Every Frankfurt case involves a device
that is never used ← this is the important bit
Consequently:
- the behaviour of the subject is totally determined (because the presence of the device rules out alternative futures)
- the subject exercises free will (he does exactly what he wants to, without anything interfering with his choice, because the device is never used)
"Frankfurt's basic claim is as follows:
"The principle of alternate possibilities is false. A person may well be morally responsible for what he has done even though he could not have done otherwise. The principle's plausibility is an
illusion, which can be made to vanish by bringing the relevant moral phenomena into sharper focus."
Frankfurt posits a counterfactual demon who can intervene in an agent's decisions if the agent is about to do something different from what the demon wants the agent to do. Frankfurt's demon will block any alternative possibilities, but leave the agent to "freely choose" to do the one possibility desired by the demon. Frankfurt claims the existence of the hypothetical control mechanisms blocking alternative possibilities are
irrelevant to the agent's free choice. This is true when the agent's choice agrees with the demon, but obviously false should the agent disagree. In that case, the demon would have to block the agent's will and the agent would surely notice.
(IRR) There may be circumstances that in no way bring it about that a person performs a certain action; nevertheless, those very circumstances make it impossible for him to avoid performing that action.
Compatibilists have long been bothered by alternative possibilities, apparently needed in order that agents "
could do otherwise." They knew that determinism allows only a single future, one actual causal chain of events. They were therefore delighted to get behind Frankfurt's examples as proofs that alternative possibilities, perhaps generated in part by random events, did not exist. Frankfurt argued for moral responsibility without libertarian free will.
Note, however, that Frankfurt assumes that genuine alternative possibilities
do exist. If not, there is nothing for his counterfactual intervening demon to block. Furthermore, without alternatives, Frankfurt would have to admit that there is only one "actual sequence" of events leading to one possible future. "Alternative sequences" would be ruled out. Since Frankfurt's demon, much like Laplace's demon, has no way of knowing the actual information about future events - such as agent's decisions - until that information comes into existence, such demons are not possible and Frankfurt-style thought experiments, entertaining as they are, can not establish the compatibilist version of free will."
Calvinism uses the Frankfurt Cases to support "Compatiblism", but Compatiblism is only needed with PAP, and with man having a true "free will".
But, as the article clearly states, "Note, however, that Frankfurt assumes that genuine alternative possibilities
do exist. If not, there is nothing for his counterfactual intervening demon to block. Furthermore, without alternatives, Frankfurt would have to admit that there is only one "actual sequence" of events leading to one possible future".
