Sounds like middle knowledge trying to not go full blown open-theist and simultaneously avoid the pseudo-determination that makes Molinism useless as a freewill theodicy.
The proposition that God knows the future is problematic for some libertarians who believe that if God knows you will do X it precludes the possibility of doing !X which makes X non-libertarian free.
The Molinists retort that God knows the future by knowing all possible futures of all possible actions a free agent can take.
The problem arises that if God possesses the knowledge of all possible contingent universes prior to choosing to creating one specific universe, he still basically determined everything in the universe. Consider: let's compare two hypothetical ways of creating the universe. One is our universe exactly as it was created, and another is an exact duplicate, except God left out a stray hydrogen atom somewhere in the deep recesses of the Triangulum Galaxy. These are different existences, therefore free will, random chance, and dumb luck should (in a libertarian worldview) cause different people to be saved (inasmuch as we cannot say that our choices are in any way determined by our material circumstances, which are, after all, identical to a distance of 2.5 million light years). If, again, by free will and dumb luck it happens that exactly everyone in these two contingent realities will be saved but for one man, let's call him Steve, who would be saved in the variant universe, is not saved in ours, and that is the only meaningful distinction between the two, then God still basically predestined Steve unto damnation in a basically Calvinist sense while maintaining absolute libertarian freedom. He accomplished this merely because he foreknew. Therefore, divine foreknowledge is useless as a libertarian theodicy.
(I have heard and therefore will anticipate the objection that there aren't enough alternate possible universes for Him to get everything exactly as he wants it by changing minutiae. As it happens, due to the many worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics, statisticians actually are quite interested in quantifying the number of possible universes. I have heard figures anywhere between 10^10^80 to 10^10^200 possible configurations of universes roughly the same size as ours. Then, keep in mind, God can increase the size of the universe at the point of creation by one plank-unit, and keep doing that infinitely. There are, accordingly, an infinite number of possible worlds. God can absolutely keep sitting around, under molinism, removing stray ions from quasars until he gets everything the way he wants it, just like I can keep reloading my saved games until the random number generator gives me what I want.)
Open Theism, of course, just denies that God has actual foreknowledge of which contingent path men will actually take because they recognize that even simple foreknowledge applied to middle knowledge may as well amount to a functional libertarian Calvinism. Unfortunately, Open Theism is a bridge too far for the typical libertarian. It's also generally recognized as a contrivance with no scriptural basis designed exclusively to avoid an undesirable logical consequence of biblical theism.
So we have ideas like these in which the temporally bound God of Open-Theism-before-the-fact talks to the temporally bound God of Open-Theism-after-the-fact to get clued in to what's going to happen now that's He's done something. That's completely unexpositable and pretty clearly just an ad-hoc way to reinsert foreknowledge into the Open Theist's theodicy. If that's what you're looking for, then I suppose you'd find this to be clever thinking.
For the rest of us, it's an ad hoc rehabilitation of a contrivance designed to avoid the logical consequences of a doctrine so ancient and central to theology that every five year old in every denomination knows it. Which is wholly unimpressive.
