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Primitive weapons used in the civil war
“Carried only bows and arrows, tomahawks, and war clubs”
-Confederate solider of native American allies quoted in James Robertson Tenting Tonight the Soldiers life Time-Life Books
The main cause of causalities in the war was not the rifled musket but disease. The civil war was the last major war where more died out of combat than in. During the civil war not everyone had a fully functional rifled musket. Many primitive and sub standard weapons were used. For a extreme example Pikes and Bowie knives were used early in the war, many times rocks were thrown when men ran out of ammo. As late as March 1862 lee approved 1,000 pikes be sent to Jackson in the valley. 700 union lancers were routed by Jeb Stuart during the peninsula campaign. Confederate forces in Missouri were forced to surrender after a skirmish with the more numerous Indians inflicting causalities with bow and arrows. A Texas regiment charged union lines in New Mexico armed only with spears. Arrows, war clubs and lances were used in fighting with Indians. The sword and bayonet still played a role in civil war casualties. Saber charges were made until the end of the war. Successful Calvary charges with swords even on entrenched infantry rifle pits positions, were successful even as late as march 1865 when the 17th Indiana did so with great success. At Brandy station “acres and acres” of Calvary clashed with sabers” the two most successful Calvary generals of the war Jeb Stuart and Nathan Bedford Forrest continually used the saber charge with success. Stuart saw the saber as the most important tool along with trust in God for southern victory.
“Your saber blows...have taught them again the weight of southern vengeance.... with a biding faith in the God of battles and a firm reliance on the saber, your success will continue.”
-General Jeb Stuart to his men following Brandy Station
Neither side could equip its army fully with the new refiled musket. The CSA started with only 10% equipped with the rifled muskets. In July 1861 Tennessee troops were armed 69% flintlock 20% smothbore 11% rifle. At Shiloh Alexander Stewards brigade had 53% smothbore and 103 flintlocks. The CSA army of Tennessee in august 1863 was equipped with 36% smotthbore and 12% substandard rifle musket. The same army in June 64 12% still had smothbore. The armies at times struggled to even arm their men. Many of John Bell Hoods men were still unarmed in 64. Jan 1864 Thomas Duckends Arkansas brigade “wholly unarmed.”. At Fredricksburg confederates captured union flintlocks after the battle. At Gettysburg the most advanced army in war, the north had over 10% of its regiments equipped with smothhbore, and many had sub par refiles as a solider of the 100th Indian stated his regiments imported Belgian rifle “I don't believe one could hit the broad side of a barn with them.” Soldiers would fire in two lines and union solider James Tinkham said “Our front rank who, were more afraid of them [second rank] than of the rebels.”
Rifle musket vs smothbore
“It might be more reasonable to talk of some minor improvements over Napoleonic performance”
-Paddy Griffith Battle tactics of the civil war Yale university press new haven and London 1989
The rifle musket had better specs than that of the smothbore especially in regards to range. Theoretically it was a Superior weapon, though in combat during the civil war, its advantages were often negated. The smothbore buck n shot within 100 yards was considered equal or better than mini ball within that range. The rifle was “Claimed not proven to be better aim” within the range of the smothbore. Some generals north and south refused to “upgrade” to the rifle musket from the smothbore. Individuals, entire regiments, and generals kept the smothbore over the rifle believing it to be a better weapon. In 1863 Elijah White's Virginian riders rejected the rifled muskets issued them in favor of their sabers refusing to carry guns preferring head long charges. It was not a universal opinion that the riffled musket performed better.
Combat ranges
"It is difficult to find any evidence at all to support the suggestion that Civil War musketry was delivered at ranges much longer than those of Napoleonic times...Civil War musketry did not ... possess the power to kill large numbers of men, even in very dense formations, at long range."
-Paddy Griffith Battle tactics of the civil war
The average combat range in Napoleonic wars using the smothbore was around 70-100. It was thought by many because the rifle has much greater range, the combat of the civil war must have been at far greater distances. However even in modern wars such as ww2, Korean and Vietnam [Slight less] all averaged small arms fire around 100 yards. The rifled muskets performance in battle, was not significant changed from the smothbore, neither were its ranges “Although the theoretical range of the rifled musket was several times that of a smothbore, much of the fighting nevertheless occurred at ranges equal to or only slightly more than that found during previous wars.” It was hard to see a man 200-500 yards off, even more so in the chaos, confusion and smoke filled civil war battles, plus a solider would have to work in the trajectory of the new rifled musket longer than 100 yards.
Various combat effects reduced the performance of the musket in civil war combat. Terrain ,smoke, visibility and stress reduce performance. The smoke alone on battlefield could hide large formations. A major reduction was lack of practice by the average solider and understanding of the muskets trajectory [see training]. So that what a solider could do in combat vs the specs of the musket, were far apart from each other. Most all casualties happened within 100 yards or less, some long range firing happened 200 yards plus, but often with little effect. Causalities were caused from 30-75 yards from musket fire in prolonged battles. Even than the loses were not always great, In a battle that lasted 4-5 hours at less than 100 yards, a union units total loses were just 50 wounded/killed.
Most commanders avoided indecisive long range firefights, they did not want to waste ammo and would only allow their soldiers to shoot at 150 yards or less, some would wait for 50-70 yards to first open fire, and on some occasions 30 paces. Only experts and trained shot would attempt over 150 yards such as snipers. The French following the Crimean war removed long range sights from their rifle musket seeing it largely as a waste of ammo. Only specialized, trained skirmish and sniping soldiers took advantage of the rifles increased range. As the war progressed after years of high causalities and drop in motivation made longer ranges more often, and soldiers less likely to assault.
Civil War battle ranges Initial contact
This is were the first shots were fired, often the combat would end up 30-70 yards as one side advanced or charged.
Mark Grimsley calculated a average range for the entire war of 116 yards, he said smothbore was 80-100.
Brent Nosworthy said “critical engagement” 80-120 yards.
Earl Hess calculated for the entire war only 94 yards
Griffith calculated
At seven pines avg 68 yards only one reference to 200 yds [ that closed to 30 yards]
61-62 a average of 104 yards
63 a average of 127 yards
64-65 average 141 yards [ only half above 100 yards]
Overall for the war In the east 136 yards Overall for the west 100 yards [ Griffith said the heavy Forrest terrain reduced western ranges]“Decisive moment” was only 33 yards
Rate of fire /Fire effectiveness/ Civil war tactics
Fire effectiveness
The rifle performed very similar to the smothbore in its effectiveness in battle. Americans were viewed as generally good shooters at the time compared to Europeans. Napoleonic rates of shots fired to casualty was around .5 to .6%. Americans using the same weapons [smothbore] in mexican war caused a causality at a rate of .8%. The civil war ratio of small arms shots fired to causality was .68 to 1.5%, about 1 causality for every 100 shots fired. At Gettysburg an average of 200 rounds were fired for one casualty, that is equal to Napoleonic times. Historians such as Allen C Guelzo calculated even lower numbers of 1 casualty for every 250-300 shots fired.
Rate of fire
The civil war musket could be loaded in practice in about 30 seconds by most well drilled soldiers. But just as with accuracy and range, in combat was not as impressive. There were 17 movements needed in the manual to load a musket properly to fire. Doing this with the noise, confusion, fear and other distractions of battle was no easy thing. In the heat of battle soldiers loaded their musket multiple times yet without firing a single shot. One gun was found loaded 23 times at Gettysburg. Other mishaps such as unopened cartage, ball behind powder etc were common and lead to misfires. Of the 24,000 muskets at Gettysburg retrieved by the north, half had 2 rounds and 20% 3 or more rounds loaded one had 20. 10% of muskets became unsuitable in combat. Misfires could be as high as 25%.
Commanders would conserve ammo in case of a charge from the enemy and fear of losing their ground. Units only brought enough ammo to last 30 min if they were to reload every 30 seconds. So while waiting for ammo, they would conserve it and slow the rate of fire. The rate of fire for entire units averaged 1 round per 2.1 min [included some breach loaders]. The slowest rate recorded was 1 shot fired every 4.6 min, the fastest recorded was 1 shot every 30 sec. Breach loaders averaged 1 shot every 12 seconds. Often faulty weapons, and lack of ammo had much to do with this.
Civil war Tactics
Many believe that the weapons of the civil war [The rifled musket] was a great improvement over the smothbore and this led the older Napoleonic linear tactics outdated and the reason for high causalities and the eventual entrenchments of late 64 and 65. That the generals of the civil war were slow to change the old ways and used outdated tactics. This is rejected now by many historians. The only aspect where the rifled musket changed civil war tactics was in sniping and skirmishing, the only places that the new musket was able to realize its full advantages. These changes happened early in the war on both sides, both sides were fast to change tactics when the rifled musket changed warfare. The generals who were in the battles, trained with the weapons and saw the results, also were in the best position to determine the correct tactics. They chose Linear Napoleonic tactics.
“From the American Revolution to the Mexican war, frontal attacks against prepared defenders were bloody affairs. This was largely true independent of the weapon, whether flintlock musket or percussion rifle. Tactics in the civil war were largely unchanged from the pattern for the preceding fifty years....the basic formation remained close files with lines close behind. There was simply no other way for the captain or colonel to control his troops in action...Dupuy recognized the continuous use of linear tactics throughout the 19th century in Europe and the United States. Even at the end of the Franco-Prussian War, the linear tactics of Gustavas Adolphus were still in vogue, for commanders still had no other way to exercise control.
-Michael Collie was the civil war modern-no
Many now believe the rifled musket was not a vast improvement in combat over the smothbore and that is the reason the Napoleonic tactics were still used, still effective, and the best tactics to win the engagement. Historian Allen C Guelzo argues The gunpowder of the time produced a great deal of smoke when fired. battles began with artillery firing for some time, and skirmishers had been firing at each other for some time. By the time the main lines of infantry began approaching each other, visibility was significantly obscured. Once the infantry began the main engagement, visibility quickly was reduced to almost nil. One solider from the 1st Minnesota wrote home the smoke “did not permit us to see anything clearly... we directed our fire at red flashes through the smoke.” Another solider said “The atmosphere was black with the smoke of battle...there was scarcely telling friend from foes.” Lack of viability due to terrain and smoke often causes friendly fire.
“The dust and smoke from the guns made it almost impossible to distinguish friend from foe.”
-Confederate Private Hopkins of Stuarts Calvary
“Once the battle was joined, the fighting became chaotic. Amid thick smoke, the crash of musketry and cannon fire, the shouts and screams of the fighting and dying, a solider knew little of what was happening except for what he saw directly ahead of him.”
-James Robertson Tenting Tonight The Soldiers Life
“A thick white cloud of battle smoke hung pall-like over the fields.... the smoke was so thick and dense...it was impossible to discern anything 50 paces away, and at midday the smoke was so thick overhead that I could just make out the sun, and it looked like a vast bull of red fire.”
-Neese horse artillery Stuarts corps battle of the wilderness 1864
With the lack of visibility, only massed infantry fire was effective, and this reality is reflected in the tactics of the time. Guelzo argues that rifling only truly benefited the sharpshooters on the skirmish line, who fought before their visibility was obscured, but the main line of infantry could not take advantage of the benefits of rifling. Under the stress of battle, virtually every infantryman asked about aiming on the battlefield replied that in practice, the best one could do was "simply raise his rifle to the horizontal, and fire without aiming." Eyewitnesses report entire companies aiming their rifles at a 45 degree angle facing the sky and discharging their rifles at Bull Run. Such untrained soldiers could not be expected to engage an enemy much further than point blank range with any level of accuracy. Thus Guelzo doubts that contemporary military leaders blatantly ignored technological advances. Rather, generals did not alter their tactics not due to ignorance, but because the battlefield had not changed substantially from the Napoleonic era.
“Spreading soldiers out took away their main tactical advantage, their ability to concentrate their firepower. A single individual with a musket was irrelevant....close tactical formations were the only way that officers could control and move men around a battlefield”
-S.C Gwynne Rebel Yell The Violence, Passion and Redemption of Stonewall Jackson Simon and Schuster 2014
What other tactics could be used? Snipers and skirmishers were “brushed off” the battle once the main lines came into play. Any unit alone would be overwhelmed by firepower and if not connected in a line or had its flanks unprotected would than be flanked by devastating fire. Skirmishers could not be counted on to take and capture and hold strategic sites. Sending multiple small units in various directions would just lead to defender getting first volley and causing high causalities and a retreat. You had to mass men in large numbers in a attack to withstand volleys from the defender and counter with high concentrated fire. Or to keep up the pressure until the enemy gave way or out of ammo. Even when in a solid formation Individual fire was ineffective against solid lines of advancing enemy it was also more inaccurate. “Volley fire was always more accurate than individual fire because it was supervised” Individual fire just pecked at the enemy formation but volleys had the power to cause panic and crush the morale of the enemy, causing a retreat.
“Carried only bows and arrows, tomahawks, and war clubs”
-Confederate solider of native American allies quoted in James Robertson Tenting Tonight the Soldiers life Time-Life Books
The main cause of causalities in the war was not the rifled musket but disease. The civil war was the last major war where more died out of combat than in. During the civil war not everyone had a fully functional rifled musket. Many primitive and sub standard weapons were used. For a extreme example Pikes and Bowie knives were used early in the war, many times rocks were thrown when men ran out of ammo. As late as March 1862 lee approved 1,000 pikes be sent to Jackson in the valley. 700 union lancers were routed by Jeb Stuart during the peninsula campaign. Confederate forces in Missouri were forced to surrender after a skirmish with the more numerous Indians inflicting causalities with bow and arrows. A Texas regiment charged union lines in New Mexico armed only with spears. Arrows, war clubs and lances were used in fighting with Indians. The sword and bayonet still played a role in civil war casualties. Saber charges were made until the end of the war. Successful Calvary charges with swords even on entrenched infantry rifle pits positions, were successful even as late as march 1865 when the 17th Indiana did so with great success. At Brandy station “acres and acres” of Calvary clashed with sabers” the two most successful Calvary generals of the war Jeb Stuart and Nathan Bedford Forrest continually used the saber charge with success. Stuart saw the saber as the most important tool along with trust in God for southern victory.
“Your saber blows...have taught them again the weight of southern vengeance.... with a biding faith in the God of battles and a firm reliance on the saber, your success will continue.”
-General Jeb Stuart to his men following Brandy Station
Neither side could equip its army fully with the new refiled musket. The CSA started with only 10% equipped with the rifled muskets. In July 1861 Tennessee troops were armed 69% flintlock 20% smothbore 11% rifle. At Shiloh Alexander Stewards brigade had 53% smothbore and 103 flintlocks. The CSA army of Tennessee in august 1863 was equipped with 36% smotthbore and 12% substandard rifle musket. The same army in June 64 12% still had smothbore. The armies at times struggled to even arm their men. Many of John Bell Hoods men were still unarmed in 64. Jan 1864 Thomas Duckends Arkansas brigade “wholly unarmed.”. At Fredricksburg confederates captured union flintlocks after the battle. At Gettysburg the most advanced army in war, the north had over 10% of its regiments equipped with smothhbore, and many had sub par refiles as a solider of the 100th Indian stated his regiments imported Belgian rifle “I don't believe one could hit the broad side of a barn with them.” Soldiers would fire in two lines and union solider James Tinkham said “Our front rank who, were more afraid of them [second rank] than of the rebels.”
Rifle musket vs smothbore
“It might be more reasonable to talk of some minor improvements over Napoleonic performance”
-Paddy Griffith Battle tactics of the civil war Yale university press new haven and London 1989
The rifle musket had better specs than that of the smothbore especially in regards to range. Theoretically it was a Superior weapon, though in combat during the civil war, its advantages were often negated. The smothbore buck n shot within 100 yards was considered equal or better than mini ball within that range. The rifle was “Claimed not proven to be better aim” within the range of the smothbore. Some generals north and south refused to “upgrade” to the rifle musket from the smothbore. Individuals, entire regiments, and generals kept the smothbore over the rifle believing it to be a better weapon. In 1863 Elijah White's Virginian riders rejected the rifled muskets issued them in favor of their sabers refusing to carry guns preferring head long charges. It was not a universal opinion that the riffled musket performed better.
Combat ranges
"It is difficult to find any evidence at all to support the suggestion that Civil War musketry was delivered at ranges much longer than those of Napoleonic times...Civil War musketry did not ... possess the power to kill large numbers of men, even in very dense formations, at long range."
-Paddy Griffith Battle tactics of the civil war
The average combat range in Napoleonic wars using the smothbore was around 70-100. It was thought by many because the rifle has much greater range, the combat of the civil war must have been at far greater distances. However even in modern wars such as ww2, Korean and Vietnam [Slight less] all averaged small arms fire around 100 yards. The rifled muskets performance in battle, was not significant changed from the smothbore, neither were its ranges “Although the theoretical range of the rifled musket was several times that of a smothbore, much of the fighting nevertheless occurred at ranges equal to or only slightly more than that found during previous wars.” It was hard to see a man 200-500 yards off, even more so in the chaos, confusion and smoke filled civil war battles, plus a solider would have to work in the trajectory of the new rifled musket longer than 100 yards.
Various combat effects reduced the performance of the musket in civil war combat. Terrain ,smoke, visibility and stress reduce performance. The smoke alone on battlefield could hide large formations. A major reduction was lack of practice by the average solider and understanding of the muskets trajectory [see training]. So that what a solider could do in combat vs the specs of the musket, were far apart from each other. Most all casualties happened within 100 yards or less, some long range firing happened 200 yards plus, but often with little effect. Causalities were caused from 30-75 yards from musket fire in prolonged battles. Even than the loses were not always great, In a battle that lasted 4-5 hours at less than 100 yards, a union units total loses were just 50 wounded/killed.
Most commanders avoided indecisive long range firefights, they did not want to waste ammo and would only allow their soldiers to shoot at 150 yards or less, some would wait for 50-70 yards to first open fire, and on some occasions 30 paces. Only experts and trained shot would attempt over 150 yards such as snipers. The French following the Crimean war removed long range sights from their rifle musket seeing it largely as a waste of ammo. Only specialized, trained skirmish and sniping soldiers took advantage of the rifles increased range. As the war progressed after years of high causalities and drop in motivation made longer ranges more often, and soldiers less likely to assault.
Civil War battle ranges Initial contact
This is were the first shots were fired, often the combat would end up 30-70 yards as one side advanced or charged.
Mark Grimsley calculated a average range for the entire war of 116 yards, he said smothbore was 80-100.
Brent Nosworthy said “critical engagement” 80-120 yards.
Earl Hess calculated for the entire war only 94 yards
Griffith calculated
At seven pines avg 68 yards only one reference to 200 yds [ that closed to 30 yards]
61-62 a average of 104 yards
63 a average of 127 yards
64-65 average 141 yards [ only half above 100 yards]
Overall for the war In the east 136 yards Overall for the west 100 yards [ Griffith said the heavy Forrest terrain reduced western ranges]“Decisive moment” was only 33 yards
Rate of fire /Fire effectiveness/ Civil war tactics
Fire effectiveness
The rifle performed very similar to the smothbore in its effectiveness in battle. Americans were viewed as generally good shooters at the time compared to Europeans. Napoleonic rates of shots fired to casualty was around .5 to .6%. Americans using the same weapons [smothbore] in mexican war caused a causality at a rate of .8%. The civil war ratio of small arms shots fired to causality was .68 to 1.5%, about 1 causality for every 100 shots fired. At Gettysburg an average of 200 rounds were fired for one casualty, that is equal to Napoleonic times. Historians such as Allen C Guelzo calculated even lower numbers of 1 casualty for every 250-300 shots fired.
Rate of fire
The civil war musket could be loaded in practice in about 30 seconds by most well drilled soldiers. But just as with accuracy and range, in combat was not as impressive. There were 17 movements needed in the manual to load a musket properly to fire. Doing this with the noise, confusion, fear and other distractions of battle was no easy thing. In the heat of battle soldiers loaded their musket multiple times yet without firing a single shot. One gun was found loaded 23 times at Gettysburg. Other mishaps such as unopened cartage, ball behind powder etc were common and lead to misfires. Of the 24,000 muskets at Gettysburg retrieved by the north, half had 2 rounds and 20% 3 or more rounds loaded one had 20. 10% of muskets became unsuitable in combat. Misfires could be as high as 25%.
Commanders would conserve ammo in case of a charge from the enemy and fear of losing their ground. Units only brought enough ammo to last 30 min if they were to reload every 30 seconds. So while waiting for ammo, they would conserve it and slow the rate of fire. The rate of fire for entire units averaged 1 round per 2.1 min [included some breach loaders]. The slowest rate recorded was 1 shot fired every 4.6 min, the fastest recorded was 1 shot every 30 sec. Breach loaders averaged 1 shot every 12 seconds. Often faulty weapons, and lack of ammo had much to do with this.
Civil war Tactics
Many believe that the weapons of the civil war [The rifled musket] was a great improvement over the smothbore and this led the older Napoleonic linear tactics outdated and the reason for high causalities and the eventual entrenchments of late 64 and 65. That the generals of the civil war were slow to change the old ways and used outdated tactics. This is rejected now by many historians. The only aspect where the rifled musket changed civil war tactics was in sniping and skirmishing, the only places that the new musket was able to realize its full advantages. These changes happened early in the war on both sides, both sides were fast to change tactics when the rifled musket changed warfare. The generals who were in the battles, trained with the weapons and saw the results, also were in the best position to determine the correct tactics. They chose Linear Napoleonic tactics.
“From the American Revolution to the Mexican war, frontal attacks against prepared defenders were bloody affairs. This was largely true independent of the weapon, whether flintlock musket or percussion rifle. Tactics in the civil war were largely unchanged from the pattern for the preceding fifty years....the basic formation remained close files with lines close behind. There was simply no other way for the captain or colonel to control his troops in action...Dupuy recognized the continuous use of linear tactics throughout the 19th century in Europe and the United States. Even at the end of the Franco-Prussian War, the linear tactics of Gustavas Adolphus were still in vogue, for commanders still had no other way to exercise control.
-Michael Collie was the civil war modern-no
Many now believe the rifled musket was not a vast improvement in combat over the smothbore and that is the reason the Napoleonic tactics were still used, still effective, and the best tactics to win the engagement. Historian Allen C Guelzo argues The gunpowder of the time produced a great deal of smoke when fired. battles began with artillery firing for some time, and skirmishers had been firing at each other for some time. By the time the main lines of infantry began approaching each other, visibility was significantly obscured. Once the infantry began the main engagement, visibility quickly was reduced to almost nil. One solider from the 1st Minnesota wrote home the smoke “did not permit us to see anything clearly... we directed our fire at red flashes through the smoke.” Another solider said “The atmosphere was black with the smoke of battle...there was scarcely telling friend from foes.” Lack of viability due to terrain and smoke often causes friendly fire.
“The dust and smoke from the guns made it almost impossible to distinguish friend from foe.”
-Confederate Private Hopkins of Stuarts Calvary
“Once the battle was joined, the fighting became chaotic. Amid thick smoke, the crash of musketry and cannon fire, the shouts and screams of the fighting and dying, a solider knew little of what was happening except for what he saw directly ahead of him.”
-James Robertson Tenting Tonight The Soldiers Life
“A thick white cloud of battle smoke hung pall-like over the fields.... the smoke was so thick and dense...it was impossible to discern anything 50 paces away, and at midday the smoke was so thick overhead that I could just make out the sun, and it looked like a vast bull of red fire.”
-Neese horse artillery Stuarts corps battle of the wilderness 1864
With the lack of visibility, only massed infantry fire was effective, and this reality is reflected in the tactics of the time. Guelzo argues that rifling only truly benefited the sharpshooters on the skirmish line, who fought before their visibility was obscured, but the main line of infantry could not take advantage of the benefits of rifling. Under the stress of battle, virtually every infantryman asked about aiming on the battlefield replied that in practice, the best one could do was "simply raise his rifle to the horizontal, and fire without aiming." Eyewitnesses report entire companies aiming their rifles at a 45 degree angle facing the sky and discharging their rifles at Bull Run. Such untrained soldiers could not be expected to engage an enemy much further than point blank range with any level of accuracy. Thus Guelzo doubts that contemporary military leaders blatantly ignored technological advances. Rather, generals did not alter their tactics not due to ignorance, but because the battlefield had not changed substantially from the Napoleonic era.
“Spreading soldiers out took away their main tactical advantage, their ability to concentrate their firepower. A single individual with a musket was irrelevant....close tactical formations were the only way that officers could control and move men around a battlefield”
-S.C Gwynne Rebel Yell The Violence, Passion and Redemption of Stonewall Jackson Simon and Schuster 2014
What other tactics could be used? Snipers and skirmishers were “brushed off” the battle once the main lines came into play. Any unit alone would be overwhelmed by firepower and if not connected in a line or had its flanks unprotected would than be flanked by devastating fire. Skirmishers could not be counted on to take and capture and hold strategic sites. Sending multiple small units in various directions would just lead to defender getting first volley and causing high causalities and a retreat. You had to mass men in large numbers in a attack to withstand volleys from the defender and counter with high concentrated fire. Or to keep up the pressure until the enemy gave way or out of ammo. Even when in a solid formation Individual fire was ineffective against solid lines of advancing enemy it was also more inaccurate. “Volley fire was always more accurate than individual fire because it was supervised” Individual fire just pecked at the enemy formation but volleys had the power to cause panic and crush the morale of the enemy, causing a retreat.