This is more Philosophy of Religion than Theology, though theologians have by no means ignored the issue.
The version originally attributed to Socrates (c470-399 BC) by Plato runs as follows:
Is the pious loved by the Gods because it is pious, or is it pious because it is loved by the Gods?
If the former, the Gods owe allegiance to some higher power than themselves that constrains them, namely, the pious; if the latter the pious is a matter of their whim, and they could equally well not love the pious at all, but, perhaps, the impious, instead, which they could call pious.
In fact, this dilemma can be asked of any authority and moral absolute.
For example; is what is right, right because the party says it is right, or does the party say it is right, because it is right?
But, for me, the formulation that hits the spot, and has afforded me many happy hours of contemplation, is this one:
Is the good, good, because God wills it so, or does God will it so, because it is good?
To the best of my knowledge, this question has yet to be satisfactorily answered.
If the former, the good is merely a divine opinion, and anything that is good could conceivably be otherwise, and anything otherwise could conceivably be good. Genocide, for example, might have been good, and liberty might have been bad. If the latter, then, as before, God owes His allegiance is to something prior and more vital than Himself that constrains Him. I find neither option palatable.
This is how I currently resolve the matter. I consider the moral absolutes to be aspects of Gods nature. The Good, the Just, the Merciful, the Kind, the Right, the Fair, the Beautiful, the True, the Brave, etc, would not exist at all if He did not exist, and He makes them manifest simply by being. God would just not be God if they did not exist and He did not, by Himself being, bring them to be. Just as you would not be you without your nature and did not, by being, bring your nature to be.
The moral absolutes, and God, therefore, are mutually interdependent. To the extent that they exist partially or at all in His world, it is because they are His metaphysical shadow on His creation.
As usual, your comments and criticisms are always welcome.
Best wishes, Strivax.
The version originally attributed to Socrates (c470-399 BC) by Plato runs as follows:
Is the pious loved by the Gods because it is pious, or is it pious because it is loved by the Gods?
If the former, the Gods owe allegiance to some higher power than themselves that constrains them, namely, the pious; if the latter the pious is a matter of their whim, and they could equally well not love the pious at all, but, perhaps, the impious, instead, which they could call pious.
In fact, this dilemma can be asked of any authority and moral absolute.
For example; is what is right, right because the party says it is right, or does the party say it is right, because it is right?
But, for me, the formulation that hits the spot, and has afforded me many happy hours of contemplation, is this one:
Is the good, good, because God wills it so, or does God will it so, because it is good?
To the best of my knowledge, this question has yet to be satisfactorily answered.
If the former, the good is merely a divine opinion, and anything that is good could conceivably be otherwise, and anything otherwise could conceivably be good. Genocide, for example, might have been good, and liberty might have been bad. If the latter, then, as before, God owes His allegiance is to something prior and more vital than Himself that constrains Him. I find neither option palatable.
This is how I currently resolve the matter. I consider the moral absolutes to be aspects of Gods nature. The Good, the Just, the Merciful, the Kind, the Right, the Fair, the Beautiful, the True, the Brave, etc, would not exist at all if He did not exist, and He makes them manifest simply by being. God would just not be God if they did not exist and He did not, by Himself being, bring them to be. Just as you would not be you without your nature and did not, by being, bring your nature to be.
The moral absolutes, and God, therefore, are mutually interdependent. To the extent that they exist partially or at all in His world, it is because they are His metaphysical shadow on His creation.
As usual, your comments and criticisms are always welcome.
Best wishes, Strivax.
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But I'm sure a counter point is available and could be cogently argued.
