Yes, I do very strongly think a will to believe exists. Belief clearly opens up actions, and these possibilities might tempt a person (sometimes very strongly), but they don't dictate action. I may believe that my dog is outside, but this doesn't necessarily make me want to let him in; or I may believe there's food in the other room when I'm very hungry, and again that opens up possibilities for me but doesn't dictate my choice. Anyone who thinks belief dictates action is supplementing the psychology of belief with determinism.
But here's the other side often missed. Although belief opens up actions, actions also perpetuate belief. My wife and I went to Sedona, AZ for our honeymoon, and as a result of the experience I came to believe that Sedona was one of the best places on earth. But since I haven't been there in a few years, I don't believe that as strongly. However, if I had spent time there once per year, then each visit might have cemented the original strength of the belief more and more -- although it could also have caused the strength of this belief to wane given desensitization.
William James said that "as a rule we disbelieve all facts and theories for which we have no use." He refers to "hypotheses" as anything that can be proposed to a person's belief, and these hypotheses can be "live" or "dead" depending on this use:
Compare this to philosopher Dallas Willard's notion of belief as referring to "inclinations of the will," i.e., belief involves action, without which it isn't belief. I believe in something only if it changes me in some way, otherwise I might accept or know something but not believe in it. This is what allows any college student to turn in a philosophy examination without it affecting his or her life despite knowledge on the subject.
Although belief requires action (compare James 2 in the New Testament: "faith without works is dead"), action doesn't necessarily require belief. This is where Pascal nails it:
So I don't think we're passive when it comes to belief, and this understanding of belief only looks at one side of the coin: belief causing action, rather than action causing belief. Beliefs open up possibilities for action, but unless these possibilities are welded with hypotheses that are to some degree "live" to us, as William James said, and sometimes unless we act as if the beliefs are true, and unless we continually act according to the belief to keep it strong (as with my Sedona experience), then we won't stick with belief in anything in particular. Which are all ways of saying that we have a will when it comes to believing -- a will to believe.
But here's the other side often missed. Although belief opens up actions, actions also perpetuate belief. My wife and I went to Sedona, AZ for our honeymoon, and as a result of the experience I came to believe that Sedona was one of the best places on earth. But since I haven't been there in a few years, I don't believe that as strongly. However, if I had spent time there once per year, then each visit might have cemented the original strength of the belief more and more -- although it could also have caused the strength of this belief to wane given desensitization.
William James said that "as a rule we disbelieve all facts and theories for which we have no use." He refers to "hypotheses" as anything that can be proposed to a person's belief, and these hypotheses can be "live" or "dead" depending on this use:
...deadness and liveness in an hypothesis are not intrinsic properties, but relations to the individual thinker. They are measured by his willingness to act. The maximum of liveness in an hypothesis means willingness to act irrevocably. Practically, that means belief; but there is some believing tendency wherever there is a willingness to act at all.
A dead hypothesis for me is that there are a hundred angels that dance on a pinhead. I don't really care if this hypothesis were true, therefore it's dead to me. What determines the deadness? My willingness to act on it if it were true.
Compare this to philosopher Dallas Willard's notion of belief as referring to "inclinations of the will," i.e., belief involves action, without which it isn't belief. I believe in something only if it changes me in some way, otherwise I might accept or know something but not believe in it. This is what allows any college student to turn in a philosophy examination without it affecting his or her life despite knowledge on the subject.
Although belief requires action (compare James 2 in the New Testament: "faith without works is dead"), action doesn't necessarily require belief. This is where Pascal nails it:
You would like to attain faith and do not know the way; you would like to cure yourself of unbelief and ask the remedy for it. Learn of those who have been bound like you, and who now stake all their possessions. These are people who know the way which you would follow, and who are cured of an ill of which you would be cured. Follow the way by which they began; by acting as if they believed, taking the holy water, having masses said, etc. Even this will naturally make you believe, and deaden your acuteness.
Do you want to believe something (i.e., you have a hypothesis that is attractive to you but your reasoning prevents you from believing in it without this belief being irrational or false)? Then act as if it were true, and actions will (along with reasons and live hypotheses) create belief in you.
So I don't think we're passive when it comes to belief, and this understanding of belief only looks at one side of the coin: belief causing action, rather than action causing belief. Beliefs open up possibilities for action, but unless these possibilities are welded with hypotheses that are to some degree "live" to us, as William James said, and sometimes unless we act as if the beliefs are true, and unless we continually act according to the belief to keep it strong (as with my Sedona experience), then we won't stick with belief in anything in particular. Which are all ways of saying that we have a will when it comes to believing -- a will to believe.
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