The modal logic version of the ontological argument.

[JonF]

There is a fairly well know proof from modal logic that shows God exist. It has three premises that can’t be derived from S5 (the “base system” of modal logic). I’m wondering which of the following of these atheists deny, because if you don’t deny one the existence of God is a logical tautology:

P1. S5 doesn’t apply to this question.


P2. If God exist, God necessarily exist.


P3. It is possible that God exist. Note this is possible in the logical sense, not the typical sense of the word. This means that we could possibly come up with a world which has God in it, where there is no inherent inconsistently in the world.


P4. Becker’s Postulate. This basically says modal truths that aren’t claims of actuality are necessary truths. It entails things: if x is possible, x is necessarily possible. If p is NOT necessary then p is necessarily not necessary. T

 

[JonF]

Not sure if anyone cares, but here is the actual argument:

Where G is the proposition: God exist. Δ will the necessary operator. And ~ will be a logical negation. → will be implication, v will be the disjunct.

1. G → ΔG by Assumption
2. ΔG v ~ΔG excluded middle
3. ~ΔG → Δ~ΔG Becker’s Postulate of “not necessary”
4. ΔG v Δ~ΔG substitution of 3 into 2.
5. Δ~ΔG → Δ~G modal modus tollens
6. ΔG v Δ~G substitution of 5 into 4
7. ~Δ~G Assumption
8. ΔG Disjunctive syllogism of 6 and 7
9. ΔG → G Modal axiom
10. G Modus ponens

Where 1 is if God exist God necessarily exist. 7 is God possibly exist. 3 is Becker’s Postulate. If 1,7, and 3 are admitted this is a valid argument in S5

 

[Lord Emsworth]

There is a fairly well know proof from modal logic that shows God exist. It has three premises that can’t be derived from S5 (the “base system” of modal logic). I’m wondering which of the following of these atheists deny, because if you don’t deny one the existence of God is a logical tautology:

Ontological arguments are by and large OK. The only problem that I see, whatever it is that they are about, it is not God. It is not God in any meaningful sense at least.

If you think that God is sufficiently defined as 'whatever it is that is necessary', well ok ... But for me that is much, much too little. Something like intelligence, sentience, consciousness needs to be there too, and no ontological argument can do that. At least not, again, in any meaningful sense.




ETA:
On the other hand, you can easily deny the following premise:

3. It is possible that God exist. Note this is possible in the logical sense, not the typical sense of the word. This means that we could possibly come up with a world which has God in it, where there is no inherent inconsistently in the world.

Either by
(1) Taking the position that is has not been shown that God is actually a possible - a logically possible - entity. Or by
(2) Taking the position that God is logically impossible. (<--- That is where I stand.)



To recap:
It all depends on what you define God as, to begin with.
(1) Only as necessary. --> The ontological arguments 'prove' that God exists.
(2) Something that goes beyond necessity, and involves for instance sentience, etc pp. --> The OAs do nothing.

 

[JonF]

Ontological arguments are by and large OK. The only problem that I see, whatever it is that they are about, it is not God. It is not God in any meaningful sense at least.

If you think that God is sufficiently defined as 'whatever it is that is necessary', well ok ... But for me that is much, much too little. Something like intelligence, sentience, consciousness needs to be there too, and no ontological argument can do that. At least not, again, in any meaningful sense.

You’re objections are more relevant to Anslem’s ontological argument, which is not what this one is. This argues that a being P necessarily exist if it has two properties:
1. P exist implies P necessarily exist
2. It is possible that P exist.
What being other than God supposedly has those properties?

ETA:
On the other hand, you can easily deny the following premise:
Either by
(1) Taking the position that is has not been shown that God is actually a possible - a logically possible - entity. Or by
(2) Taking the position that God is logically impossible. (<--- That is where I stand.)

Are you familiar with the many possible worlds interpretation of possibility/necessity? If so I find God being not possible hard to buy. For example consider nearly empty worlds.

(1) Only as necessary. --> The ontological arguments 'prove' that God exists.
(2) Something that goes beyond necessity, and involves for instance sentience, etc pp. --> The OAs do nothing.

You’re right, this argument shows nothing about which god exist if it’s sound. But that is an issue for anther thread.

 

[Lord Emsworth]

You&#8217;re objections are more relevant to Anslem&#8217;s ontological argument, which is not what this one is.

They all are roughly the same. And they all fail/succeed, before it even started. It doens't really matter all that much which OA it exactly is.

(And make no mistake, when I said "fail/succeed", I mean both failure or even success.)

This argues that a being P necessarily exist if it has two properties:
1. P exist implies P necessarily exist
2. It is possible that P exist.
What being other than God supposedly has those properties?

Keep in mind that "being" here means, and can only mean "something that exists", and that it may be much, much less misleading if you used the word "thing" instead of "being." (Although "thing" just as "being" might have unwarranted implications. So, substituting "being" with "thing" in your question renders it as follows:

What thing/being other than God supposedley has those properties?

A: Something 'natural' maybe.
B: Something 'materialistic' maybe.
C: Something that does not fullfill other requirements that need to be met in order to make that something meaningfully God.

Are you familiar with the many possible worlds interpretation of possibility/necessity?

Maybe I am. Although, the phrase "many possible worlds interpretation of possibility/necessity" does not ring any definite bells.

If so I find God being not possible hard to buy. For example consider nearly empty worlds.

I have my (own) criteria for what is/would be God, and what would not be God.

- Necessity is one of those. (<-- Creator, source are almost synonymous. This falls into the category of "well, duh.")
- Another one is something like sentience/intelligence/conciousness (in a meaningful sense) is another one.
- Libertarian Free Will is a third one. (Compatibilism is not permissible as per necessity. Arbitrariness/Randomness is not permissible either. (<-- However this falls into the catogory of square circles and colorless green ideas, i.e. impossibility.)
- It needs to be what a significant portion of humanity (regardless of whether atheist, theist, or other) means by "God". (<-- This falls into the category of "I can be a real jerk. ).

In short, if I stick to my own devices, my own expectations, criteria, minimum definition, then I can only conclude God to be impossible. With the only hope of first 'redefining' (from my POV) what the word "God" means and then maybe ... .

So, sure if we define God as solely something which possibly and necessarily exists then yeah, then yes "God" exists. By definition. IF we define God in this way. I have a hunch most people don't do that, and just like me would like something more.

You&#8217;re right, this argument shows nothing about which god exist if it&#8217;s sound. But that is an issue for anther thread.

I disagree. You first should define what you are talking about, and then bring in the arguemts for that which you just defined.

And not the other way 'round. It only invites equivocation. In one breath "God" is merely the fundamental, the necessary parts of existence, and no matter what precisely. And in the next, HE (!) is already busily gluing together cells, atoms etc. by spoken word and answering petitive prayers, while his Son judges the living and the dead.

No.

 

[JonF]

They all are roughly the same. And they all fail/succeed, before it even started. It doens't really matter all that much which OA it exactly is.

(And make no mistake, when I said "fail/succeed", I mean both failure or even success.)

Modal claims are different, are you familiar with modal systems?

Keep in mind that "being" here means, and can only mean "something that exists", and that it may be much, much less misleading if you used the word "thing" instead of "being." (Although "thing" just as "being" might have unwarranted implications. So, substituting "being" with "thing" in your question renders it as follows:

What thing/being other than God supposedly has those properties?

A: Something 'natural' maybe.
B: Something 'materialistic' maybe.
C: Something that does not fullfill other requirements that need to be met in order to make that something meaningfully God.

Maybe I am. Although, the phrase "many possible worlds interpretation of possibility/necessity" does not ring any definite bells.


So, sure if we define God as solely something which possibly and necessarily exists then yeah, then yes "God" exists. By definition. IF we define God in this way. I have a hunch most people don't do that, and just like me would like something more.

I have no problem using &#8220;thing&#8221; if you want.

I think you are misunderstanding the two claims in question (God exist implies God necessarily exist and God possibly exist)
God exist implies God necessarily is different than God necessarily exist! The most common intuitive understanding of logical necessity is the many possible worlds idea. Consider W* the set of all possible temporarily successive states of existence that are self-consistent. For example, the world where I wasn&#8217;t born would be in W*. The world where Lincoln&#8217;s assassin missed is in W*, the world where life never existed on earth is in W*, the world where Earth itself doesn&#8217;t exist is in W*&#8230;

We say something is necessary if it exist in every world. We say something is possible if it exist in at least one world.
So 1. G &#8594; &#916;G could be understood as if God exist in any world, God must exist in every world.
And 7. ~&#916;~G as God possibly exist in some world. For example the world composing of a single piece of uniform circular mass that is in a static state could consistently contain God.

I have my (own) criteria for what is/would be God, and what would not be God.

- Necessity is one of those. (<-- Creator, source are almost synonymous. This falls into the category of "well, duh.")
- Another one is something like sentience/intelligence/conciousness (in a meaningful sense) is another one.
- Libertarian Free Will is a third one. (Compatibilism is not permissible as per necessity. Arbitrariness/Randomness is not permissible either. (<-- However this falls into the catogory of square circles and colorless green ideas, i.e. impossibility.)
- It needs to be what a significant portion of humanity (regardless of whether atheist, theist, or other) means by "God". (<-- This falls into the category of "I can be a real jerk.

).

In short, if I stick to my own devices, my own expectations, criteria, minimum definition, then I can only conclude God to be impossible. With the only hope of first 'redefining' (from my POV) what the word "God" means and then maybe ... .

Libertarian Free Will and Arbitrariness/Randomness is not permissible seem more like what you would like God to be, not what is entailed by His definition.

I disagree. You first should define what you are talking about, and then bring in the arguemts for that which you just defined.

And not the other way 'round. It only invites equivocation. In one breath "God" is merely the fundamental, the necessary parts of existence, and no matter what precisely. And in the next, HE (!) is already busily gluing together cells, atoms etc. by spoken word and answering petitive prayers, while his Son judges the living and the dead. No.

It isn&#8217;t equivocating to prove one part of your claim first. So let&#8217;s start with a "thing" with properties 1 and 7 must exist. Later I&#8217;ll try to argue that being must be god, then that it must be God.

 

[Lord Emsworth]

Modal claims are different, are you familiar with modal systems?

I have no problem using &#8220;thing&#8221; if you want.

I think you are misunderstanding the two claims in question (God exist implies God necessarily exist and God possibly exist)

And you are misunderstanding what I am trying to tell you:
This is just playing around with insignificant, inconsequential detail. This type of thing is not in the ballpark. Not even close.

God exist implies God necessarily is different than God necessarily exist! The most common intuitive understanding of logical necessity is the many possible worlds idea. Consider W* the set of all possible temporarily successive states of existence that are self-consistent. For example, the world where I wasn&#8217;t born would be in W*. The world where Lincoln&#8217;s assassin missed is in W*, the world where life never existed on earth is in W*, the world where Earth itself doesn&#8217;t exist is in W*&#8230;

We say something is necessary if it exist in every world. We say something is possible if it exist in at least one world.
So 1. G &#8594; &#916;G could be understood as if God exist in any world, God must exist in every world.
And 7. ~&#916;~G as God possibly exist in some world.

Excuse me if I cut this off here. I understand this stuff. At least roughly. However, you first need to define God. Then you need to show (7) to be true, i.e. that that what you defined is possible. Keep in mind what "possible" means here!

It does not mean, "Hey, I have no idea, but for the sake of argument, let it be so." It means:

Note this is possible in the logical sense, not the typical sense of the word. This means that we could possibly come up with a world which has God in it, where there is no inherent inconsistently in the world.​

These are of course your words. So, I take it you know what your task is.


If there just is no world in which God exists ... God does also not possibly exist.

As to this part:

Consider W* the set of all possible temporarily successive states of existence that are self-consistent. For example, the world where I wasn&#8217;t born would be in W*. The world where Lincoln&#8217;s assassin missed is in W*, the world where life never existed on earth is in W*, the world where Earth itself doesn&#8217;t exist is in W*&#8230;

IS there a world where you weren't born?

IS there a world where Lincoln's assasin missed?

IS there a world where Earth at no time exists?

Well?

IS there a world in which God (definition pending) exists?


Answer to any one of those:
1. Yes
2. No.
3. Maybe. Maybe not.

For example the world composing of a single piece of uniform circular mass that is in a static state could consistently contain God.

IF
(a) this world is composed of this single piece uniform circular mass thing.
(b) this world contains God

Then God IS this single piece uniform circular mass thing.


If this makes you happy. Fine by me. But I can only say "No, thanks".

Libertarian Free Will and Arbitrariness/Randomness is not permissible seem more like what you would like God to be, not what is entailed by His definition.

Your very sentence here implies that in principle you agree with what I said. Not necessarily about whether there needs to be libertarin free will ... But you too seem to define God beyond anything what any OA could possibly show. To wit:
- God all of a sudden is a He. Out of nowhere.
- God has a definition. ughhhh .... To think of the rats tail of what requirements need to be met before 'a thing' can be meaningfully said to hold definitions.
- It also, very weakly(!), implies that this definition has been communicated and that you have it.


But be that as it may. While there may be a little wiggling room, my criteria for "God" are not really up for debate. You can take it, or leave. If you leave it, we are talking about different things, though.

It isn&#8217;t equivocating to prove one part of your claim first. So let&#8217;s start with a being with properties 1 and 7 must exist.

You already have my answer. I am of the opinion that such a 'thing' with properties 1 and 7 definitely exists. (At worst it is the whole world). However ... This alone does not make it God.

Later I&#8217;ll try to argue that being must be god, then that it must be God.

Are you familiar with affirming the antecedent? Of course you are. But watch out that you do not fall into some such trap:

If God exists, then God is something which has properties 1 and 7.
1 and 7 for the win.
Therefore God.



I can only repeat the closing paragraph of my first post:

It all depends on what you define God as, to begin with.
(1) Only as necessary. --> The ontological arguments 'prove' that God exists.
(2) Something that goes beyond necessity, and involves for instance sentience, etc pp. --> The OAs do nothing.​

Same story for those two properties:
It all depends on what you define God as, to begin with.
(1) Only as something which has properties 1 and 7. --> The ontological arguments 'prove' that God exists.
(2) Something that goes beyond properties 1 and 7, and involves for instance sentience, etc pp. --> The OA does nothing. And you have all the work still in front of you.

 

[JonF]

And you are misunderstanding what I am trying to tell you:
This is just playing around with insignificant, inconsequential detail. This type of thing is not in the ballpark. Not even close.

I don&#8217;t get why you are objecting to this so much. And you haven&#8217;t answered my question. Name anything that potentially has properties 1 and 7 other than God? You&#8217;re previous examples weren&#8217;t even relevant. You didn&#8217;t post any phenomena or objects; you basically said &#8220;something&#8221;. And even if you&#8217;re right, fine all things with these properties exist. I mean what would that generate? You can&#8217;t even name one other possible object besides God.

Excuse me if I cut this off here. I understand this stuff. At least roughly. However, you first need to define God. Then you need to show (7) to be true, i.e. that that what you defined is possible. Keep in mind what "possible" means here!

It does not mean, "Hey, I have no idea, but for the sake of argument, let it be so." It means:

Note this is possible in the logical sense, not the typical sense of the word.

Go back and read the OP, I said in order to disagree with the conclusion you must deny one of these 4 things. You deny (7) here. My question was why? Both (7) and (1) are typically found in most people&#8217;s conception of God. Why aren't they found in yours?

This means that we could possibly come up with a world which has God in it, where there is no inherent inconsistently in the world.

These are of course your words. So, I take it you know what your task is.


If there just is no world in which God exists ... God does also not possibly exist.

As to this part:

IS there a world where you weren't born?

IS there a world where Lincoln's assassin missed?

IS there a world where Earth at no time exists?

Well?




Answer to any one of those:
1. Yes
2. No.
3. Maybe. Maybe not.

You don&#8217;t understand the many possible world concept. I wasn&#8217;t asking questions I was letting you know what are considered possible worlds. This isn&#8217;t my idea, it&#8217;s a pretty much universally accepted notion by people who are active in the field. None of this is actually my idea. Everyone pretty much agrees that your need to deny one of the four things I listed for a consistent logical denial of God&#8217;s existence.

IS there a world in which God (definition pending) exists?

the whole point of this post was for me not to define God. It was for you to state, with your conception of God, and the universe, which of the 4 you deny and why. My definition of God isn&#8217;t relevant. All this argument shows is if your concept of God has (1) and (7) you don&#8217;t deny Becker&#8217;s Postulate&#8217;s (which most logicians don&#8217;t) and you think S5 applies (which most logicians would say it does) it follows that God exist. You don&#8217;t believe God exist, so you need to deny one of these. I was hoping we could discuss why you deny whichever one you pick.

IF
(a) this world is composed of this single piece uniform circular mass thing.
(b) this world contains God

Then God IS this single piece uniform circular mass thing.


If this makes you happy. Fine by me. But I can only say "No, thanks".

You misunderstand the example, God isn&#8217;t phenomina. If God created a world with a singular piece of mass, is that world consistent?

You already have my answer. I am of the opinion that such a 'thing' with properties 1 and 7 definitely exists. (At worst it is the whole world). However ... This alone does not make it God.

I can only read this as the no true scottsman fallacy. Take whatever conception of God you use when you say &#8220;God&#8221;. It could be the omni&#8217;s, the first mover, the Judeo-Christian God of the bible. Whatever one you pick, why do you think that entity doesn&#8217;t have 1 and 7.

If God exists, then God is something which has properties 1 and 7.
1 and 7 for the win.
Therefore God.

Are you familiar with a straw man? That isn&#8217;t my argument. This proof is universally accepted in the logical community as valid, it&#8217;s the soundness that is in question.

I can only repeat the closing paragraph of my first post:

It all depends on what you define God as, to begin with.
(1) Only as necessary. --> The ontological arguments 'prove' that God exists.
(2) Something that goes beyond necessity, and involves for instance sentience, etc pp. --> The OAs do nothing.
Same story for those two properties:
It all depends on what you define God as, to begin with.
(1) Only as something which has properties 1 and 7. --> The ontological arguments 'prove' that God exists.

Look, you are trying a straw man again. This argument shows if anything has (1) (7), you affirm Becker&#8217;s Postulate, and S5 that thing necessarily exist. My question is which do you deny (1), (7), S5, or Becker&#8217;s Postulate for God. If so why? All you&#8217;ve been able to offer so far is a no true scott explanation.

(2) Something that goes beyond properties 1 and 7, and involves for instance sentience, etc pp. --> The OA does nothing. And you have all the work still in front of you.

This is not true. This is almost a valid objection to OA that follow Anslem&#8217;s method. This one is fundamentally different. Do you actually understand and follow the proof? If not that&#8217;s okay, but then you will either need to research modal logic or trust what experts say about it. If do you should see why it&#8217;s not relevant.

 

[Lord Emsworth]

I don&#8217;t get why you are objecting to this so much. And you haven&#8217;t answered my question. Name anything that potentially has properties 1 and 7 other than God? You&#8217;re previous examples weren&#8217;t even relevant. You didn&#8217;t post any phenomena or objects; you basically said &#8220;something&#8221;.

Well, I gave you the following:

What thing/being other than God supposedley has those properties?

A: Something 'natural' maybe.
B: Something 'materialistic' maybe.
C: Something that does not fullfill other requirements that need to be met in order to make that something meaningfully God.​

Is there a problem with that? Or do you want me to throw around names?

And even if you&#8217;re right, fine all things with these properties exist. I mean what would that generate?

You can&#8217;t even name one other possible object besides God.

Jon, this one is not true. And the issue lies with "besides God." Look at my first post, which is post #3 in this thread. I point out that you can easily deny

3. It is possible that God exist.​

either by
(1) Taking the position that is has not been shown that God is actually a possible - a logically possible - entity. Or by
(2) Taking the position that God is logically impossible. (<--- That is where I stand.)

Go back and read the OP, I said in order to disagree with the conclusion you must deny one of these 4 things. You deny (7) here. My question was why?

I actually tried to explain this to you. I am a strong atheist and God to me is logically impossible. If I am going to use my definition of God, that is. (You may disagree of course.)

A weak atheist, and agnostic, (or a typical theist even) on the other hand, could simply deny that the possibility of God has been demonstrated. It may be logically possible. It may not be logically possible. With the jury still being out.

Both (7) and (1) are typically found in most people&#8217;s conception of God.

This is what I don't think is true.

Why aren't they found in yours?

(1) is in my definition.
(7) is equivalent with saying that God does exist. (I hope you don't distrust your own syllogism here. Or do you? )


So, (7) is not in my definiton, because I don't think that God is logically possible. It is logically impossible.

You don&#8217;t understand the many possible world concept. I wasn&#8217;t asking questions I was letting you know what are considered possible worlds.

Those were examples to get a point across. Not truths.

This isn&#8217;t my idea, it&#8217;s a pretty much universally accepted notion by people who are active in the field. None of this is actually my idea. Everyone pretty much agrees that your need to deny one of the four things I listed for a consistent logical denial of God&#8217;s existence.

the whole point of this post was for me not to define God. It was for you to state, with your conception of God, and the universe, which of the 4 you deny and why. My definition of God isn&#8217;t relevant. All this argument shows is if your concept of God has (1) and (7) you don&#8217;t deny Becker&#8217;s Postulate&#8217;s (which most logicians don&#8217;t) and you think S5 applies (which most logicians would say it does) it follows that God exist. You don&#8217;t believe God exist, so you need to deny one of these. I was hoping we could discuss why you deny whichever one you pick.

Are you trying to argue about something?

Or are you just pushing around semantically meaningless words? Gee Ohhh Deee.


This is something you seriously need to ask yourself. As a simple litmus test try this:

Is God sentient? Yes or no?

If you think that, yes, God is sentient, does the argument you are offering even have the power to prove that a sentient being exists? Does sentience show up anywhere withing your OA? (No, it doesn't.)

If on the other hand, you think that God does not necessarily have to be sentient, hmmm, fair enough. But can you in this case, blame people who see sentience as a necessity for rejecting this type of argument? (Huh?)

You misunderstand the example, God isn&#8217;t phenomina. If God created a world with a singular piece of mass, is that world consistent?

No, God is a logical impossibility. And there is no logically possible world where God exsits. (What else would you expect a strong atheist to say, huh?)


As an alternative, I offer you a "I don't have the slightest inkling whether or not that world is consistent or whether it is not consistent." (Again weak atheist, agnostic, a lot of theists even should be of that opinion.)

I can only read this as the no true scottsman fallacy. Take whatever conception of God you use when you say &#8220;God&#8221;. It could be the omni&#8217;s, the first mover, the Judeo-Christian God of the bible. Whatever one you pick, why do you think that entity doesn&#8217;t have 1 and 7.

Recycling two paragraphs from further above:

I actually tried to explain this to you. I am a strong atheist and God to me is logically impossible. If I am going to use my definition of God, that is. (You may disagree of course.)

A weak atheist, and agnostic, (or a typical theist even) on the other hand, could simply deny that the possibility of God has been demonstrated. It may be logically possible. It may not be logically possible. With the jury still being out.

Are you familiar with a straw man? That isn&#8217;t my argument.

I hope so.

This proof is universally accepted in the logical community as valid, it&#8217;s the soundness that is in question.

This is also valid:

If God exists, then God exists.
God exists.
Therefore God exists.

The soundness though ...

Look, you are trying a straw man again. This argument shows if anything has (1) (7), you affirm Becker&#8217;s Postulate, and S5 that thing necessarily exist. My question is which do you deny (1), (7), S5, or Becker&#8217;s Postulate for God. If so why?

I agree that something fulfulls (1) and (7). Just not God.

All you&#8217;ve been able to offer so far is a no true scott explanation.

Sorry, why do you think it is a no-true Scotsman.

God? What the heck are you talking about. I put my cards on the table.

I also pointed out that I consider your argument to be good. (Although I should mitigate a little maybe, and say "It is good, as far as I can see.") It is just not about God. God as I understand it, that is. Of course.

ETA: Although, if I plug in my definition, then the premises are false and I have to reject the argument.

This is not true. This is almost a valid objection to OA that follow Anslem&#8217;s method. This one is fundamentally different. Do you actually understand and follow the proof? If not that&#8217;s okay, but then you will either need to research modal logic or trust what experts say about it. If do you should see why it&#8217;s not relevant.

It is a moot point. You are just pushing around meaningless and empty words. And if there is something which truly is not relevant, ... I know already that you can give names to stuff. And I know you can give the name "God" to stuff as well.



And I'll again, so that this all has not been for naught, answer your question from your OP:

I&#8217;m wondering which of the following of these atheists deny, because if you don&#8217;t deny one the existence of God is a logical tautology.

I deny number 3. God is a logical impossibility.

(If I were a weak atheist, or so, I would deny number 3 as well and point out that God has not been shown to be logically possible.)


Cheers.

 

[JonF]

[FONT=&quot]

Well, I gave you the following:

[/FONT]

[FONT=&quot]What thing/being other than God supposedley has those properties?

A: Something 'natural' maybe.
B: Something 'materialistic' maybe.
C: Something that does not fullfill other requirements that need to be met in order to make that something meaningfully God.[/FONT]
[FONT=&quot]Is there a problem with that? Or do you want me to throw around names? [/FONT]

[FONT=&quot]Yes throw around names.[/FONT]
[FONT=&quot]I see how all of these satisfy 7. I don&#8217;t see how any satisfy 1. [/FONT]
[FONT=&quot]

[/FONT]
[FONT=&quot]

Jon, this one is not true. And the issue lies with "besides God." Look at my first post, which is post #3 in this thread. I point out that you can easily deny

[/FONT]

[FONT=&quot]3. It is possible that God exist.[/FONT]
[FONT=&quot]either by
(1) Taking the position that is has not been shown that God is actually a possible - a logically possible - entity. Or by
(2) Taking the position that God is logically impossible. (<--- That is where I stand.)[/FONT]

[FONT=&quot]I actually tried to explain this to you. I am a strong atheist and God to me is logically impossible. If I am going to use my definition of God, that is. (You may disagree of course.)

A weak atheist, and agnostic, (or a typical theist even) on the other hand, could simply deny that the possibility of God has been demonstrated. It may be logically possible. It may not be logically possible. With the jury still being out.
[/FONT]

[FONT=&quot]
Good! This is what I was looking for. Why do you think God isn&#8217;t possible in the logical sense. I get you don&#8217;t believe that God isn&#8217;t possible in THIS world, but that has nothing to do with the modal sense of the word necessary. What about my single mass world? Can you agree that &#8220;god&#8221; with your sense of the word could possible exist in that world?

(1) is in my definition.
(7) is equivalent with saying that God does exist. (I hope you don't distrust your own syllogism here. Or do you?

)

[/FONT]

[FONT=&quot]So, (7) is not in my definiton, because I don't think that God is logically possible. It is logically impossible.
[/FONT]

[FONT=&quot]So you&#8217;re objection to the proof is that it isvalid? That&#8217;s like the definition of the &#8220;no true scotts..&#8221; fallacy.

Those were examples to get a point across. Not truths.

That those worlds are considered possible is a fact. Are you a fatalist?

Are you trying to argue about something?

Or are you just pushing around semantically meaningless words? Gee Ohhh Deee.

This is something you seriously need to ask yourself. As a simple litmus test try this:

Is God sentient? Yes or no?

If you think that, yes, God is sentient, does the argument you are offering even have the power to prove that a sentient being exists? Does sentience show up anywhere withing your OA? (No, it doesn't.)

You realize that you&#8217;re objection here isn&#8217;t cogent by any sense. You are essentially objecting to proving a general case then applying to a specific. Better throw all math out the window then. Sentientality is irrelevant to this argument. If something satisfies 1,7, becker&#8217;s postulate, and s5 it exist. Period. It doesn&#8217;t matter if it&#8217;s sentient, or anything else. The only question is if God satisfies 1, 7, S5 applies, and Becker's is true.

I actually tried to explain this to you. I am a strong atheist and God to me is logically impossible. If I am going to use my definition of God, that is. (You may disagree of course.)

I agree that something fulfulls (1) and (7). Just not God.

What? Give me a specific example and please explain how it satisfies 1.

Sorry, why do you think it is a no-true Scotsman.

Cause the discussion of God not existing in any world has gone as follows: I don&#8217;t believe God can exist in any world. what about world W? Clearly God can&#8217;t exist there, because God can&#8217;t exist in any world.

ETA: Although, if I plug in my definition, then the premises are false and I have to reject the argument.

yes, and that is only possible if your definition denies 1, 7, becker&#8217;s, or s5. You have explicitly said you deny 7. I was confused before cause a billion other objections were thrown around. Is the basis of your rejection a denial of 7?

It is a moot point. You are just pushing around meaningless and empty words. And if there is something which truly is not relevant, ... I know already that you can give names to stuff. And I know you can give the name "God" to stuff as well.

I agree it&#8217;s moot, I&#8217;m not the one who keeps raising it.

I deny number 3. God is a logical impossibility.

(If I were a weak atheist, or so, I would deny number 3 as well and point out that God has not been shown to be logically possible.)

3&#8217;s justification isn&#8217;t anything about the existence of God, it&#8217;s the Becker&#8217;s Postulate. Do you deny this? [/FONT]

[FONT=&quot]This may simplify things:[/FONT]
[FONT=&quot]Do you deny (1)?[/FONT]
[FONT=&quot]Do you deny (7)?[/FONT]
[FONT=&quot]Do you deny becker&#8217;s postulate?[/FONT]
[FONT=&quot]Do you deny S5 is relevant.[/FONT]
[FONT=&quot]Do you understand these are the only things you can deny logically?[/FONT]

 

[Lord Emsworth]

Yes throw around names.

I just said that in order to make the point that this would just be a formality. But if you really insist.

Necessary being. Flordnap. X. That-which-necessarily-exists-in-all-possible-worlds-but-is-not-God.

I see how all of these satisfy 7. I don&#8217;t see how any satisfy 1.

It would satisfy 1 by simply existing in all possible worlds.


What exactly it is that satisfies 7 and 1 ...

Good! This is what I was looking for. Why do you think God isn&#8217;t possible in the logical sense. I get you don&#8217;t believe that God isn&#8217;t possible in THIS world, but that has nothing to do with the modal sense of the word necessary. What about my single mass world? Can you agree that &#8220;god&#8221; with your sense of the word could possible exist in that world?

No, not possible.

(And again, if in your world just a single mass exists, and if it also true that God exists in that world, then it follows that God must be that single mass.)

So you&#8217;re objection to the proof is that it isvalid? That&#8217;s like the definition of the &#8220;no true scotts..&#8221; fallacy.

No. I cannot grant the premises. Validity is OK, afaics.

That those worlds are considered possible is a fact.

Considered possible, and actually possible. There is a fine, but crucial difference.

Be that as it may ...

Are you a fatalist?

Fate? No.

You realize that you&#8217;re objection here isn&#8217;t cogent by any sense. You are essentially objecting to proving a general case then applying to a specific. Better throw all math out the window then. Sentientality is irrelevant to this argument.

Precisely.

If something satisfies 1,7, becker&#8217;s postulate, and s5 it exist. Period. It doesn&#8217;t matter if it&#8217;s sentient, or anything else. The only question is if God satisfies 1, 7, S5 applies, and Becker's is true.

Does the word "God" signify to you a sentient entity? If yes, it matters full well.

(Sentience is just an example, of course.)

What? Give me a specific example and please explain how it satisfies 1.

Cause the discussion of God not existing in any world has gone as follows: I don&#8217;t believe God can exist in any world. what about world W? Clearly God can&#8217;t exist there, because God can&#8217;t exist in any world.

No, this is just consistency. I am sticking to my terms, to my devices. Nothing more, and nothing less.

yes, and that is only possible if your definition denies 1, 7, becker&#8217;s, or s5. You have explicitly said you deny 7. I was confused before cause a billion other objections were thrown around. Is the basis of your rejection a denial of 7?

There are plenty of objections you can rise. There are plenty of traps and pitfalls to avoid.

But I believe in every post I pointed out a rejection, or just non-acceptance the proposition "God is logically possible"

I agree it&#8217;s moot, I&#8217;m not the one who keeps raising it.



3&#8217;s justification isn&#8217;t anything about the existence of God, it&#8217;s the Becker&#8217;s Postulate. Do you deny this?

Watch out.

In your OP you gave a numbered list of possible rejections for the OA. Item #3 on that list was about God being possible, and item #4 was Becker's postulate.

In your follow up post, that is post #2, you posted the OA itself, with numbered premises. Here premise 7 was the premise about God being possible, while premise number 3 indeed was Becker's postulate.

I was referring to item #3 of your OP. I hope that didn't cause too much confusion.

This may simplify things:
Do you deny (1)?

No. I even strongly insist.

Do you deny (7)?

Yes.

Do you deny becker&#8217;s postulate?

Not quite sure.

Do you deny S5 is relevant.

Not quite sure either.

Do you understand these are the only things you can deny logically?

I would strike out (1).

 

[JonF]

I just said that in order to make the point that this would just be a formality. But if you really insist.

Necessary being. Flordnap. X. That-which-necessarily-exists-in-all-possible-worlds-but-is-not-God.
It would satisfy 1 by simply existing in all possible worlds

Good definition, but it’s not permissible with ZFC, so it’s not in S5, so it has no bearing on this thread. Also, even if we accepted this definition it still doesn't satisfy premise 1! It’s a property of S5, if S5 is necessary in any world it’s necessary in all worlds (this is one of the properties that separates it from S4). So your definition is equivalent to Flordnap is necessary but not God. I think you don’t understand 1. 1 in its general form isn’t a statement about God, or God necessarily existing. It’s a statement between the relationship between the two. Think of it in this way. If P exist in any world this makes it so P must exist in every world. Essentially you are arguing material implication, when the claim is about implicit implication.

Here are some examples of 1 on things other than God by virtue of assumption.

I exist in this world, so I exist in all worlds - this is a property of what it means to be me.
Pink Unicorns exist in some possible world, by virtue of that and what it means to be a pink unicorn they must exist in all worlds.



Also your Flordnap is an indeterminate, which isn’t a definition.

No, not possible.

(And again, if in your world just a single mass exists, and if it also true that God exists in that world, then it follows that God must be that single mass.)

Really? Do you think that God if He were to exist would be “in mass”?

Considered possible, and actually possible. There is a fine, but crucial difference. Fate? No.

The only accepted denial I’ve ever come across is a fatalistic one. That how things are, are the only possible way they could have been. i.e. any other world would have a internal-contradiction.

Precisely. TO you are essentially objecting to proving a general case then applying to a specific. Better throw all math out the window then. Sentientality is irrelevant to this argument.

If you can’t agree to this, we can’t even have a discussion. Since you are essentially denying all rationality, reason, logic, and modern thought. We have no medium to communicate about these ideas. You do get you’re objecting to this type of reasoning. All mammals produce milk. Dogs are mammals. Thus, Dogs produce milk.

Does the word "God" signify to you a sentient entity? If yes, it matters full well.

This is not relevant for the previously stated reason.

No, this is just consistency. I am sticking to my terms, to my devices. Nothing more, and nothing less.

The way you were sticking to your premises, and defending particular cases is called the Scotts man fallacy. Disagree that the scotts man fallacy is fallacious if you want, but that’s what it is called.

In your OP you gave a numbered list of possible rejections for the OA. Item #3 on that list was about God being possible, and item #4 was Becker's postulate.

In your follow up post, that is post #2, you posted the OA itself, with numbered premises. Here premise 7 was the premise about God being possible, while premise number 3 indeed was Becker's postulate.

I was referring to item #3 of your OP. I hope that didn't cause too much confusion.

Ah, for convention let’s agree that numbers by themselves refer to post #2. And P1, P2, P3, P4 will be post 1. I’ll go relabel post 1 after this.

No. I even strongly insist.

Yes.

Not quite sure.

Not quite sure either.

I would strike out (1).

What S5 is, is hard to talk about without strong formal logic background. It probably is sufficient to know that it’s the most standard logic propositional calculus designed to deal with necessity and possibility. Becker’s postulate essentially says that if something is a modal truth (truths about necessity/possibility), then it is a necessary truth, provided it’s not a statement of actuality.
For example it would imply things like. If time travel doesn’t necessarily exist, then it is necessarily the case that time travel doesn’t necessarily exist. Or if gravity is possible, gravity is necessarily possible.
WHAT IT DOESN’T SAY IS THIS. Cats exist so cats necessarily exist.

Can we agree for argument sake to affirm 1, Becker’s, S5? That way we can discuss 7. If we reach some agreement about 7 we can always come back to these other questionable assumptions.

 

[Eudaimonist]

P2. If God exist, God necessarily exist.

And if God doesn't exist, God doesn't necessarily exist.

P3. It is possible that God exist.

It is possible that God doesn't exist -- in any "world" -- since God doesn't necessarily exist.

Anyway, I have a strong dislike for modal logic, since it seems like the ultimate in rationalism.

When I speak of possibility, I mean more than possibilities that one can imagine. I mean rational possibilities for which there is at least some evidence to consider them possible in our reality, and not merely in the limits of one's imagination.


eudaimonia,

Mark

 

[JonF]

And if God doesn't exist, God doesn't necessarily exist.

This is logically equivalent to 1 in S4 or higher. Did you intend to state this as an equivalency to add understanding? Or as an objection? If it’s the latter (~G &#8594;&#916;~G) &#8596; (G &#8594; &#916;G) is a formula of S4.

It is possible that God doesn't exist -- in any "world" -- since God doesn't necessarily exist.

With 1 this is equivalent to (via modus tollens) God doesn’t exist. Do you believe this? What about the trivial world, where there is no matter or energy. Do you think it’s possible that God exist there?

Anyway, I have a strong dislike for modal logic, since it seems like the ultimate in rationalism.

When I speak of possibility, I mean more than possibilities that one can imagine. I mean rational possibilities for which there is at least some evidence to consider them possible in our reality, and not merely in the limits of one's imagination.

I don’t see modal logic as being limited to what we can imagine. So I take it your objection to this argument is a denial of S5?

 

[Lord Emsworth]

Here are some examples of 1 on things other than God by virtue of assumption.

I exist in this world, so I exist in all worlds - this is a property of what it means to be me.
Pink Unicorns exist in some possible world, by virtue of that and what it means to be a pink unicorn they must exist in all worlds.

Also your Flordnap is an indeterminate, which isn’t a definition.

I know. It is an, as of now, undefined word. Quite right.

But if the game is play with words, I don't see why we could not define it so it fits 1.

Really? Do you think that God if He were to exist would be “in mass”?

Me? No, most certainly not. I can always stick to my terms.


What about you? Do you think that God if He
--- He?? Where on Gods green earth do you have the idea from that God is a "He?" ---
exists would be "in mass." If not, then God does also not exist in that world. You forgot to put it in. Remember, you only put that mass thing in. And if that is not God, then nothing is God in that world.

*Shrug*

The only accepted denial I’ve ever come across is a fatalistic one. That how things are, are the only possible way they could have been. i.e. any other world would have a internal-contradiction.

No, you just don't get this one.

It *might* be the case, that neither fatalism nor determism are true, and the world where you were never were born is still impossible.

It *might* be the case, because such a world *might* involve a contradiction.

If you can’t agree to this, we can’t even have a discussion. Since you are essentially denying all rationality, reason, logic, and modern thought.

If you say so ...

We have no medium to communicate about these ideas. You do get you’re objecting to this type of reasoning. All mammals produce milk. Dogs are mammals. Thus, Dogs produce milk.

That is not true, Jon. I am not objecting to this type of reasoning.

I am reminding you that we are not just talking about normal dogs.

I am reminding you that we are discussing whether the Magic Mystical Wonder Dog in the Sky exists.

Does the Magic Mystical Wonder Dog in the Sky give milk?
Does that beast even exist???

(Analogy alert)

This is not relevant for the previously stated reason.

Hey, maybe God really is a that mass thing from that world that you outlined previously.

If you do not give any meaningful definitions, and just try to hide behind basically meaningless generalities like "it exists in all possilbe worlds" (or whatever the correct phrasing of the day is) then this is the garbage
that you might end up with.

A mass thing being God.

All this is your problem.

The way you were sticking to your premises, and defending particular cases is called the Scotts man fallacy. Disagree that the scotts man fallacy is fallacious if you want, but that’s what it is called.

Oh, please.

Can we agree for argument sake to affirm 1, Becker’s, S5? That way we can discuss 7.

You already got all the answers that you need from me.

And with respects to discussing (7) ... Will it involve sentience, for instance?

Be that as it may ...

There is really no need for me to repeat myself a million times.

 

[Tinker Grey]

If no one minds a diversion, could someone define "modal logic" for me? How does it differ from plain ole logic?

 

[Eudaimonist]

To be perfectly honest, JonF, I don't respect modal logic enough to try to argue entirely from within its methods, or within the structure of that argument. To me, modal logic is rationalistic. I reject it as insufficiently empirical. (Not that I support pure empiricism, which has its own problems.)

What about the trivial world, where there is no matter or energy. Do you think it&#8217;s possible that God exist there?

I have no good reason to think that God is possible anywhere in the reality that we know, and any speculation beyond what we know is just a guessing game.


eudaimonia,

Mark

 

[Eudaimonist]

If no one minds a diversion, could someone define "modal logic" for me? How does it differ from plain ole logic?

I'm not sure how to define it, but it's a form of deductive logic that deals with such issues as possibility and necessity.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Modal_logic

Personally, I think this sort of reasoning is subject to abuse. While it may have some legitimate uses, it deals too much with the "logically possible" as opposed to what we can know to be possible through empirical knowledge. Conclusions that may be arrived at in logic space aren't necessarily true or possible in our reality.


eudaimonia,

Mark

 

[JonF]

There is really no need for me to repeat myself a million times.

I agree, this is getting pointless. You refuses to discuss in the standards of logic. I gave you many reasons why your definition isn&#8217;t really a &#8220;definition&#8221; or doesn&#8217;t apply. 1. It&#8217;s not allowed in ZFC thus now allowed in S5 (are you familiar with Russell&#8217;s Paradox?), it&#8217;s an indeterminate, and even if we ignore all that it still doesn&#8217;t meet 1. You admitly are confronting my objections via accepted logical fallacies (no true scotts), you are objection to reasoning from general to specific and your only reason is because we&#8217;re talking about God.

 

[JonF]

To be perfectly honest, JonF, I don't respect modal logic enough to try to argue entirely from within its methods, or within the structure of that argument. To me, modal logic is rationalistic. I reject it as insufficiently empirical. (Not that I support pure empiricism, which has its own problems.) .

I 100% agree it’s completely rationalist, I just don’t have a problem with that. Out of curiosity, Do you think anything a priori synthetic can be justified.

I have no good reason to think that God is possible anywhere in the reality that we know, and any speculation beyond what we know is just a guessing game

I’m guessing you find anything purely rational as speculation though?