reading Sam Harris take on morality

[Jeff S]

I've started going through Sam Harris book The Moral Landscape hoping to eventually do a review of it. He is, after all, one of the four horsemen of atheism and should be one of those most knowledgeable and likely to offer an explanation on moral knowledge that counters theistic thinking. I've read through chapter one. Here's my thoughts on him.

Harris is obviously anti-Christianity from some of what he says (and i won't go into detail here) So he enlists the aid of science, instead of religion of any sort, to decide what is moral or immoral. But first he must jump over what has been called the "is-ought" fallacy. That states that you cannot find what you "ought" to do from what "is." That's because what something "is" is merely a description of what exists in the world or how it exists while an "ought" dictates the behavior you should engage in and is not descriptive of the state of the world. These are two different things. Let's see how Harris navigates around that obstacle.

Harris, early in chapter one, says that science will tell you what you should do and should want and therefore what other people should do or should want. This, he says, centers on our concept of well-being. This definitely has some merit. Science can certainly tell me what vitamins or pills to take for high blood pressure just as it can tell me that drinking less soda is better. It certainly can do the same for others. In this sense science is helpful.

But what about other circumstances? Science can tell us that most people want to maximize the amount of money in their accounts. I suppose sociological studies will tell us that. However, some people want to increase their "takings" at the expense of others who would rather have the money themselves. Think of some public sector employees or big corporation executives. In fact, a scientific study will probably show that many people will, if they can get away with it, take something from others. In this case, science, per Harris, shows us people want certain things - the same things that other people want to take from them. What, at this point, does Harris's moral system do? This is the main problem I find with his argument: that one group of people can say they want something while another group of people might say "tough, I know you want that but I, instead, want to take it from you."

What we have here are two groups of people who want something - one perhaps selfishly. Harris might say that we should value what benefits the well-being of others. The natural question is "but why." "Why," a skeptical doubter might say, "should I value his or her interest in that item when I want the item myself and would benefit from having it?" That, I think, is a question that Harris cannot answer

 

[zippy2006]

Harris, early in chapter one, says that science will tell you what you should do and should want and therefore what other people should do or should want.

Question: how does Harris attempt to bridge the is/ought problem? How does science get to this "should"?

 

[durangodawood]

I agree that human well being is the standard by which moral rules succeed or fail. (Expandable to the well being of the rest of the living world, but we can leave that aside).

I dont see whats so complicated about evaluating theft in this light.

A world where its OK to steal stuff willy nilly will be pretty miserable to live in for most people - as a matter of observable fact. So, we correctly call stealing wrong for that reason.

 

[Not David]

I only remember Sam Harris being accused of being Islamophobic

 

[essentialsaltes]

Question: how does Harris attempt to bridge the is/ought problem? How does science get to this "should"?

He fails spectacularly, as far as I can tell, by never really addressing it.

As OP notes, he basically defines morality as maximizing well-being (some sort of utilitarianism, I suppose) and then assumes that well-being is something that can be measured objectively by science.

IMNSHO, the idea of an objective wellbeingometer is absurd. It can't be as simple as one measure, like picking which face you feel like.

So it has to incorporate a lot of different things that go into a 'total wellbeing score'.

Suppose Sam built a wellbeingometer and discovered that women in cultures that wear hijab have more wellbeing (more positive feelings of community and belonging, less anxiety about appearance) than those that don't (who may have more positive feelings of 'being attractive' or 'being myself').

Would he accept that result, or would he just declare that the wellbeingometer was improperly calibrated, and assign greater weight to the latter forms of wellbeing?

His previous writings would seem to make that clear. So the wellbeingometer, is not really objective, but rather an epitome of Sam Harris' subjective views about wellbeing.

[Now I don't think Harris ever actually talks about wellbeingometers, even as a hypothetical object, but his stance would seem to require that such a thing is possible, and indeed would be necessary in order to really scientifically test what rules maximize wellbeing. Harris, I think, just ignores the entire question in a huge blindspot.]

Massimo Pigliucci's review of the book expresses a lot of this, probably better than I have.

 

[quatona]

But first he must jump over what has been called the "is-ought" fallacy. That states that you cannot find what you "ought" to do from what "is." That's because what something "is" is merely a description of what exists in the world or how it exists while an "ought" dictates the behavior you should engage in and is not descriptive of the state of the world. These are two different things. Let's see how Harris navigates around that obstacle.

Has anyone (be they religious or not) ever managed to successfully bridge the is-ought gap?

 

[durangodawood]

Has anyone (be they religious or not) ever managed to successfully bridge the is-ought gap?

You have to assume some axiomatic values, like "we should be well rather than miserable".

Once you do that, lots of IS implies OUGHT.

 

[quatona]

You have to assume some axiomatic values, like "we should be well rather than miserable".

Once you do that, lots of IS implies OUGHT.

(Emphasis added)
Sure, but since "should" and "ought" are basically the same, someone who asks for an "ought" without an "ought" will never be satisfied (unless, of course, they just ignore the fact that their own morality starts with "oughts" rather than them being the end result).

 

[zippy2006]

He fails spectacularly, as far as I can tell, by never really addressing it...

Okay, thanks for this post. Pigliucci's observation that Harris is using 'science' to denote any intellectual context that discusses facts is probably also relevant. 300 pages might not be enough for such an ambitious project.

 

[grasping the after wind]

You have to assume some axiomatic values, like "we should be well rather than miserable".

Once you do that, lots of IS implies OUGHT.

You also have to assume that what leads to well being or being miserable are the same for every individual. Something which I do not see any evidence to suggest is true. Harris is just off base thinking there is such a thing as objective morality. The difference between is and ought is totally subjective. There is no objective reason to think that one thing is morally better than something else. The only way we ever decide what is good or bad is to subject it to how well it jibes with our own POV.

 

[durangodawood]

You also have to assume that what leads to well being or being miserable are the same for every individual. Something which I do not see any evidence to suggest is true. Harris is just off base thinking there is such a thing as objective morality. The difference between is and ought is totally subjective. There is no objective reason to think that one thing is morally better than something else. The only way we ever decide what is good or bad is to subject it to how well it jibes with our own POV.

Sure we're different at the fringes.

But most of us really do like the same things:
-contentment rather than fear
-freedom rather than slavery
-food rather than hunger
-life rather than getting murdered
-material security rather than poverty
-health rather than sickness
-friendship rather than loneliness

Whether a moral rule enables those or not is a matter for objective inquiry.

Far flung outliers like psychopaths are out of luck. The rest of us are against you.

 

[durangodawood]

(Emphasis added)
Sure, but since "should" and "ought" are basically the same, someone who asks for an "ought" without an "ought" will never be satisfied (unless, of course, they just ignore the fact that their own morality starts with "oughts" rather than them being the end result).

Oh yeah, I figured should and ought should (and ought to) be considered the same.

I dont know what the big mystery is about value-axioms. In fact some of them may be hard wired and available to objective scrutiny.

For instance: "we prefer food over starving". Thats an IS. Given some more info about our environment, we can get some OUGHTS from that, I think

 

[grasping the after wind]

Sure we're different at the fringes.

But most of us really do like the same things:
-contentment rather than fear
-freedom rather than slavery
-food rather than hunger
-life rather than getting murdered
-material security rather than poverty
-health rather than sickness
-friendship rather than loneliness

Whether a moral rule enables those or not is a matter for objective inquiry.

Far flung outliers like psychopaths are out of luck. The rest of us are against you.

What you are speaking of is the subjective preferences of the consensus of people not an objective morality. If it was objective then the talk of us being so many against the few others is silly. The objective truth would be all one needed. In fact, depending on what the objective moral truth was we all could be the wrong ones and the few could be correct.

Morality is about the correctness of our actions not about meeting our wants and needs.

For instance, is it morally upright to take things away from other people because we want or even think we need those things? Does some objective truth tell us or is it based upon what we consider to be fair or just or on what we assume to be self evident?

 

[durangodawood]

What you are speaking of is the subjective preferences of the consensus of people not an objective morality. If it was objective then the talk of us being so many against the few others is silly. The objective truth would be all one needed. In fact, depending on what the objective moral truth was we all could be the wrong ones and the few could be correct....

Since when does objective mean universal? It doesnt. All we need for some basic human preferences to be considered objective is that the scientific study of human behavior reveals them to be highly typical.

...Morality is about the correctness of our actions not about meeting our wants and needs.....

Of course morality is about meeting our natural wants and needs. If not, then its totally arbitrary.

For instance, is it morally upright to take things away from other people because we want or even think we need those things? Does some objective truth tell us or is it based upon what we consider to be fair or just or on what we assume to be self evident?

I have heard that we're hard wired with a sense of fairness, probably from our evolution as a social species. Additionally, I think humans can see for themselves pretty quickly that a culture with no respect at all for property will be awful to live in. Not sure if this is what youre getting at tho.

 

[grasping the after wind]

Since when does objective mean universal? It doesnt. All we need for some basic human preferences to be considered objective is that the scientific study of human behavior reveals them to be highly typical.

Since when does preference mean objective? It doesn't. What could n be more subjective than a preference? Most people prefer chocolate cake to castor oil. Does that mean that chocolate cake is morally superior to castor oil?

 

[durangodawood]

Since when does preference mean objective? It doesn't. What could n be more subjective than a preference? Most people prefer chocolate cake to castor oil. Does that mean that chocolate cake is morally superior to castor oil?

Of course human preference is available to objective inquiry. Just like the preferences of any other animal that we study. You dont have to get into their heads and fuse with their subjectivity. You can see what they prefer by how they behave.

 

[Ken-1122]

Question: how does Harris attempt to bridge the is/ought problem? How does science get to this "should"?

What is the "is/ought" problem? And how is this supposed to be bridged?

 

[essentialsaltes]

What is the "is/ought" problem? And how is this supposed to be bridged?

Wikipedia.

 

[quatona]

Oh yeah, I figured should and ought should (and ought to) be considered the same.

I dont know what the big mystery is about value-axioms. In fact some of them may be hard wired and available to objective scrutiny.

For instance: "we prefer food over starving". Thats an IS. Given some more info about our environment, we can get some OUGHTS from that, I think

(emphasis added)
Well, some people would prefer morality to be "objective", and they do not accept anything as "objective" that is based on human preferences. They will keep asking "why should we... (e.g. do what we prefer)"?
They think this is a good strategy to tackle non-theistic moralities (but unfortunately forget that the same strategy can be used against theistic moralities, as well: "why should we... (e.g. do what God commands?)".
IOW: They criticize other moralities for having value axioms, but are unable or unwilling to see that every morality (especially their own) necessarily starts from value axioms.

 

[jayem]

I have heard that we're hard wired with a sense of fairness, probably from our evolution as a social species. Additionally, I think humans can see for themselves pretty quickly that a culture with no respect at all for property will be awful to live in. Not sure if this is what youre getting at tho.

Absolutely. What we call morals, at the most basic level, are behavioral instincts hard wired in our brains by our evolution as social primates. And what drives evolution is reproductive success. But 2 qualifiers are important to understand:
1) Our species evolved when we lived in smallish tribes and extended family clans. So our instinctive inhibitions on anti-social behavior, like killing or stealing resources from others, are much more directed towards members of our own tribe. Because pro-social, cooperative behaviors obviously increase the likelihood that our tribe will survive and grow over the generations. Our interactions with those of different tribes, or those unlike, or unknown to us, can be much different.
2) With our big brains, much—and likely most—of our behavior is shaped by learning. Learning and acculturation can modify our basic instincts—sometimes reinforcing them, and sometimes suppressing them.

What a scientific approach to ethics does (I prefer the term naturalistic, rather than scientific) is to explain the how and why of morals. Normative ethics, which is how to determine specific moral choices, is a very different topic.