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Alvin Plantinga's argument against evolutionary naturalism goes something like....
Evolutionary naturalism is the scientific theory that states humanity is the product of evolution that has occurred over billions of years with the main goal of survival and reproduction. There are several blind mechanisms within evolutionary naturalism that are meant to produce varying biological traits with no aim of their own. Natural selection 'selects' for favorable traits based on survival and reproduction, which enables "evolution". God is not present in this process. There is no direction or guide.
If evolutionary naturalism (further EM) is true, then our cognitive faculties will have resulted from blind mechanisms like random mutation with the primary goal of the survival of the individual. If this is true, then the probability our cognitive faculties are reliable would be low or inscrutable.
P(R/N&E) Probability of reliable cognitive faculties given naturalism & evolution = low or inscrutable
The conclusion is that N&E cannot be rationally accepted as you would have a defeater for your belief that your cognitive faculties are reliable, therefore, you have a defeater for believing N&E.
This is not an objection to the truth of N&E, but that someone cannot rationally affirm both N&E.
The response by Quinn & Popper is that the probability of P(R/N&E) would be high considering a species that produces false beliefs would lead to unfavorable behavior. This theory is based on the thought that belief and action are highly correlated and the result would be a natural selection for species with reliable cognitive faculties.
There are a number of possible ways our beliefs would originate on E&N (taken from Plantinga)
1) beliefs do not cause behavior (epiphenomenalism: the theory that a person is identified with their physical parts [i.e. you have no mind or soul independent from your body]). This means that your beliefs would be distinct and invisible to E&N as your beliefs would not cause your actions. The probability E&N has selected for true beliefs out of a larger amount of false beliefs would be low (i.e. it is more likely for you to believe one of the host of false beliefs rather than a true belief).
2) beliefs do indeed cause behavior, but only by virtue of their electro-chemical properties, not by virtue of their content (production of true beliefs low)
3) beliefs cause behavior by way of content but is maladaptive (production of true beliefs low)
4) the beliefs of creatures cause their behavior and are also adaptive (The Quinn & Popper response). What is the probability (on this possibility together with N&E) that their cognitive faculties are reliable?
"Not as high as you might think. Beliefs don't causally produce behavior by themselves; it is beliefs, desires, and other factors that do so together. Then the problem is that there will be any number of different patterns of belief and desire that would issue in the same action; and among those there will be many in which the beliefs are wildly false. Paul is a prehistoric hominid; the exigencies of survival call for him to display tiger avoidance behavior. There will be many behaviors that are appropriate: fleeing, for example, or climbing a steep rock face, or crawling into a hole too small to admit the tiger, or leaping into a handy lake. Pick any such appropriately specific behavior B. Paul engages in B, we think, because, sensible fellow that he is, he has an aversion to being eaten and believes that B is a good means of thwarting the tiger's intentions.
But clearly this avoidance behavior could result from a thousand other belief-desire combinations: indefinitely many other belief-desire systems fit B equally well. Perhaps Paul very much likes the idea of being eaten, but when he sees a tiger, always runs off looking for a better prospect, because he thinks it is unlikely that the tiger he sees will eat him. This will get his body parts in the right place so far as survival is concerned, without involving much by way of true belief. Or perhaps he thinks the tiger is a large, friendly, cuddly pussycat and wants to pet it; but he also believes that the best way to pet it is to run away from it. Or perhaps he confuses running towards it with running away from it, believing the action is really running away from it, that it is running towards it; or perhaps he thinks the tiger is a regularly reoccurring illusion, and hoping to keep his weight down, has formed the resolution to run a mile at top speed whenever presented with such an illusion; or perhaps he thinks he is about to take part in a 1600 meter race, wants to win, and believes the appearance of the tiger is the starting signal; or perhaps . . . . Clearly there are any number of belief-cum-desire systems that equally fit a given bit of behavior"
So if you believe N&E together than you have a defeater for R and, therefore, have a defeater for rationally accepting N&E.
Evolutionary naturalism is the scientific theory that states humanity is the product of evolution that has occurred over billions of years with the main goal of survival and reproduction. There are several blind mechanisms within evolutionary naturalism that are meant to produce varying biological traits with no aim of their own. Natural selection 'selects' for favorable traits based on survival and reproduction, which enables "evolution". God is not present in this process. There is no direction or guide.
If evolutionary naturalism (further EM) is true, then our cognitive faculties will have resulted from blind mechanisms like random mutation with the primary goal of the survival of the individual. If this is true, then the probability our cognitive faculties are reliable would be low or inscrutable.
P(R/N&E) Probability of reliable cognitive faculties given naturalism & evolution = low or inscrutable
The conclusion is that N&E cannot be rationally accepted as you would have a defeater for your belief that your cognitive faculties are reliable, therefore, you have a defeater for believing N&E.
This is not an objection to the truth of N&E, but that someone cannot rationally affirm both N&E.
The response by Quinn & Popper is that the probability of P(R/N&E) would be high considering a species that produces false beliefs would lead to unfavorable behavior. This theory is based on the thought that belief and action are highly correlated and the result would be a natural selection for species with reliable cognitive faculties.
There are a number of possible ways our beliefs would originate on E&N (taken from Plantinga)
1) beliefs do not cause behavior (epiphenomenalism: the theory that a person is identified with their physical parts [i.e. you have no mind or soul independent from your body]). This means that your beliefs would be distinct and invisible to E&N as your beliefs would not cause your actions. The probability E&N has selected for true beliefs out of a larger amount of false beliefs would be low (i.e. it is more likely for you to believe one of the host of false beliefs rather than a true belief).
2) beliefs do indeed cause behavior, but only by virtue of their electro-chemical properties, not by virtue of their content (production of true beliefs low)
3) beliefs cause behavior by way of content but is maladaptive (production of true beliefs low)
4) the beliefs of creatures cause their behavior and are also adaptive (The Quinn & Popper response). What is the probability (on this possibility together with N&E) that their cognitive faculties are reliable?
"Not as high as you might think. Beliefs don't causally produce behavior by themselves; it is beliefs, desires, and other factors that do so together. Then the problem is that there will be any number of different patterns of belief and desire that would issue in the same action; and among those there will be many in which the beliefs are wildly false. Paul is a prehistoric hominid; the exigencies of survival call for him to display tiger avoidance behavior. There will be many behaviors that are appropriate: fleeing, for example, or climbing a steep rock face, or crawling into a hole too small to admit the tiger, or leaping into a handy lake. Pick any such appropriately specific behavior B. Paul engages in B, we think, because, sensible fellow that he is, he has an aversion to being eaten and believes that B is a good means of thwarting the tiger's intentions.
But clearly this avoidance behavior could result from a thousand other belief-desire combinations: indefinitely many other belief-desire systems fit B equally well. Perhaps Paul very much likes the idea of being eaten, but when he sees a tiger, always runs off looking for a better prospect, because he thinks it is unlikely that the tiger he sees will eat him. This will get his body parts in the right place so far as survival is concerned, without involving much by way of true belief. Or perhaps he thinks the tiger is a large, friendly, cuddly pussycat and wants to pet it; but he also believes that the best way to pet it is to run away from it. Or perhaps he confuses running towards it with running away from it, believing the action is really running away from it, that it is running towards it; or perhaps he thinks the tiger is a regularly reoccurring illusion, and hoping to keep his weight down, has formed the resolution to run a mile at top speed whenever presented with such an illusion; or perhaps he thinks he is about to take part in a 1600 meter race, wants to win, and believes the appearance of the tiger is the starting signal; or perhaps . . . . Clearly there are any number of belief-cum-desire systems that equally fit a given bit of behavior"
So if you believe N&E together than you have a defeater for R and, therefore, have a defeater for rationally accepting N&E.
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