The Teleological Argument (p4)

[KCfromNC]

You misunderstood Hawking. If you read all I have posted, he is actually favors the chance option. And btw, the truth or falsity of p3 is not contingent on a poll. Opinions don't change the truth.

If we're not supposed to believe the people you're quoting, why quote them? Seems strange you'd offer someone up as an expert and then tell us to ignore them. Something's not adding up here.

 

[KCfromNC]

You're just ranting here and not worth responding to.

That's not ranting. It is an important point. Finding life in a universe which can naturally support life doesn't provide evidence one way or another for supernatural creator gods. On the other hand, if we did find life in a universe which couldn't naturally support life that would require the existence of supernatural gods. So basically, finding out we're living in a universe which naturally supports life points away from there being a supernatural creator. If there were creator gods responsible, it would be much more likely we'd find ourselves in a universe which didn't naturally support life since there are infinitely many more of those than ones which support life naturally.

 

[KCfromNC]

Yes. Being under oath and cross examination, can do wonders to get at the truth of the matter.

Indeed. Funny how actual penalties for lying makes people stop spouting Christian apologetics. Perhaps there's something to learn from that fact.

 

[FrumiousBandersnatch]

... it seems that the constants can be different and still have some kind of universe.

Strictly, we don't know that. We know that our model is good enough to be consistent with, and predict, most of our observations of the universe we see, and that if we tweak some parameters it's no longer consistent with what we observe, but still predicts a habitable universe, and if we tweak others it doesn't, and so-on; however, being able to tweak parameters in our model does not imply that they can vary in the real world, nor does our model prediction necessarily correspond to how a real universe would look with those parameters. The earliest moments of the development of the universe are still basically a matter of informed guesswork - we don't know how the parameter values for our model are determined, so we can only speculate about whether they could be different in a real universe, and how that would affect it.

So we can speculate that the values could be different and that our model might still give a valid prediction of how such a universe would behave.

 

[FrumiousBandersnatch]

...But again, with the odds so stacked against the actualization of a life-permitting universe, what we should be really surprised at is the fact that we exist at all.

As I said before, if we assume a multiverse, then even if potentially habitable universes are a vanishingly small proportion, we can expect life to exist among that vanishingly small proportion. We don't yet have enough information to do more than speculate about the numbers involved, but we are here, so however small the proportion of habitable universes, it's clearly not zero.

Regarding your firing squad scenario, we don't know why we're still alive, but there seem to be two main possibilities - either that, small though the chance was, they all missed their shots despite intending to kill us - and there are any number of potential explanations, from the extremely improbable, such as multiple independent flukes, to single events that affected them all, such as a dazzling light; or that our assumptions were incorrect - e.g. they didn't intend to kill us, it was a cruel torture, or a means to scare us into submitting, or a last-minute reprieve, etc. With regard to the fine tuning argument, the situation is that we don't know whether it's an incredible fluke (e.g. only one universe that happens to be habitable), or inevitable (e.g. an infinite number of varied universes), or something in between; or alternatively, that our assumptions are wrong (e.g. our model only applies to this universe, or the parameters can't be different in the real world, or sentient systems can develop in entirely different universes, or ours is actually a typical universe, etc).

It is more likely that we should not have existed in the first place. Hawking knows that, and that's why he supports the idea of a multi-verse. But, as I've pointed out, there's not one iota of evidence for it.

As I said before, the multiverse is a prediction of some important applications of the Standard Model. If it was just a purely speculative solution to the appearance of fine tuning, it would be quite unsatisfying and far less interesting - because there would be no framework within which it could be investigated and potentially falsified.

 

[FrumiousBandersnatch]

If there were creator gods responsible, it would be much more likely we'd find ourselves in a universe which didn't naturally support life since there are infinitely many more of those than ones which support life naturally.

Using comparative infinities in this kind of context can lead to confusion and despair - for example, there could be infinitely more uninhabitable universes than habitable ones, yet still an infinite number of habitable universes... blame Cantor

 

[Joshua260]

As I said before, if we assume a multiverse, then even if potentially habitable universes are a vanishingly small proportion, we can expect life to exist among that vanishingly small proportion. We don't yet have enough information to do more than speculate about the numbers involved, but we are here, so however small the proportion of habitable universes, it's clearly not zero.

Yes, assuming a mutl-verse. And not just one or two, but a enormous amount of them in order to make chance a reasonable option...again, with not even one iota of evidence for even a second one. I just think you should understand the lengths one has to go to in order to avoid design.

Regarding your firing squad scenario, we don't know why we're still alive, but there seem to be two main possibilities - either that, small though the chance was, they all missed their shots despite intending to kill us - and there are any number of potential explanations, from the extremely improbable, such as multiple independent flukes, to single events that affected them all, such as a dazzling light; or that our assumptions were incorrect - e.g. they didn't intend to kill us, it was a cruel torture, or a means to scare us into submitting, or a last-minute reprieve, etc. With regard to the fine tuning argument, the situation is that we don't know whether it's an incredible fluke (e.g. only one universe that happens to be habitable), or inevitable (e.g. an infinite number of varied universes), or something in between; or alternatively, that our assumptions are wrong (e.g. our model only applies to this universe, or the parameters can't be different in the real world, or sentient systems can develop in entirely different universes, or ours is actually a typical universe, etc).

yes...again...a lot of supposition to justify chance a an option.

As I said before, the multiverse is a prediction of some important applications of the Standard Model. If it was just a purely speculative solution to the appearance of fine tuning, it would be quite unsatisfying and far less interesting - because there would be no framework within which it could be investigated and potentially falsified.

Still no evidence for it.

 

[Davian]

...


Still no evidence for it.

 

[Joshua260]

None of this has anything to do with my question. How do you know the constants can be any different than they are in our universe in the first place? Sure, it is great to talk about what would happen if they are different, but how are you sure that these different values are even possible?

The Hawking quote you gave says nothing about this question. Do you even understand what I'm asking?

Wow. So which view do you support? That the fine-tuning is due to physical necessity, or by chance.

BTW, Hawking supports chance. So do you suppose that might indicate that Hawking believes it is possible for the constants to be different? Think about it.

 

[Joshua260]

Well there's thinking that it is reasonable, and I can agree with that to an extent, and then there's thinking that it is more reasonable than other explanations, and I don't agree with that. I don't think it would be a miracle if it was more reasonable either, so I don't really understand the purpose of these logical arguments to begin with.

Thanks for a great thoughtful reply. This is much more interesting than much of the other banter that gets batted back and forth constantly in many of these threads.

I think you hit on the crux of the argument here. "What is reasonable?"

I'd like to look at one extreme versus the other in the following scenarios:

What if you strolled down the beach and saw seashells laid out to spell "Howdy, Nicholas!"?

A. Suppose that you lived in a city that you knew was populated with a million people. Is it more reasonable to believe in chance or design?
I think design.

B. Now suppose that you knew that you were the only being that ever existed and still found the same message "Howdy, Nicholas!"? Is it more reasonable to believe in chance or design?
I think we have no choice but to choose chance here (unless we opt for physical necessity). (Personally, I'd still have a hard time believing in chance due to the complexity of the message).

C. Lastly, suppose that you do not know whether you live on a populated planet or are all alone in the universe? Is it more reasonable to believe in chance or design?
I think it is more reasonable to believe in design because of the extremely high odds against finding "Howdy, Nicholas!" being spelled out on the beach solely without intelligent input.

So given the extremely high odds against finding "Howdy Nicholas!" spelled out on the beach, why would someone choose to believe in chance for the last option? I suspect that it might be because they already have a commitment to the belief that a designer does not exist and they have rationalized a way to make chance a more reasonable (viable) option.

 

[Moral Orel]

Thanks for a great thoughtful reply. This is much more interesting than much of the other banter that gets batted back and forth constantly in many of these threads.

I think you hit on the crux of the argument here. "What is reasonable?"

I'd like to look at one extreme versus the other in the following scenarios:

What if you strolled down the beach and saw seashells laid out to spell "Howdy, Nicholas!"?

A. Suppose that you lived in a city that you knew was populated with a million people. Is it more reasonable to believe in chance or design?
I think design.

B. Now suppose that you knew that you were the only being that ever existed and still found the same message "Howdy, Nicholas!"? Is it more reasonable to believe in chance or design?
I think we have no choice but to choose chance here (unless we opt for physical necessity). (Personally, I'd still have a hard time believing in chance due to the complexity of the message).

C. Lastly, suppose that you do not know whether you live on a populated planet or are all alone in the universe? Is it more reasonable to believe in chance or design?
I think it is more reasonable to believe in design because of the extremely high odds against finding "Howdy, Nicholas!" being spelled out on the beach solely without intelligent input.

So given the extremely high odds against finding "Howdy Nicholas!" spelled out on the beach, why would someone choose to believe in chance for the last option? I suspect that it might be because they already have a commitment to the belief that a designer does not exist and they have rationalized a way to make chance a more reasonable (viable) option.

First, the message isn't that clear so it makes it a bad example. It's more like seeing a message written in a burnt piece of toast. It may seem a little like a message, but it can also seem like we are reading too much into something.

Secondly, we're going to disagree about C. If I have never known any other intelligent creature, then I do not believe it is more likely that design would be responsible for some message than chance.

And lastly, I saw that you are still saying there is no evidence for a multiverse, but I wonder if you read the article I posted a while ago. Multiverse isn't a theory in and of itself, it is something that is predicted as a result of eternal inflation, which there is a decent amount of evidence for. Proof? Certainly not, but plenty of evidence. So there is a decent enough chance that multiverse is true.

 

[Joshua260]

First, the message isn't that clear so it makes it a bad example. It's more like seeing a message written in a burnt piece of toast. It may seem a little like a message, but it can also seem like we are reading too much into something.

Secondly, we're going to disagree about C. If I have never known any other intelligent creature, then I do not believe it is more likely that design would be responsible for some message than chance.

Ok.

And lastly, I saw that you are still saying there is no evidence for a multiverse, but I wonder if you read the article I posted a while ago. Multiverse isn't a theory in and of itself, it is something that is predicted as a result of eternal inflation, which there is a decent amount of evidence for. Proof? Certainly not, but plenty of evidence. So there is a decent enough chance that multiverse is true.

No, sorry. I did not take the opportunity to look at the link with the evidence for a multi-verse, but I take your point. I actually meant to, but I was busy today.

Although we may disagree, thanks again for a good question.

 

[Arythmael]

No, you misunderstood on physical necessity. If I misspoke, I apologize. Let me clarify a little bit better. Physical necessity does not mean that only a certain values could be set to support life. Rather, it means that it would be impossible for those values to be different...period! (whether or not there is or isn't life). But instead, it seems that the constants can be different and still have some kind of universe.
So the choices are like saying:
1: did it have to be this way?
2: was it by chance that it's this way?
3: did a free-causal agent make it this way?

Thank you for bearing with me while I get the concept clarified. I hope you can bear with me just a little longer.

In terms of my analogy, where I thought you were saying:

(a) There are N ways to combine various ingredients in various amounts to make a chocolate cake, but only one of them is actually edible and tastes really good.​

... you are actually saying:

(b) there are N ways to combine various ingredients in various amounts but none of them will make a chocolate cake except this one, and it also happens to be edible and tastes really good.​

In terms of creating universes, the physical necessity option says there may be N ways to theoretically combine these constants and their values, but only one of them will make a universe (presumably, one that does not immediately result in annihilation or utter chaos). Ignoring the refutation of that option for a moment, this still sounds like a basic statement about the chances that our universe was possible. It does not offer a cause outside that of chance or design. Can you show me how it does?

Let me try to clarify my issue with it. With physical necessity you are creating a dependency relationship, saying that the universe is a "result of" or is "due to" these settings. But that is not the argument's question. We are asking what made the constants and their values as they are in the first place; specifically, your argument asks how and why they are in this state of being fine-tuned. It is not asking what was required to make the universe possible. So even if the universe is the direct and unavoidable result of these constants and settings (physical necessity), while chance and design attempt to explain how those settings came to be in the first place, physical necessity does not. It only speaks about the unavoidability of the universe as the outcome of their existence.

 

[Joshua260]

Thank you for bearing with me while I get the concept clarified. I hope you can bear with me just a little longer.

In terms of my analogy, where I thought you were saying:

(a) There are N ways to combine various ingredients in various amounts to make a chocolate cake, but only one of them is actually edible and tastes really good.​

... you are actually saying:

(b) there are N ways to combine various ingredients in various amounts but none of them will make a chocolate cake except this one, and it also happens to be edible and tastes really good.​

In terms of creating universes, the physical necessity option says there may be N ways to theoretically combine these constants and their values, but only one of them will make a universe (presumably, one that does not immediately result in annihilation or utter chaos). Ignoring the refutation of that option for a moment, this still sounds like a basic statement about the chances that our universe was possible. It does not offer a cause outside that of chance or design. Can you show me how it does?

Let me try to clarify my issue with it. With physical necessity you are creating a dependency relationship, saying that the universe is a "result of" or is "due to" these settings. But that is not the argument's question. We are asking what made the constants and their values as they are in the first place; specifically, your argument asks how and why they are in this state of being fine-tuned. It is not asking what was required to make the universe possible. So even if the universe is the direct and unavoidable result of these constants and settings (physical necessity), while chance and design attempt to explain how those settings came to be in the first place, physical necessity does not. It only speaks about the unavoidability of the universe as the outcome of their existence.

No, I'm sorry. I still don't think you properly understand what it means to say that one option is that the fine-tuning of the universe is due to physical necessity. For example, in the formula for the gravitational pull between two objects F=G(mm/R2), physical necessity would mean that the value of G is 6.674×10−11 N⋅m2/kg2 and could not be anything else, in any universe.
Another example is the proton-electron mass ratio which is = 1836.152470(76). If that ratio was a physical necessity, then it could not be anything else, in any universe.
But what we find is that theoretically, we could alter some of these constants a little bit and still produce a life-permitting universe model. We could also alter some a little bit more and we would still get a universe but no life. A little bit more on certain constants, and then no universe. So there doesn't seem to be any hard and fast rule that many of the constants had to have the values they do.
So when we are considering the physical necessity option, what we are doing is asking, did things have to be this way? And it seems like they didn't. If things had to be this way, then chance does not come into play.

It's as if as if we made a die that had sixes on every side. Is there any chance that you could roll a five?

 

[nonbeliever314]

in any universe

Explain.

 

[Joshua260]

Explain.

Read the last two sentences of my last reply (with the example of the die with sixes on every side). That is what is meant by the option of the fine tuning of the universe being due to physical necessity.

 

[Arythmael]

No, I'm sorry. I still don't think you properly understand what it means to say that one option is that the fine-tuning of the universe is due to physical necessity. For example, in the formula for the gravitational pull between two objects F=G(mm/R2), physical necessity would mean that the value of G is 6.674×10−11 N⋅m2/kg2 and could not be anything else, in any universe.
Another example is the proton-electron mass ratio which is = 1836.152470(76). If that ratio was a physical necessity, then it could not be anything else, in any universe.

This is essentially what I said. Set G to 6.600×10−11 N⋅m2/kg2 and you now have 2 ways to theoretically combine these constants and their values: one at 6.674 (and all other constants the same) and one at 6.600 (and all other constants the same). Set to G to 6.210 ... and you have a third way. Do this with all other values and eventually you have N (in fact an infinite number of) ways, but only one is ours, and physical necessity says that only our settings will result in a viable universe. I do not see how this differs from what I said. It is a number of possible events (settings for the constants) but only one has a specific outcome (viable universe).

But what we find is that theoretically, we could alter some of these constants a little bit and still produce a life-permitting universe model. We could also alter some a little bit more and we would still get a universe but no life. A little bit more on certain constants, and then no universe. So there doesn't seem to be any hard and fast rule that many of the constants had to have the values they do.

This is just the refutation I wanted us to ignore for a minute. I'm discussing the sensibleness of what the argument is claiming first. I'm not beginning to refute it yet.

So when we are considering the physical necessity option, what we are doing is asking, did things have to be this way?

You seem to be missing my point about this. Again, the above asks if the universe (U) was dependent upon the constants being set to these values (C). That is, did the constants have to be this way for the universe to exist. It says

• If U then C

This means you could not have U without C. But your argument asks why C in the first place! That is:

• If C then ?

In other words you could not have C without what? Did we arrive at C by chance, or did someone design it in that fine-tuned state? Physical necessity only presents the universe as the unavoidable result of the existence of C in the fine-tuned state that it is. Read your second premise again, carefully:

"The fine-tuning of the universe is due to..."​

How many different ways can I state this?

Look. What is "fine-tuning" except to say that if Cx is the values of the constants in our universe, then:

• For all theoretical constant settings in the set {C1, C2, C3, ... Cn} for an infinitely large number n the total number of constant settings for which Ci can sustain a universe is extremely small and the set contains or is exactly Cx.

The very definition of "fine-tuned" means you have a large bandwidth of possibilities but the one or ones you need to "tune" into to create and/or sustain a universe like ours lies within a very narrow bandwidth -- it was "fine-tuned". The definition already acknowledges that there may be only and exactly one such tuning: "If U then Cx". This is physical necessity as you keep describing it. The definition of "fined-tuned" already acknowledges this. It says that Cx was at least sufficient if not necessary among very few ("fine-tuned") such possibilities for C that could have made a universe. THAT is exactly what makes it appear fine-tuned to us!

But then the argument goes on to ask what caused this fine-tuning to exist in the first place. You can't answer that it simply had to be this way. Really? What forced it to be these settings? What rule? That's like answering how the ingredients got measured to 1 cup of this and 1 tablespoon of that by saying because they had to be that way to make a chocolate cake! The question is how did they get so meticulously measured like that in the first place so that you could even get a cake?

Read my last paragraph again:

With physical necessity you are creating a dependency relationship, saying that the universe is a "result of" or is "due to" these settings. But that is not the argument's question. We are asking what made the constants and their values as they are in the first place; specifically, your argument asks how and why they are in this state of being fine-tuned. It is not asking what was required to make the universe possible. So even if the universe is the direct and unavoidable result of these constants and settings (physical necessity), while chance and design attempt to explain how those settings came to be in the first place, physical necessity does not. It only speaks about the unavoidability of the universe as the outcome of their existence.

And it seems like they didn't. If things had to be this way, then chance does not come into play.

If I have to roll a five in order to win the stuffed animal, and I roll a five, are you telling me that chance did not come into play? That makes no sense. If I have to roll the constants so that G=6.674×10−11 N⋅m2/kg2 (and all the other constants equal their current numbers) in order to get a universe, and I roll those constants, you are telling me that chance did not come into play?

That doesn't add up. And even so you are still talking about what caused the constants to arrive at those numbers in the first place, not whether once they are set they must result in a universe.

Here's another way to look at it.

Try stating each option:

1. The fine-tuning of the universe is due to mere chance.
2. The fine-tuning of the universe is due to the fact that someone designed it specifically.
   
3. The fine-tuning of the universe is due to the fact that you cannot have a universe without the constants set exactly as they are ... because it is fine-tuned ... very fine-tuned ... in fact the fine-tuning of the universe is due to the fact that it is so fine-tuned that there is only one way to tune the constants so that you get a universe.

That last statement doesn't make any sense because it is just restating part of the definition of being fine-tuned in the first place. It is not trying to explain what this fine-tuning is due to. It is not attempting to explain what caused it to be fine-tuned in the first place.

Is my side of this point getting any clearer?

 

[Archaeopteryx]

Yes, assuming a mutl-verse. And not just one or two, but a enormous amount of them in order to make chance a reasonable option...again, with not even one iota of evidence for even a second one. I just think you should understand the lengths one has to go to in order to avoid design.

One can easily avoid design if there is no evidence for it.

Still no evidence for it.

If this is a problem for the chance option, it's a problem for your preferred option also.

 

[Arythmael]

One can easily avoid design if there is no evidence for it.

What would be your idea of evidence showing that the universe was, in fact, designed?

I mean, if something landed on earth from outer space, and upon investigation you determined that the thing was clearly from an alien civilization, what attributes would it have had that brought you to that conclusion? Coherent, interactive units of apparent functionality? Detailed elements with some kind of thematic structure, the clear appearance of patterns, etc.?

How does the universe itself fail to show all of this and much more?

 

[Archaeopteryx]

What would be your idea of evidence showing that the universe was, in fact, designed?

I mean, if something landed on earth from outer space, and upon investigation you determined that the thing was clearly from an alien civilization, what attributes would it have had that brought you to that conclusion? Coherent, interactive units of apparent functionality? Detailed elements with some kind of thematic structure, the clear appearance of patterns, etc.?

How does the universe itself fail to show all of this and much more?

How does one distinguish a universe that is designed from one that isn't? The presence of complex structure probably isn't sufficient because we know that natural processes are capable of producing complex structure without the guidance of an intelligence.