The Paradoxical Lies within your Logic …

[2PhiloVoid]

Here I am, sinking again, and within, the paradoxical lies in my meaning and being. I'm in over my head, but at this depth, no one could have warned me that the semantics wouldn't work in my synthethesia. Yet, I think I like the view of what I'm hearing, and it's never, the less ...

Following the scent of Eubulides and following it through to Tarski ... I think I see, but you might think I'm lying. I am lying. Down.

***********************************************************************

Give me more thinking and clarity at its best, please. I'll even take a second order of that over my first order, thank you!


1) Titus 1:12 - One of them [Epimenides], a prophet of their own, said, “Cretans are always liars, evils beasts, lazy gluttons.” (see Epimenides paradox - Wikipedia)

2) Eubulides and his paradoxes

3) Truth? Truth – Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy

John 14:6 New International Version (NIV)
6 Jesus answered, “I am the way and the truth and the life. No one comes to the Father except through me.

************************************************************

NOTE: If after initially glancing at this strange OP and you don't find that it makes any sense, then that's great! Feel right at home! But, all you need to do, really, is read the article on "truth" above and note the various, competing notions as to what constitutes a 'valid' theory of truth. All semantics aside, the overall question here is: Which theory and understanding of "Truth" should we go with ultimately, especially when considering the Truth claims which any one person may make about the Bible and/or from personal Christian Experience?

 

[public hermit]

Is Tarski's theory of truth a correspondence theory or deflationary theory? And, more importantly, does it even matter?

 

[2PhiloVoid]

Is Tarski's theory of truth a correspondence theory or deflationary theory? And, more importantly, does it even matter?

Whatever are you... referring ... to, PH?

 

[Amittai]

I love the heavy metalanguage soundtrack.

I am not orthodox, I am not heterodox - I am paradox.

Under 2b, Black pointed out Brouwer has commented on inappropriate attempts to over-use the excluded middle. (Black was three quid in Oxfam.) Reputedly the equivalent in regard to non-contradiction is called dialetheism?

Incidentally the main example cited must be the verbal and/or formulaic equivalent of the Mobius Strip. It always did my head in if we produced one during the Christmas chain making.

 

[Amittai]

Life is like a Mobius Strip. We never know when we are on the Dark Side.

 

[2PhiloVoid]

I love the heavy metalanguage soundtrack.

I am not orthodox, I am not heterodox - I am paradox.

Under 2b, Black pointed out Brouwer has commented on inappropriate attempts to over-use the excluded middle. (Black was three quid in Oxfam.) Reputedly the equivalent in regard to non-contradiction is called dialetheism?

Incidentally the main example cited must be the verbal and/or formulaic equivalent of the Mobius Strip. It always did my head in if we produced one during the Christmas chain making.

I'm glad you find it interesting, Amittai, and I think that both you and I sympathize with the 'paradoxical' nature of our Christian faith, as well as with the strange referential dynamics we find involved in human language and meaning. Thanks for mentioning the Mobius Strip and dialetheism. I think these things have some relation to all that this thread could detour into and explore ...

 

[2PhiloVoid]

NOTE: If after initially glancing at the strange OP above and you don't find that it makes any sense, then that's great! Feel right at home! But, all you need to do, really, is read the article on "truth" (in the OP above) and note the various, competing notions as to what constitutes a 'valid' theory of truth. All semantics aside, the overall question here is: Which theory and understanding of "Truth" should we go with ultimately, especially when considering the Truth claims which any one person may make about the Bible and/or from personal Christian Experience?

 

[2PhiloVoid]

Is Tarski's theory of truth a correspondence theory or deflationary theory? And, more importantly, does it even matter?

It might matter. But then again, there is a difference in saying that "it does matter" versus the idea that "it could make a difference, for better or even for worse."

 

[public hermit]

I might matter. But then again, there is a difference in saying that "it does matter" versus the idea that "it could make a difference, for better or even for worse."

Personally, I think of truth as a matter of correspondence and coherence. I begin with the assumption that there is a reality independent of human understanding. Truth being a correspondence between human understanding and that reality. But, since we can't achieve some objective point of view separate from our own understanding, coherence aids the pursuit of truth. Even this approach has its issues, but I think it has been the norm, historically speaking.

Deflationary theories, to me, seem to do no more than observe that adding "It is true that..." to any assertion is redundant. The assertions "The cat is on the mat" and "It is true that the cat is on the mat" assert the exact same thing. That being said, the attempt to go further and argue that the very idea of truth is redundant is not one for which I would argue.

 

[public hermit]

I do wonder if the idea of truth would even arise if it were not for our experience of what is false (e.g. mistakes, lies, illusions, etc.). I don't see why it would.

 

[2PhiloVoid]

I do wonder if the idea of truth would even arise if it were not for our experience of what is false (e.g. mistakes, lies, illusions, etc.). I don't see why it would.

How about adding to your list things like: obfuscation, sophistry, polemics, propaganda...and other distortions of human language which purport to be of 'truthful' quality but yet give us less than the full picture of the reality to which they're claimed to Correspond to?

Would the realization that statements aren't always either fully true or false, nor exhaustive or comprehensive in connotation, let alone denotation, impel some people to want to discern better the different between....truth and error? I'm just wondering. There might even be additional reasons. What do you think about that, PH?

 

[public hermit]

How about adding to your list things like: obfuscation, sophistry, polemics, propaganda...and other distortions of human language which purport to be of 'truthful' quality but yet give us less than the full picture of the reality to which they're claimed to Correspond to?

Would the realization that statements aren't always either fully true or false, nor exhaustive or comprehensive in connotation, let alone denotation, impel some people to want to discern better the different between....truth and error? I'm just wondering. There might even be additional reasons. What do you think about that, PH?

Yes, I agree. I took my statement to be trivial. Obviously, if we didn't experience falsehood via those various ways then truth wouldn't be an issue. Intentional lies, obfuscation, etc. to the side, our limitations would expose the need for the pursuit of truth. But, would it have been a different pursuit had it not been for those intentional means of falsehood? For some reason I want to think so, but not sure why.

 

[2PhiloVoid]

Yes, I agree. I took my statement to be trivial. Obviously, if we didn't experience falsehood via those various ways then truth wouldn't be an issue. Intentional lies, obfuscation, etc. to the side, our limitations would expose the need for the pursuit of truth. But, would it have been a different pursuit had it not been for those intentional means of falsehood? For some reason I want to think so, but not sure why.

Have you ever come across someone in your reading, of a philosopher or a theologian, or of a scientist or a logician, who has stated that he/she can readily think of certain reasons 'why' he/she thinks the pursuit of truth comes to people from some certain impetus (or some confluence of factors)?

 

[public hermit]

Have you ever come across someone in your reading, of a philosopher or a theologian, or of a scientist or a logician, who has stated that he/she can readily think of certain reasons 'why' he/she thinks the pursuit of truth comes to people from some certain impetus (or some confluence of factors)?

Interesting question. Nothing immediately comes to mind. The pursuit of truth is often assumed as a given. Who sets out to discover a lie? Other than various theories of what truth is or how to pursue it, it seems obvious that what humans want is truth. But, it's still an interesting question.

Variations on Descartes' decieving diety are interesting, in this regard. Assuming a decieving diety created a world where all that we believe is real is, in fact, illusory it wouldn't change things all that much so long as such a world "worked." A working world that was an illusion would be practically indistinguishable from a similar world where representations correspond to an independent reality. This tells me that the impetus towards truth acquisition is about more than just mere correspondence. It is also a matter of function and fit. It's pragmatic in that truth allows us to function in an appropriate way within reality. When we don't succeed (believe what is false), we often know it, haha.Every time I misjudge a step, nearly twisting my ankle, I'm reminded that my perception of reality doesn't always correspond with the facts.

All that to say, pragmatic approaches to truth, even religious truth, have significant value. Why pursue truth? It makes life possible.

 

[2PhiloVoid]

Interesting question. Nothing immediately comes to mind. The pursuit of truth is often assumed as a given. Who sets out to discover a lie? Other than various theories of what truth is or how to pursue it, it seems obvious that what humans want is truth. But, it's still an interesting question.

That's a good point. The pursuit of truth is often assumed to be a given aspect of human thought and life. But despite the fact that a large number of people say they're 'interested' in something called truth, or in some specific kind of truth, I'm thinking a possible fact remains: that none of us fully knows what best constitutes truth, other than that on which we each may say "it [seems] to work for me."

I mean, can we say that people really "know" that they have true ideas that are actually 'justified' in the way they claim, especially where religion or worldviews (like Humanism) are concerned?

Needless to say, I think the state of being fully justified in saying that one 'has truth' or 'kinds' of truth, especially to a high, objectively recognizable level is problematic, and holding propositional truth can, more often than realized, be problematic due to overly simplistic epistemic assumptions about how we come by knowledge and how we conceptualize the nature of 'truth.'

Variations on Descartes' deceiving deity are interesting, in this regard. Assuming a decieving diety created a world where all that we believe is real is, in fact, illusory it wouldn't change things all that much so long as such a world "worked." A working world that was an illusion would be practically indistinguishable from a similar world where representations correspond to an independent reality. This tells me that the impetus towards truth acquisition is about more than just mere correspondence. It is also a matter of function and fit. It's pragmatic in that truth allows us to function in an appropriate way within reality. When we don't succeed (believe what is false), we often know it, haha.Every time I misjudge a step, nearly twisting my ankle, I'm reminded that my perception of reality doesn't always correspond with the facts.

I think you're mostly right about this. And it almost seems like the implication is that we shouldn't expect one kind of Theory of Truth to work for every human endeavor which we might deign to employ in our thoughts and lives.

All that to say, pragmatic approaches to truth, even religious truth, have significant value. Why pursue truth? It makes life possible.

Ok. I can hang with that too. Now to the locus of the OP, which has to do more with the mode of [the how] of 'truth finding' and 'truth affirming' than it does with human motivation to have or find truth.

So, PH, why do you think various intelligent individuals put all of their epistemic eggs in one basket, a single basket like that of the Correspondence Theory of Truth, for instance, and ignore all of the implications of competing theories? You don't think it's because they've discovered some kind of Ultra-Metaphysical (Meta-Truth) about which theory of truth is most "truthy," do you?

 

[public hermit]

I'm thinking a possible fact remains: that none of us fully knows what best constitutes truth, other than that on which we each may say "it [seems] to work for me."

We don't know. That's just it. This limitation demands a certain amount of faith and humility. I don't care who it is, we all have some kind of faith, some kind of way of seeing the world that works for us. So long as it works, we are going to be hard pressed to change it. But, once the cracks start showing we can enter a kind of existential crisis, a shift in how we see the world. I've been through it. Many have. And, one thing that process shows is that when we come out on the other side we are, significantly, still where we started: faith. The atheist who rejects her childhood faith has simply exchanged one form of faith for another. It's inescapable.

I mean, can we say that people really "know" that they have true ideas that are actually 'justified' in the way they claim, especially where religion or worldviews (like Humanism) are concerned?

No, I don't think we can say that.

And it almost seems like the implication is that we shouldn't expect one kind of Theory of Truth to work for every human endeavor which we might deign to employ in our thoughts and lives.

I agree, we shouldn't expect one approach to cover all the bases.

So, PH, why do you think various intelligent individuals put all of their epistemic eggs in one basket, a single basket like that of the Correspondence Theory of Truth, for instance, and ignore all of the implications of competing theories? You don't think it's because they've discovered some kind of Ultra-Metaphysical (Meta-Truth) about which theory of truth is most "truthy," do you?

I think what lurks behind many of our commitments, whether they be epistemological or metaphysical, is pragmatism. We stick with that which works for us, at that time. I may hold to a Correspondance Theory because it strikes me as true, but also because I don't want to accept what other theories might entail or imply. Maybe I reject a coherence theory because I don't think it is readily grounded in experience. I have a commitment to empirical experience, and so I prefer a Correspondance Theory. At what point am I commmited to a theory because it strikes me as true and at what point because it fits what I need in a theory? Non-epistemic reasons for our epistemological commitments don't get enough attention, I think.

That's not to say I can willy-nilly change what strikes me as true or simply change my pragmatic considerations, for that matter. Not only do we want to know way more than we can, we don't like to give up what we think we know (or what enables us to go forward meaningfully). This goes back to that notion of an existential crisis/shift.

 

[public hermit]

I had higher expectations for the truth.

 

[2PhiloVoid]

I had higher expectations for the truth.

Maybe some people have yet to watch the epistemological movie, A Few Good Men ...

 

[2PhiloVoid]

I had higher expectations for the truth.

Yes, I did too, especially when there's a number of skeptics and atheists here who claim to "care so very much about the concept of truth." But I keep wondering: which truth(s)---and which theory of truth---do they care so very much about?

 

[2PhiloVoid]

... and there's been diddly squat response to this thread, too. What's up with that, skeptics?