As promised, I am starting a new thread to hash out this non-sense about atheism being faith. I have my own reasons for posting this in Science instead of in Apologetics - but in addition to those, Lucaspa thinks that science is somehow intertwined with this issue. In a remote sense, it is. Part of what I hope to do here is to finally disentangle science from what is chiefly a philosophical debate.
First, Morat: HUGE thumbs up fo your last post in Do evolutionists silence the critics?! You have probably made my work here redundant. Still, I will have my own say in response to Lucaspa.
Second, Lucaspa: See above. If you haven't read Morat's last post there, please do so now!
Now, on to the debate:
On what basis? Is this an example of the pedantry that Morat complained about in his last post? Are you pretending that it must not be acceptable to put forth an hypothesis in hopes that it is true and to test it, in hopes that it may be found meritorious - simply because we are equally well allowed to dismiss it?
Science could not work if every hypothesis offerred carried an obligation to any other than its own proponents that it must be tested before dismissed. I have explained this before, but you disagree:
Now, when you provide a reference that clearly demonstrates "science's" opinion on this, I will possibly accept that "science" does not agree with me. Right now, it is obvious to me only that you disagree.
Indeed science is tentative. Indeed, I have heard that.
Indeed, its conclusions are not final.
One reason for this is truly that one (a finite number) of the infinite (a much larger number) of the possible hypotheses out there might better explain the data. Therefore, we must continue to do science: that is, we must continue to propose and test hypotheses from this loaded-dice search space, and me must constantly re-evalutate our theories with new data.
Still, you have not countered my argument. The argument is not that we are forbidden from working with unproven hypotheses: it is only that we are allowed to dismiss any that are untested unless we choose not to! The force of this statement becomes far more powerful when we begin discussing those hypotheses that are, in principle, unfalsifiable.
As you have mentioned, no test of an hypothesis carries any weight unless there is the possibility of falsifying that hypothesis. Since we will never be able to take a whole class of hypotheses to the scientific method for potential falsification, then we cannot do science with these hypotheses. They are worthless to science, and must be dismissed - out of hand. This is the view of methodological naturalism, and that is one of the cornerstones of science.
Philosophical naturalism (which generally can be divided into the different types of atheism) is merely the observation that it cannot demonstrated that we lose any valuable knowledge by extending the principles of science to the principles of knowledge, as a metaphysics or epistemology. It can only be demonstrated that it is conceivable that we could lose valuable knowledge by doing this. Since no metaphysics, and no epistemology can be shown to be more effective at maximizing our ability to accurately know, then philosophical naturalism is a perfectly good metaphysics for those of us without the desire for faith in things that are beyond empirical knowledge.
You have shown no grounds for this statement. You have not shown that by dismissing the undemonstrable, or even the undemonstrated, as we see fit, we stand to lose anything of value.
You seem to be horrified by the idea that we may dismiss a good hypothesis, merely because it is uncertain. The fact is, though, that we trade our uncertainty on an idea for uncertainty in our accepted theories. Instead of remaining obtusely agnostic on any given hypothesis (I remain agnostic on the matter of a Northern-dwelling magic elf), no matter how outlandish, we disbelieve them, and remain agnostic about our current understanding of the world. (I disbelieve in the existence of a Northern-dwelling magic elf, but I constantly re-evaluate my theories, and look for new data to improve them. If I am wrong in my disbelief in the Northern-dwelling magic elf, there is as good a chance that I will correct that mistake as that I will correct any other mistake).
.....On to the real meat of the matter.
Your biggest mistake, lucaspa, is this false dichotomy:
Cottage cheese is not faith - must it therefore be knowledge?
Atheism is not cottage cheese: it is disbelief. Disbelief (without cause to believe) is neither faith nor knowledge. We believe an hypothesis out of a sense of faith or out of a sense of knowledge. We disbelieve the same hypothesis because we lack either of the other two senses of it. We disbelieve because we have no knowledge of its truth, and because we also have no faith that it is true.
Agnosticism, is the position of great caution. Agnosticism would prefer to remain uncertain - neither believing or disbelieving - in spite of the lack of a compelling reason (either faith or knowledge) to believe. The outcome is that the agnostic can claim not to believe or disbelieve falsely (on questions of knowledge), but is left in the untenable position of having to remain "uncertain" of the existence of Northern-dwelling magic elves.
The biggest point here is that faith/knowledge is a false dichotomy. Other positions are available and tenable: disbelief is one, and is a matter of neither faith nor knowledge but instead their absence. Complete uncertainty is another option - the agnostic position - it is also the absence of faith or knowledge. So instead of the dichotomy faith vs knowledge (which is probably a true dichotomy where it concerns positive beliefs), you have a dichotomy of faith or knowledge on the one side and uncertainty or disbelief on the other.
When you consider where weak atheism belongs on this better dichotomy, you find that it obviously is neither faith nor knowledge (as it is not a positive belief), but it is disbelief.
Weak atheists prefer to hold their positive beliefs from a sense of knowledge, and their negative ones from a sense of disbelief.
I certainly hope this is clear now.
First, Morat: HUGE thumbs up fo your last post in Do evolutionists silence the critics?! You have probably made my work here redundant. Still, I will have my own say in response to Lucaspa.
Second, Lucaspa: See above. If you haven't read Morat's last post there, please do so now!
Now, on to the debate:
On what basis? Is this an example of the pedantry that Morat complained about in his last post? Are you pretending that it must not be acceptable to put forth an hypothesis in hopes that it is true and to test it, in hopes that it may be found meritorious - simply because we are equally well allowed to dismiss it?
Science could not work if every hypothesis offerred carried an obligation to any other than its own proponents that it must be tested before dismissed. I have explained this before, but you disagree:
Now, when you provide a reference that clearly demonstrates "science's" opinion on this, I will possibly accept that "science" does not agree with me. Right now, it is obvious to me only that you disagree.
Indeed science is tentative. Indeed, I have heard that.
Indeed, its conclusions are not final.
One reason for this is truly that one (a finite number) of the infinite (a much larger number) of the possible hypotheses out there might better explain the data. Therefore, we must continue to do science: that is, we must continue to propose and test hypotheses from this loaded-dice search space, and me must constantly re-evalutate our theories with new data.
Still, you have not countered my argument. The argument is not that we are forbidden from working with unproven hypotheses: it is only that we are allowed to dismiss any that are untested unless we choose not to! The force of this statement becomes far more powerful when we begin discussing those hypotheses that are, in principle, unfalsifiable.
As you have mentioned, no test of an hypothesis carries any weight unless there is the possibility of falsifying that hypothesis. Since we will never be able to take a whole class of hypotheses to the scientific method for potential falsification, then we cannot do science with these hypotheses. They are worthless to science, and must be dismissed - out of hand. This is the view of methodological naturalism, and that is one of the cornerstones of science.
Philosophical naturalism (which generally can be divided into the different types of atheism) is merely the observation that it cannot demonstrated that we lose any valuable knowledge by extending the principles of science to the principles of knowledge, as a metaphysics or epistemology. It can only be demonstrated that it is conceivable that we could lose valuable knowledge by doing this. Since no metaphysics, and no epistemology can be shown to be more effective at maximizing our ability to accurately know, then philosophical naturalism is a perfectly good metaphysics for those of us without the desire for faith in things that are beyond empirical knowledge.
You have shown no grounds for this statement. You have not shown that by dismissing the undemonstrable, or even the undemonstrated, as we see fit, we stand to lose anything of value.
You seem to be horrified by the idea that we may dismiss a good hypothesis, merely because it is uncertain. The fact is, though, that we trade our uncertainty on an idea for uncertainty in our accepted theories. Instead of remaining obtusely agnostic on any given hypothesis (I remain agnostic on the matter of a Northern-dwelling magic elf), no matter how outlandish, we disbelieve them, and remain agnostic about our current understanding of the world. (I disbelieve in the existence of a Northern-dwelling magic elf, but I constantly re-evaluate my theories, and look for new data to improve them. If I am wrong in my disbelief in the Northern-dwelling magic elf, there is as good a chance that I will correct that mistake as that I will correct any other mistake).
.....On to the real meat of the matter.
Your biggest mistake, lucaspa, is this false dichotomy:
Cottage cheese is not faith - must it therefore be knowledge?
Atheism is not cottage cheese: it is disbelief. Disbelief (without cause to believe) is neither faith nor knowledge. We believe an hypothesis out of a sense of faith or out of a sense of knowledge. We disbelieve the same hypothesis because we lack either of the other two senses of it. We disbelieve because we have no knowledge of its truth, and because we also have no faith that it is true.
Agnosticism, is the position of great caution. Agnosticism would prefer to remain uncertain - neither believing or disbelieving - in spite of the lack of a compelling reason (either faith or knowledge) to believe. The outcome is that the agnostic can claim not to believe or disbelieve falsely (on questions of knowledge), but is left in the untenable position of having to remain "uncertain" of the existence of Northern-dwelling magic elves.
The biggest point here is that faith/knowledge is a false dichotomy. Other positions are available and tenable: disbelief is one, and is a matter of neither faith nor knowledge but instead their absence. Complete uncertainty is another option - the agnostic position - it is also the absence of faith or knowledge. So instead of the dichotomy faith vs knowledge (which is probably a true dichotomy where it concerns positive beliefs), you have a dichotomy of faith or knowledge on the one side and uncertainty or disbelief on the other.
When you consider where weak atheism belongs on this better dichotomy, you find that it obviously is neither faith nor knowledge (as it is not a positive belief), but it is disbelief.
Weak atheists prefer to hold their positive beliefs from a sense of knowledge, and their negative ones from a sense of disbelief.
I certainly hope this is clear now.
It was your criteria. I'm stating the logical consequences of that criteria. You were stating that we couldn't put hypotheses forward without evidence. Well, since nearly all hypotheses are put forward without evidence, your criteria stopped science.
