Why be a skeptic

[FrumiousBandersnatch]

Well, we only have sufficient information if our cognitive abilities are as adequate as we think they are.

We can only play the cards we're dealt.

To paraphrase Descartes, we can't know that sensory input is not the product of a malicious demon toying with our minds.

That's precisely why Descartes decided we must doubt our senses, i.e. be skeptical - 'methodic doubt' in his terms. But this is the same problem as Berkeley's idealism, and they're problematic to refute - if there is no way to identify or distinguish them.

If the information we have about the world allows us to make generally coherent and consistent explanatory models that make fruitful predictions, it seems reasonable to provisionally take it 'as is' and suspend judgement about demon or Gods or other distorting influences manipulating our senses or perceptions, pending supporting evidence.

As it happens, we have found evidence of various distorting influences on our senses and perceptions, and well-informed people try to take these influences into account when interpreting them.

I take it this means that this particular approach is only applicable to broadly empirical questions? Suspending judgment on moral propositions, pending evidence of their truth or falsity, seems like a terrible idea.

Not at all; I think it's important that we try to suspend judgement on moral propositions & issues about which we are not well-informed. It's not always possible - sometimes immediate action is necessary, and what constitutes 'sufficient' information is problematic in itself, but as moral judgements so often involve the well-being of ourselves and/or others, I think it's important.

Moral decisions have a strong emotional basis and a generally weak rational basis; even the way a proposition is presented can change people's moral judgement of it (as the Trolley Problems have - arguably - demonstrated), so skepticism seems an appropriate way to approach moral propositions.

 

[bhsmte]

We can only play the cards we're dealt.

That's precisely why Descartes decided we must doubt our senses, i.e. be skeptical - 'methodic doubt' in his terms. But this is the same problem as Berkeley's idealism, and they're problematic to refute - if there is no way to identify or distinguish them.

If the information we have about the world allows us to make generally coherent and consistent explanatory models that make fruitful predictions, it seems reasonable to provisionally take it 'as is' and suspend judgement about demon or Gods or other distorting influences manipulating our senses or perceptions, pending supporting evidence.

As it happens, we have found evidence of various distorting influences on our senses and perceptions, and well-informed people try to take these influences into account when interpreting them.

Not at all; I think it's important that we try to suspend judgement on moral propositions & issues about which we are not well-informed. It's not always possible - sometimes immediate action is necessary, and what constitutes 'sufficient' information is problematic in itself, but as moral judgements so often involve the well-being of ourselves and/or others, I think it's important.

Moral decisions have a strong emotional basis and a generally weak rational basis; even the way a proposition is presented can change people's moral judgement of it (as the Trolley Problems have - arguably - demonstrated), so skepticism seems an appropriate way to approach moral propositions.

Well stated. And i will add, some folks look for cards that arent in the deck.

 

[Silmarien]

That's precisely why Descartes decided we must doubt our senses, i.e. be skeptical - 'methodic doubt' in his terms. But this is the same problem as Berkeley's idealism, and they're problematic to refute - if there is no way to identify or distinguish them.

This is the difficulty with all of metaphysics. It is all by its very nature problematic to refute. I think that ontological materialism lands us in the exact same position as Descartes' demon--intentional mental states must be regarded with suspicion if physical matter cannot be about or directed towards anything, which has troubling consequences for rationality as a concept.

Which doesn't necessarily mean that it's false--it too just implies a radical skepticism that doesn't quite seem to match reality. Scientific evidence can have metaphysical implications (it certainly makes popular forms of substance dualism look impractical), but it's limited when it comes to adjudicating between metaphysical positions. I see no way around that. Which leads us back to "pending forever."

If the information we have about the world allows us to make generally coherent and consistent explanatory models that make fruitful predictions, it seems reasonable to provisionally take it 'as is' and suspend judgement about demon or Gods or other distorting influences manipulating our senses or perceptions, pending supporting evidence.

Take reality "as is" and matter seems to either involve an infinite regress of more fundamental particles or to ultimately dissolve into potentiality. I'm not sure what "as is" even really entails anymore.

Whatever your preferred metaphysics, there's an interpretation of quantum mechanics that supports it. Evidence still needs to be interpreted; scientific inquiry doesn't just produce it with all of its ramifications attached, and once we're in the realm of interpretation, you can't suspend judgment on how to proceed pending more empirical information. You'd just end up with reams of data that mean absolutely nothing.

Not at all; I think it's important that we try to suspend judgement on moral propositions & issues about which we are not well-informed. It's not always possible - sometimes immediate action is necessary, and what constitutes 'sufficient' information is problematic in itself, but as moral judgements so often involve the well-being of ourselves and/or others, I think it's important.

Moral decisions have a strong emotional basis and a generally weak rational basis; even the way a proposition is presented can change people's moral judgement of it (as the Trolley Problems have - arguably - demonstrated), so skepticism seems an appropriate way to approach moral propositions.

Sorry for the vagueness, I meant from the metaethical standpoint. Should we approach the whole notion of moral propositions with skepticism and question whether "genocide is bad" is a meaningful statement at all? Should we delay investigation of moral reasoning pending some consensus on what the objective of ethics is at all and whether "well-being" can be empirically demonstrated to be important?

Philippa Foot was a Neo-Aristotelian metaethicist, so we're already dealing with moral realism going into the Trolley Problems. So back it up a little bit--do we go with virtue ethics, utilitarianism, moral nihilism, or what? This is where you're going to run into trouble if you're suspending judgment.

 

[Michael]

Sorry for the vagueness, I meant from the metaethical standpoint. Should we approach the whole notion of moral propositions with skepticism and question whether "genocide is bad" is a meaningful statement at all? Should we delay investigation of moral reasoning pending some consensus on what the objective of ethics is at all and whether "well-being" can be empirically demonstrated to be important?

It seems as though that is both a meaningful question and an easy one to answer in terms of the suffering imposed on human beings. In terms of how we 'feel', the concept of well-being can be demonstrated to be "of importance" to human beings, as well as to other living beings. Such a question may not have meaning to a non-living rock, but it has meaning to a living organism.

 

[FrumiousBandersnatch]

Sorry, I forgot to respond to this...

... intentional mental states must be regarded with suspicion if physical matter cannot be about or directed towards anything, which has troubling consequences for rationality as a concept.

Not really, such mental states are just the result of applying the intentional stance to goal-directed activity.

Take reality "as is" and matter seems to either involve an infinite regress of more fundamental particles or to ultimately dissolve into potentiality. I'm not sure what "as is" even really entails anymore.

By 'as is', I mean as it is observed to be; this changes according to the means of observation, so the task is to provide a coherent framework that accounts for all the observations.

Whatever your preferred metaphysics, there's an interpretation of quantum mechanics that supports it.

Not sure that's true; interpretations must - at least - be consistent with the quantum formalism.

Evidence still needs to be interpreted; scientific inquiry doesn't just produce it with all of its ramifications attached, and once we're in the realm of interpretation, you can't suspend judgment on how to proceed pending more empirical information. You'd just end up with reams of data that mean absolutely nothing.

Seems to me that quantum mechanics gives the lie to this. We're still in the realm of interpretation, suspending judgement on which interpretation is most appropriate, yet we have reams of useful and productive data, because we have a mathematical model that works.

Should we approach the whole notion of moral propositions with skepticism and question whether "genocide is bad" is a meaningful statement at all? Should we delay investigation of moral reasoning pending some consensus on what the objective of ethics is at all and whether "well-being" can be empirically demonstrated to be important?

In principle, yes. In practice, broad consensus has been reached on the fundamentals, pace cultural differences, fine details and fuzzy edges. The difficulties are generally in judgement and interpretation - as the old saw has it, "One man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter"; we should be skeptical of moral propositions and claims. For example, we may all agree that it is morally wrong to intentionally kill innocent people, but what about foresight without intent (e.g. the possibility or certainty of 'collateral damage')? how do you define 'innocent' in a war? non-combatants? supply chains? weapons manufacturers? conscripts are combatants, however reluctant - are they innocent? etc. Equally, we should be skeptical of claims of moral responsibility (C.J.Whitman, the "Texas Tower Sniper" is a notable example) and moral rectitude or superiority (e.g. Mother Teresa).

Philippa Foot was a Neo-Aristotelian metaethicist, so we're already dealing with moral realism going into the Trolley Problems.

I'm not interested in Foot's philosophical position, just in what the Trolley Problems show - e.g. that our moral decision-making is not consistent or entirely rational.

--do we go with virtue ethics, utilitarianism, moral nihilism, or what? This is where you're going to run into trouble if you're suspending judgment.

I think you will run into trouble if you plump for any one moral philosophy, or apply any of them rigidly. Morality should be informed by justice and fairness.

 

[Michael]

Equally, we should be skeptical of claims of moral responsibility (C.J.Whitman, the "Texas Tower Sniper" is a notable example) and moral rectitude or superiority (e.g. Mother Teresa).

Did you really just question the motives of Mother Teresa? I'm not sure I follow that argument. Could you elaborate a bit?

 

[FrumiousBandersnatch]

Did you really just question the motives of Mother Teresa? I'm not sure I follow that argument. Could you elaborate a bit?

She wasn't the saint she was made out to be (wiki). If you Google M.T. exposed or M.T. fraud, etc., you'll find plenty of articles, many in reputable newspapers and magazines, from many different people, including those who saw her work in public and private.

 

[Silmarien]

Not really, such mental states are just the result of applying the intentional stance to goal-directed activity.

If intentionality is illusory, it seems to necessarily follow that rationality is as well. If rationality evolved from simpler instances of intentionality, and intentionality itself is folk psychology, then so is rationality. An evolutionarily advantageous falsehood, but a falsehood all the same. I am not sure why I should take it more seriously than materialists take consciousness--it seems equally ephemeral given the presuppositions involved.

Also, please don't toss out Dennettian conjecture as if it were established scientific fact. It's interpretation. You don't get to criticize Christians for not qualifying every post with "if Christianity is true," as you did here, and then do the same exact thing yourself with your own preferred metaphysics.

Not sure that's true; interpretations must - at least - be consistent with the quantum formalism.

Aristotelian interpretations appear pretty consistent. You can get some Vedanta flavored approaches as well, though I'm not sure how strong they really are.

Seems to me that quantum mechanics gives the lie to this. We're still in the realm of interpretation, suspending judgement on which interpretation is most appropriate, yet we have reams of useful and productive data, because we have a mathematical model that works.

Useful and productive how? For technological advancement or for providing a genuine picture of reality? Given your focus on modeling, we may be talking about different things entirely. I don't see how reams of uninterpreted data can give us actual knowledge, but they can certainly be put to practical use.

I think you will run into trouble if you plump for any one moral philosophy, or apply any of them rigidly. Morality should be informed by justice and fairness.

And that is a metaethical stance, which was my point exactly. Should I suspend judgment over whether that is a better approach than Friedrich Nietzsche's? (And I am a former Nietzschean, so I mean this seriously. If naturalism is true, then traditional morality looks suspiciously like a matter of the weak taking advantage of herd mentality to muzzle the strong.)

 

[Michael]

She wasn't the saint she was made out to be (wiki). If you Google M.T. exposed or M.T. fraud, etc., you'll find plenty of articles, many in reputable newspapers and magazines, from many different people, including those who saw her work in public and private.

I've never met a Pope, nor the Dalai Lama but I was fortunate enough to meet and spend a few hours with Mother Teresa when I was in Mexico helping on a Habitat for Humanity project back in the late 80's. I listened to her give a speech at one of the poorest communities in Tijuana, and then I got to spend about a hour chatting with her in private with some other friends. I've never met a more loving, selfless, humble, grounded or down to Earth human being in my life. It's seems like no matter what one does with their life, there's always someone who wants to tear them down. It's just sad IMO.

 

[FrumiousBandersnatch]

If intentionality is illusory, it seems to necessarily follow that rationality is as well. If rationality evolved from simpler instances of intentionality, and intentionality itself is folk psychology, then so is rationality. An evolutionarily advantageous falsehood, but a falsehood all the same.

They're behavioural abstractions, names we give to ways of doing things. I wouldn't call them illusory, although our subjective experience of them may be misleading.

I am not sure why I should take it more seriously than materialists take consciousness--it seems equally ephemeral given the presuppositions involved.

There's no obligation.

Also, please don't toss out Dennettian conjecture as if it were established scientific fact. It's interpretation.

It was my own conjecture, using a Dennettian term; it's obviously not scientific fact, established or otherwise.

Useful and productive how? For technological advancement or for providing a genuine picture of reality? Given your focus on modeling, we may be talking about different things entirely. I don't see how reams of uninterpreted data can give us actual knowledge, but they can certainly be put to practical use.

Useful and productive in providing a predictive model of the world that has practical (e.g. technological) application.

And that is a metaethical stance, which was my point exactly. Should I suspend judgment over whether that is a better approach than Friedrich Nietzsche's? (And I am a former Nietzschean, so I mean this seriously. If naturalism is true, then traditional morality looks suspiciously like a matter of the weak taking advantage of herd mentality to muzzle the strong.)

As a former Nietzschean, you've already made a judgement.

 

[Silmarien]

As a former Nietzschean, you've already made a judgement.

Yes... one that involved converting to Christianity. Nietzsche's critique of Christian morality obviously fails if Christianity is true. This was not a decision grounded in empirical reasoning.

From a non-theistic perspective, the question remains: who is a better representative of humanity at its "greatest," Alexander the Great or Siddhārtha Gautama?

 

[FrumiousBandersnatch]

... the question remains: who is a better representative of humanity at its "greatest," Alexander the Great or Siddhārtha Gautama?

Seriously? For 8-10 year-olds, maybe.

Or is that an ironic comment on the triumph of knowledge over understanding?

 

[Silmarien]

Seriously? For 8-10 year-olds, maybe.

Or is that an ironic comment on the triumph of knowledge over understanding?

No, I just think that given his starting point, Nietzsche is probably right.

 

[FrumiousBandersnatch]

No, I just think that given his starting point, Nietzsche is probably right.

Perhaps, but there's more than one way to skin a cat; whether a strategy is successful or not depends on both the context (environment) and the criteria for success, and both may change.

 

[bhsmte]

Yes... one that involved converting to Christianity. Nietzsche's critique of Christian morality obviously fails if Christianity is true. This was not a decision grounded in empirical reasoning.

From a non-theistic perspective, the question remains: who is a better representative of humanity at its "greatest," Alexander the Great or Siddhārtha Gautama?

Ok, so how do we test whether Christianity is true?

 

[Silmarien]

Ok, so how do we test whether Christianity is true?

Only the historical aspects are "testable" in anything resembling an empirical sense. So you start with biblical scholarship and a study of comparative religion and mythology. Christianity is pretty unique as far as its origins are concerned, and we do know a good amount about when and how the movement got started. Historically speaking, it does have more going for it than any other religion, and the fact that it wasn't founded on the blood of its political opponents is an additional point in its favor.

Then you need to trace its development, particularly over the first 400 years or so of its existence, to make sure the early Christians didn't go off the rails completely with their theology. The more you know about the history of Christianity, the easier it is to identify the cultural influences that have shaped it over the centuries, in some cases making it look completely incomprehensible. I very much don't agree with infallibility of church teachings--religion is an institution and should be treated as such.

 

[bhsmte]

Only the historical aspects are "testable" in anything resembling an empirical sense. So you start with biblical scholarship and a study of comparative religion and mythology. Christianity is pretty unique as far as its origins are concerned, and we do know a good amount about when and how the movement got started. Historically speaking, it does have more going for it than any other religion, and the fact that it wasn't founded on the blood of its political opponents is an additional point in its favor.

Then you need to trace its development, particularly over the first 400 years or so of its existence, to make sure the early Christians didn't go off the rails completely with their theology. The more you know about the history of Christianity, the easier it is to identify the cultural influences that have shaped it over the centuries, in some cases making it look completely incomprehensible. I very much don't agree with infallibility of church teachings--religion is an institution and should be treated as such.

Yes, I have done a lot of studying the historicity of the NT. It is not the sole reason, but one of the reasons why I eventually moved away from Christianity and simply couldn't reconcile the basic Christian theology (claims), with reality any longer.

I find it very interesting, to read a wide variety of NT historians and scholars and see who plays fast and loose with the historical method and who adheres more closely to it.

 

[Silmarien]

Yes, I have done a lot of studying the historicity of the NT. It is not the sole reason, but one of the reasons why I eventually moved away from Christianity and simply couldn't reconcile the basic Christian theology (claims), with reality any longer.

Well, much of what we consider basic theology in the West doesn't go back further than the 16th century, if even. I don't find the Gospels difficult at all to reconcile with reality as long as you treat them like oral history and not an inerrant account of events handed down directly by God. Granted, many denominations don't approve of that approach.

I find it very interesting, to read a wide variety of NT historians and scholars and see who plays fast and loose with the historical method and who adheres more closely to it.

Yes, the amount of bias that comes up in biblical scholarship is outrageous. On both sides--someone with an anti-religious agenda is as likely to be sloppy as an inerrantist.

 

[GrowingSmaller]

I like to base some decisions on intuition and feeling. I think theism, whatever its truth, helps enable psychic powers in the sense that skeptical rationalism by comparison is dry and cold, and misses a lot of the subtleties in life.

A non natural view of self as ensouled, and a non natural cosmology with a "link" to God, actually sensitises our intuitive (i.e. to know without conscious reasoning) faculties. This is because a soul/breath perspective focuses attention on affective aspects of psyche, as well as theism psychologically priming us to have a "summum bonum" (highest good) in our cognitive world.

If you want proof, what about subliminal consciousness , or subconscious process - would this influence us better via tough-minded evidence based skepticism or rather through intuitions? I personally believe intuitions are there for a reason, just as are our rational and conceptual faculties too. And if I can be primed by secular media, why not religious texts too?

 

[bhsmte]

Well, much of what we consider basic theology in the West doesn't go back further than the 16th century, if even. I don't find the Gospels difficult at all to reconcile with reality as long as you treat them like oral history and not an inerrant account of events handed down directly by God. Granted, many denominations don't approve of that approach.



Yes, the amount of bias that comes up in biblical scholarship is outrageous. On both sides--someone with an anti-religious agenda is as likely to be sloppy as an inerrantist.

IMO, if people are motivated to learn, it would benefit them to understand the historical method and how it was intended to be applied.

In my reaearch, i found many more christian scholars/historians playing fast and loose with the method, compared to non theist scholars.