- Feb 13, 2012
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When arguing for the existence of God, one should understand what kind of God one is giving evidence for. Generally these arguments prove only a few qualities that the being they prove must have.
I believe that in arguments from effect to cause, such as the cosmological and design arguments, the definition of God that is being used is simply: 'a being that has always existed, who intentionally caused the universe to come into existence.' The being must have always existed or it would itself need a cause, and it must have significant intelligence and power to have intentionally created the universe. Whether such a being is also morally good, or entirely immaterial, or infinite in any quality besides time it has existed, is not addressed in these arguments. If someone slips these qualities in without evidence, it is right to call that out, but until they do, to keep with the topic only to discuss the evidence for the minimal type of God defined above.
A second category of theistic arguments uses a different definition of God, due to the different type of evidence under examination. These are the arguments from human experience of the supernatural. Miracles, revelation, near-death-experiences, and such, provide evidence for this definition of God: 'A superhuman being who is good, powerful, worthy of worship, and interested in the growth (in character) of humanity.' The exact qualities depend on which experiences one is presenting, but they tend to be these primarily.
By itself the first category of arguments would only support a deistic god, while the second category, depending on the specifics, might support a variety of types of gods. When you take both together, you get something closer to the Christian concept of God.
I believe that in arguments from effect to cause, such as the cosmological and design arguments, the definition of God that is being used is simply: 'a being that has always existed, who intentionally caused the universe to come into existence.' The being must have always existed or it would itself need a cause, and it must have significant intelligence and power to have intentionally created the universe. Whether such a being is also morally good, or entirely immaterial, or infinite in any quality besides time it has existed, is not addressed in these arguments. If someone slips these qualities in without evidence, it is right to call that out, but until they do, to keep with the topic only to discuss the evidence for the minimal type of God defined above.
A second category of theistic arguments uses a different definition of God, due to the different type of evidence under examination. These are the arguments from human experience of the supernatural. Miracles, revelation, near-death-experiences, and such, provide evidence for this definition of God: 'A superhuman being who is good, powerful, worthy of worship, and interested in the growth (in character) of humanity.' The exact qualities depend on which experiences one is presenting, but they tend to be these primarily.
By itself the first category of arguments would only support a deistic god, while the second category, depending on the specifics, might support a variety of types of gods. When you take both together, you get something closer to the Christian concept of God.