it than he does.

o_mlly said:
I addressed the possibility of confirmation bias in atheists and determinists in a previous post.

You claimed that being an atheist means that you'd deny free will. That is not the case. Take the most recognised atheists like Harris, Hitchens, Dennett and Dawkins. Dawkins is unsure, but thinks the world is deterministic, Hitchens thought he had it, but that 'he had no choice' in having it. Dennett says we have it and Harris says we don't.

o_mlly said:
(Augustine did not deny free will. But that's interesting that you cite him. So, can you cite any Christian philosopher or scientist that denies free will? If not then that tends to support my contention of confirmation bias.)

I'll assume that there are many Calvinist and Lutheran scientists, although you'd need to discuss their attitude to free will with them. But if there are many atheists who hold both views but generally all Christians hold to free will, then there's your bias there. If you are an atheist you'd have no idea about their position. But if you are Christian, then you'd be pretty certain.

o_mlly · May 19, 2024

Bradskii said:
In post 593 I actually gave you links to the arguments for and against one aspect of it.

The links in 593 do not answer my question: Do you have any peer reviewed papers not authored by Sapolsky that provide evidence that free will does not exist?

So, I take it that you do not have anything else to offer that is at least a bit sciency.

Bradskii said:
Yes, it appears to be self evident.

Appears? You don't believe your own "lying eyes"?

Free will in the human moral act, an act in which the actor anticipates and intends certain effects is self-evident. His decision may have been influenced by externalities but he is the cause of his act and responsible for its effects.

Bradskii said:
if you had just asked, 'Do you think the matter is settled'. You'd have got a most definite 'No'.

But we did not get a "No" from you. What we did get from you is. "... there's no room for free will." Have you now changed your position?

Bradskii said:
I'm losing count of the number of times I have asked this in the thread, but can you give me an event that has no cause?

Can you also count the number of times you were told that human agency is a cause for the free will moral act?

Bradskii said:
Unless someone makes a scientific claim about part of the process, such as quantum indeterminacy, then all this is 'op'.

Since, as far as I can tell, no one has made that claim, we agree all this is just your opinion which you are, of course, free to hold.

Bradskii said:
Are you somehow denying the effects of low blood sugar?

I'm denying, with evidence, that the deterministic conclusion that low blood sugar determines one's mood. As I pointed out long ago, humans have the ability to assert self-control over and against their physically driven impulses. (The hungry healthy dog does not fast; humans do.)

o_mlly · May 19, 2024

Bradskii said:
Chimps don't have any evolutionary descendants.

Doesn't matter what evolutionary tree an evolutionist wants to put man on as a descendant. The principle still holds true. If you don't have it (cause) then you can't give it (effect).

Bradskii said:
You claimed that being an atheist means that you'd deny free will.

Nope. Sad, you were doing so well avoiding the strawman argument. I addressed the possibility of confirmation bias in atheists and determinists in a previous post.

Bradskii said:
Take the most recognised atheists like Harris, Hitchens, Dennett and Dawkins. Dawkins is unsure, but thinks the world is deterministic, Hitchens thought he had it, but that 'he had no choice' in having it. Dennett says we have it and Harris says we don't.

I try to avoid reading the thoughts of muddled thinkers. I get an instant headache in the thought that, "I think I have free will but I had no choice in having free will."

Bradskii · May 19, 2024

o_mlly said:
Can you also count the number of times you were told that human agency is a cause for the free will moral act?

You missed the point of the question. Let me try again.

In a post yesterday you rejected the compatibilist view. I do as well. That only leaved incompatibilism and libertarianism. You've already rejected incompatibilism so that leaves libertarianism (Kane that I quoted earlier is a libertarian).

They generally deny that the world is deterministic. So I asked if you could give me an example of an event without a cause. I may have to back the truck up a little because you haven't been too specific on your views. It's just been 'it's obvious that we have free will' so far. So...

Do you think the world is deterministic or not. If not, then the question still stands.

Following on from that, as regards libertarianism, I assume that you'd opt for an agency caused version as you state above. As opposed to an event caused or non causal. Is that correct?

o_mlly · May 20, 2024

Bradskii said:
Do you think the world is deterministic or not.

I think the physical world at the macro level is deterministic. There appears to be fundamental indeterminacy at the lowest levels.

Bradskii said:
Following on from that, as regards libertarianism, I assume that you'd opt for an agency caused version as you state above. As opposed to an event caused or non causal. Is that correct?

See Post #270.

o_mlly said:
All goodness comes from God. In the moment of choice involving a moral act, God provides the actual grace to choose the good. Conscience -- reason, illumined by Omniscience, informs my free will. We are free to accept or reject His grace. To reject grace is to sin.

We are causal free agents using our special faculty of reasoning, determine the reasons for acting one way or another. We are not alone in this reasoning process but are guided by Natural Law:

Deep within his conscience man discovers a law which he has not laid upon himself but which he must obey. Its voice, ever calling him to love and to do what is good and to avoid evil, sounds in his heart at the right moment. . . . For man has in his heart a law inscribed by God. . . . His conscience is man's most secret core and his sanctuary. There he is alone with God whose voice echoes in his depths.

Moral conscience, present at the heart of the person, enjoins him at the appropriate moment to do good and to avoid evil. It also judges particular choices, approving those that are good and denouncing those that are evil. It bears witness to the authority of truth in reference to the supreme Good to which the human person is drawn, and it welcomes the commandments. When he listens to his conscience, the prudent man can hear God speaking.

Conscience is a judgment of reason whereby the human person recognizes the moral quality of a concrete act that he is going to perform, is in the process of performing, or has already completed. In all he says and does, man is obliged to follow faithfully what he knows to be just and right. It is by the judgment of his conscience that man perceives and recognizes the prescriptions of the divine law:

Conscience is a law of the mind; yet [Christians] would not grant that it is nothing more; I mean that it was not a dictate, nor conveyed the notion of responsibility, of duty, of a threat and a promise. . . . [Conscience] is a messenger of him, who, both in nature and in grace, speaks to us behind a veil, and teaches and rules us by his representatives. Conscience is the aboriginal Vicar of Christ.

It is important for every person to be sufficiently present to himself in order to hear and follow the voice of his conscience. This requirement of interiority is all the more necessary as life often distracts us from any reflection, self-examination or introspection (CCC #1776 -1779).

We can witness the principle of justice from the Natural Law at work even in our youngest children, "That's not fair!"

Bradskii · May 20, 2024

o_mlly said:
I think the physical world at the macro level is deterministic.

We are causal free agents using our special faculty of reasoning, determine the reasons for acting one way or another. We are not alone in this reasoning process but are guided by Natural Law:

This is quite a mixture. You say the world is deterministic but deny compatibilism and likewise incompatibilism, the only two positions that accept it. And then say you believe decisions are agent causal, which is a libertarian position. Which denies determinism.

So how do you choose? You say: 'Conscience -- reason, illumined by Omniscience, informs my free will.' So you know which act to choose. But that's not how you choose. They are two separate matters. So we are left with agent causal. It's not determined by an event, It's a libertarian free will. 'You' are making the call. So let's check out the agent...

You have beliefs and moral concepts that you use to make your decisions. Your definition of free will is that conditions exterior to you could obviously affect your choices but are not necessarily dictating your choices. They are made internally.

So where does this internal ‘you’ come from? What has formed your beliefs? What has led to you holding your moral positions? By what process was your conscience formed? From where do the standards that you maintain when choosing to act emerge? Well, most would say it's either nature or nurture. But are you going to say that God has determined your character, which then determines your will? But your choices can't be blind obedience. There is no free will in that.

Most of us know what the 'correct' answer is going to be anyway. We know that stealing is wrong. God isn't required for us to know that. But do you not steal just because God has told you not to? Or is there some process that you go through to confirm that the answer you think you have been given is the correct one? We have enough examples of people doing horrendous things because they think God told them is was right to do it. So what's the process that you use?

I could suggest that it's the same process that you use when the decision has no moral implications. I doubt if God is going to give you a heads up on whether you should go steak or fish. But you let me know. Antecedent conditions, or something inbuilt, formed by nature and nurture.

o_mlly · May 20, 2024

Bradskii said:
You say the world is deterministic but deny compatibilism and likewise incompatibilism, the only two positions that accept it.

Incompatibilism merely negates compatibilism but does not technically affirm free will. The third proposition, which I hold, is free will.

Bradskii said:
From where do the standards that you maintain when choosing to act emerge? Well, most would say it's either nature or nurture.

No. Our human nature is fallen; our nurturing is probabilistic. The third way, as posted, to come to know the moral truth is via the Natural Law. The Natural Law is written on every heart. We are free to accept or reject it.

Bradskii said:
But are you going to say that God has determined your character ...

No. Please read the post again. God through Natural Law only proposes to us the good choice. We may accept or reject the proposal.

Bradskii said:
We know that stealing is wrong. God isn't required for us to know that.

Yes, He is. He loves (wants to unite with) all His children. Natural Law still operates on believers and non-believers.

Interesting that you as a hard determinist would write: We know that stealing is wrong." How did you come to that knowledge?

Bradskii said:
I doubt if God is going to give you a heads up on whether you should go steak or fish.

Throughout this thread, I have limited the examination and exercise of free will to only moral decisions.

The decision to eat is a moral decision; the decision as to what to eat is usually just a matter of taste.

Halbhh · May 20, 2024

Bradskii said:
Whether free will is compatible with a determinate world or incompatible with it.

To me what I define as 'free will' (I'll give a key part of the definition later below) cannot be compatible with "determinism" (definition discussed just below), unless at least one of these 2 conditions below are true:

A) One is using the word 'determinism' to refer to something other than physics determinism, since in physics determinism means that all future events are already fully and entirely in all ways predetermined by current conditions. In physics determinism all future events can only happen one certain way, and no change is possible by forces of nature (which are physics). Assuming this physics determinism as just reality is the old 19th century (now outdated) view of the "Clockwork Universe".

or, alternatively:

B) Sometimes people have a form of various views where human consciousness might not be entirely dependent on physics (nature) alone (which would be very interesting if you have any such viewpoint, as many Christians have a variety of that idea, where we believe we are more than only the physical body, that we have a separate individual spirit (soul) which might not be dependent on this physics (or if partly in this physics still perhaps it might have some other non physics aspect also) -- and then having this Self (or soul or spirit or etc. other names), we might at times choose to follow the impulses/preferences of the spirit, instead of the biological drives of the bodily urges, and this spirit might not be bound under a deterministic control (and operates by some other mechanism than our physics here in this universe).

But, if A) and B) are considered not the case, in that case there would be no "free will" possible in such a fully deterministic physics where the brain operates solely by nature alone forces.

I define "free will" as a genuine ability to choose a new action that isn't already predetermined. (I am not using the somewhat less common nominal (in name only) 'free will' some people might, where the term is meant to refer to a person feeling that they have freedom of choice, but there choices are already foreseeable by God (an an sufficiently powerful computer with total data) -- which fact of being foreseen which instantly would mean those future events and 'choices' people make are predetermined, can never change (so that 'choice' is actually an illusion of choice instead of an ability to alter course).

There are a variety of ways that a genuine free will (meaning we are unpredictable at least sometimes) would be possible, and it could be built into nature even. (that's why I linked for you the variety of interpretations of QM, as you can readily see many are non-deterministic).

Bradskii · May 20, 2024

o_mlly said:
Incompatibilism merely negates compatibilism but does not technically affirm free will. The third proposition, which I hold, is free will.

There are only two positions that accept free will. Compatibilism and libertarianism. And you have specifically said that you reject compatibilism, So your position is libertarianism and you have said it's agent causal. You are the one making the decision. We'll start with that.

But, this is the first problem...it's only the first two positions hold to determinism. Free will is either compatible with it or it isn't. So you are rejecting, on one hand, determinism. But then state quite plainly that determinism is true 'on a macro level'. You are holding to positions that contradict each other.

The second problem is that you say that at some level existence is not deterministic. Now that either filters up and has an effect on us or it does not. If it does, then the basis for any decisions you make are random. There is no free will there. So we'll go with deterministic, which 'emerges' at some level. So free will is compatible with a deterministic world. But you've already rejected that.

o_mlly said:
No. Our human nature is fallen; our nurturing is probabilistic. The third way, as posted, to come to know the moral truth is via the Natural Law. The Natural Law is written on every heart. We are free to accept or reject it.

The third problem is that you say the answer to any moral problem is 'written on your heart'. You know what it is. But that has nothing to do with making a free will decision. Knowing what the answer is doesn't absolve you from making a decision. The guy who breaks into the house knows it's wrong. He'd be ropeable if someone broke into his house. So he still has to make a decision to do the right thing or the wrong thing. We need to examine how he does that. And how you do it.

o_mlly said:
No. Please read the post again. God through Natural Law only proposes to us the good choice. We may accept or reject the proposal.

So here comes the fourth problem. You say that God has not determined your character. But yours is different to mine. Different to the guy who breaks into the house. Different to everyone else's. Because your lived experience is specifically yours. And we're back to nature and nurture. All the conditions that made up the burglar's character were different to yours. If yours had been different then you wouldn't be the same. If you had a different parent or a different upbringing etc etc then you'd be different. And you say that your decisions are not determined by anything outside of you. So we are left with 'you'. The person you are. Which would change depending on circumstances.

o_mlly said:
Interesting that you as a hard determinist would write: We know that stealing is wrong." How did you come to that knowledge?

Because when my things were stolen I was mightily [bless and do not curse][bless and do not curse][bless and do not curse][bless and do not curse]ed off. I had worked hard to earn the money to buy what I wanted and now someone else has simply taken them. And I can empathise. And I know for a fact that if I took someone else's gear then they'd be angry as well. Even if it was the guy who stole my things.

o_mlly said:
Throughout this thread, I have limited the examination and exercise of free will to only moral decisions.

Your fifth problem. Because I'm pretty certain that God doesn't whisper 'Skip the pizza, it has anchovies and I know you don't like anchovies'. So you have to make the decision yourself. And it's plain that you'll skip the pizza because you simply don't like the taste of anchovies. Hey, look. The decision was determined by something over which you had no control.

Determinism? But you rejected that. Or rather you rejected compatibilism. And incompatibilism. Which makes you a libertarian, so no determinism. But you said that some things were deterministic. And that there's indeterminism in there somewhere as well. Which makes the decision random. But it's an internal decision governed by your character. But that was formed via our good friends nature and nurture. They made you who you are. But you decided what your character was going to be. And how did you make that decision? Internally of course, based on...your character. Hey, watch out for the infinite regress.

You may not agree with my position. But it's blazingly simple to explain. Every event has a cause. So the universe is deterministic. We are part of the universe and are bound by the same rules. Hence no free will.

Your position, and I'd even hesitate to call it a position in the first instance, is plainly and evidentially contradictory. It looks like you're picking a little here, a little there and trying to mush it all together. You've spent umpteen posts trying to dismantle one view and have avoided giving an alternative. Which, let's face it, is the whole idea of the thread. This is my idea...what's yours.

Now you've tried to explain yours and it's completely incoherent.

o_mlly said:
The decision to eat is a moral decision...

And there's me thinking it was determined by being hungry.

o_mlly said:
...the decision as to what to eat is usually just a matter of taste.

Which are determined by antecedent conditions. So I guess you think it's a free will decision to eat but not a free will decision if the choice is pizza. Pardon the expression but free will seems to be something of a moveable feast with you.

Bradskii · May 20, 2024

Halbhh said:
...in physics determinism means that all future events are already fully and entirely in all ways predetermined by current conditions. In physics determinism all future events can only happen one certain way, and no change is possible by forces of nature (which are physics).

That's my position.

Halbhh said:
...we believe we are more than only the physical body, that we have a separate individual spirit (soul) which might not be dependent on this physics (or if partly in this physics still perhaps it might have some other non physics aspect also) -- and then having this Self (or soul or spirit or etc. other names), we might at times choose to follow the impulses/preferences of the spirit, instead of the biological drives of the bodily urges...

I can only say that you've kicked the can down the road. On what basis does this deus ex machina make the decisions?

Halbhh said:
this spirit might not be bound under a deterministic control (and operates by some other mechanism than our physics here in this universe).

Well, yeah. It might also be a magic unicorn that sprinkles pixie dust over us which causes a decision. Or we might be players in some galactic computer game where some spotty faced alien in his mum's basement is making the decisions. If that's what you think then you have to go with it. But rather than a positive explanation in itself, it comes across to me as a means to deny alternate views. It's an argument that should start with 'But hey, what if...

Halbhh said:
There are a variety of ways that a genuine free will (meaning we are unpredictable at least sometimes) would be possible, and it could be built into nature even.

I'm wary of using terms like unpredictable because most events are unpredictable even in a determined universe. But if you mean random, then there's no free will there.

o_mlly · May 21, 2024

Bradskii said:
There are only two positions that accept free will. Compatibilism and libertarianism. And you have specifically said that you reject compatibilism, So your position is libertarianism and you have said it's agent causal. You are the one making the decision. We'll start with that.

But, this is the first problem...it's only the first two positions hold to determinism. Free will is either compatible with it or it isn't. So you are rejecting, on one hand, determinism. But then state quite plainly that determinism is true 'on a macro level'. You are holding to positions that contradict each other.

The second problem is that you say that at some level existence is not deterministic. Now that either filters up and has an effect on us or it does not. If it does, then the basis for any decisions you make are random. There is no free will there. So we'll go with deterministic, which 'emerges' at some level. So free will is compatible with a deterministic world. But you've already rejected that.

The third problem is that you say the answer to any moral problem is 'written on your heart'. You know what it is. But that has nothing to do with making a free will decision. Knowing what the answer is doesn't absolve you from making a decision. The guy who breaks into the house knows it's wrong. He'd be ropeable if someone broke into his house. So he still has to make a decision to do the right thing or the wrong thing. We need to examine how he does that. And how you do it.

So here comes the fourth problem. You say that God has not determined your character. But yours is different to mine. Different to the guy who breaks into the house. Different to everyone else's. Because your lived experience is specifically yours. And we're back to nature and nurture. All the conditions that made up the burglar's character were different to yours. If yours had been different then you wouldn't be the same. If you had a different parent or a different upbringing etc etc then you'd be different. And you say that your decisions are not determined by anything outside of you. So we are left with 'you'. The person you are. Which would change depending on circumstances.

Because when my things were stolen I was mightily [bless and do not curse][bless and do not curse][bless and do not curse][bless and do not curse]ed off. I had worked hard to earn the money to buy what I wanted and now someone else has simply taken them. And I can empathise. And I know for a fact that if I took someone else's gear then they'd be angry as well. Even if it was the guy who stole my things.

Your fifth problem. Because I'm pretty certain that God doesn't whisper 'Skip the pizza, it has anchovies and I know you don't like anchovies'. So you have to make the decision yourself. And it's plain that you'll skip the pizza because you simply don't like the taste of anchovies. Hey, look. The decision was determined by something over which you had no control.

Determinism? But you rejected that. Or rather you rejected compatibilism. And incompatibilism. Which makes you a libertarian, so no determinism. But you said that some things were deterministic. And that there's indeterminism in there somewhere as well. Which makes the decision random. But it's an internal decision governed by your character. But that was formed via our good friends nature and nurture. They made you who you are. But you decided what your character was going to be. And how did you make that decision? Internally of course, based on...your character. Hey, watch out for the infinite regress.

You may not agree with my position. But it's blazingly simple to explain. Every event has a cause. So the universe is deterministic. We are part of the universe and are bound by the same rules. Hence no free will.

Your position, and I'd even hesitate to call it a position in the first instance, is plainly and evidentially contradictory. It looks like you're picking a little here, a little there and trying to mush it all together. You've spent umpteen posts trying to dismantle one view and have avoided giving an alternative. Which, let's face it, is the whole idea of the thread. This is my idea...what's yours.

Now you've tried to explain yours and it's completely incoherent.

And there's me thinking it was determined by being hungry.

Which are determined by antecedent conditions. So I guess you think it's a free will decision to eat but not a free will decision if the choice is pizza. Pardon the expression but free will seems to be something of a moveable feast with you.

Ranting with multiple strawmen, faulty logic and not-so-funny inept attempts at sarcasm evidences the desperation of one who has lost the argument. Distilling this post of those defeatist tendencies, we're left with:

Bradskii said:
... The guy who breaks into the house knows it's wrong. .. You say that God has not determined your character. But yours is different to mine. Different to the guy who breaks into the house.

We can only choose that which we think is good for us in the moment. It is not cognitively dissonant to think that which is wrong for me is also good for me.

One can mute the voice of conscience by habitually choosing to reject it.

Bradskii said:
Because when my things were stolen I was mightily [bless and do not curse][bless and do not curse][bless and do not curse][bless and do not curse]ed off. I had worked hard to earn the money to buy what I wanted and now someone else has simply taken them. And I can empathise. And I know for a fact that if I took someone else's gear then they'd be angry as well. Even if it was the guy who stole my things.

This is your answer to the question: "How did you come to know that stealing is wrong?"

Why would you be angry? That seems quite odd. The one who took your gear, according to you, didn't choose to do so; he was inevitably determined to do so. It seems, like the child, you cry, "That's not fair!"

While throwing free will out the front window, determinists allow it to come in through the back door by accepting, however grudgingly, the pragmatic moral test for the act.

The determinist deduces that there can be no blame, praise, award or punishment for human behaviors. If we cannot be responsible for out acts then no moral blame attaches to them. Morality, itself, is a meaningless concept. Yet despite this conclusion, Sapolsky claims retribution is wrong and you claim stealing is wrong. In what sense can the thief or the retributionist acts be “wrong”? According to determinists, they could not have acted otherwise.

Bradskii · May 21, 2024

o_mlly said:
We can only choose that which we think is good for us in the moment.

So your choice is determined by that which you think is good. At least at that time. That's most definitely not a libertarian view. That's a compatibilist view, which you dismissed. Your decision is determined by your desires. You desire that which you think is good. It also contradicts your stated position of your decisions being agent causal.

'Libertarian free will means that our choices are free from the determination or constraints of human nature and free from any predetermination by God. All "free will theists" hold that libertarian freedom is essential for moral responsibility, for if our choice is determined or caused by anything, including our own desires, they reason, it cannot properly be called a free choice. Libertarian freedom is, therefore, the freedom to act contrary to one's nature, predisposition and greatest desires. Responsibility, in this view, always means that one could have done otherwise.' https://www.theopedia.com/libertarian-free-will

I'll note that I gave you five specific problems. You haven't addressed any of them. You should because all you have done is to make a statement which again contradicts your previous ones. The water is getting muddier.

o_mlly said:
This is your answer to the question: "How did you come to know that stealing is wrong?"

You seem to have skipped some of the arguments. Not having free will does not remove the concept of right or wrong. The guy who steals your wallet knows it's wrong whether he has free will or not. I said as much earlier. For the reasons given.

o_mlly said:
Why would you be angry? That seems quite odd. The one who took your gear, according to you, didn't choose to do so; he was inevitably determined to do so. It seems, like the child, you cry, "That's not fair!"

If my car breaks down on the morning I'm off on a road trip then I'll be angry. But it's not the car's fault. So I won't blame it.

o_mlly said:
The determinist deduces that there can be no blame, praise, award or punishment for human behaviors. If we cannot be responsible for out acts then no moral blame attaches to them. Morality, itself, is a meaningless concept. Yet despite this conclusion, Sapolsky claims retribution is wrong and you claim stealing is wrong. In what sense can the thief or the retributionist acts be “wrong”? According to determinists, they could not have acted otherwise.

You mean an incompatibilist. Not a determinist. A determinist can be a compatibilist and they think there's free will. I'm beginning to think that you aren't that familiar with the concepts. The contradictions you made earlier are another indication of that.

Compatibilism
Incompatibilism
Libertarianism

You need to nominate one of those, and any variation of it you choose, because I now have no idea at all which you think you are.

But yes, you are right. There is no room for blame if there is no free will. There is no culpability. But if you class an immoral act as one you commit when you know it to be wrong then you commit an immoral act even if there is no free will. The two aspects of punishment that have been discussed upstream remain. But retributive punishment does not.

Now how about addressing those problems. And please make a selection from those three positions.

Halbhh · May 21, 2024

Bradskii said:
because most events are unpredictable even in a determined universe.

This I've mentioned a few times, distinguishing between the 2 very unalike situations of merely impractical to calculate (for us at this time) due to complexity vs entirely unalike situation of physics being indeterministic, where even perfect total data (which...the universe itself has ) and sufficient computing power still could not calculate more than only probabilities for some given time frame of interest (e.g., such as less than the age of the universe since the apparent singularity point we call the big bang). Those are of course not at all alike. One is a type of clockwork universe situation and the other is not.

o_mlly · May 21, 2024

Bradskii said:
So your choice is determined by that which you think is good.

You determine your choice as you have decided that the object of the act is good. Goodness always inheres in objects that we desire. Unfortunately, that which we may desire may only be apparently and not really good for us.

Bradskii said:
That's most definitely not a libertarian view. That's a compatibilist view, which you dismissed. Your decision is determined by your desires. You desire that which you think is good. It also contradicts your stated position of your decisions being agent causal.

You are not following my argument. I'll lay it out step by step again for you. My position is not compatibilist, or non-compatibilist, or libertarian despite your repeated attempts to label those as the only possible choices.

The rational being (me) has the ability through reason to accept or deny the impulses of my bodily appetites. My passions do not control my choices. I do.
Of course, that does not mean that the passion is eliminated (I'm still hungry, even though I've decided to fast as I think that that is good),
The passion is unwilled. The moral man moves the passion or feeling to his intellect for confirmation that the desire delivers a real good.
One might say in the moments the passion is felt and before the intellect decides, that an under-determined choice goes to the intellect for approval or rejection.
If approved by the intellect, the passion is perfected, and I determine to choose to act on the impulse.
If rejected by the intellect, the passion is dismissed, and I determine to choose not to act on the impulse.

The proper term for that decision-making process is "Free Will".

Bradskii said:
Not having free will does not remove the concept of right or wrong. The guy who steals your wallet knows it's wrong whether he has free will or not.

Should the guy who stole your wallet not have done so? Why or why not?

You catch the guy who took your wallet red-handed. Do you demand he give it back? Why or why not?

You demand and he refuses to give your wallet back to you? What do you do?

Should the police prosecute the thief? Why or why not?

durangodawood · May 21, 2024

o_mlly said:
...

The rational being (me) has the ability through reason to accept or deny the impulses of my bodily appetites. My passions do not control my choices. I do.

Of course, that does not mean that the passion is eliminated (I'm still hungry, even though I've decided to fast as I think that that is good),

The passion is unwilled. The moral man moves the passion or feeling to his intellect for confirmation that the desire delivers a real good.

One might say in the moments the passion is felt and before the intellect decides, that an under-determined choice goes to the intellect for approval or rejection.

If approved by the intellect, the passion is perfected, and I determine to choose to act on the impulse.

If rejected by the intellect, the passion is dismissed, and I determine to choose not to act on the impulse.

The proper term for that decision-making process is "Free Will".

That process simply follows from a desire "higher" than passions or appetites that you bring to the table from prior to the point of acting. In this way the outcome is determined by existing conditions.

o_mlly · May 21, 2024

durangodawood said:
That process simply follows from a desire "higher" than passions or appetites that you bring to the table from prior to the point of acting. In this way the outcome is determined by existing conditions.

We've been through this routine before. Your effort to semantically shoehorn in the passive voice again misses the point. Who determines one's beliefs, values and goals?

Free will and determinism

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