Shall I take that as a tacit acceptance on your part of the fact that an inflationary multiverse concept isn't particularly "plausible" for the reasons he outlines?
No, take it as saying you didn't answer the question.
So how exactly does that differ from the concept of the existence of an intelligent creator?
It differs by
not being the concept of the existence of an intelligent creator, but rather the prediction of a widely used physical hypothesis.
What you're also kind of glossing over is that in order to falsify inflation, you'd have to have observations which specifically relate to "non uniformity", which you would immediately try to associate with interactions with another 'bubble universe" rather than accepting such an observation as a falsification of inflation.
No; an interaction with another bubble volume would apparently leave a characteristic imprint on only part of the CMB. Inflation explains the overall distribution of the CMB (as well as cosmological isotropy, homogeneity, the flatness of spacetime, and the lack of magnetic monopoles).
Was it? When was it first proposed, by whom, and why, and which *specific* variation are you talking about? The first time I heard the term was in direct relationship to 'eternal inflation', after the 1980's.
Inflation was proposed by Alan Guth in 1981; Steinhardt described eternal inflation in 1983, and the anthropic principle problem arose out of a subsequent debate on how to calculate statistical probabilities in an eternal model that produced a potentially infinite number of bubbles with varying physical properties.
we have exactly zero evidence that more than a single universe exists, or that any of them deviate from the physical laws that we observe here on Earth. How would we even begin test such a concept in the first place?
I don't know. Inflation explains a number of puzzling observed features, but also has implications that some people are uncomfortable with. The best way to solve the problem is to come up with a better explanation that fits the data and is more palatable (though frankly in the meantime they can still use what is relevant to our universe and simply ignore the bits that are causally isolated from us).
So how do you justify the "plausibility" of proposing different universes with different physics laws, while trying to deny the "plausibility" of all of that deviation being done by a "creator"
I'm not denying that anything could be done by a "creator" (I presume you mean God?). I'm saying that given my criteria for plausibility in this context (described previously), the predictions of a widely accepted hypothesis with a solid physical and mathematical basis, are more plausible than invoking an ill-defined and ontologically inexplicable 'creator' entity. Eternal inflation may not rank very high by common abductive criteria, but inevitably outranks the bottom dwellers (the supernatural, mystical, magical, etc).
I'm yet to get an answer as to how the God hypothesis is a better hypothesis than 'magic', or what abductive criterion it satisfies in any respect.
If you're going to propose an "anything is possible" set of universes, why would you "assume" that an intelligent creator exists in *none* of them?
Strawman. Nobody suggested 'anything is possible', and nobody said an intelligent creator didn't exist in any - e.g. humans are intelligent creators that exist in one. As long as your intelligent creator is consistent with the physics of some physically
possible universe, you're welcome to imagine an infinite number of them, of all
physically possible varieties.
You'd have to explain to me what you think makes *any* suggestion of a *any* multiverse concept is "better"/more plausible than any other. I don't really see much of an empirical difference frankly because most of the same criticisms would still apply. How would I go about validating or falsifying *any* of them (unrelated to inflation)?
The scientific plausibility of any prediction depends to a large degree on the robustness of the theory that predicts it and the additional assumptions it requires. The plausibility to any given individual will be additionally influenced by personal biases.
So perhaps you'd like to explain why
you don't think the patchwork or 'quilted' cosmological multiverse is plausible?
Alternatively, you could try to explain why
you don't find the quantum multiverse plausible...
IOW what do you see as the scientific or philosophical arguments against them?
Is that an appeal to authority fallacy by chance?
No; a request for authoritative corroboration is quite different from an appeal to authority (which is insisting that a claim is true simply because a valid authority or expert on the issue said it was true, without any other supporting evidence offered).
Thanks, that was quite amusing... Ostrowick clearly doesn't hold a high opinion of restricted theism or traditional models of pantheism:
"
...it is quite possible to construct a model of pantheism which is not as implausible as restricted theism or traditional models of pantheism..."
And to add insult to injury, he puts his idea in the same plausibility ball-park as Boltzmann brains. So, understandably, he's not making any claims for it:
"...in the end, it will not do the same job as restricted theism, even if it turned out to be true. The article does not aim to defend its premises ... in more than a cursory way; the conclusions of the article are tentative and conditional: if functionalism is true, then physicalist pantheism may be true."
If you read the paper, there are a number of very dubious arguments; but his implication that if cosmologists can accept one sort of disembodied consciousness (Boltzmann brains), other forms of disembodied consciousness should be equally plausible - misses the point that Boltzmann brains are supposed to be (very briefly)
identical to biological brains, so disembodied only in the sense of an organ removed from its body, not in the sense of being independently viable (equivocation or ignorance? you be the judge).
Then there's the speculative requirements for consciousness, and the hand-wavingly vague definition of functionalism, "
...anything structured a lot like a brain will give rise to consciousness"(!), and the cargo-cult 'Law of Similars' (that you used earlier), where superficial resemblance is equated to structural similarity, and so to functional equivalence... He chooses gravity waves for communication rather than electromagnetic waves, but like you, fails to grasp the speed of gravity relative to the size of the structures involved.
Make your terms sufficiently vague and hand-wave wherever possible, and you can make a '
wildly speculative' case that any old tosh is less implausible than '
restricted theism or traditional models of pantheism.'
It's almost a POE, except that he admits it's "
wild speculation", and that, in any case,
"... physicalist pantheism (PP) does not in fact give us any explanatory benefits."
Some chuckles in there, but it's hardly a vote of encouragement for physical pantheism!