Supernatural philosophy/natural philosophy

[sandwiches]

OK. Your answer is different than sandwiches (post #64). I had been asking what thing apart from the brain "speed" refers to and we got a bit diverted for a time. If the most basic thinking is not mathematical, then what is this most basic thinking of "speed"? It seems you are saying it involves no concept of number.

I said if we wish to use it in for calculations, technology, or if we wish to express this concept for someone else, we'll need some naming convention for sets.

No, that misses the point - actually 3 points - though I suppose some of the differences are subtle.

1) Does a perfect vacuum exist somewhere that we can access? I think the answer is no. If so, our model is based on an ideal that has never physically (materially) manifested. Among other things that means there is no possible falsification test.

2) Can one prove that the "error" in a measurement is due 100% to the instrumentation? I would say no. As such, it means there are aspects not being captured by the resulting model, likely will never be captured. If all we're interested in is an engineering "good enough" OK. But that leads to the "we don't know" conclusion I mentioned earlier, i.e. a dead end.

3) Correlation is not causation, and yet that is what we're depending on to say the speed of light is constant. With regard to developing models for my engineering job, I have a reference from one of the world experts on model building that (to paraphrase) states that selecting a model is often arbitrary because of the difficulties of correlation. Selecting a different model has huge consequences on the conclusions drawn.

I'm sorry but this did nothing about my complaint regarding your extreme skepticism. So, again, please make your point. We know we can't know anything with 100% certainty? So? What does our lack of imprecision and full certainty have to do with the material/immaterial?

 

[Resha Caner]

I'm sorry but this did nothing about my complaint regarding your extreme skepticism. So, again, please make your point. We know we can't know anything with 100% certainty? So? What does our lack of imprecision and full certainty have to do with the material/immaterial?

You seem to be hung up on a detail that I have said is a misunderstanding of my position. If we can't get past that, I don't know what else to do.

Per my earlier promise, I'll try to use examples to clarify.

1) Does a perfect vacuum exist somewhere that we can access? I think the answer is no. If so, our model is based on an ideal that has never physically (materially) manifested. Among other things that means there is no possible falsification test.

A lack of falsification tests doesn't bother you? I thought you were one of these "where's the evidence" kind of guys. Regardless, consider the example of force vs. energy. When Newton first formulated his equations of motion, the fundamental concept was "force". Others came later (LaGrange, etc.) and claimed the true fundamental was "energy", not force. To us this doesn't seem like a big deal because the equivalency of the two approaches has since been proven. But at the time there was a concern that differences in these untestable ideals were going to produce contradictions. If they did, which idea should be thrown out? Force or energy?

That is the one where we know the answer. In current physics there is one where we don't know the answer. QM and SR do produce different results when dealing with the very small & very massive. Wiccan would know better than me, but I don't think anyone has come up with a way to resolve that. At this point it appears to be an untestable dilemma. As such, we keep both even though we know there is a contradiction.

2) Can one prove that the "error" in a measurement is due 100% to the instrumentation? I would say no. As such, it means there are aspects not being captured by the resulting model, likely will never be captured. If all we're interested in is an engineering "good enough" OK. But that leads to the "we don't know" conclusion I mentioned earlier, i.e. a dead end.

A common constituitive model for metals is stress = modulus * strain. In simple terms it defines how "stiff" a metal is - how much it will bend when I apply a force. This model was based on Hooke's Law, and was in play for centuries. Even once elastomers (rubber, plastic, etc.) were discovered this model continued. The differences were dismissed as measurement error. But then people began to play with different models, and a huge controversy errupted. Once you add a parameter to Hooke's Law, where do you stop? How do you know what the "true" model is?

Regardless, ever since, the "Maxwell-Voigt" constituitive model has been used for elastomers. But where does the definition of "metal" end and the definition of "elastomer" begin when these models are not based on molecular models? What about systems that use both? It's never been settled.

Currently, it's just a matter of choice. When 2 models produce similar measurement errors, the engineer chooses whatever he is most familiar with. This is the engineering application of Occam's Razor - not what is simplest in terms of math, but what is simplest in terms of familiarity.

3) Correlation is not causation, and yet that is what we're depending on to say the speed of light is constant. With regard to developing models for my engineering job, I have a reference from one of the world experts on model building that (to paraphrase) states that selecting a model is often arbitrary because of the difficulties of correlation. Selecting a different model has huge consequences on the conclusions drawn.

So, in the course of my research, I came across a paper on elastomer mounts (a means of attaching exhaust pipes to an engine). The paper used an exponential constituitive model for the elastomer - something I had never seen before. They used it because they claimed it correlated to their data better than the traditional Maxwell-Voigt model. The modelling expert that I mentioned also happened to study this curiosity, and concluded there was no technical reason to choose between them.

I know this modelling expert, and had a personal discussion with him to express my disagreement. By choosing that model, the engineer had a priori ruled out the possibility of a phenomenon known as a "bifurcation". The expert replied that bifurcations had never been observed for the system being studied.

The problem is, they are known to exist in other systems. I argued that the better approach was to use the standard model, predict where the bifurcations would occur, and then test to see if they did indeed occur ... i.e. a falsification test. Regardless of the result, it would be significant. It would show one of the two models to be wrong. Lack of interest and funding means that test never happened.

So, we don't know which model better represents the physics. This is more than an issue of measurement error.

 

[sandwiches]

You seem to be hung up on a detail that I have said is a misunderstanding of my position. If we can't get past that, I don't know what else to do.

Per my earlier promise, I'll try to use examples to clarify.

A lack of falsification tests doesn't bother you? I thought you were one of these "where's the evidence" kind of guys. Regardless, consider the example of force vs. energy. When Newton first formulated his equations of motion, the fundamental concept was "force". Others came later (LaGrange, etc.) and claimed the true fundamental was "energy", not force. To us this doesn't seem like a big deal because the equivalency of the two approaches has since been proven. But at the time there was a concern that differences in these untestable ideals were going to produce contradictions. If they did, which idea should be thrown out? Force or energy?

To the best of our abilities, there's evidence that the speed of light is c in a vacuum. Now, I'm not sure 'falsification' means what you think it means. Now, if you mean that because our measurements might be billionths of a meter/second wrong, we would never be able to falsify the speed of light because we'd attribute it to a measurement error or some other variable out of our control, then again, I reiterate the phrase TO THE BEST OF OUR ABILITIES. To the best of my ability to measure, I am 5 foot 11.2 inches. Should I be bothered by this lack of imprecision and say that might height is unfalsifiable?

That is the one where we know the answer. In current physics there is one where we don't know the answer. QM and SR do produce different results when dealing with the very small & very massive. Wiccan would know better than me, but I don't think anyone has come up with a way to resolve that. At this point it appears to be an untestable dilemma. As such, we keep both even though we know there is a contradiction.

OK.

A common constituitive model for metals is stress = modulus * strain. In simple terms it defines how "stiff" a metal is - how much it will bend when I apply a force. This model was based on Hooke's Law, and was in play for centuries. Even once elastomers (rubber, plastic, etc.) were discovered this model continued. The differences were dismissed as measurement error. But then people began to play with different models, and a huge controversy errupted. Once you add a parameter to Hooke's Law, where do you stop? How do you know what the "true" model is?

Regardless, ever since, the "Maxwell-Voigt" constituitive model has been used for elastomers. But where does the definition of "metal" end and the definition of "elastomer" begin when these models are not based on molecular models? What about systems that use both? It's never been settled.

Again, I'm not sure 'model' means what you think it means. There's no such thing as 'the true model.' If you mean to ask "How do you know what the most accurate model is? Then it's the one that gives the results closest to predictions based on it. Model are about usefulness for a particular need. That we can still use Newtonian models of gravitation to launch rockets despite us knowing that it's not completely accurate is a good example of this.

Currently, it's just a matter of choice. When 2 models produce similar measurement errors, the engineer chooses whatever he is most familiar with. This is the engineering application of Occam's Razor - not what is simplest in terms of math, but what is simplest in terms of familiarity.

OK.

So, in the course of my research, I came across a paper on elastomer mounts (a means of attaching exhaust pipes to an engine). The paper used an exponential constituitive model for the elastomer - something I had never seen before. They used it because they claimed it correlated to their data better than the traditional Maxwell-Voigt model. The modelling expert that I mentioned also happened to study this curiosity, and concluded there was no technical reason to choose between them.

I know this modelling expert, and had a personal discussion with him to express my disagreement. By choosing that model, the engineer had a priori ruled out the possibility of a phenomenon known as a "bifurcation". The expert replied that bifurcations had never been observed for the system being studied.

The problem is, they are known to exist in other systems. I argued that the better approach was to use the standard model, predict where the bifurcations would occur, and then test to see if they did indeed occur ... i.e. a falsification test. Regardless of the result, it would be significant. It would show one of the two models to be wrong. Lack of interest and funding means that test never happened.

So, we don't know which model better represents the physics. This is more than an issue of measurement error.

So, the guy used the model he was most familiar but you felt wasn't as accurate. OK.

 

[Resha Caner]

To the best of our abilities, there's evidence that the speed of light is c in a vacuum.

And I've explained my issue to the best of my abilities. It seems you still don't get it. I am not using falsification or model as you inferred (hence, for example, the scare quotes around "true" model).

As simply as I can put it: It's not about the accuracy of the measurement. It's about how error can mislead us about the model that underlies that measurement.

What if, for example, we were to find that we actually could identify both the position and momentum of an electron? What would that mean to our understanding of physics? It's just an example. I don't doubt the Uncertainty Principle. I'm not saying I believe that will happen. But what if it did?

Well, it does happen as in the examples I gave.

I guess the last thing I can ask is if anyone understands what I'm saying. Not that someone has to agree, but that they understand. If so, do they think they can explain it better than I have? If so, please do. Otherwise, I'm out of options.

A rather frustrating way to end. I'd rather people understand and disagree than have no idea what I'm talking about.

 

[KCfromNC]

Frustrated maybe, but not offended. I simply thought it was time to explain what dominates your posts as I interpret them. Again, this is just how I read them. If you intend something different, it's not coming through to me.

IMO your posts are dominated by comments on semantic issues. Your very first post said that all you expected was word games. That followed with questions of what I mean by ontology, exist, real. There were more questions about what context I intended for object, location, number, etc.

When I try to define a word, your reply often seems to ask for definitions of the words within the definitions. When I push back on that, your replies become flippant. For example, I don't know whether I should take your definition of "change" seriously. I was not asking you to guess. It is common in communication to paraphrase what another has said as a means to verify understanding. Again, when I asked for that your reply seemed flippant to me. This is, at least, my impression. To that end, I will offer the following:

1. The only words for which I am offering a new definition are "material" and "immaterial".
2. For all other words I will use the definitions specified here:
Dictionary.com | Find the Meanings and Definitions of Words at Dictionary.com
3. The one caveat to #2 is when discussions of math or science require further definition of terms. For example: c = the speed of light in a vacuum
4. Requests for context will be answered in one of two ways:
a) By clarifying which of the multiple definitions offered by #2 is intended
b) With an example. However, all effort should be made by both sides to not expand the example. If the example turns out to be insufficient, it will need to be abandoned in favor of something better.

Is that clear enough? If so, discuss on.

Does anyone else view this is a transparent attempt to avoid discussing my earlier responses?

 

[KCfromNC]

OK. Your answer is different than sandwiches (post #64). I had been asking what thing apart from the brain "speed" refers to and we got a bit diverted for a time.

How does speed refer to the brain in the first place? Speed refers to an object being measured, not the brain observing or thinking about those measurements.

No, that misses the point - actually 3 points - though I suppose some of the differences are subtle.

1) Does a perfect vacuum exist somewhere that we can access? I think the answer is no. If so, our model is based on an ideal that has never physically (materially) manifested. Among other things that means there is no possible falsification test.

Why would you think that measurements should be subject to falsification tests? I think you're confusing several different concepts here.

2) Can one prove that the "error" in a measurement is due 100% to the instrumentation? I would say no. As such, it means there are aspects not being captured by the resulting model, likely will never be captured. If all we're interested in is an engineering "good enough" OK. But that leads to the "we don't know" conclusion I mentioned earlier, i.e. a dead end.

There's a large difference between 100% accuracy and "we don't know".

3) Correlation is not causation, and yet that is what we're depending on to say the speed of light is constant. With regard to developing models for my engineering job, I have a reference from one of the world experts on model building that (to paraphrase) states that selecting a model is often arbitrary because of the difficulties of correlation. Selecting a different model has huge consequences on the conclusions drawn.

How does selecting a different model invalidate measurements of an object's properties. I'm still 5'10" regardless of your opinion on the many-worlds interpretation of QM.

 

[Resha Caner]

Does anyone else view this is a transparent attempt to avoid discussing my earlier responses?

Maybe you missed post #84, but I'm conceding that it appears, at this point, that I've failed to communicate my position. I still think it's a good idea, but if I'm the only one who understands it, then it's pretty useless.

So ask away. I don't see what any of these questions will achieve. Regardless, I'll stick to what I said. If word usage is not clear, note it and I'll identify the associated definition from dictionary.com. If you want an example as further clarification, I'll try to think of one.

How does speed refer to the brain in the first place? Speed refers to an object being measured, not the brain observing or thinking about those measurements.

My question was to ask what thing "apart from the brain" is being referred to. I don't recall ever claiming that "speed refer to the brain", so I just can't make sense of this question.

Are you asking about the discussion regarding human ideas and how one idea can refer to another? Or are you asking about this issue that we can never know "the thing in itself", for which you stated, "How can any human say anything about the thing itself without referring to our human ideas about it? Your idea that there is a thing itself is in fact your human idea about it, along with anything else any other human would say." Or is it something else?

Why would you think that measurements should be subject to falsification tests? I think you're confusing several different concepts here.

No. There seems to be a fixation on a misunderstanding of what I said. I wasn't talking about the measurement, but the model which correlates to that measurement, and that model can (possibly) be falsified.

With that said, measurement is also a model (and I'll give an example in answer to your last comment).

There's a large difference between 100% accuracy and "we don't know".

And? Not the point I was trying to convey with that statement. Is it possible to prove what part of the error is measurement error and what part is due to a lack of model fidelity?

How does selecting a different model invalidate measurements of an object's properties. I'm still 5'10" regardless of your opinion on the many-worlds interpretation of QM.

Every measurement uses a model. Some are so ridiculously simple - both in concept and application - that it's useless to challenge them. " I'm 5'10" " is an example of that. Still, simple as it is, that measurement uses a model. If you want an example of an alternative measure of distance I'll give you one.

But for now, I think the measurement of acceleration demonstrates this better. Acceleration is not measured directly. It is measured with an accelerometer. The actual phenomena is to produce a charge in a crystal. That charge is then conditioned (converted to voltage, amplified, filtered to eliminate cross-talk, etc.). Once a voltage is obtained, it is assumed that this is linearly proportional to acceleration by using Newton's Law (F=ma), i.e. the accelerometer contains a known mass that can be used as a scale factor. Finally, an isolation principle is assumed so that all other mass can be ignored and only the mass of the accelerometer is used in the calculation.

So, the measurement of acceleration depends upon a model of what acceleration is.

 

[sandwiches]

Maybe you missed post #84, but I'm conceding that it appears, at this point, that I've failed to communicate my position. I still think it's a good idea, but if I'm the only one who understands it, then it's pretty useless.

So ask away. I don't see what any of these questions will achieve. Regardless, I'll stick to what I said. If word usage is not clear, note it and I'll identify the associated definition from dictionary.com. If you want an example as further clarification, I'll try to think of one.



My question was to ask what thing "apart from the brain" is being referred to. I don't recall ever claiming that "speed refer to the brain", so I just can't make sense of this question.

Are you asking about the discussion regarding human ideas and how one idea can refer to another? Or are you asking about this issue that we can never know "the thing in itself", for which you stated, "How can any human say anything about the thing itself without referring to our human ideas about it? Your idea that there is a thing itself is in fact your human idea about it, along with anything else any other human would say." Or is it something else?



No. There seems to be a fixation on a misunderstanding of what I said. I wasn't talking about the measurement, but the model which correlates to that measurement, and that model can (possibly) be falsified.

With that said, measurement is also a model (and I'll give an example in answer to your last comment).



And? Not the point I was trying to convey with that statement. Is it possible to prove what part of the error is measurement error and what part is due to a lack of model fidelity?



Every measurement uses a model. Some are so ridiculously simple - both in concept and application - that it's useless to challenge them. " I'm 5'10" " is an example of that. Still, simple as it is, that measurement uses a model. If you want an example of an alternative measure of distance I'll give you one.

But for now, I think the measurement of acceleration demonstrates this better. Acceleration is not measured directly. It is measured with an accelerometer. The actual phenomena is to produce a charge in a crystal. That charge is then conditioned (converted to voltage, amplified, filtered to eliminate cross-talk, etc.). Once a voltage is obtained, it is assumed that this is linearly proportional to acceleration by using Newton's Law (F=ma), i.e. the accelerometer contains a known mass that can be used as a scale factor. Finally, an isolation principle is assumed so that all other mass can be ignored and only the mass of the accelerometer is used in the calculation.

So, the measurement of acceleration depends upon a model of what acceleration is.

Here's my issue with this discussion. You're explaining things and when we agree with them, you seem to go "TADA!" as though that was some major revelation. And then you appear frustrated when we don't understand what it is that we were supposed to get from your explanation.

For instance, we understand that the measurement of acceleration depends on our understanding of acceleration and a model from this. So, I'll ask for the tenth time. Now what? What was the big revelation here? What were we supposed to get from this?

 

[Resha Caner]

Here's my issue with this discussion. You're explaining things and when we agree with them, you seem to go "TADA!" as though that was some major revelation. And then you appear frustrated when we don't understand what it is that we were supposed to get from your explanation.

Yes, so I'm failing to communicate somehow. And we each feel as if we are repeating the same statements over and over. My goal was to gain some common understanding - even if disagreement continues after that.

So, at each step, I'm hoping we obtain that understanding. When we don't, I try to dive deeper. But I think I've gone as deep as I can.

For instance, we understand that the measurement of acceleration depends on our understanding of acceleration and a model from this. So, I'll ask for the tenth time. Now what? What was the big revelation here? What were we supposed to get from this?

Maybe you understand that, maybe you've understood it for a long time, but it's the first time that I recall anyone saying they got it (this particular detail about measurement). If nothing I'm saying is new, then I'm doubly puzzled.

I've heard your question, but each time I respond the reply is something like "it does not follow because". IMO the "because" misrepresents my position. So, I go one layer deeper to explain why.

This is how I would recap ...

Others: No one ever gives a definition of these things.

Me: Definitions of material & immaterial.

Others: So what?

Me: The conclusion would be that light is immaterial.

Others: Why?

Me: Because, for one thing, my definition contains the statement that immaterial things have a constant property. The speed of light is stated to be constant.

Others: Why is "constant" immaterial? Did you just pick that to get the result you wanted?

Me: No. I consider "constant" to be a mathematical concept. Further, I consider math to be an idea of the mind. Therefore, even if mind is material, light does not depend on mind. It does not depend on our idea of "constant".

Others: So? It is what it is. Light happens.

Me: It means we are not perceiving the "thing in itself".

Others: So? Isn't that true of everything we perceive?

Me: There are distinctions. I perceive a cube by touching it. I perceive "constant" by thinking about a human idea. It seems no one can tell me of any reference outside the brain. Therefore, it is immaterial.

Others: We can measure speed.

Me: What if your conclusion of "constant" from that measurement is wrong?

Others: So? We measured it. It is what it is.

Me: No, measurement depends upon a model, and further, the model depends on mathematics. Once again, you are referring to a human idea, not a thing. Yes, we can perceive speed (i.e. motion) by touch (or sight or other senses) just as we perceive the cube by touch. But you didn't perceive "constant" by touch. You are referring to a model - a human idea. You are referring to the immaterial.

Do you disagree with that summary?

 

[sandwiches]

Yes, so I'm failing to communicate somehow. And we each feel as if we are repeating the same statements over and over. My goal was to gain some common understanding - even if disagreement continues after that.

So, at each step, I'm hoping we obtain that understanding. When we don't, I try to dive deeper. But I think I've gone as deep as I can.



Maybe you understand that, maybe you've understood it for a long time, but it's the first time that I recall anyone saying they got it (this particular detail about measurement). If nothing I'm saying is new, then I'm doubly puzzled.

I've heard your question, but each time the answer is something like "it does not follow because". IMO the "because" misrepresents my position. So, I go one layer deeper to explain why.

This is how I would recap ...

Others: No one ever gives a definition of these things.

Me: Definitions of material & immaterial.

Others: So what?

Me: The conclusion would be that light is immaterial.

Others: Why?

Me: Because, for one thing, my definition contains the statement that immaterial things have a constant property. The speed of light is stated to be constant.

Others: Why is "constant" immaterial? Did you just pick that to get the result you wanted?

Me: No. I consider "constant" to be a mathematical concept. Further, I consider math to be an idea of the mind. Therefore, even if mind is material, light does not depend on mind. It does not depend on our idea of "constant".

Others: So? It is what it is. Light happens.

Me: It means we are not perceiving the "thing in itself".

Others: So? Isn't that true of everything we perceive?

Me: There are distinctions. I perceive a cube by touching it. I perceive "constant" by thinking about a human idea. It seems no one can tell me of any reference outside the brain. Therefore, it is immaterial.

Others: We can measure speed.

Me: What if your conclusion of "constant" from that measurement is wrong?

Others: So? We measured it. It is what it is.

Me: No, measurement depends upon a model, and further, the model depends on mathematics. Once again, you are referring to a human idea, not a thing. Yes, we can perceive speed (i.e. motion) by touch (or sight or other senses) just as we perceive the cube by touch. But you didn't perceive "constant" by touch. You are referring to a model - a human idea. You are referring to the immaterial.

Do you disagree with that summary?

I have to admit that when put like that, it is almost a revelation! Now, let me see if I can summarize your position:
You picked 'having a constant' as a property of the immaterial because it is just a concept and not something that is a thing outside of a brain.

Now, assuming I was correct with that, I have a few questions. My pen, under the same environmental conditions, never varies in it's dimensions. They are constant, as it were. They are also equally impossible to measure with 100% accuracy. Does that make my pen immaterial or would something immaterial have to meet all conditions?

Second, the speed of light we call constant because it never seems to change according to empirical data and mathematical models of physics. However, calling it constant is just qualifying a property of light. For instance, my vitamin bottle sitting on my desk has weight, height, width, color, density, smoothness, etc, etc. All these properties, regardless of whether they're constants or not, are only abstractions of the object. There's no weight or height as things outside our minds. So, the question is: Why are properties we have qualified as 'constants' the ones that should be properties of the immaterial? Now, upon rereading your definitions of the immaterial, it seems you picked those properties thinking specifically of light, pretty much.

 

[Resha Caner]

I have to admit that when put like that, it is almost a revelation! Now, let me see if I can summarize your position:
You picked 'having a constant' as a property of the immaterial because it is just a concept and not something that is a thing outside of a brain.

Close. It's difficult to keep one's head in these discussions and not get lost in the digressions. So, maybe I left out an important detail in my recap. Remember that, for this discussion, I have no problem saying the brain is material. As such, brain states are material. Thinking about a cube has a material manifestation. But thinking about a cube is different than the cube itself. So, is thinking about "constant" only a thought - only a material brain state - or does it refer to something? It seemed that some were saying "constant" is only a thought. I contend that something which is only a thought is meaningless. It must refer to something outside the brain. So our material thought of "constant" refers to something immaterial.

Now, assuming I was correct with that, I have a few questions. My pen, under the same environmental conditions, never varies in it's dimensions. They are constant, as it were. They are also equally impossible to measure with 100% accuracy. Does that make my pen immaterial or would something immaterial have to meet all conditions?

Recall that I said my opening definition was intentionally simple. It may be that to conform to the rules of using dictionary.com I would have to replace that with some new term like "omniconstant". That is how your pen example differs from light. If a pen were omniconstant, then all pens would have the same dimensions under the same conditions. That is not the case.

Second, the speed of light we call constant because it never seems to change according to empirical data and mathematical models of physics. However, calling it constant is just qualifying a property of light.

It's much more than that. Relativity is dependent upon the model of the constant speed of light. If it were not constant, many many models would start to crumble. As an example, the color of your car is "just a property". But if the car didn't have an engine, transmission, wheels, or brakes one could hardly call it a car anymore.

Now, upon rereading your definitions of the immaterial, it seems you picked those properties thinking specifically of light, pretty much.

No. That was part of my recap that such was not the case. There are various posts where I gave some history on how these definitions developed.

 

[sandwiches]

Close. It's difficult to keep one's head in these discussions and not get lost in the digressions. So, maybe I left out an important detail in my recap. Remember that, for this discussion, I have no problem saying the brain is material. As such, brain states are material. Thinking about a cube has a material manifestation. But thinking about a cube is different than the cube itself. So, is thinking about "constant" only a thought - only a material brain state - or does it refer to something? It seemed that some were saying "constant" is only a thought. I contend that something which is only a thought is meaningless. It must refer to something outside the brain. So our material thought of "constant" refers to something immaterial.

Recall that I said my opening definition was intentionally simple. It may be that to conform to the rules of using dictionary.com I would have to replace that with some new term like "omniconstant". That is how your pen example differs from light. If a pen were omniconstant, then all pens would have the same dimensions under the same conditions. That is not the case.

It's much more than that. Relativity is dependent upon the model of the constant speed of light. If it were not constant, many many models would start to crumble. As an example, the color of your car is "just a property". But if the car didn't have an engine, transmission, wheels, or brakes one could hardly call it a car anymore.

No. That was part of my recap that such was not the case. There are various posts where I gave some history on how these definitions developed.

Alright. So, let me make sure I understood, then. The speed of light is a constant that is present in all forms of light under specific circumstances (in a vacuum for instance.) This constant speed isn't a thing itself and what we call 'c' or the speed of light is only a mental representation of something that isn't a thing itself. Now, the speed of light is a special property because it seems to be a fundamental part of the universe.

Did I get it?

 

[Resha Caner]

Did I get it?

Yes, that seems a fair paraphrase. So now what?

 

[sandwiches]

Yes, that seems a fair paraphrase. So now what?

I thought you'd tell me!

So, light is immaterial according to your definition. What next?

Specifically, is this related to what is commonly referred to as "the supernatural" versus "the natural?"

 

[KCfromNC]

Maybe you missed post #84, but I'm conceding that it appears, at this point, that I've failed to communicate my position. I still think it's a good idea, but if I'm the only one who understands it, then it's pretty useless.

So ask away. I don't see what any of these questions will achieve.

Already have. You can go back and address any of the posts you dismissed any time you'd like.

I don't recall ever claiming that "speed refer to the brain"

Then why bring up the brain at all?

No. There seems to be a fixation on a misunderstanding of what I said. I wasn't talking about the measurement, but the model which correlates to that measurement, and that model can (possibly) be falsified.

What model, specifically? GR? SR? QM? Mass-energy equivalence? Emission and absorption spectra? Derivations of the fine structure constant? There are lots of models which depend on the value of c. Which ones specifically can't be falsified because we can't produce an absolutely perfect vacuum?

And? Not the point I was trying to convey with that statement. Is it possible to prove what part of the error is measurement error and what part is due to a lack of model fidelity?

It's relevant because you're jumping from "lack of 100% certainty" to "we don't know". I pointed out that large jump because you made it without justification.

And again, you're confusing observations with the models that explain and predict those observations.

Every measurement uses a model. Some are so ridiculously simple - both in concept and application - that it's useless to challenge them. " I'm 5'10" " is an example of that. Still, simple as it is, that measurement uses a model. If you want an example of an alternative measure of distance I'll give you one.

Sure, please give me a falsifiable model which changes the observation that I'm 5'10".

[But for now, I think the measurement of acceleration demonstrates this better. Acceleration is not measured directly. It is measured with an accelerometer.

Or any number of other ways. But I'm not seeing the relevance here. Can you give an example of something which is measured "directly", in the context you're using it here? If not, then whatever distinction you're making is irrelevant in the long run, since observation means "indirect observation" by the way you're defining the words.

Once a voltage is obtained, it is assumed that this is linearly proportional to acceleration by using Newton's Law (F=ma),

Wrong word here. People just didn't randomly guess at this and never check it.

So, the measurement of acceleration depends upon a model of what acceleration is.

This particular method of measuring it, perhaps. But as you say, it's not just a single model, it's cross-checked between two different models (how the accelerometer works and Newton's laws).

But as others have said, what difference does any of this make? It's all interesting trivia but I have no idea how it fits in with your previous ideas, such as the idea that if numbers exist in human cognition that we can't know anything.

 

[KCfromNC]

Yes, that seems a fair paraphrase. So now what?

If I count the number of pennies in a jar every hour on the hour for a week in a row, and the count doesn't change, what about that set of objects is immaterial in your model? And if someone takes a penny away, does that make it material again? Seems like a very strange definition to me, but we'll go with it and see where it ends up.

 

[KCfromNC]

Me: It means we are not perceiving the "thing in itself".

That's kind of a jump. All it means is that the thing we observe doesn't rely on our understanding of it to act as it does. It says nothing about whether or not we're perceiving it correctly. At best you can say we don't know if we're perceiving the thing itself, but I think that hurts your case.

Me: There are distinctions. I perceive a cube by touching it. I perceive "constant" by thinking about a human idea.

Or by getting the same results from repeated observations.

It seems no one can tell me of any reference outside the brain.

The object you've repeatedly measured a constant property of is outside the brain. I think I've mentioned this before.

Me: What if your conclusion of "constant" from that measurement is wrong?

What if your conclusion of "constant" from thinking about it is wrong? I guess we can never know if something is material or not by your definition.

Me: No, measurement depends upon a model, and further, the model depends on mathematics.

I thought you just gave an example of someone rebuilding science without using math?

But you didn't perceive "constant" by touch.

How else do you perceive something has a constant feel other than by touching it multiple times?

 

[Resha Caner]

I thought you'd tell me!

Post #35. I guess we're into discussing objections to my definitions.

Then why bring up the brain at all?

When a misunderstanding occurs, I try not to assume too much. I would prefer you clarify what you said rather than me guess. But you appeared to invert the statement. It is not that speed refers to the brain, but that the idea in the brain refers to the physical manifestation of speed.

As you stated it, I don't know what you're talking about, so I can't reply.

What model, specifically?

Any model that depends upon the concept of a constant speed of light.

And again, you're confusing observations with the models that explain and predict those observations.

Did you not state that we can't say anything about the thing itself without referring to our human ideas about it?

Sure, please give me a falsifiable model which changes the observation that I'm 5'10".

That is not the example I offered. I offered a different measure of distance. Briefly, if one uses affine geometry coupled with Grossman & Katz's definition of exponential arithmetic, one defines "distance" in a manner that is incommensurable with the standard definition - a good indication that one is defining something in a unique way.

But if you're going to take the additional step of asking me to falsify that you are 5'10", let me first explain how falsification happens. A model makes a prediction and specifies a test that will confirm/deny the prediction. If the prediction is denied, the model is falsified.

The statement that you are 5'10" is not a model. It is an application of a model. What, then, is the model? The model is to use the Euclidean concept of a point and to associate those points with a number line based on standard arithmetic. The distance, then, is the difference between the numbers associated with the points. The model is further associated with something material by defining units based on a physical reference. The foot & inch are currently based on the meter, which is in turn defined as the distance traveled by light in a given time. A further aspect of the model, then, is that the physical reference is unchanging (i.e. the speed of light is constant).

How can I falsify that? I can't. The only possible test I could suggest is that the speed of light isn't constant within some agreed upon accuracy. But this leads to something Nagel pointed out. The fact is, past physical references have been shown to be inconstant ... defining "foot" as the length of the king's foot, etc. That didn't, however, lead to a rejection of the model. People just changed the physical reference. It then becomes a semantic argument whether the model was falsified and replaced with a new model or whether it was a correction of the application. In this case I don't really care what people want to call it; I tend to think of falsification in the larger context, e.g. Einstein vs. Newton.

Regardless, the question remains, which model of distance should be used? The standard one, the affine one I offered, or the nominalist one? Shrug. There's no way to falsify any of those, so it just becomes a matter of parsimony. Likewise, do planets revolve around the sun or the earth? Shrug. Picking the "center" is arbitrary, so let's pick the sun because the math is simpler. Is the speed of light constant or does the cesium atom change behavior in different reference frames? (FYI, cesium is the basis for the definition of "second", and, thereby, the definition of "meter"). Shrug. Neither idea can be falsified, but, again, picking light to be "constant" is more parsimonious.

I'm not seeing the relevance here. Can you give an example of something which is measured "directly", in the context you're using it here? If not, then whatever distinction you're making is irrelevant in the long run, since observation means "indirect observation" by the way you're defining the words.

All measurement depends on a model. I wasn't trying to make a distinction, but supporting that statement with an example.

But as others have said, what difference does any of this make? It's all interesting trivia but I have no idea how it fits in with your previous ideas, such as the idea that if numbers exist in human cognition that we can't know anything.

That was not my position. It was a question: Is this where you guys are going? To saying we can't know anything? The general answer was no, that is an extreme and unreasonable skepticism.

If I count the number of pennies in a jar every hour on the hour for a week in a row, and the count doesn't change, what about that set of objects is immaterial in your model? And if someone takes a penny away, does that make it material again? Seems like a very strange definition to me, but we'll go with it and see where it ends up.

This is the same as the pen example. I've answered this.

I guess we can never know if something is material or not by your definition.

The object you've repeatedly measured a constant property of is outside the brain. I think I've mentioned this before.

If you want to go to the "we can never know" thing, there's not much I can do. As I said earlier, I would just have to conclude that I've failed to communicate my position.

We also seem to be in an endless spin on this "thing vs. the idea of the thing" problem, and many of your questions stem from that. In reply to the specific quote above, the object (light) is an example of constant, but is not itself a manifestation of the thing called "constant". When I line up my 3 ducks, I give an example of "3" but the set of ducks is not itself "3". If so, then a line of cats could never be 3 cats because they're not ducks. So, the idea of constant cannot refer to a material thing called "constant". It is a reference to the immaterial.

 

[KCfromNC]

Is the speed of light constant or does the cesium atom change behavior in different reference frames?

It's constant. Lots of different independent tests have been developed to answer this question, and they all point one way. Unless you want to apply some sort of hyper-skepticism to these results, we know the answer.

If you want to go to the "we can never know" thing, there's not much I can do.

You're the one telling us that everything we measure is so intertwined with models that they are unfalsifiable. I'm just consistently applying that same hyper-skepticism to your ideas as well. Doing so makes it impossible to know if anything even fits your criteria for immaterial in the first place.

We also seem to be in an endless spin on this "thing vs. the idea of the thing" problem, and many of your questions stem from that. In reply to the specific quote above, the object (light) is an example of constant

Light isn't a constant. Some of its properties are, but others aren't.

When I line up my 3 ducks, I give an example of "3" but the set of ducks is not itself "3". If so, then a line of cats could never be 3 cats because they're not ducks. So, the idea of constant cannot refer to a material thing called "constant". It is a reference to the immaterial.

No one says that a duck is 3, just that a the count of a group of them might be. Keeping this in mind, you'll have to show that just because two sets share one characteristic (the same count, in this case) that they must share all of them. If you can't, your second sentence makes no sense.

And again, counting the number of physical objects in a set obviously refers to something physical. - the things being counted. Sure, we use shorthand of numbers instead of saying "it's the same count as the result Bob got 2 years ago counting how many cows he had", but that shorthand doesn't mean that suddenly the thing being communicated is immaterial.

Also, didn't the answer to your pen example require immaterial things to be omniconstant? If that's true, then the number 3 in these examples doesn't refer to an immaterial constant since the count of either set of animals can change, just like the dimensions of the pen or the number of coins on my desk. So I guess the conclusion here is that 3 sometimes refers to the immaterial and other times not. Are there two types of 3 out there then, one for constants and the other for variables? This seems like an awfully confusing way to look at the world with very little gain in utility.

 

[Resha Caner]

Did you not state that we can't say anything about the thing itself without referring to our human ideas about it?

Is there a reason you didn't answer the above question?

It's constant. Lots of different independent tests have been developed to answer this question, and they all point one way. Unless you want to apply some sort of hyper-skepticism to these results, we know the answer.

I've got no problem in saying it's constant. But please explain to me how you would falsify my alternative.