zippy2006
Dragonsworn
- Nov 9, 2013
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Speaking of these being too long, feel free to trim some fat in your next response. I'll feel like I'm being rude by ignoring something you find important to the discussion if I do it, but I think we both could do with a little less meandering, don't you?
Ha, both of us are bad at shortening posts. I will try to shave some out, though I think it is beginning to narrow some. The difficulty is that the topic is difficult.
A few weeks ago I almost tried to tackle a difficult book: Knowing the Natural Law: From Precepts and Inclinations to Deriving Oughts. I will probably read it soon but I want to finish a few others first. It is very much on topic, and now there are a number of threads that relate to this problem. The difficulty is that our undertaking here is ambitious to say the least. Trying to nail down the foundations of practical reason and tie up the is-ought problem isn't easy for anyone, and you are probably a skeptic with regard to objective morality precisely because the problem seems to intractable. So I'll try, but longer posts may be unavoidable since we're in a forest with very few trails. In any case, I think we're converging in some areas, and I don't write more than one long post per day so hopefully things are manageable.
But in this scenario they don't know what security is. No one has agreed to not steal from one another, so it's on me to convince them what it's like.
If citizens don't steal then their possessions will be more secure. If they value the security of their possessions then you're in like flint. If they don't you either have to convince them or "emotionally manipulate" them to change their mind. Sound about right?
That makes sense I guess. "More reasonable" meaning "More likely to be true", okay. But when an argument is shown to have a premise that is not true, then there's no more gauging reasonableness or the likelihood of it being true. How likely the other premises are doesn't matter in an unsound argument.
I agree, especially if you're focused on the conclusion. When reading some thinkers you can learn a lot from inferential reasoning, thus benefiting from a wise mind even if their ultimate conclusion is off. This is also true if you read older thinkers who were working with outdated premises, such as a geocentric cosmology or the like.
I think your previous statements got the point across better, and I'm satisfied with the conclusion on that. I'm compelled to share my opinion on psychological subjects though so I have to point out that Freud was a fraud. Not only is case-study an awful way to make general statements about human psychology, he studies loonies, and when the data didn't match his theories he altered the findings to fit. It's ridiculous that he's the most famous psychologist in pop-culture. And CBT and psychoanalysis are techniques, I don't see them as "striking close to the truth". Different techniques work for different people, and it's good that people can find options that work for them.
Okay, thanks for sharing. Yeah, I didn't mean to imply that the approaches strike closer to the truth.
The despairing individual desires to not act, though. Not wasting energy is the closest thing to a state of happiness they think is attainable. Like a guy in high school who never asks out any girls because he thinks the only answer he'll get is "no". Avoiding embarrassment is desire fulfillment too.
Taking depression as an example, is it a desire to not act or merely a lack of desire? I'd go with the latter. When my sister sits in her chair and sulks out of spite rather than play ping pong she has a desire to not act. After she has fallen asleep in the chair she merely has a lack of desire.
There is a weird sort of pathology that people experience suffering when they feel too good, but that's sort of like guilt. They still desire to be happy, but feel suffering for feeling happy. So they abstain from things that bring happiness because they desire to not feel guilt. It happens mostly in religious circles, heh.
Haha, that's interesting.
Sounds circular. If I do good things then I deserve to have good things come my way, sounds reasonable. But what are good things to do? Whatever I desire is all we have so far. So if I do what I desire then I deserve what I desire?
Let me try an outrageous example. This isn't an exception to a rule, it's entirely fictional, so treat it like a proof of concept. Let's say Superman lands on our planet with all of his powers, none of his weaknesses, and he's a complete sociopath. He can't experience negative consequences of any kind because of his invulnerability and lack of empathy, so would you say that he should destroy entire cities with his laser beam eyes if that's how he gets his jollies? (You don't have to tell him that)
Mmm, I basically agree that the idea is circular and unhelpful, which is why I said the better option is to take a pre-moral route for the time being. You introduced morality when you asked whether they deserve it.
In a way this goes back to my claim that we act on desire, but not on every desire, for we have competing desires. But no matter which desires we act on, we will be acting on desire. For starters you just do what you find to be desirable. In time you will learn that it isn't desirable to take what you don't deserve (but we're not at that point in our conversation yet; we're still talking about desire in a pre-moral way, or as the foundation of morality and normativity).
I also want to point out that you ought to be careful about the subjective/objective distinction. Speaking about desert or truth that is unknown to the subject is reading ahead in the book. I'm not there yet. I'm talking about truth and happiness as perceived. I'm still on the subjective end of the spectrum, and we have to be patient before we move towards the objective end. To speak paradoxically, humans seek what is good before they know what is good; they seek what is desirable before they have thought about what they ought to desire. ..but I will say more about this below.
See, that just sounds like an empty assertion to me: that if I say X I mean Y.
But do you think my claim of equivalence was false? If so, why?
Using "should" means that X is supposed to happen and you are the one who is supposed to cause it to happen. Why is X supposed to happen? Just because you want it to?
The ground of the assertion is happiness, to be sure. "This will make you happier" means you should do it because happiness is what all men seek. It's like saying, "This will get you where you are trying to go." I'm still not convinced your questions are meaningful: "Why should I seek happiness?" "Why should I reach for what I want?" "Why should I get to where I am trying to go?"
Granted, in some ways the question, "Why do we want to be happy?" or "Why do humans want to be happy?" has no answer. Happiness really is an end in itself. It doesn't require external justification or some other end to which it can be subordinated to.
Another general piece of advice for our conversation: arguments and reasoning are grounded in premises and rules of inference. Premises can in turn be argued for when they are questioned. Yet the buck has to stop somewhere (both in speculative and practical reasoning). We could call the place where the buck stops "foundational premises": premises that are not the conclusions of further syllogisms. For example: the law of non-contradiction. It isn't justified by argument, it just is. You just see it. You just accept it.
Foundational premises are inherently mysterious, but however we know them, it isn't in the normal way we know normal premises and conclusions. It isn't through discursive and deductive reasoning. The most parsimonious answer is that they are simply the product of basic induction, and that could be right, but the point is that when we arrive at a foundational premise you aren't allowed to attack it in the same way you would attack a non-foundational premise. It seems to us that there is always a further reason in the long chain of practical motives and reasoning, but not for happiness. Happiness is an end in itself. (Of course you can challenge whether a putatively foundational premise is really foundational, but you cannot use standard argumentation to criticize a premise qua foundational) It's like our hovercraft switches over to water and the laws of physics change due to the different medium.
You can make an okay case that desire is ordered to fulfillment based on the fact that we do it 100% of the time. We deny the truth all the time, so I don't see how you can make a case that "You just believe the truth". People believe what feels convincing to them, and that is quite often not the truth.
But here is an example of a place where that crucial distinction between subjective and objective is necessary. The reason people believe things that are not the truth is because they don't see the truth. If they saw that it was the truth they would believe it. When people look up at the night sky and see Venus they will tell you it's a star. Their belief does not correspond to the reality. Give them a powerful telescope and they will correct their belief.
Some folks might be tempted to call a "no true scotsman" on that "healthy" remark, but I agree that we can equate normal and healthy in this instance. And since that's generally the extent I was pointing to a problem with the use of the word "universal", I agree. Everyone wants to be happy.
I figured since you studied psychology you would accept the idea that certain pathologies should not bear on our conversation. That's even a difference between truth and morality. Truth & logic allow no deviations, but morality is looser. We end up looking at trends and probabilities in a way that the mathematical certitude of logical reasoning would not.
Trouble is, what makes people happy is much, much less universal.
That's true.
Okay. I can't disagree, but I can't see anything of substance either. We're still just saying that people desire things, and they're interested in what they desire. Coupled with the statement above, people want to be happy and they're interested in their own happiness.
Okay good, I think it's important that we agree on this. (I'd like to say more but I'm going to wait since this post is getting quite long)
Maybe I'm not explaining it clearly enough. Dopamine is in a mediatory role, the sensation of pleasure is what we're after. If you hooked a person up to a robust dopamine machine they would never leave it. It would be the most addictive thing on the planet and it would become the only thing they desire.
The sensation of pleasure is what we want. We want to eat because dopamine is released when we eat. We want dopamine to be released because it feels good. We want to feel good because.... it feels good. I don't get it, that's where the magic happens. If there is anything that is intrinsically good, that would be it.
Perhaps you could create a machine or a drug that "the rats would happily consume until they obliviously died of starvation." Still, I don't think it's what we desire. It would just be a drug that is so powerful that the addict has no chance of digging himself out. I think a large part of him would still want to dig himself out as his body atrophies, connected to the machine. (This is a large topic that may need to be tabled--not sure)
Okay, makes sense. Saying, "I should desire this" doesn't necessarily mean I don't desire it, but I might not. "I should desire this, and I do." See? But it very well might be, "I should desire this, but I don't".
Okay, sure. So you are saying there is an opening between, "I am right to desire this," and, "I should fulfill this desire." Or if you don't like that phrasing, "I desire this and I should desire this," and, "I should fulfill this desire." I'm not sure there is a gap. If she desires it and she is fully convinced that it is a worthwhile desire, then I think she will draw the conclusion that it should be fulfilled (or act spontaneously to fulfill it). We are in the odd position of always translating behavioral motivations into syllogistic logic. Desires don't always work that way, even if they are reflective, intellectual desires.
What we need to talk about is how discursive reasoning and automatic human nature relate. I alluded to it above with the idea of foundational premises, but I think this is one of the central questions. For example, if we fully believe something to be true then we cannot help but believe it. That is basically not a moral or praiseworthy "transition." It's just what happens. Similarly, it is not morally praiseworthy that we desire happiness, nor is it at all volitional. That's just the way we are. It's just a starting point. Anyway, I won't say more in this ever-lengthening post.
I agree with the second statements, I have to ask "Why?" about the first statements. If they are true, put them in a syllogism form for me with "we should believe things that are true" and "we should seek things that make us happy" as the conclusions. I'm bad at writing 'em, but I can read 'em just fine!
I'm not quite sure how to write a syllogism for these. If I tried it would be symbolic logic with lots of steps and I'm not sure how helpful it would be.
We've agreed that we do believe things that we believe are true. Truth is the natural object of the intellect. That seems to support the first proposition, no? What would the alternative be? "We should believe things that are false"? We could ask why we ought to seek after truth. Because it is good.
I think parallel reasoning applies to the second proposition. We do seek things that we believe will make us happy. Happiness is the natural object of the will. The alternative is to seek things that make us unhappy. Happiness is good/desirable.
(Trying to carry out the contrary of either proposition is probably literally impossible. Trying to believe things that are false or seek things that make us unhappy just wouldn't work. You may as well ask someone to fly like Superman.)
Whether someone deserves happiness or not, people almost universally feel that they do.
"I decided to do X" isn't the same as "I should do X". See my Superman analogy above to address it.
I'm passing over these in light of length. Lemme know if you object.
Yeah, our convos will likely run pretty parallel. And if he bothers to read these dissertations we've been writing he might find clues as to where I disagree with him, I just won't do it outright.
*Dusts off hands and admires his work.* Wow, I really succeeded in making that substantially shorter than before, didn't I?
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