Details of Pentagon secret document Discord leaker emerge

[mindlight]

Consider then what is being suggested here....

A national guard airman, gets access to rooms where senior officials or top analysts are just chucking intel into the trash, or leaving it out, while this guy is supposed to fix the computer....and it is the sort of intel you could sell for billions of dollars....far more valuable than anything released by Snowden or others....but time sensitive.

And he's just folding it up in his pocket, and walking out the door with it?

Again, it's either a level of incompetence that is unparalleled in Pentagon history or he isn't the leaker. He probably shared this stuff on the discord room...

It took months to find him? Why? They don't have any security cameras in the Pentagon? They can't track this guy's IP address? Nothing about this story makes sense.

What was actually shared were photos on top of a hunting magazine. You cannot take photos of secure documents inside a secure location and the hunting magazine suggests a private one though maybe national guard toilets have copies for while-you-wait scenarios. He is the one they have traced the leak to. He is a network specialist at a fairly high level but in the national guard. National Guard IT resources are probably also used by the regular military on some bases and if so as a network specialist, it is possible he intercepted the original documents onsite and found a digital way to smuggle them out of the secure location. I find that surprising because it is possible to secure top-secret documents even from high-level IT support personnel and admins with encryption to specific devices and people profiles and passwords for example. He might then have done his own printout which was stolen by someone else or this printout of more than 100 documents (so a big document) is the original source. It is not something you could smuggle out in the lining of your jacket. maybe in a briefcase. It should have been noticed unless the security on these bases works on some kind of trust system and he just violated that trust.

That they took so long to find him argues against malicious intent and also against digital theft of data. It sounds like the leak to the public occurred via someone he shared the documents with. His motives seem more like bragging rights or keeping a group of friends informed. If the source was a printout there would be no digital audit trail to follow. They would only have known when the press found out.

Given the volume of intelligence and the sheer numbers with high levels of access, this is not so much incompetence as an accident that has been waiting to happen. As I said before most of what was revealed could have been worked out by educated guesswork without the documents. There are very few surprising revelations here. It is just that the mainstream narrative and Biden's pronouncements have been keen to magnify Ukrainian successes rather than their weaknesses in public. This is a normal war stance.

 

[RDKirk]

Consider then what is being suggested here....

A national guard airman, gets access to rooms where senior officials or top analysts are just chucking intel into the trash, or leaving it out, while this guy is supposed to fix the computer....and it is the sort of intel you could sell for billions of dollars....far more valuable than anything released by Snowden or others....but time sensitive.

And he's just folding it up in his pocket, and walking out the door with it?

Again, it's either a level of incompetence that is unparalleled in Pentagon history or he isn't the leaker. He probably shared this stuff on the discord room...

That is exactly how it is. That's how it was when I was an airman his age. That's how it was on the day I retired. The whole concept of a SCIF is that the entire facility is as secure as a bank vault so it's considered secure to leave the classified material on your desk at the end of your shift. I could have easily slipped a frame of satellite imagery (back when the very existence of satellite reconnaissance was still TOP SECRET) into my briefcase and walked right out of the SCIF.

The DoD thoroughly vets people with that clearance with a comprehensive background check. Rank doesn't really make a difference for personal reliability, and you're not going to have senior people crawling around running cable.

It took months to find him? Why? They don't have any security cameras in the Pentagon? They can't track this guy's IP address? Nothing about this story makes sense.

There are no security cameras in a SCIF. Those would only be at the entrances. In addition, individuals are require to key in and out one-by-one, and that is also recorded. If someone punches the wrong key code three times, the police show up post-haste with guns already drawn and take everyone at the door into custody. That's a real pain in the okole for the people in line behind that guy. If you see the guy in front of you get his code wrong twice, you stop him and ask him to let you go on ahead of him before he tries the third time.

As I see it from the news reporting, the theory is that he took documents from other people's desks in the SCIF, photographed them at home, and uploaded the images to the Discord server for his chat group. I would suppose that he then discarded the documents (if the police found those documents in his home, then of course he's toast).

The government was only clued to the existence of the documents on the Discord server by other members of the chat group. It would have been difficult or impossible to have located them otherwise. Other members of the chat group probably didn't know his real name and location though, and that indeed might have been a matter of tracking down his IP from the Discord system (which would have required a search warrant).

 

[RDKirk]

What was actually shared were photos on top of a hunting magazine. You cannot take photos of secure documents inside a secure location and the hunting magazine suggests a private one though maybe national guard toilets have copies for while-you-wait scenarios. He is the one they have traced the leak to. He is a network specialist at a fairly high level but in the national guard. National Guard IT resources are probably also used by the regular military on some bases and if so as a network specialist, it is possible he intercepted the original documents onsite and found a digital way to smuggle them out of the secure location. I find that surprising because it is possible to secure top-secret documents even from high-level IT support personnel and admins with encryption to specific devices and people profiles and passwords for example. He might then have done his own printout which was stolen by someone else or this printout of more than 100 documents (so a big document) is the original source. It is not something you could smuggle out in the lining of your jacket. maybe in a briefcase. It should have been noticed unless the security on these bases works on some kind of trust system and he just violated that trust.

[/QUOTE]
He could have carried it out in his tool case. Any door check would have been a fairly cursory opening and glancing into the case. The guard would not have had him remove and replace all his tools.

It is, indeed, a system of trust.

 

[RDKirk]

I take it five is higher than 0 in the military world? The highest level Microsoft Admin is a tier 0 admin with potential root access to all systems - depending on how they were set up.

The Air Force system is kind of like the trade idea.

Lowest level is Apprentice, noted as a "3" in the fourth digit of the Air Force Specialty Code. Next is Journeyman, which is a "5." Then Craftsman, which is a "7," and finally Master, which is a "9." They correspond roughly with rank, inasmuch as each level requires a certain minimum of experience time at that level before the next can be attained (they also require tests. And, as well, promotion to a higher rank requires having attained the skill level appropriate for that rank.

Apprentices cannot complete work on their own (except maybe for the most rudimentary tasks in low-tech fields); they are considered trainees and should normally be working with at least a Journeyman.

Journeymen and Craftsmen are carrying the workload, with Craftsmen tending more into the training aspect. At a wing-level facility, Journeymen and Craftsmen would have all the accesses required to do any work required.

Masters are primarily managing and planning, although lower-ranking Masters might be "working managers" or very high-end workers at high-end locations such as at the Pentagon. I was essentially a high-end worker at the Pentagon; my immediate supervisors were be GS-15 civilians or colonels.

For promotion purposes, though, a lower-ranking Master doesn't want to be at the Pentagon. The work may be cool, but he needs to show supervisory experience of junior troops for further promotion. That period when National Guard troops were assigned to me for a special task at the Pentagon was very important for me promotion-wise. That was also when I first got into networking (which is what they were doing for me); that entrance into networking later paved the way for my post-military civilian career.

 

[RocksInMyHead]

Other members of the chat group probably didn't know his real name and location though, and that indeed might have been a matter of tracking down his IP from the Discord system (which would have required a search warrant).

I believe I recall an article that included some snippets of an interview with one of the other members of the chat group who said he did know Teixeira's identity, but was unwilling to reveal that to the interviewer. Can't find it now (I think it was either from Bellingcat or the NY Times), but assuming that's true, I would imagine that the feds could provide a much bigger incentive to talk than a journalist.

Edit: actually, it was in the OP

 

[RDKirk]

Once when I was at SAC headquarters, we had an incident where an officer decided to carry a TOP SECRET SCI document from one SCIF in the building to another SCIF in the same building. He carried it in a simple, plain manila folder. That was already a huge security offense; it should have been in a locked briefcase with a prominent "If found, return to..." sticker.

But the officer made the situation worse by not going directly to the other SCIF. Instead, he stopped at the building convenience store to peruse the magazines...and he left the folder on the magazine rack.

At some point later, the magazine vendor found the folder, saw that it contained something that looked important, and gave it to the store cashier. The cashier looked inside, saw that it looked important, and gave it to the first person he saw in uniform.

None of those people, of course, had clearance. It was an incredibly big Bozo no-no that cause a general security clampdown on everyone for a good while.

 

[Hans Blaster]

Some have already posted some of these items because the news reports got them from the same place as I did:

https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.mad.255930/gov.uscourts.mad.255930.3.1.pdf

23. According to a review of government records and information, since May 2022, TEIXEIRA has been serving as an E-3/Airman First Class in the USANG and has been stationed at Otis Air National Guard Base in Massachusetts. TEIXEIRA enlisted in the USANG in September 2019 as an E-1 rank. As of February 2023, TEIXEIRA’s title was Cyber Defense Operations Journeyman.

24. As required for this position, TEIXEIRA holds a Top Secret security clearance, which was granted in 2021. Based on my training and experience, I know that to acquire his security clearance, TEIXEIRA would have signed a lifetime binding non-disclosure agreement in which he would have had to acknowledge that the unauthorized disclosure of protected information could result in criminal charges.

25. In addition to TEIXEIRA’s Top Secret clearance, he maintained sensitive compartmented access (SCI) to other highly classified programs. He has also had this access since 2021.

26. The Government Document posted on Social Media Platform 1 was accessible to TEIXEIRA by virtue of his employment with USANG. According to a U.S. Government Agency, which has access to logs of certain documents TEIXEIRA accessed, TEIXEIRA accessed the Government Document in February 2023, approximately one day before User 1 reposted the information on the Internet. User 1 told the FBI that the information he reposted was originally posted on Server 1 by the individual using the Subject Username.


Social Media Platform 1 = Discord
User 1 = a user interviewed by the FBI on Apr 10 (Monday) (See paragraphs 15-19)
Server 1 = Teixeira's personal Discord server
Subject Username = Teixeira
Government Document = 1 classified document Teixeira is charged with releasing.

Paragraph 26 shows the path of the charged document from restricted control to Teixeira's Discord server to the broader internet in about 1 day.

 

[RDKirk]

Some have already posted some of these items because the news reports got them from the same place as I did:

https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.mad.255930/gov.uscourts.mad.255930.3.1.pdf

23. According to a review of government records and information, since May 2022, TEIXEIRA has been serving as an E-3/Airman First Class in the USANG and has been stationed at Otis Air National Guard Base in Massachusetts. TEIXEIRA enlisted in the USANG in September 2019 as an E-1 rank. As of February 2023, TEIXEIRA’s title was Cyber Defense Operations Journeyman.

24. As required for this position, TEIXEIRA holds a Top Secret security clearance, which was granted in 2021. Based on my training and experience, I know that to acquire his security clearance, TEIXEIRA would have signed a lifetime binding non-disclosure agreement in which he would have had to acknowledge that the unauthorized disclosure of protected information could result in criminal charges.

25. In addition to TEIXEIRA’s Top Secret clearance, he maintained sensitive compartmented access (SCI) to other highly classified programs. He has also had this access since 2021.

26. The Government Document posted on Social Media Platform 1 was accessible to TEIXEIRA by virtue of his employment with USANG. According to a U.S. Government Agency, which has access to logs of certain documents TEIXEIRA accessed, TEIXEIRA accessed the Government Document in February 2023, approximately one day before User 1 reposted the information on the Internet. User 1 told the FBI that the information he reposted was originally posted on Server 1 by the individual using the Subject Username.


Social Media Platform 1 = Discord
User 1 = a user interviewed by the FBI on Apr 10 (Monday) (See paragraphs 15-19)
Server 1 = Teixeira's personal Discord server
Subject Username = Teixeira
Government Document = 1 classified document Teixeira is charged with releasing.

Paragraph 26 shows the path of the charged document from restricted control to Teixeira's Discord server to the broader internet in about 1 day.

The prosecution would still have a potential hole in it unless they find those documents at Teixeira's residence. I expect the FBI is going to spend days going over his place with a fine-toothed comb.

There may have already been a quiet search going on for those documents, with whoever had had them sweating bullets over their disappearance.

 

[Ana the Ist]

That is exactly how it is. That's how it was when I was an airman his age.

That's how it was on the day I retired.

Really? Because as far as I know, those would all be violations of basic procedure. I'm not in the DOD...so perhaps their methods are a lot less stringent. That seems unlikely though.

The whole concept of a SCIF is that the entire facility is as secure as a bank vault so it's considered secure to leave the classified material on your desk at the end of your shift. I could have easily slipped a frame of satellite imagery (back when the very existence of satellite reconnaissance was still TOP SECRET) into my briefcase and walked right out of the SCIF

But there's no cameras? It's just remarkable to someone else in a similar but different occupation.

Here's a better description of his job...

https://www.npr.org/2023/04/13/1169808275/fbi-agents-arrested-a-21-year-old-suspect-for-leaked-u-s-intelligence-documents

As it notes....other intel officials don't seem to think he had access to all this stuff. I'm pretty sure it was being worked but when the story broke...they made an arrest.

The DoD thoroughly vets people with that clearance with a comprehensive background check.

Uh huh. Contracted out or through another federal entity?

Rank doesn't really make a difference for personal reliability, and you're not going to have senior people crawling around running cable.

Mhm.

There are no security cameras in a SCIF. Those would only be at the entrances. In addition, individuals are require to key in and out one-by-one, and that is also recorded. If someone punches the wrong key code three times, the police show up post-haste with guns already drawn and take everyone at the door into custody. That's a real pain in the okole for the people in line behind that guy. If you see the guy in front of you get his code wrong twice, you stop him and ask him to let you go on ahead of him before he tries the third time.

I'm not in the DOD, I'll concede your point. It just seems unlikely to me, that's all. I'm speculating.

As I see it from the news reporting, the theory is that he took documents from other people's desks in the SCIF, photographed them at home, and uploaded the images to the Discord server for his chat group. I would suppose that he then discarded the documents (if the police found those documents in his home, then of course he's toast).

That also seems unlikely.

The government was only clued to the existence of the documents on the Discord server by other members of the chat group. It would have been difficult or impossible to have located them otherwise. Other members of the chat group probably didn't know his real name and location though, and that indeed might have been a matter of tracking down his IP from the Discord system (which would have required a search warrant).

I don't think it would in this case. It's possible that the group was what is claimed....it's also possible one or more actors are using it as an exchange. He could have been compromised. Group provides cover so he doesn't know who he's dumping info to.

If he joined at 17, judging by his title, he was maybe a year into the real job. If he waited till 18, probably less. That's not much time to become jaded...I would imagine those years are very much still "left hand doesn't know what the right is doing" still. The reasoning is stupid beyond a doubt despite understanding the danger posed. It's goofy.

But I don't know.

 

[Ana the Ist]

Russia is boosting its cyberattacks on Ukraine, allies, Microsoft says

Moscow will intensify its cyber efforts to pressure the sources of Ukraine's military and political support both domestic and foreign, according to Microsoft.

www.stripes.com

 

[RDKirk]

Really? Because as far as I know, those would all be violations of basic procedure. I'm not in the DOD...so perhaps their methods are a lot less stringent. That seems unlikely though.

As I said, it's a trust system. Nobody checks your pockets as you enter and leave the facility. If you have the clearance, you are trusted to protect the information.

But there's no cameras? It's just remarkable to someone else in a similar but different occupation.

Having cameras within the facility is itself a security risk.

Here's a better description of his job...

https://www.npr.org/2023/04/13/1169808275/fbi-agents-arrested-a-21-year-old-suspect-for-leaked-u-s-intelligence-documents

As it notes....other intel officials don't seem to think he had access to all this stuff. I'm pretty sure it was being worked but when the story broke...they made an arrest.

Who do they think keeps their computers operational? Who do they think plugs in the wires?

If you read the arrest warrant posted by Hans Blaster, it clearly states that he did, indeed, have access and provides proof of such.

Uh huh. Contracted out or through another federal entity?

The Defense Investigative Service handles the background checks.

That also seems unlikely.

It turns out my speculation is precisely what he's being charged with having done.

I don't think it would in this case. It's possible that the group was what is claimed....it's also possible one or more actors are using it as an exchange. He could have been compromised. Group provides cover so he doesn't know who he's dumping info to.

If he joined at 17, judging by his title, he was maybe a year into the real job. If he waited till 18, probably less. That's not much time to underestimate the ease of catching him or become jaded. The reasoning is stupid beyond a doubt despite understanding the danger posed. It's goofy.

But I don't know.

See the court document posted by Hans Blaster. It traces what the government believes he did.

 

[Valletta]

Unless they can show he had access, his defense will be "I didn't have access, so you've got the wrong guy." That's a large a hole in a prosecution. They would also have to reasonably show that someone else did provide him with the documents, not just theorize it.

Remember that he doesn't have to prove his innocence, they have to prove his guilt, and the military court-martial process is actually more protective of defendant's rights than civilian courts are. The reason court-martials have a high conviction rate is because they don't even take a case to court unless it's a slam dunk.

They court martialed and convicted Vietnam War Marine Bobby Garwood of treason and almost of desertion, even though they had classified documents showing he was captured in a firefight. Garwood tried to bring a Vietnamese defector as a witness because the defector knew he was a POW, but was denied because at the time of the trial the defector said he did not know Garwood. Later when asked in a sworn deposition why the defector at that time said he never knew Garwood, the defector said an attorney from the U.S. Defense Department instructed the defector to pretend he did not know Garwood. No retrial to this date. Remember too they court martialed and convicted Billy Mitchell. There is heavy corruption in the leadership of the military just like in the rest of the government.

 

[mindlight]

Some have already posted some of these items because the news reports got them from the same place as I did:

https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.mad.255930/gov.uscourts.mad.255930.3.1.pdf

23. According to a review of government records and information, since May 2022, TEIXEIRA has been serving as an E-3/Airman First Class in the USANG and has been stationed at Otis Air National Guard Base in Massachusetts. TEIXEIRA enlisted in the USANG in September 2019 as an E-1 rank. As of February 2023, TEIXEIRA’s title was Cyber Defense Operations Journeyman.

24. As required for this position, TEIXEIRA holds a Top Secret security clearance, which was granted in 2021. Based on my training and experience, I know that to acquire his security clearance, TEIXEIRA would have signed a lifetime binding non-disclosure agreement in which he would have had to acknowledge that the unauthorized disclosure of protected information could result in criminal charges.

25. In addition to TEIXEIRA’s Top Secret clearance, he maintained sensitive compartmented access (SCI) to other highly classified programs. He has also had this access since 2021.

26. The Government Document posted on Social Media Platform 1 was accessible to TEIXEIRA by virtue of his employment with USANG. According to a U.S. Government Agency, which has access to logs of certain documents TEIXEIRA accessed, TEIXEIRA accessed the Government Document in February 2023, approximately one day before User 1 reposted the information on the Internet. User 1 told the FBI that the information he reposted was originally posted on Server 1 by the individual using the Subject Username.


Social Media Platform 1 = Discord
User 1 = a user interviewed by the FBI on Apr 10 (Monday) (See paragraphs 15-19)
Server 1 = Teixeira's personal Discord server
Subject Username = Teixeira
Government Document = 1 classified document Teixeira is charged with releasing.

Paragraph 26 shows the path of the charged document from restricted control to Teixeira's Discord server to the broader internet in about 1 day.

Good source.

So he had Top secret access and special access also, and this fits his job profile see below. He is the guy that tests and ensures that people can read the documents sent to them so he also has access and clearance for those documents. He administers all the ways in which access might occur or be restricted. He could digitally access the documents and there is a record of him doing so in February 2023. It remains unclear how he got the documents out of the base - e.g. whether digitally or via printouts. The photos of printouts were taken at home. He was identified because he searched for the word "leak" after the documents went public and because the Discord platform itself revealed his personal details.

The Discord platform provided information about the chat room administrator, identifying him as Jack Teixeira, who lives in North Dighton, Massachusetts, located about 40 miles south of Boston. On Thursday, he was taken into custody by FBI agents.

Suspected Pentagon leaker arraigned in federal court in Boston

A member of the Massachusetts Air National Guard remains in custody after he was charged in connection with the release of hundreds of classified documents to an online gaming chat server, while prosecutors disclosed that a social media platform provided information that led to the suspect.

www.washingtontimes.com

You are being redirected...

Cyber Transport Systems Specialist - U.S. Air Force

Discover a fulfilling career as a Cyber Transport Systems specialist, playing a vital role in maintaining the infrastructure of U.S. Air Force communications network.

www.airforce.com

 

[RDKirk]

On the OSI model used by most IT experts, he is assigned to the Physical, Data Link, and Network levels. So all the data flows through those layers but it should be heavily encrypted and could probably only be read on the application layer, depending on how the military set this up. You could be a level 0 admin and still not be able to read stuff inside "classified" documents in my world. But in some scenarios, Level 0 sees all as they have to test that the data is moving as designed. Level 0 can of course put themselves in reader groups also but that should leave an audit trail as should the use of USB ports, printouts, etc. Unless he can also edit the logs. I do not know how he smuggled the data out of his secure zone. Maybe he had a way around the military protocols with flash drives or maybe he just took the risk and walked out with a printed paper in his pockets and there was a lapse on door security that night, who knows? The New York Times seems to think he walked out with a folded paper in his pocket.

He walked out with the paper. They don't do a body search. He probably had it hidden in his tool case.

 

[RDKirk]

They court martialed and convicted Vietnam War Marine Bobby Garwood of treason and almost of desertion, even though they had classified documents showing he was captured in a firefight. Garwood tried to bring a Vietnamese defector as a witness because the defector knew he was a POW, but was denied because at the time of the trial the defector said he did not know Garwood. Later when asked in a sworn deposition why the defector at that time said he never knew Garwood, the defector said an attorney from the U.S. Defense Department instructed the defector to pretend he did not know Garwood. No retrial to this date. Remember too they court martialed and convicted Billy Mitchell. There is heavy corruption in the leadership of the military just like in the rest of the government.

There have been a lot more court-martials than those two. I've been on the jury panel of one of them, I've observed a couple more, and I've closely followed several.

In my lights, my experience trumps your conspiracy theory. I'm satisfied with the quality of the court-martial process, particularly compared to the civilian court system.

I have my own opinion of the Garwood case.

 

[USincognito]

In case any of you are wondering, it's a Portuguese name (there are lots of Portuguese in MA) pronounced "Teh-sherra"

 

[Valletta]

There have been a lot more court-martials than those two. I've been on the jury panel of one of them, I've observed a couple more, and I've closely followed several.

In my lights, my experience trumps your conspiracy theory. I'm satisfied with the quality of the court-martial process, particularly compared to the civilian court system.

I have my own opinion of the Garwood case.

Facts are hardly conspiracy, just the opposite. I gave you pure facts. The defector who testified has has been praised by virtually all of the Defense Department for his truthfulness. And the declassified intelligence report of Garwood being captured matches with his personal testimony, so they knew he was not a defector but instead of giving him the Purple Heart they charged him with defecting. The failure to properly pursue the defector's statement is telling no matter what you think of Garwood. As to Billy Mitchell, his court martial too is a matter of record. They were arrogant to not accept the reality of his demonstratin of air power. Unfortunately there is a serious problem with leadership, a lack of honor and courage, for too many who have reached high levels. I have a friend and one day I asked him how he was sent to Vietnam since he was working in an office here in the states. A Marine's mother was quite ill, he got a temporary pass to see her, and on his way back to the base he was notified she was dying. He went back to see her without permission. My friend's commanding office initiated a court martial with the intent to boot him out of the service, my friend objected and said he wanted no part of it, and the next day he got his orders to go to Vietnam. The Marine was wrong, he should have done some time, but the commanding officer wanted to make an example of him. There is not always justice, just remember that.

 

[mindlight]

We actually prayed for this guy Teixeira in our church this morning. He clearly loved his job and the world of information it landed him in. Even in his free time, he was debating geopolitical historical stuff online as many of us here do also. It was his whole life and I do not think he ever thought he was betraying his country. He was in that pandemic generation locked up in a gamer digital bubble and lacking the perspective and maturity that comes from living in real-world relationships. Maybe there was a bit of narcissism involved here as he sought bragging rights from strangers on his discussion networks. But he has caused a lot of damage and exposed sources and assets and strategic thinking that should not be out there. He will face consequences and no longer be able to do the job he loved.

The leak seemed to have followed the below path:

From Discord to 4chan: The Improbable Journey of a US Intelligence Leak - bellingcat

A recent leak of sensitive US intelligence documents leads to stranger corners of the internet than initially thought.

www.bellingcat.com

 

[essentialsaltes]

I wonder who was the one who actually gave the documents to the media and if they got paid for that information by the press?

That's not what happened. A member of the closed Discord group shared it with at least one other Discord server, and from there somebody shared it on 4chan and Telegram. They were essentially out in the open at that point, and that's where the media obtained them.

 

[mindlight]

That's not what happened. A member of the closed Discord group shared it with at least one other Discord server, and from there somebody shared it on 4chan and Telegram. They were essentially out in the open at that point, and that's where the media obtained them.

Yeh, I had already edited my post and shared a link about that.