Supernatural philosophy/natural philosophy

[sandwiches]

You didn't use that word, but if my definitions are no better than saying things are blue and not blue, you came pretty close.

You repeated a question I had already answered.

I assume you mean this in a "for the sake of the argument" sort of way.

It doesn't. Your paraphrase of what I said earlier belies a misunderstanding between us - one I've tried to explain many times. I see definitions as a means for closing that gap, but maybe the ones I gave are not yet fundamental enough. I'm just not sure you're actually interested enough to dig deeper.

So, let me ask you a question. The speed of light in a vacuum is approximately 3E8, which is denoted as c. What is your position on the ontology of the number c?

What do you base your definitions of material/immaterial?

Now, as far as your question, I'd be lying if I said I know what you're asking, exactly.

 

[TrutherAU]

So many terms that mean the same thing, Spiritual=supernatural=metaphysical on the other side of the coin Naturalism=Positivism=Empircism one wonders why the english language has so many words for the same concept or at least why academia comes up with so many!.

I think this thread highlights what is wrong with Religion generally spiritually void & very much just another materialistic institution for bogus victorian era moralists designed to imprison the mind!. I am sure some of you just like it that way as well. Philosophy is actually the worst method to approach this subject,especially if you are coming at it from an empirical position, already this thread looks to have turned into pointless sophistry what is to be proved by this, the metaphysical dimensions do not require such pointless treatment.

 

[Resha Caner]

What is your position on the ontology of the number c?

I'd be lying if I said I know what you're asking, exactly.

Ontology: The study of the nature of existence.

What is the nature of the existence of the number c? Eventually I would add "as it relates to light," but maybe even that is too much for now.

 

[sandwiches]

Ontology: The study of the nature of existence.

What is the nature of the existence of the number c? Eventually I would add "as it relates to light," but maybe even that is too much for now.

I have to say that I am not sure what you mean. But I'll do my best: c is the variable that represents the speed of light in a vacuum.

 

[Resha Caner]

I have to say that I am not sure what you mean. But I'll do my best: c is the variable that represents the speed of light in a vacuum.

This is probably going to offend you, but I have to wonder if you're the same person I used to talk to. You've never been this obtuse before. Or maybe it's just an amusing game - Poe's Law and such makes it hard to tell.

Does the number c exist?

P.S. If you're wondering, "Where is all this going?" it relates to my definition of immaterial - specifically that it has a constant attribute - if that helps at all. It's just that, at the moment, we're not even on the ground floor of understanding - we're somewhere in the basement wandering around in the dark looking for the stairs.

 

[KCfromNC]

This is probably going to offend you, but I have to wonder if you're the same person I used to talk to. You've never been this obtuse before. Or maybe it's just an amusing game - Poe's Law and such makes it hard to tell.

Does the number c exist?

Yes, it's right here ----^

Perhaps the obtuse answers you're getting are due to the obvious word games we're about to be subjected to.

 

[Resha Caner]

Perhaps the obtuse answers you're getting are due to the obvious word games we're about to be subjected to.

I realize people are suspicious of that, whether because they think I'm being devious, I'm too naive to know better, or whatever they think the reason is. It is what it is.

As I've already said once, if I'm trying your patience, just ignore me. I'm not going to continue posting if I get no replies, so don't encourage my trolling if that's what you think this is.

Yes, it's right here ----^

OK, so are numbers an object in the same way that a chair is an object - a thing. More specific to your comment, do numbers have location?

The chair is here but not there.
C is here but not there.

 

[Eudaimonist]

OK, so are numbers an object in the same way that a chair is an object - a thing. More specific to your comment, do numbers have location?

That's a much better question than asking if a number exists. I'm speaking off of the top of my head, so my language may be imprecise.

Numbers, IMJ, are a cognitive and abstract means for conceptualizing relationships between entities. They may be a count of conceptually grouped entities, or a measurement of entities or their relationships in terms of some unit of measurement. (I may be leaving out some uses of numbers, but these are the two that come to mind.)

Numbers can be so abstract that they can be mentally divorced from any particular entities. We may speak of "one" without speaking of "one marble" or "one millimeter as measured by a ruler".

Even despite their "non-material" aspect, they are aspects of brain function, and so they exist in the sense that brain activity exists. I'm not speaking here of the referent of numbers, but their existence as a reference.


eudaimonia,

Mark

 

[Resha Caner]

That's a much better question than asking if a number exists.

I was intentionally trying to leave the question as open as possible rather than leading with it. I've tried asking questions several different ways, and my conclusion is that many people just like to complain.

The question has become very narrow. As such, we're a long way from having the discussion I would like to have. I'm willing to carefully lay the foundation, but people also complain about how long that takes.

Numbers, IMJ, are a cognitive and abstract means for conceptualizing relationships between entities. They may be a count of conceptually grouped entities, or a measurement of entities or their relationships in terms of some unit of measurement. (I may be leaving out some uses of numbers, but these are the two that come to mind.)

Numbers can be so abstract that they can be mentally divorced from any particular entities. We may speak of "one" without speaking of "one marble" or "one millimeter as measured by a ruler".

Even despite their "non-material" aspect, they are aspects of brain function, and so they exist in the sense that brain activity exists. I'm not speaking here of the referent of numbers, but their existence as a reference.

Very close to my own thoughts on the matter. One big debate in number theory is whether sets are necessary. In layman's terms, people in favor of the necessity of sets think of "number" as having the same role as an adjective in language. It describes an attribute of a thing, but is not itself a thing.

These people tend to be called "fictionalists". But that position does have a problem. Even if number exists as an abstraction in the brain (whether one wants to say that means it is purely abstract or whether it is a material part of the brain), light existed before the brain (both evolutionists and creationists can agree on that, oddly enough). That means c is not necessary for light to function. If so, it should be possible to describe the function of light without c. People who try to do that are called "nominalists", and the most famous is Hartry Field if you want to look him up.

 

[Eudaimonist]

Even if number exists as an abstraction in the brain (whether one wants to say that means it is purely abstract or whether it is a material part of the brain), light existed before the brain (both evolutionists and creationists can agree on that, oddly enough). That means c is not necessary for light to function.

Perhaps I'm missing some nuance of the position of the fictionalists, but I don't see how that is a problem. All one need do is recognize that existence is not dependent on understanding, or to put that another way, that the nature (that is, the behavior) of a referent is not dependent on the existence of a reference.

If c is a human way of describing an attribute of light, that does not make light in any way dependent on the existence of the "adjective" c. A description is, after all, just a description, not the attribute or entity itself. It is important to retain the distinction between reference and referent.


eudaimonia,

Mark

 

[KCfromNC]

OK, so are numbers an object in the same way that a chair is an object - a thing. More specific to your comment, do numbers have location?

Sure, when you write them down they're right there on paper. Just like words - math is just a more precise type of language, with all the positives and negatives that implies (ignore the pun).

OK, so are numbers an object in the same way that a chair is an object - a thing. More specific to your comment, do numbers have location?

Depends on the context. As I said, if you write down a number it has a location. If you're asking if the 3 in "3 apples" exists in a specific location, no it doesn't - it's a property of the set of objects. Or maybe it does, in the sense that it's something that exists in the mind of the observer which is located in their brain. Kind of like red - apples are red, but the red doesn't exist as an independent entity. Or naming a dog Fido - the name exists but is it an object? Depends on what you mean by exists and object, I guess.

 

[sandwiches]

This is probably going to offend you, but I have to wonder if you're the same person I used to talk to. You've never been this obtuse before. Or maybe it's just an amusing game - Poe's Law and such makes it hard to tell.

It's not offensive and it's not malice but simple ignorance on my part. ;P

I simply don't know what "ontology of..." and "nature of the existence of..." mean.

Does the number c exist?

P.S. If you're wondering, "Where is all this going?" it relates to my definition of immaterial - specifically that it has a constant attribute - if that helps at all. It's just that, at the moment, we're not even on the ground floor of understanding - we're somewhere in the basement wandering around in the dark looking for the stairs.

Alright. So, light does seem to travel at a constant speed in a given medium. Does that answer the question? Or are you asking in a more literal manner regarding 'c?'

 

[Resha Caner]

Or maybe it does, in the sense that it's something that exists in the mind of the observer which is located in their brain. Kind of like red - apples are red, but the red doesn't exist as an independent entity.

I'm not after the mind-body thing. So, for the sake of this discussion, I'm willing to consider human thought to be a material thing.

Depends on the context. As I said, if you write down a number it has a location. If you're asking if the 3 in "3 apples" exists in a specific location, no it doesn't - it's a property of the set of objects.

You seem to lean toward and away from the fictionalist position I mentioned. That's not necessarily a problem. Maybe your position is perfectly coherent, but I get the impression this is just coming off the top of your head. The camps of mathematical philosophy are legion, so you could probably find one that suits your taste.

But I will point out that one must distinguish the symbol from the number. Three, 3, III, and 11_2 are all symbols that refer to the same number. So, even if the symbol has a location, that doesn't mean the number has a location.

 

[Resha Caner]

Alright. So, light does seem to travel at a constant speed in a given medium. Does that answer the question? Or are you asking in a more literal manner regarding 'c?'

Maybe you need to look at the questions in post #47. I was trying to avoid a leading question - to give you a chance to express your position. But it seems you don't have one, and others have said they like the questions in #47 better.

 

[Resha Caner]

All one need do is recognize that existence is not dependent on understanding, or to put that another way, that the nature (that is, the behavior) of a referent is not dependent on the existence of a reference.

I agree with both of those statements. But as I said to KC, the symbol is not the number. So, to what is the symbol referring? More on that below.

Perhaps I'm missing some nuance of the position of the fictionalists, but I don't see how that is a problem.

I don't see a problem either, but that's because of something I accept that you don't. So, I'll answer you in 3 parts. First, number exists in God's mind, which preceded the creation of all material things. So, for me, the immaterial can exist in a mind, and the material can be dependent upon that.

Without that, I think fictionalism does have a problem. So, second, if you want to cut to the heart of the matter, and if you don't mind pushing through some mathematics, read Science Without Numbers by Hartry Field. He is a nominalist - rejects fictionalism. His approach is not to try to prove fictionalism wrong, but to show what nominalism can accomplish. If science can be successfully done without numbers, it seems to follow tacitly that fictionalism is false. I have some problems with his book, so I don't accept his conclusion. But, it is an impressive work. His development of a numberless theory of gravity is very impressive.

Third, if you don't understand where Field is coming from, his book probably won't seem very impressive. So, I'll start talking through some of the background. First, in math theory, "number" (the concept) is not the same as "numeral" (the symbol). So, what Field is trying to do is formulate science without reference to number (the concept).

For example, multiplication can be defined as repeated addition: 4*1 = 1+1+1+1. So, multiplication (as a concept) refers to another concept (addition). It refers to "number". Even if I write it as x*y, it refers to "number". Does that chain end anywhere? Is addition also a concept that refers to a concept? Is there some concept at the bottom that refers to something material? Take the number 3 as an example. If I line up 3 ducks am I referring to number or to a physical structure? (FYI the latter is the "structuralist" answer to the issue). Field would contend that 3 ducks invokes the concept of a "set", and set is a mathematical concept - it is numerical - it refers to number (i'm not quite sure what the proper wording would be).

Number has some very unique properties. Other adjectives can be said to be a property of a thing. If a house is red, red is a property of the house. Even if I have 3 red houses, red is still a property of each individual house, whereas "3" is not. I can't have a "2" house and a "3" house like I can have a red house and a blue house. When I have 3 red houses, I am referring to a set.

Somehow, the cognititive aspect must be removed. So, nominalists use concepts like "identity" and "between" instead of "equal" and "greater than"/"less than".

So, there is a concept you might be missing: If light is not dependent on human cognition, and if number (c, the speed of light) is only a human cognitive function, then "speed of light" should not refer to number, but to some physical attribute. Put another way: If "speed of light" refers to c, a number which exists only via human cognition, then "speed of light" is also merely human cognition. We never leave the human brain by such a process, but end up in some infinite loop where we're never perceiving anything.

One answer would be to say we don't "know" what the speed of light is. It is just the human cognitive understanding of the thing, not the thing itself. That is the "instrumentalist" approach to science, an approach I happen to agree with. They would say science is a model and nothing more. But what many scientists hate about the instrumentalist idea is that it starts to unravel everything.

It means we don't know if c is actually a constant. We don't know if photons exist (are real), etc. etc. etc. In the end, we don't know anything. Someone might be willing to argue that position here at CF, but I doubt anyone really lives their life that way.

So, when we use the number c as a symbol for the speed of light, to what material thing (what thing apart from human cognition) does that symbol refer?

 

[KCfromNC]

You seem to lean toward and away from the fictionalist position I mentioned.

Like I said before, a lot of this depends on what definitions you use for things like "real" and "exist", so it's no surprise that my answer isn't very specific.

But I will point out that one must distinguish the symbol from the number. Three, 3, III, and 11_2 are all symbols that refer to the same number. So, even if the symbol has a location, that doesn't mean the number has a location.

This seems to assume there's some sort of immaterial ideal number three out there that's only hinted at by written symbols, which is begging the question.

 

[KCfromNC]

I agree with both of those statements. But as I said to KC, the symbol is not the number.

In the same sense that none of the collection of letters here are the words you think you are using? In other words, only if you assume there's some sort of immaterial numbers floating around that serve as the ideal the symbols hope to refer to some dim shadow of.

None of this is a problem if you just realize that math is a language people use to best describe certain properties.

If science can be successfully done without numbers, it seems to follow tacitly that fictionalism is false.

If you can order dinner in English, French isn't a useful language in some situations? In other words, just because you can do something without a certain tool doesn't mean that tool isn't useful. I can describe a race without ever using the word fast - doesn't mean that fast isn't a valid word.

But, it is an impressive work. His development of a numberless theory of gravity is very impressive.

This doesn't sound that revolutionary - we teach physics to people who don't know calculus all the time. It's more difficult, but that's what happens when you avoid the best tool or language for the job available.

If I line up 3 ducks am I referring to number or to a physical structure?

Neither. You're referring to the process of lining up ducks. But a line of 3 ducks refers to both a number and physical structure of the collection. So I guess line is something which also refers to a set of things, which makes the idea below :

Number has some very unique properties.

not as true as you might think. Can't have a line of one thing, so I guess numbers aren't unique in being applicable only to a set.

Other adjectives can be said to be a property of a thing. If a house is red, red is a property of the house. Even if I have 3 red houses, red is still a property of each individual house, whereas "3" is not.

What if the house has white shutters? House aren't uniformly one color, it's just a shorthand for a summary of the most common color of the set of parts which make up the house. So just like numbers, color in this example refers to a property of a set of things. We just have a shorthand in language to refer to the set of parts as a single object in this case. So a house isn't a uniform indivisible object, it's a set of components - lumber, roofing material, wiring, drywall, and so on. Color is referring to the properties of a subset of these materials.

You could extend your example and say a neighborhood has 25 houses, so you've got a single object (the neighborhood) with a number attached to it. Word games work in both directions here.

So, there is a concept you might be missing: If light is not dependent on human cognition, and if number (c, the speed of light) is only a human cognitive function, then "speed of light" should not refer to number, but to some physical attribute.

It doesn't "refer' to a number, it refers to how quickly light propagates in a vacuum. A number is used to concisely communicate our measurement of the physical attribute in question. There are lots of ways to describe the speed of light, but as you've discovered, using a symbol to represent the number we've measured / defined saves a lot of typing.

Put another way: If "speed of light" refers to c, a number which exists only via human cognition, then "speed of light" is also merely human cognition.

This hopelessly confuses human models of a physical system with the reality of the system itself. Of course human-made models of a system rely on human cognition. That doesn't put any requirements on the system itself.

We never leave the human brain by such a process, but end up in some infinite loop where we're never perceiving anything.

What? Human brains perceive something external so the process is internal to the brain and our perception of the external doesn't perceive anything? I really hope this isn't an accurate description of what professionals actually think.

One answer would be to say we don't "know" what the speed of light is. It is just the human cognitive understanding of the thing, not the thing itself

Yes, our knowledge of something isn't that something. Obviously. But understanding it means we don't "know" it? There's lots of unstated assumptions there, for sure.

That is the "instrumentalist" approach to science, an approach I happen to agree with. They would say science is a model and nothing more. But what many scientists hate about the instrumentalist idea is that it starts to unravel everything.

It means we don't know if c is actually a constant. We don't know if photons exist (are real), etc. etc. etc. In the end, we don't know anything.

Depends on what you mean by "know" and "actually" and "exist". I doubt you'll find many working scientists who believe they have found absolute truth (that's why god invented error bars), so I think you're setting up some philosophy-of-science idealized scientist strawman here. We do the best with the limited tools we're given. It doesn't give us absolute truth (just like every other approach), it just gets us better accuracy and reproducibility than anything else we've tried so far.

So, when we use the number c as a symbol for the speed of light, to what material thing (what thing apart from human cognition) does that symbol refer?

Depends on the context of the problem you're trying to solve. The constant appears in lots of formulas.

If you're asking which number it refers to, for any sane calculations at energies where it matters, it's obviously 1. The units are left as an exercise to the reader.

 

[Resha Caner]

This seems to assume there's some sort of immaterial ideal number three out there that's only hinted at by written symbols, which is begging the question.

You seem to be missing several things:
1) A mathematical set is not constrained to groups of more than 1. It can have 1 member. It can even be empty.
2) I disagree with Field's nominalist position, but at least I can appreciate the cleverness of what he did. If I didn't present it well, maybe you should read it for yourself. [edit] Maybe it would give you more a sense of what he's after if I said he tries to do science (not just teach concepts) without numbers. And it's not just an issue of calculus. That means not even something as simple as addition.
3) You shifted the analogy for color by adding things to the definition that I didn't specify. As I presented it, it is perfectly valid. I could choose something else if you prefer - a cube of only one color. The purpose of the analogy was to compare something that obviously need not refer to number (such as color) with number itself.
4) I was specifically separating the human idea of something from the thing itself.
5) Along the vein of #3, you seem to miss that saying a number is merely language is not satisfactory. When I write the word "cube", it's not like I think those letters are the cube. But they do refer to something physical - to something I perceive. If number refers to nothing, then it's a useless concept.

So, I was trying to point out that one idea can refer to another idea. No problem with that. But light is something we can perceive. It's not just an idea. So, at some point, we move from referring to an idea to referring to something we consider to be real.

If number is just an idea, then referring to the speed of light with the statement, "The speed of light = c" is a reference to an idea, not to something we perceive. If that's all science is - mind games about imaginary things - well, I don't think I would find it as useful as I do for my daily job.

So, when we perceive velocity, what physical thing are we perceiving? The question is again phrased differently, but it's the same thing I've been trying to ask all along.

 

[KCfromNC]

You seem to be missing several things:
1) A mathematical set is not constrained to groups of more than 1. It can have 1 member. It can even be empty.

Doesn't change anything I've said.

2) I disagree with Field's nominalist position, but at least I can appreciate the cleverness of what he did. If I didn't present it well, maybe you should read it for yourself. [edit] Maybe it would give you more a sense of what he's after if I said he tries to do science (not just teach concepts) without numbers. And it's not just an issue of calculus. That means not even something as simple as addition.

I'm sure it's an interesting exercise, but just because you can doesn't mean you should. Nor does it say anything about the alleged failings of other approaches.

3) You shifted the analogy for color by adding things to the definition that I didn't specify. As I presented it, it is perfectly valid. I could choose something else if you prefer - a cube of only one color.

Considering that you gave an example of how numbers are not unique in that they only refer to sets of things, the whole point is irrelevant since other words in various languages have the same property. Or it shows that the objection about numbers is really an objection about any type of communication at all.

4) I was specifically separating the human idea of something from the thing itself.

How can any human say anything about the thing itself without referring to our human ideas about it? Your idea that there is a thing itself is in fact your human idea about it, along with anything else any other human would say. No fair trying to pretend you have some sort of privileged position here. What we're discussing are various different human ideas of the thing itself, not a distinction between human ideas and the thing itself.

5) Along the vein of #3, you seem to miss that saying a number is merely language is not satisfactory. When I write the word "cube", it's not like I think those letters are the cube. But they do refer to something physical - to something I perceive. If number refers to nothing, then it's a useless concept.

But numbers don't refer to nothing. They are [often] used as a way to describe or communicate observations, just like the word cube is in a particular natural language.

So, I was trying to point out that one idea can refer to another idea. No problem with that. But light is something we can perceive. It's not just an idea. So, at some point, we move from referring to an idea to referring to something we consider to be real.

Ideas aren't real?

If number is just an idea, then referring to the speed of light with the statement, "The speed of light = c" is a reference to an idea, not to something we perceive.

Again, this seems to be a limitation of any use of language, not just mathematics. By talking about the speed of something, you're referring to and idea, not something we perceive? Seems exactly the same as the claim you're making about using math to communicate, so I don't see why it wouldn't apply equally here. Nor do I see how it matters. When we communicate ideas, obviously we're talking about ideas. Some of them are ideas about things we've observed, other times about things we feel, other times about things we're making up, and any number of other things. I don't see how the particular language chosen makes the ideas more or less real. That's confusing the medium with the message.

So, when we perceive velocity, what physical thing are we perceiving?

• Change in position over time.
• [dx/dt, dy/dt, dz/dt] or [dr/dt, dθ/dt, dz/dt] or [dΘ/dt, dΦ/dt, dr/dt] or ... well you get the idea, I'm not going to type out tensor algebra here.

The first bullet uses natural language, the second uses more formal language(s) to answer your question. Why does one refer to something physical and the second refer to something not real.

Hmm, this is a perfect place to throw in a pun about imaginary numbers but I'll resist.

 

[Resha Caner]

This hopelessly confuses human models of a physical system with the reality of the system itself.

How can any human say anything about the thing itself without referring to our human ideas about it? Your idea that there is a thing itself is in fact your human idea about it, along with anything else any other human would say. No fair trying to pretend you have some sort of privileged position here. What we're discussing are various different human ideas of the thing itself, not a distinction between human ideas and the thing itself.

I never claimed any privileged position. I don't even know where that came from. I realize that in your view our communication problems are 100% my fault, but you honestly confuse me. You seem to say one thing one time, and the opposite another time - hence the 2 quotes above. If it really is all my fault, I guess you'll just have to stoop to my level and hope I can improve.

When I read the word "cube", yes it associates with something in my brain. The same when I see or touch a cube. But in spite of that similarity, I consider those 2 cases to be very different. Do you see differences in those 2 cases? If so, what?

Ideas aren't real?

This just seems like a debating tactic. A way to pick apart the semantics rather than address the content. Here's a challenge for you. Take a shot at fixing my statement with a word you think is better than "real" as a way to convey what you perceive to be my intention.

I'm sure it's an interesting exercise, but just because you can doesn't mean you should. Nor does it say anything about the alleged failings of other approaches.

There may not be much point in discussing this further unless we can clear up a few of the other issues, but I'll try one more time. This is not about language and saying something one way versus another. I understand what a synonym is. With Field specifically, it is about identifying what is necessary. Is the concept of number necessary? He would say it is not. So, his book is not a simple paraphrase of science. It is science without the concept of number.

Change in position over time.

So now define "change" for me in the specific context in which you used it without the concept of number. Your calculus notation involves the concept of number, and you yourself have basically said that this is just words that mean the same thing as your calculus notation.

And, so I don't have to mention this later, you probably need to define what you mean by position in order to define how it changes.

Hmm, this is a perfect place to throw in a pun about imaginary numbers but I'll resist.

It very much applies to our discussion. Do you know what a phase plane is?