Shall we take apart the Euthyphro Dilemma piece by piece?

[2PhiloVoid]

Yes, we shall.

So, I'll start. I'll start with a simple affirmation:

The Euthyphro Dilemma is firmly contingent upon, and originated from, and can only be applied to, an ethical analysis involving the concept of POLY-THEISM at its core.

Note: For those who are new to the idea, the Euthryphro Dilemma is an ontological and axiological problem entailed in an answer to the following Socratic/Platonic inquiry: "Is the pious [the Moral Good] loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it pious because it is loved by the gods?"​

Thus, Christianity---a MONO-THEISTIC religion---is not included in any application of ethical analysis that comes by way of reference to this overly used Socratic dilemma.

Offer your rebuttals, complaints, or other misgivings about my affirmation above, below ...

 

[mkgal1]

Isn't the dilemma which came first, piety or love? IOW....are the pious loved for their piety....or are the pious that way *because* they're loved, is what i understand the dilemma to be. I can see that applicable to monotheism.

 

[Caliban]

Yes, we shall.

So, I'll start. I'll start with a simple affirmation:

The Euthyphro Dilemma is firmly contingent upon, and originated from, and can only be applied to, an ethical analysis involving the concept of POLY-THEISM at its core.

Note: For those who are new to the idea, the Euthryphro Dilemma is an ontological and axiological problem entailed in an answer to the following Socratic/Platonic inquiry: "Is the pious [the Moral Good] loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it pious because it is loved by the gods?"​

Thus, Christianity---a MONO-THEISTIC religion---is not included in any application of ethical analysis that comes by way of reference to the overly used Socratic dilemma.

Offer your rebuttals, complaints, or other misgivings with my affirmation above, below ...

Euthyphro, like any good thought experiment, transcends its original use. It works for any claim that proposes a benevolent god (or gods). In its original context, the piety of the Greek gods is challenged by showing they could not be both capable of stopping evil/tragedy and maintain goodness. This dilemma works for many gods or one. Actually, it works best with one maximally powerful god because in the Greek pantheon, one god could subvert the will and actions of another. A single god has no external limitation to its will.

 

[zippy2006]

In its original context, the piety of the Greek gods is challenged by showing they could not be both capable of stopping evil/tragedy and maintain goodness.

Clearly you have never read the Euthyphro.

 

[2PhiloVoid]

Isn't the dilemma which came first, piety or love? IOW....are the pious loved for their piety....or are the pious that way *because* they're loved, is what i understand the dilemma to be. I can see that applicable to monotheism.

Not really, Sister Mkgal1. If you read Plato's work, Euthyphro, you'll see that its Socratic argument and analysis goes beyond simply the question of whether the Chicken or the Egg came first.

 

[zippy2006]

Note: For those who are new to the idea, the Euthryphro Dilemma is an ontological and axiological problem entailed in an answer to the following Socratic/Platonic inquiry: "Is the pious [the Moral Good] loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it pious because it is loved by the gods?"

Why couldn't the dilemma be modified by replacing "the gods" with "God"?

 

[Xenophon]

Yes, we shall.

So, I'll start. I'll start with a simple affirmation:

The Euthyphro Dilemma is firmly contingent upon, and originated from, and can only be applied to, an ethical analysis involving the concept of POLY-THEISM at its core.

Note: For those who are new to the idea, the Euthryphro Dilemma is an ontological and axiological problem entailed in an answer to the following Socratic/Platonic inquiry: "Is the pious [the Moral Good] loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it pious because it is loved by the gods?"​

Thus, Christianity---a MONO-THEISTIC religion---is not included in any application of ethical analysis that comes by way of reference to the overly used Socratic dilemma.

Offer your rebuttals, complaints, or other misgivings with my affirmation above, below ...

Well, that's Socrates argument on the doorstep of the court. When a young man says he can help Socrates win his court case based on the 'will of the Gods.' Socrates refutes and dismisses him on the basis that there is no single will and no single good based on the very multiplicity of the gods.

It is not inherently solved by monotheism, but monotheism has many forms. Monotheisms of mere 'ontological oneness' or monadistic fall into the trap Caliban describes.

Ultimately, classical Christianity overcomes the dilemma by a Godhead which is a, kind of union between a monad and triad (without a dyad) which is called Trinity and proper distinctions between nature, person/hypostasis, and will. This means that there is both unity and distinction in the Godhead, explaining access and communion, which in turn breaks the dilemma.

 

[2PhiloVoid]

Why couldn't the dilemma be modified by replacing "the gods" with "God"?

Essentially, because...............[drum roll]............"Socrates" spots what he thinks is an inconsistency in the contingent ethical thinking of his interloctor and then proceeds to explicate the inherent problem between the Good and the god's love of the good. The problem being brought about due to the fact that within the pantheon involved, the gods.............[gasp!!!!!!!]........can disagree with one another.

Oh, God forbid!

 

[2PhiloVoid]

Well, that's Socrates argument on the doorstep of the court. When a young man says he can help Socrates win his court case based on the 'will of the Gods.' Socrates refutes and dismisses him on the basis that there is no single will and no single good based on the very multiplicity of the gods.

It is not inherently solved by monotheism, but monotheism has many forms. Monotheisms of mere 'ontological oneness' or monadistic fall into the trap Caliban describes.

Ultimately, classical Christianity overcomes the dilemma by a Godhead which is a, kind of union between a monad and triad (without a dyad) which is called Trinity and proper distinctions between nature, person/hypostasis, and will. This means that there is both unity and distinction in the Godhead, explaining access and communion, which in turn breaks the dilemma.

Ewwwwww! Nice!!! I like the sound of this. Feel free to keep going, Xenophon!

 

[zippy2006]

Essentially, because...............[drum roll]............"Socrates" spots what he thinks is an inconsistency in the contingent ethical thinking of his interloctor and then proceeds to explicate the inherent problem between the Good and the god's love of the good. The problem being brought about due to the fact that within the pantheon involved, the gods.............[gasp!!!!!!!]........can disagree with one another.

Oh, God forbid!

Socrates refutes and dismisses him on the basis that there is no single will and no single good based on the very multiplicity of the gods.

There is a stage of Plato's argument in which he focuses on the fact that the gods' opinions differ at times, but he also moves beyond that stage, making a deeper criticism when he redefines piety as that which all the gods love:

I said to myself: "Well, and what if Euthyphro does prove to me that all the gods regarded the death of the serf as unjust, how do I know anything more of the nature of piety and impiety? for granting that this action may be hateful to the gods, still piety and impiety are not adequately defined by these distinctions, for that which is hateful to the gods has been shown to be also pleasing and dear to them." And therefore, Euthyphro, I do not ask you to prove this; I will suppose, if you like, that all the gods condemn and abominate such an action. But I will amend the definition so far as to say that what all the gods hate is impious, and what they love pious or holy; and what some of them love and others hate is both or neither. Shall this be our definition of piety and impiety? (ICA)
​

In general, though, I agree that Socrates was not intending to attack monotheism, but that doesn't mean that a modified form of the dilemma cannot be wielded against monotheism.

 

[2PhiloVoid]

Euthyphro, like any good thought experiment, transcends its original use. It works for any claim that proposes a benevolent god (or gods). In its original context, the piety of the Greek gods is challenged by showing they could not be both capable of stopping evil/tragedy and maintain goodness. This dilemma works for many gods or one. Actually, it works best with one maximally powerful god because in the Greek pantheon, one god could subvert the will and actions of another. A single god has no external limitation to its will.

...hmmm. That's something to think about. ....... DING! Done!

The problem with your response here is that you've got a mere collection of [...excuse me while I count them...] ... one...two...three.... six, essentially six, "just so" statements in need of a heck of a lot of buttressing, all of which is missing here, of course.

No, the dilemma/argument here DOES NOT transcend its original use, and especially NOT simply because you say it does without clear and extensive demonstration. Your attempted points here are not default positions with no need of deeper, further explication, an explication that needs to directly deal with the entire work of Plato's Euthyphro and its use by other subsequent philosophers or theologians in centuries afterwards.

 

[Caliban]

Clearly you have never read the Euthyphro.

You are wrong about that.

 

[2PhiloVoid]

There is a stage of Plato's argument in which he focuses on the fact that the gods' opinions differ at times, but he also moves beyond that stage, making a deeper criticism when he redefines piety as that which all the gods love:

I said to myself: "Well, and what if Euthyphro does prove to me that all the gods regarded the death of the serf as unjust, how do I know anything more of the nature of piety and impiety? for granting that this action may be hateful to the gods, still piety and impiety are not adequately defined by these distinctions, for that which is hateful to the gods has been shown to be also pleasing and dear to them." And therefore, Euthyphro, I do not ask you to prove this; I will suppose, if you like, that all the gods condemn and abominate such an action. But I will amend the definition so far as to say that what all the gods hate is impious, and what they love pious or holy; and what some of them love and others hate is both or neither. Shall this be our definition of piety and impiety? (ICA)
​

In general, though, I agree that Socrates was not intending to attack monotheism, but that doesn't mean that a modified form of the dilemma cannot be wielded against monotheism.

I'd think, then, that you, dear brother Zippy, would need to move on to the sections of Euthyphro involving 'how' and exactly in what terms, and to which exact ethical entities, Socrates refers to and analyzes AFTER the ending question is posed in your nice quote above .......

Moreover, I think it should go without saying that if my specific reference in my OP was to Christianlity and not to just any ol' form of 'mono-theism,' then that curtails the focal point and nexus of where the conceptual problems actually lie here and to its application to what I'm referring to.

 

[zippy2006]

I'd think, then, that you, dear brother Zippy, would need to move on to the sections of Euthyphro involving 'how' and exactly in what terms, and to which exact ethical entities, Socrates refers to and analyzes AFTER the ending question is posed in your nice quote above .......

Moreover, I think it should go without saying that if my specific reference in my OP was to Christianlity and not to just any ol' form of 'mono-theism,' then that curtails the focal point and nexus of where the conceptual problems actually lie here and to its application to what I'm referring to.

I am content to leave my points there. I will only point out that, even apart from apologetics, the Euthyphro concepts are applicable to intra-Christian dialogue and theology in various ways. The debates around Scotism and Voluntarism, the tensions between Christian virtue ethics and Christian deontology, and the debates around the motive for loving God ("mercenary vs. filial love") and John Piper's "Christian Hedonism," are just a few examples of places where the distinction that Socrates makes relates to the Christian religion. Jesus' point of contrasting Pharisaical legalism with the divine love of the Spirit--hearts of stone vs. hearts of flesh--really sets Christianity off on a similar footing of assessing goodness intrinsically rather than extrinsically.

 

[Caliban]

...hmmm. That's something to think about. ....... DING! Done!

The problem with your response here is that you've got a mere collection of [...excuse me while I count them...] ... one...two...three.... six, essentially six, "just so" statements in need of a heck of a lot of buttressing, all of which is missing here, of course.

No, the dilemma/argument here DOES NOT transcend its original use, and especially NOT simply because you say it does without clear and extensive demonstration. Your attempted points here are not default positions with no need of deeper, further explication, an explication that needs to directly deal with the entire work of Plato's Euthyphro and its use by other subsequent philosophers or theologians in centuries afterwards.

I can address your concern if I know one simple thing--what do you think is the crux of the Dilemma? What is it getting at? Can you pleas sum it up in as few words as possible for clarity's sake or would you agree with this summary:
‘is an action right because it is commanded by the gods, or do the gods command it because it is right?’

 

[2PhiloVoid]

I can address your concern if I know one simple thing--what do you think is the crux of the Dilemma? What is it getting at? Can you pleas sum it up in as few words as possible for clarity's sake or would you agree with this summary:
‘is an action right because it is commanded by the gods, or do the gods command it because it is right?’

Since a picture can be worth a thousand words, I'll just condense my own position of understanding about Socrates' argument to Euthyphro as such:

Breaking the Circle - by Ivan Kosta

 

[Caliban]

Since a picture can be worth a thousand words, I just condense my own position as such:

Breaking the Circle - by Ivan Kosta

Wow--great. Now I really know why you think. Perfectly clear.

 

[2PhiloVoid]

I can address your concern if I know one simple thing--what do you think is the crux of the Dilemma? What is it getting at? Can you pleas sum it up in as few words as possible for clarity's sake or would you agree with this summary:
‘is an action right because it is commanded by the gods, or do the gods command it because it is right?’

Wow--great. Now I really know why you think. Perfectly clear.

And ......... "I think" that Socrates is right, but IF and only IF we're discussing the world of ethics in relation to the Grecian style pantheon ...

I also agree with Socrates that we should "no longer ignorantly indulge in loose speech and innovation," which is what an attempt to apply his argument to Christianity would be ...

 

[Caliban]

And ......... "I think" that Socrates is right, but IF and only IF we're discussing the world of ethics in relation to the Grecian style pantheon ...

I also agree with Socrates that we should "no longer ignorantly indulge in loose speech and innovation," which is what an attempt to apply his argument to Christianity would be ...

I think what you are are not recognizing is that the Euthyphro Dilemma is recognized by all (or nearly all) moral philosophers as relevant to issues relating to all forms of moral derivation involving theistic constructs. For example: here is an article from the National Institute for Health demonstrating the use and application of Euthyphro in secular and religious concepts of moral philosophy.

Here is another from the peer reviewed IEP connecting the Dilemma to Divine Command Theory. You may say these things are not connected or you might want to say it is "more complicated" in some way. That's fine. Share your opposition research and convince the readers of this thread. I'll read it--maybe others will too.

When the vast majority of public intellectuals, Universities, and the average person use the Euthyphro Dilemma as a touchpoint for discussing morality and theism--you can't simply dismiss it without evidence.

 

[durangodawood]

Yes, we shall.

So, I'll start. I'll start with a simple affirmation:

The Euthyphro Dilemma is firmly contingent upon, and originated from, and can only be applied to, an ethical analysis involving the concept of POLY-THEISM at its core.

Note: For those who are new to the idea, the Euthryphro Dilemma is an ontological and axiological problem entailed in an answer to the following Socratic/Platonic inquiry: "Is the pious [the Moral Good] loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it pious because it is loved by the gods?"​

Thus, Christianity---a MONO-THEISTIC religion---is not included in any application of ethical analysis that comes by way of reference to the overly used Socratic dilemma.

Offer your rebuttals, complaints, or other misgivings with my affirmation above, below ...

Well done. You dispatched it with ease!

Now, how about dawood's dilemma: "Is the pious [the Moral Good] loved by God because it is pious, or is it pious because it is loved by the God?"