Review of "The mystery and agency of God" (2014), by Frank G. Kirkpatrick

[Mark Quayle]

Teofrastus said:
and that's why their universe required an Unmoved Mover. But today we know that, thanks to natural laws, the material world has autonomy. In consequence, theology has to give up the Unmoved Mover and formulate another view of divine action.

We don't live under a Newtonian scientific paradigm anymore.

Many still do.

What do you guys mean by this? Are you trying to say that the law of causation is no longer prevalent?

Maybe more to the point, @Teofrastus , do you believe that God is not absolute First Cause?

 

[Teofrastus]

[...] How do you differentiate your position from deism? Is it just the fact that God acts intermittently in creation?

Yes, divine intervention is what makes the difference. God is personal in that he relates to 'me' and takes 'my' life seriously. In fact, the view that God sustains creation as a whole is accepted by some deists, so called pantheistic deists.

Do you hold that God has no responsibility for creating a world where the Holocaust could happen, given that God's agency is primarily reduced to the front-end, so to speak, of creation?

The catastrophe which is called the Fall occurred. This was when the material universe became autonomous. Today it is called the Big Bang. Nobody really knows why it happened, but the bible insists that it wasn't God's fault. Arguably, God requires the existence of an 'other'. After all, for what purpose shall God emit grace if there is nobody to accept it? I think that Creation necessitated the Fall and concomitant disobedience. The material universe is again and again disobedient, and that's why God has to make corrections. But he cannot take away our autonomy—not yet, anyway. Thus, he could not prevent the Holocaust and cannot be held responsible.

Is God able to ensure God's intention in creating is realized? I'm assuming, even given your position, that God intends a good creation. But if God's agency is limited to the front-end, and humanity is totally autonomous, then it is possible that God's intention in creating could result in a sizable failure. Or does God's intermittent agency ensure a partial or full realization of the divine intention?

Creation is only temporary, anyway. According to the bible God intends a new Creation, a new heaven and earth. Creation is ingenious, and a horrible failure all the same. It became a failure because it is autonomous, and that's why it can never become a good creation. It can only deteriorate, following the second law of thermodynamics. And that's why human beings can never create a perfect society, explains Augustine in The City of God. It's because they are disobedient.

 

[public hermit]

Yes, divine intervention is what makes the difference. God is personal in that he relates to 'me' and takes 'my' life seriously. In fact, the view that God sustains creation as a whole is accepted by some deists, so called pantheistic deists.

The catastrophe which is called the Fall occurred. This was when the material universe became autonomous. Today it is called the Big Bang. Nobody really knows why it happened, but the bible insists that it wasn't God's fault. Arguably, God requires the existence of an 'other'. After all, for what purpose shall God emit grace if there is nobody to accept it? I think that Creation necessitated the Fall and concomitant disobedience. The material universe is again and again disobedient, and that's why God has to make corrections. But he cannot take away our autonomy—not yet, anyway. Thus, he could not prevent the Holocaust and cannot be held responsible.

Creation is only temporary, anyway. According to the bible God intends a new Creation, a new heaven and earth. Creation is ingenious, and a horrible failure all the same. It became a failure because it is autonomous, and that's why it can never become a good creation. It can only deteriorate, following the second law of thermodynamics. And that's why human beings can never create a perfect society, explains Augustine in The City of God. It's because they are disobedient.

Thank you for indulging my questions. I'll keep my word and leave it at that.

 

[Teofrastus]

[...]
But as to your stomach, a question: Do you deny the enormous ethnic cleansing ordered by God in the OT? Do you consider the Holocaust any more heinous than the murder of the Son of God?

Of course, the mass murders were not decreed by Yahweh, but by Moses, Aaron, the priests and the prophets. Nor did everything happen as the bible says. The sack of Jericho never happened, for instance. The priests always said it was decreed by Yahweh, because they were the messengers of Yahweh, responsible for the interpretation of the Abrahamic revelation. It's the same with the Christian revelation. It consists mostly of interpretations of later authors. Some of them we have discarded, such as the Gnostics.

As evidence that it was not by direct decree, we only need to look at the ritual regulations for diagnosing and healing a house afflicted by leprosy (Leviticus 14). God isn't that stupid!

We don't say that the murder of the Son of God was a heinous crime, because it was the best thing that has happened to us. Satan fell into the trap, and we were saved.

 

[Teofrastus]

Teofrastus said:
and that's why their universe required an Unmoved Mover. But today we know that, thanks to natural laws, the material world has autonomy. In consequence, theology has to give up the Unmoved Mover and formulate another view of divine action.


What do you guys mean by this? Are you trying to say that the law of causation is no longer prevalent?

Maybe more to the point, @Teofrastus , do you believe that God is not absolute First Cause?

In my view, God created the universe; but he is not the Unmoved Mover who sustains existence and is behind all that happens. Modern science has found that we cannot rely on causal thinking so much as before, in view of the findings of chaos theory and quantum physics. Unlike what Pierre Laplace thought, there are no causal chains from the beginning of the universe to far off into the future.

 

[FireDragon76]

No, by "natural law" Aquinas means "the light of reason", which God has placed in every man to guide him in his acts. It is the moral law in our hearts. But he did not take account of the fact that it is ambivalent. While we are prone to help our neighbour we are equally prone to attack the tribe living on the other side of the river. So "natural law" does not come from God. In fact, it is shaped by evolution, as Steven Pinker (The Blank Slate) explains.

"Natural law" can't be understood through materialist reductionism. Aristotle's metaphysics is more robust than just consideration of material causes.

Killing the tribe across the river is wrong because it denies the right of that tribe to pursue their own natural ends, whether or not we consider Darwin's ideas, they don't really factor into it.

 

[FireDragon76]

Okay, that is an unusual position, in terms of a classical Christian understanding of God's relation to creation, but I see what you're saying. This is an interesting position. I hope you don't mind answering some questions. I'm not going to try and convince you otherwise, but I am curious about the implications.

How do you differentiate your position from deism? Is it just the fact that God acts intermittently in creation?

Do you hold that God has no responsibility for creating a world where the Holocaust could happen, given that God's agency is primarily reduced to the front-end, so to speak, of creation?

Is God able to ensure God's intention in creating is realized? I'm assuming, even given your position, that God intends a good creation. But if God's agency is limited to the front-end, and humanity is totally autonomous, then it is possible that God's intention in creating could result in a sizable failure. Or does God's intermittent agency ensure a partial or full realization of the divine intention?

What if there's no logical way to create a world where the Holocaust wouldn't happen, and yet where there wouldn't also be free, moral agents? Things like the Holocaust only happened because of lost of choices by of individual people, some more significant than others.

 

[public hermit]

What if there's no logical way to create a world where the Holocaust wouldn't happen, and yet where there wouldn't also be free, moral agents? Things like the Holocaust only happened because of lost of choices by of individual people, some more significant than others.

I suppose that is a possibility but it would be hard to show. The number of logically possible worlds (modal logic) is huge (I don'tknow about infinite, but definitely more than a finite mind can count). Although God exists in every possible world since God is a necessary being, an event like the Holocaust (presumably) does not since it is dependent on contingent beings making contingent choices. Still, if one could show that the Holocaust was unavoidable (although contingent) in every possible world, that would be very significant.

 

[Mark Quayle]

Yes, divine intervention is what makes the difference. God is personal in that he relates to 'me' and takes 'my' life seriously. In fact, the view that God sustains creation as a whole is accepted by some deists, so called pantheistic deists.

The catastrophe which is called the Fall occurred. This was when the material universe became autonomous. Today it is called the Big Bang. Nobody really knows why it happened, but the bible insists that it wasn't God's fault. Arguably, God requires the existence of an 'other'. After all, for what purpose shall God emit grace if there is nobody to accept it? I think that Creation necessitated the Fall and concomitant disobedience. The material universe is again and again disobedient, and that's why God has to make corrections. But he cannot take away our autonomy—not yet, anyway. Thus, he could not prevent the Holocaust and cannot be held responsible.

Creation is only temporary, anyway. According to the bible God intends a new Creation, a new heaven and earth. Creation is ingenious, and a horrible failure all the same. It became a failure because it is autonomous, and that's why it can never become a good creation. It can only deteriorate, following the second law of thermodynamics. And that's why human beings can never create a perfect society, explains Augustine in The City of God. It's because they are disobedient.

Define what you mean by autonomous. How far do you go with that. They operate TOTALLY independent of God's causation? Are you talking about autonomy as in they are a law unto themselves, or are you talking about autonomy as in total spontaneity?

 

[Mark Quayle]

What if there's no logical way to create a world where the Holocaust wouldn't happen, and yet where there wouldn't also be free, moral agents? Things like the Holocaust only happened because of lost of choices by of individual people, some more significant than others.

Things like the Holocaust also happened because of God's sovereignty.

 

[Mark Quayle]

Of course, the mass murders were not decreed by Yahweh, but by Moses, Aaron, the priests and the prophets. Nor did everything happen as the bible says. The sack of Jericho never happened, for instance. The priests always said it was decreed by Yahweh, because they were the messengers of Yahweh, responsible for the interpretation of the Abrahamic revelation. It's the same with the Christian revelation. It consists mostly of interpretations of later authors. Some of them we have discarded, such as the Gnostics.

As evidence that it was not by direct decree, we only need to look at the ritual regulations for diagnosing and healing a house afflicted by leprosy (Leviticus 14). God isn't that stupid!

We don't say that the murder of the Son of God was a heinous crime, because it was the best thing that has happened to us. Satan fell into the trap, and we were saved.

I'm not saying it wasn't the best thing to happen to us. I'm asking if it was extreme injustice and injury to innocence. No need for playing games here.

But nevermind. I see you reject plenary verbal inspiration. Don't think there's much more need to be said here.

 

[Mark Quayle]

I suppose that is a possibility but it would be hard to show. The number of logically possible worlds (modal logic) is huge (I don'tknow about infinite, but definitely more than a finite mind can count). Although God exists in every possible world since God is a necessary being, an event like the Holocaust (presumably) does not since it is dependent on contingent beings making contingent choices. Still, if one could show that the Holocaust was unavoidable (although contingent) in every possible world, that would be very significant.

"Contingent" does not in and of itself invoke any possibility that the contingent thing needed not exist, but its dependence on "Necessary". What "becomes" depends on what "is". It is only speculation to say that it could have not existed. We don't know that. All we know is that it exists because God caused its existence.

 

[public hermit]

"Contingent" does not in and of itself invoke any possibility that the contingent thing needed not exist, but its dependence on "Necessary". What "becomes" depends on what "is". It is only speculation to say that it could have not existed. We don't know that. All we know is that it exists because God caused its existence.

That's an arguable point. When it comes to modal logic, most philosophers speak in terms of ersatz worlds since modal logic is a logical tool; the primary exception being David Lewis who believed all possible worlds were concrete. What I will say is that if contingency does not entail possibility, then it's tantamount to saying all that exists is necessary since no other possibilities could have existed, and so the distinction between necessity and possibility disappears. When it comes to ontologies, there's always a price to pay no matter how you approach it. It all depends on what you're trying to do and what you're willing to give up.

 

[Mark Quayle]

What I will say is that if contingency does not entail possibility, then it's tantamount to saying all that exists is necessary since no other possibilities could have existed, and so the distinction between necessity and possibility disappears. When it comes to ontologies, there's always a price to pay no matter how you approach it. It all depends on what you're trying to do and what you're willing to give up.

I tend to equate "Necessary" with "Brute Fact". There is only one, and that is God. All else is "contingent".

To be honest, I'm just being picky, having a little fun. (While the following may sound crazy, and is certainly not mainstream, I can't find anything wrong with the reasoning, yet, except that nobody (but I) seems to like it very much.) If we define 'possible' as more than whatever actually happens, then it is only the weaker brother of 'probability'; both are guesswork, not fact.

To my causally determined thinking: Concerning all past events the only possibility was whatever actually happened, (and what's more, we know WHY it happened). As we have no evidence that anything else ever happened, then why assume other things were possible? It is, after all, impossible that they DID happen, so why say it was possible for them to have happened, knowing they didn't?

Even when God says things like, "If only you had obeyed (repented, etc), I would have blessed you (etc)." possibility is not implied. They didn't and he didn't. Or they did and he did. Still, only the one thing happened.

"With God, all things are possible"; so would you say, then, "with God, all (or most) things are probable"? Of course not! What he is talking about there is faith, dedication, salvation, God's ability and decision-making priorities.

So anyway, 'contingency' does not logically-necessarily imply that God's creation need not have included it, but that its being derives from what is necessary. Contingency does indeed entail possibility, but not impossibility. Obviously, though, I admit that the usual definition of "contingent" is not how I see it.

Our ontological statements are only ours. The truth we try to describe is God's. We're not very good at it.


One thing for sure: Whatever is possible, is only possible because of God.

 

[Teofrastus]

"Natural law" can't be understood through materialist reductionism. Aristotle's metaphysics is more robust than just consideration of material causes.

Killing the tribe across the river is wrong because it denies the right of that tribe to pursue their own natural ends, whether or not we consider Darwin's ideas, they don't really factor into it.

Of course it's wrong, but the point is that you get a medal if you kill the enemy. But you also get a higher status in society if you are helpful to your neighbours. Since you get your reward on earth, Jesus says, there is no reward in heaven. So, evidently, this "natural law" does not derive from heaven. Pinker explains that homo sapiens behave like this because it increases the survival value. If we kill other tribesmen, steal their cattle and rape their women, then it serves to propagate our genes, and that's why such behaviour has been perpetuated. Pinker was criticized for bringing up the doctrine of original sin again.

 

[Teofrastus]

Define what you mean by autonomous. How far do you go with that. They operate TOTALLY independent of God's causation? Are you talking about autonomy as in they are a law unto themselves, or are you talking about autonomy as in total spontaneity?

Yes, totally independent of God's causation. The material world runs by itself. Somehow such a view has become associated with deism. However, God may intervene in a cosmos that runs by itself; but he has no need of intervening in a cosmos which he upholds. Luther had no concept of physical energy. Instead he thought that all willful action derives directly from God, which is then moulded into good and evil by the moral nature of the being that receives the divine power: "It is the fault, therefore, of the instruments, which God does not allow to be idle, that evil things are done, with God himself setting them in motion" (De Servo).

But it is not God that sets us in motion. It is energy derived from food.

 

[FireDragon76]

Of course it's wrong, but the point is that you get a medal if you kill the enemy. But you also get a higher status in society if you are helpful to your neighbours. Since you get your reward on earth, Jesus says, there is no reward in heaven. So, evidently, this "natural law" does not derive from heaven.

Natural law isn't about doing something for an extrensic reward, but about fulfillment as a human being. For Aristotle, this fulfillment was experienced as eudaimonia, or well-being or good-spiritedness.

Pinker explains that homo sapiens behave like this because it increases the survival value. If we kill other tribesmen, steal their cattle and rape their women, then it serves to propagate our genes, and that's why such behaviour has been perpetuated. Pinker was criticized for bringing up the doctrine of original sin again.

It would be reductionistic to apply Pinker's logic to natural law in such a manner.

I don't think Aristotle or any other philosopher that utilizes the concept of natural law, believes that perpetuating ones genes fulfills natural law. "Fecundity" is not a virtue that Aristotle recognized.

Frankly, I am surprised a Christian would take this kind of logic seriously. While it might appear to support the concept of original sin, it rests on purely materialistic assumptions about human life (perpetuating genes).

 

[FireDragon76]

This article might be helpful to the discussion, since it's about Chaos Theory and divine agency. Mark Vernon is an English psychotherapist that writes alot about the interaction between science and spirituality.

Chaos theory and divine action | Mark Vernon

Mark Vernon: Can science explain everything? Physicist John Polkinghorne is often accused of offering up a God-of-the-gaps argument. But his work has subtler shades

www.theguardian.com

 

[Teofrastus]

Natural law isn't about doing something for an extrensic reward, but about fulfillment as a human being. For Aristotle, this fulfillment was experienced as eudaimonia, or well-being or good-spiritedness.

Yes, and Augustine rejected the pagan concept of eudaimonia. True happiness can only be obtained through a relationship with the divine. Luther says that "...Aristotle's philosophy is contrary to theology since in all things it seeks those things that are its own and receives rather than bestows something good" (The Heidelberg Disputation). His point is that we cannot better ourselves without the sanctifying grace of God.

It would be reductionistic to apply Pinker's logic to natural law in such a manner.

I don't think Aristotle or any other philosopher that utilizes the concept of natural law, believes that perpetuating ones genes fulfills natural law. "Fecundity" is not a virtue that Aristotle recognized.

Frankly, I am surprised a Christian would take this kind of logic seriously. While it might appear to support the concept of original sin, it rests on purely materialistic assumptions about human life (perpetuating genes).

As Christians we are not required to follow the Thomistic teaching of natural law. We know today that human nature has been moulded by the natural evolutionary process. According to a Platonic concept, rather than an Aristotelian, we can only participate in the divine, imitate its forms. But the divine does not live in us. We can only have a vague picture of the divine, and try to emulate it. Throughout the ages, people have done just this, and we can observe that humanity has bettered itself. We are much less warlike and violent than in primitive society (vide Gat, War in Human Civilization). This process changes human nature at the genetic level.

 

[public hermit]

I tend to equate "Necessary" with "Brute Fact". There is only one, and that is God. All else is "contingent".

To be honest, I'm just being picky, having a little fun. (While the following may sound crazy, and is certainly not mainstream, I can't find anything wrong with the reasoning, yet, except that nobody (but I) seems to like it very much.) If we define 'possible' as more than whatever actually happens, then it is only the weaker brother of 'probability'; both are guesswork, not fact.

To my causally determined thinking: Concerning all past events the only possibility was whatever actually happened, (and what's more, we know WHY it happened). As we have no evidence that anything else ever happened, then why assume other things were possible? It is, after all, impossible that they DID happen, so why say it was possible for them to have happened, knowing they didn't?

Even when God says things like, "If only you had obeyed (repented, etc), I would have blessed you (etc)." possibility is not implied. They didn't and he didn't. Or they did and he did. Still, only the one thing happened.

"With God, all things are possible"; so would you say, then, "with God, all (or most) things are probable"? Of course not! What he is talking about there is faith, dedication, salvation, God's ability and decision-making priorities.

So anyway, 'contingency' does not logically-necessarily imply that God's creation need not have included it, but that its being derives from what is necessary. Contingency does indeed entail possibility, but not impossibility. Obviously, though, I admit that the usual definition of "contingent" is not how I see it.

Our ontological statements are only ours. The truth we try to describe is God's. We're not very good at it.


One thing for sure: Whatever is possible, is only possible because of God.

I have some sympathy with this line of thinking; although, I'm open to other possibilities.

Consider this statement: God knows all possibilities, even those that never happen.
Why would God know what never happens? It seems God would know all actualities and would have no need to know things that never happen. Then again, if God creates a world where acrualities depend on human choices, it could be that God knows all possibilities, even those that never happen (pace Molinism).

I agree that part of the issue is that we only know from our perspective, and we can imagine other possibilities that would seem to fit what is actual, e.g. I could have worn a green sweater this morning instead of a gray one. That's just one way out of a myriad of ways things could have been different right now.