Open Theism VS. Traditional Doctrine

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MarkRohfrietsch

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Stipulations:


  1. Topic:Open Theism VS. Traditional Doctrine
  2. Affirmative: rogueapologist
    Opposing: elopez
  3. Rounds: 3; additional rounds may be added by mutual agreement of both parties.
  4. Alternating rounds starting each with rogueapologist being the first post.for a total of 6 posts.
  5. Time limit between posts: 1 week maximum, there is no minimum.
  6. Maximum length for each post: Limited to the preset maximum post size (I don't know just how big that is... but it's big;)).
  7. Quotes and References are allowed; Please note that all quotes will fall under the 20% rule. (Note: since rogueapologist is still under 50 posts, and therefore can not post links, for fairness; links will not be allowed.
  8. Start Date: As soon as possible.
The Peanut Gallery for this debate can be found here:
Formal Debate-Peanut Gallery-Open Theism VS. Traditional Doctrine

 

rogueapologist

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Some Introductions

At first blush, the a discussion regarding a technical definition of divine omniscience might seem fairly innocuous--yet another example of theologians and philosophers proving once again just how "valuable" they are to society. Despite the levels on which this criticism is most certainly true, the discussion does have significant import to Christian teaching. The doctrine of God's divine knowledge, after all, is no subject of unimportant minutiae; rather, as a fundamental aspect of God's very nature, omniscience has dramatic consequences to nearly every principle within Christian theology…especially when one begins the arduous (if not questionable) process of systematization.

So it is with no lack of reverence that I begin my defense of a variation of Open Theism, a doctrine which I believe not only properly describes the fundamental nature of God's divine knowledge in relation to that which God has created, but more importantly has been misunderstood and misrepresented by its detractors. In the series of posts that follow, I shall endeavor to accomplish the following:

  • Articulate a brief rendering of Open Theism which is both philosophically sound and theologically relevant
  • Describe the grave shortcomings which exist in the contrarian position
  • Respond to objections

Start at the End

To give away the ending, so to speak, Open Theism (or "Open Futurism", in Gregory Boyd's words) is a belief that the knowledge of God does not extend to future events, that the future is outside the pale of God's knowing. While OT's detractors are quick to suggest that this "lack" of knowledge about the future signals something of a "limitation" or "inability" on the part of God, such a conclusion is not justifiable…at least not in a technical sense. Open Theism does not teach that God is unable to know the future, as if God's lack of knowledge about the future is somehow rooted in a deficiency or "lack" within the divine mind. To the contrary, OT suggests that the future is not known to God (or anyone else, for that matter) precisely because the future does not exist to be known.

In this regard, the future-as-not-existing is not an object of knowledge, for it is no-thing. It is, however, not a no-thing in the sense that empty space, being actually something, is flippantly considered "nothing". Rather, the future-as-not-existing is completely lacking in any form of ontology. As no-thing, then, the future cannot be known…in fact, we must "ontologize" the future as a artificial extension of existence in order to even "name" it. So then, we find no manner of inability within God regarding this lack of knowledge, for how can it be charged as a weakness or inability within the divine mind to lack knowledge of that which has no ontology? How can God be criticized for knowing no-thing? Such a conclusion is self-evidently nonsensical.

In light of this, OT's detractors often suggest that the main failing is that such a perspective of the "non-existence" of the future, while perhaps explaining how God can not have knowledge of the future and still be spoken of as omniscient, does not take into consideration another important aspect of divine knowledge: its immutability.

The Immutability Canard

These two pillars--infinity and immutability--are cornerstones of any robust conception of divine omniscience. If one has immutability without infinitude of knowledge, God has an unchanging knowledge of only a subset of all that can be known (certainly not an exhaustive understanding of "all-that-there-is"). And if God has infinite knowledge, but this knowledge lacks permanence, severe challenges to divine sovereignty would be engendered.

Therefore, detractors of OT are right to question whether or not OT's understanding of divine omniscience can pass the test of immutability. After all, if God does not know the future (because it doesn't exist), doesn't God's knowledge change as "future" obtains? Isn't there something "added to" divine knowledge as history moves and grows, given that God had no pre-knowledge of this events before they were actualized?

While this is a certainly legitimate line of questioning, I believe the answer is fairly straightforward, and can be conceptualized via an analogy to the universe.

Consider the universe. By definition, the universe is "what is". As such, it is infinite--there is nothing "outside", "before" or "after" the universe, for the very definitions of space/time emerge from within the actuality of the universe-as-it-is, not some vantage point external to the universe (of which there can obviously be none). In this way, then, whether the universe is "measured" in duration or distance, both inevitably point to the universe as all-that-there-is, as infinite.

This is an important concept to grasp, for now matter how one views the universe at any particular "moment" or "position" within space-time, the universe is constantly infinite. Notwithstanding the phenomenological changes (expansion, contraction, reduction to a single point) that might occur, the universe remains "what is", it remains the infinite sum of reality. Therefore, there can be conceived no change that can occur that adds to or diminishes the infinity of the universe. If it is 15 billions light years across, or the smallest point of singularity possible, the universe--as "what is"--remains infinite, and no measurement or slight of perception can alter that reality in any way.

I think, then, that we can use this understanding of the relative immutable infinity of the universe as a foil for thinking about the nature of divine knowledge in relation to events which occur in space time.

God's knowledge, like the universe, is infinite. It encompasses all that "is". But for God this "is", it must be understood, is actually unquantifiable. For example, we often think that divine omniscience means that God has knowledge of discreet objects and realties, as if "x", "y" and "z" were something of a collection of objects by which the actuality or non-actuality of God's omniscience can be measured. However, this does disservice to the infinity of God's knowledge, for not only does God have infinite knowledge of that which God has created (a finite, yet infinite set), but God also has infinite knowledge of Godself, whose being and existence is certainly unquantifiable. Because divine knowledge, then, is unquantifiably infinite, there can be no extension or diminution of the content or, in fact, the very nature of divine knowledge by any supposed "change" in the content of God's knowledge. In all things, the scope (unquantifiable infinity) of God's knowledge remains the same, immutability exhaustive of all that is.

Emergence and Divine Knowledge

These conclusions lead me, ultimately, to my operative principle for divine knowledge vis-a-vis the future obtaining reality. I would propose that God's knowledge of the universe-as-it-is, contrary to being "fixed" or even preemptively related to creation, actually "emerges" with God's very acts of creations. I use the plural "acts", of course, because of the presupposition that God has not created "once and for all" at some point in temporal or eternity "past", but is rather bringing creation into being ex nihilo with every moment/state of space-time that obtains. However, because God's nature and knowledge remain unquantifiably infinite, the emergence of the universe-as-it-is with each creative act is incorporated seamlessly into God's perfect and exhaustive knowledge (the scope of which remains "all that is"). And furthermore, because each moment of creation ex nihilo is emergently incorporated into divine omniscience, there is--importantly--also no "change" which can be said to occur within divine omniscience; as God's knowledge remains infinitely inclusive of all that can be known (and exclusive of only that which does not exist, which is absurd), God's omniscience suffers no mutability.

(I will expand upon this important concept of emergence in divine knowledge regarding creation ex nihilo when I discuss the dangers which I see present in more "classic" conceptions of divine omniscience).

Conclusion

Of course, there is much more than can and should be said on this subject. However, I hope that this illuminates, at least in part, a coherent way of holding together the central tenants of Open Theism which concomitantly preserving a strong affirmation of the infinite and immutable nature of divine omniscience.
 
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elopez

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God is known in Christendom to be omniscient. What that means exactly is usually disagreed on, and so in this debate I wish to clarify, according to traditional doctrine, what it means for God to be omniscient. Traditional doctrine states that God knows all -- the past, present, and the future. God has known everything there is to be known from all eternity. God obviously knows the past. He knows what is happening now, and He has known everything. I would say God has foreknowledge to the extent that the word is anthropomorphism so we can better understand the infallible omniscience of God. However, when it comes down to it foreknowledge means God having knowledge of an event before it happens.

In the most simplistic sense "omniscient" means "all – knowing." "Omni" is literally "all" or "universally," and the suffix "science" is "knowledge" or "knowing." God has knowledge of all things. He understands and knows things in a universal way. So God knows everything there is to be known. This is an eternal knowledge of all creation.

Since to be omniscient means to have knowledge of everything, it would require that said knowledge is perfect. The knowledge would not be open for correction. It would be infallible. If it is said by the Open Theist that god does not know the future, then there are things which are not known by god. If that is so, he is not all knowing as the future would encompass "everything." So, it seems that there cannot be an omniscient being as Open Theism would have it. There is no room for guess work in an omniscient being, either, so it’s not as if god would have known something could happen and still is omniscient; he would have to know with certain, perfect, knowledge of what is going to happen. This only goes to show that perfect knowledge is not something a god of open theism is described as attaining. God being perfect in knowledge is even displayed in Scripture, so to advertise one’s view opposed to such is highly erroneous.

Job 37:16 -"Do you know the balancing of the clouds, the wondrous works of him who is perfect in knowledge?"

Psalm 147:5 - "Great is our Lord and mighty in power; his understanding has no limit."

1 John 3:19-20 - "By this we shall know that we are of the truth and reassure our heart before him; for whenever our heart condemns us, God is greater than our heart, and he knows everything."

Something also to consider is the nature of God in respect to divine perfection. God is perfect, and not just in knowledge. We know this from Scripture: Matthew 5:48. "Perfect" here means “brought to its end, finished; wanting nothing necessary to completeness.” In relation to man it means to be consistent and regular, not Holy and sinless such as God is. Only God is perfect.

According to this view of Open Theism then, god must come to know something that has not yet happened and thus must be 'in time' to know it. If god must be in time to know something, then there is a change from not knowing to knowing. If there is a change in god, he is not perfect, since to be perfect is to be wholly complete, needing nothing in addition to be complete. If something changes it would be for the better or worse, and since god would be able to know what is happening and interact accordingly it would presumably be for the better, so god would change for the better. See, something that is needed is added. However, God should not need anything to make Him 'better,' for He is already the maximum being that exists. Coming to apprehend something would change the nature of god in a direct way since there would be an experience of temporality just we experience it. Yet this cannot be true since God’s nature is perfect. Also, since it must be logically maintained that god changes in nature, neither can it be said he is immutable.

Immutability suggests that God cannot change in nature. This is true from Scripture:

Malachi 3:6 - "I the Lord do not change."

James 1:17 – "Every good and perfect gift is from above, coming down from the Father of the heavenly lights, who does not change like shifting shadows."

Hebrews 6:18 – "God did this so that, by two unchangeable things in which it is impossible for God to lie, we who have fled to take hold of the hope set before us may be greatly encouraged."

Another seeming issue with Open Theism is that of the temporal nature god would have to take on to become aware of what is going to happen. He would have to change his ontological existence (again contradicting immutability) since god would have at least been atemporal sans creation, and now after creation, in time or temporal. So what does this mean on face value? If god exists in time, does that mean he occupies time and space? And that just begs the question of how then could an incorporeal being occupy space? Or does god become incarnate again as with the Son, but then that would make the Son’s incarnation nearly moot. God is infinite, so how could he be in time when time and thus temporality is not infinite itself? All of these are nagging questions of Open Theism and as of now seem to have no satisfactory answer to.

This leads me to delve into my position even further. God did occupy time and space through the Son Christ, so in that sense it wouldn’t be inappropriate at all to say God is temporal, or at least was temporal via the Son's incarnation. In relation to the Trinity, God the Father is not the Son, hence the Father could still be atemporal while Christ is on earth experiencing temporality. Thus, it is best to maintain that God is both outside and in time according to a Trinitarian view. God is in time insofar as Christ the son was incarnated. God is outside of time insofar as the Father exists the same as He did sans creation as He does with creation.

We know God can be said to exist outside of time being that He is eternal. We know God is eternal from Scripture, such as,

Deuteronomy 33:27 - "The eternal God is your refuge, and underneath are the everlasting arms: and he shall thrust out the enemy from before you; and shall say, Destroy them."

1 Timothy 1:17 - "Now to the King eternal, immortal, invisible, the only God, be honor and glory for ever and ever. Amen."

God is eternal, which means He existed prior to the universe, hence He created the universe. Time began when the universe did, so time began at the moment of creation. If God existed prior to the universe, then He also existed prior to time. God is therefore existent outside of time.

The future is an objective aspect of reality. We can distinguish what has happened in the past, what could happen in the present, and may plan for the future. We know we cannot foresee the future, although we can anticipate and expect based on human behavior. This is because we are temporal beings. God, however, can also be said to be an atemporal being in relation to the Trinity. If God exists outside of time, then the future can in no way hinder God in anyway. What we deem as the future is an aspect of time, which God is above, and thus is not effected by. In this sense, that the future hasn't actually happened yet doesn't seem like an issue for God being able to percieve of it perfectly.

This brings up my last point for this round. The universe was created by God. That means the universe has a beginning, unlike the Creator God. If the universe was created and had a beginning, it cannot possibly be infinite. Well, what exactly do you mean by "infinite"? Infinite in time? Then no, as again the universe had a beginning that is around 14 billion years ago. Either way I do not think there is a way to tell for certain is the universe is infinite or not.

Now when you say the universe "is 'what is'" it doesn't make much sense. What is, "what is"? How does that, which like I said does not make much sense, make the universe infinite? God is 'outside' the universe as He created it. Creation is after the universe. Thus, to claim there is nothing "outside" or "after" the universe is false. It is, in a way, to discredit god as creator.

The line of questioning I posed about the temporal ontological existence of god is something I sincerely am curious about. After thinking about what it means to say god is time, aside from relating to the incarnation, I couldn't come up with anything. Regardless I look forward to your response and will talk with you soon.

Citations:

Wikipedia, <staff edit> Last modified May 23 2012. <staff edit>
 
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rogueapologist

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I will now turn my attention to addressing serious and terminal flaws which exist in the "traditional" view of divine omniscience. The questions raised by elopez were anticipated in my previous post, so I shall address the main issues as a whole, rather than countering point by point. However, before I embark on this discussion, I want to address a few ancillary points in the interest of clarification.

Clarifications

If the universe was created and had a beginning, it cannot possibly be infinite...as again the universe had a beginning that is around 14 billion years ago...

I would disagree. From the perspective of space/time, the universe is certainly infinite. If we conceptually inquire about what is "beyond" the universe (defined as "what is"), we find a non-sequitur. As the universe is "what is," there is no-thing beyond the universe. Not "ether", not empty space. The universe, if we conceive of it as "expanding", is literally expanding into nothingness. There is simply "it-is-not-the-universe" beyond the universe, e.g., nothingness (by even asking the question we have betrayed the incapability of human thought to deal with the concept objectively).

In this way, then, the universe is infinite, as its boundaries (purely conceptual as they might be) are, in fact, the boundaries between "what is" and nothingness (which is really not a "boundary" at all, since a boundary can only be manifest between that which "is"). Moreover, the universe must also be thought of as infinite in duration (not eternal, mind you), for there is no vantage point of "time" or "space" outside of the universe (as the infinite has no "outside"). As time and space themselves emerge within the universe, there is no conceptual beginning or ending point to it. Therefore, from the perspective of "what is", the universe is infinite, both in its inclusion of "that which exists in what-is", but also in its duration.

Finally, it should be noted that it is not philosophically appropriate to speak of God as being "outside" the universe. To place God in proximal relationship to the universe (either in terms of ontology, conceptual location, or otherwise) is a fundamental and categorical error. It represents a conceptual materialization of God, for in defining such a proximal relationship, the nature of God must be brought to the level of existence which is commensurate with the universe wherein the identification of proximity has meaning. However, as God is not "outside of", but rather "other than" the universe, we can consistently speak of the universe as being legitimately infinite, while concomitantly acknowledging that God is both "other than" the universe, as well as the ultimate creator of it (even though we must, in this acknowledgement, be sure to avoid any discussion of mechanism which would create a causal [and therefore material] link between God and that which is not God).

God is eternal, which means He existed prior to the universe, hence He created the universe. Time began when the universe did, so time began at the moment of creation. If God existed prior to the universe, then He also existed prior to time. God is therefore existent outside of time.

If space/time emerge with the universe, then to speak of God in relation to some temporal proximity to the universe (e.g., "prior to") is inappropriate. There can be no "prior to" the universe, if, in fact, space/time arise with the existence of the universe. There is room, I think, to speak of some logical priority; however, it should be used with the utmost of precision lest an intention of logical priority be misconstrued as a temporal/material priority. If God is "other than" the universe, then God is not before, after or prior to the universe. While we can loosely speak of God as creator of the universe, our language must take a decidedly measured tone, lest we invent some causal link between God's creative works and the existence of the universe which would render our understanding of God as ultimately materialistic.

The Problem of the Future and the Danger of "Traditional" Omniscience

Despite the claims in the contra position, much of the outlines of traditional omniscience and open theism are nearly identical. At a minimum, the following core features are affirmed by both sides:

  • * God's knowledge is exhaustive of all that can be known
  • * God's knowledge of what can be known is perfect and infallible
  • * In divine knowledge, God is unchanging

The crux of the debate, then, is really the question of the future: does the future exist to be known, or not? If this question is ignored, there is fundamentally no difference between the two position's understanding of God's knowledge. But of course, the question is the central issue, so let's now turn our attention to the problem of the "future."

As was noted in the previous post, a traditional view of omniscience maintains that God's knowing is marked by a "certain, perfect knowledge of what is going to happen", as well as the ability to "perceive&#8230;perfectly" a "future [that] hasn't actually happened yet." In other words, such a view of omniscience suggests that while the future may not have yet obtained in reality, God nonetheless has perfect knowledge of "what is going to happen".

So what is the problem with the line of thinking? To begin, I think it misunderstands the nature of divine knowledge about events within creation. When we think of the "past" or the "present" or the "future", we tend to think in terms of isolated events: I went to the store yesterday; I am typing a response; I will go to work tomorrow. While this is certainly legitimate, the tensed nature of reality is more than events. Rather, each tensed moment in reality is really much more complicated, as it represents not just events, places, etc&#8230;but also the full and unique constitution of the universe-as-it-is. We use these "tenses" as conceptual pointers along an arbitrary "line of time" to describe what "was", "is" and "will be." But from the perspective of the whole of space-time, the line of time is irrelevant, as each demarcation of "tense" itself refers to a real, ontological constitution of the universe.

This point becomes especially poignant when we turn our attention to the subject of "knowledge" of the universe as "past, present or future." After all, if knowledge of the universe at any of these conceptual markers is predicated upon the universe-as-it-is actually existing whereby it might an object of knowledge, we find that we can no longer think about the future in terms of "hasn't-happened-yet." If it hasn't happened, we are actually saying that the universe-as-future, or the universe-as-it-is in the framework of "future", is non-existent. But if it is non-existent, it is a no-thing, and as I argued in my previous post, a no-thing cannot be an object of knowledge by virtue of its objective-less-ness, its entire lack of ontology. To speak of knowledge of a future that doesn't exist, then, is to speak of knowledge of no-thing, which is absurd.

So if past, present, and future are not just ideas about the universe, but are actually themselves a snapshot of the full ontological reality of the universe-as-it-is, we run afoul of some serious issues. For example, if any tensed way of speaking about the universe is not describing a potential universe, but actually the universe-at-it-is, there is no sense in which the future "hasn't happened yet." If the future is actually a fully formed universe-as-it-is, the difference between the "past" and the "present" and the "future" is not the has-or-hasn't-happened-yet-ness of them, but merely the ontological proximity of a person to each.

Therefore, if we say that God has "knowledge" of the future, we are faced with two very unpalatable options, both of which are extremely illogical.

The first option is that God has knowledge of a potential future. As I suggested above, there is actually no such thing as a "potential" future. If God has knowledge of the future, it is only because that future exists in an ontologically realized manner whereby it might be an object of knowledge. If, therefore, God has knowledge of that which "hasn't happened yet," one is forced to conclude that God does not actually have knowledge about the future (which, if it exists, must necessarily exist in a non-potential, but fully ontologically realized form [e.g., the universe-as-it-is]), but rather has knowledge of no-thing, which is absurd.

The second option is much more alarming. Before continuing, I must stress that I am not insinuating that this is the perspective of the contra position, nor that my counter-part in this debate is purposefully or even unknowingly advocating such. Rather, I merely intend to expound what I understand to be the necessarily logical conclusion of suggesting that God has knowledge of the future.

If we suggest that God has knowledge of the future; and if we accept that the future, in order to be known, must have ontology (for no-thing cannot an object of knowledge); we find a very curious contradiction within the knowledge of God. And this contradiction arises from the fact that we must necessarily posit not only knowledge about the future, but also the future itself (by virtue of the fact that the future, in order to be known, must exist) within the eternal mind of God. That is, if God's knowledge of the universe (present, past or future) does not emerge from God's creation of the universe, but actually logically precedes God's creation of the universe, we have unwittingly made the material co-eternal with God by virtue of its existence within the eternal knowledge of God. Or to put it another way, if we must presume the actuality of the universe-as-it-is in order to affirm its place within the domain of God's eternal and perfect knowledge of all that "is", must we not conclude that the universe itself is eternal whereby it might be the proper object of God's eternal omniscience? And if so, where can the ontological distinction be made between that which God has made and that which is God? Would we not then be placing the universe-as-it-is (e.g., and object of knowledge) on the same ontological plane as very God? In such a scenario, to speak of divine knowledge of the universe would be, unfortunately, akin to speaking of divine self-knowledge. This leaves us with a very subtle, but very dangerous form of pantheism.

Toward a Better Conclusion

If we assume that God's knowledge of the universe-as-it-is logically precedes the universe, we are left with little recourse; pantheism is ultimately our philosophical end, for we can find no way of bifurcating an existence of God apart from God's knowledge of the universe, and knowledge of the universe-as-it-is is fundamentally indistinguishable from God's knowledge of Godself (and, in fact, must necessarily be considered the same thing). But of course, this need not be the rocks upon which our understanding of God's knowledge is wrecked. If viewed properly, God's knowledge of the universe-as-it-is can be easily separated from divine self-knowledge while also maintaining a robust theology of divine omniscience which affirms both the infinity and immutability of the knowledge of God.

For this, I will revisit my suggestion for the "emergence" of divine knowledge of the universe within God's creating of the universe. In this perspective, we find that God's knowledge does not logically precede the universe-as-it-is, as if God "knows" about the universe "before" it exists (which is absurd, for knowledge of that which exists is akin to saying that God knows no-thing). Rather, God's knowledge about the universe emerges via God's creation of the universe. In this way, God's knowledge of the universe comes not from potentiality, but rather in an emergent way via the actualizing of the universe through God's creative acts.

On this point, my associate in this debate suggests that:

Originally Posted by elopez
Coming to apprehend something would change the nature of god in a direct way since there would be an experience of temporality just we experience it. Yet this cannot be true since God&#8217;s nature is perfect. Also, since it must be logically maintained that god changes in nature, neither can it be said he is immutable.
When I suggest that God's knowledge of the universe "emerges" with God's creative engendering of the universe, I am not speaking of a "change" in the "state" of divine knowledge regarding the universe. As I mentioned previously, God's knowledge is necessarily infinite and immutable; there can be nothing added to it nor taken away from it that would change that conclusion. So then, if we understand that the knowledge which God has about the universe-as-it-is emerges from God's creation of the universe, there is no "addition" to divine knowledge being made. Rather, as God's knowledge of the universe emerges with the creation of the universe, it is infinitely complete and encompassing of all that there is to know about the universe-as-it-is, and no change is rendered with the infinity of God's omniscience.

But more importantly, it must be understood that God's knowledge about the universe does not emerge from a logically prior understanding of the universe-as-it-should-be. As mentioned, such a knowledge would be no knowledge at all, for knowledge about that which has no ontology is knowledge of no-thing, which is absurd. To the contrary, God's knowledge of the universe emerges perfectly and pristinely from the very act of God creating, for God's creation of the universe is from-nothing, ex nihilo. It is not an organization of prior-existing ontology into a shape, nor is it a fashioning of ontology around a prior-existing knowledge of the universe-as-it-should-be. Rather, in a mysterious and difficult to comprehend manner, God's creation is truly ex nihilo, from nothing.

This is an important point to grasp. Because God's creation of the universe (and emergent knowledge about it) is ex nihilo, there is no change which occurs, either for the universe or for God. Since no-thing is the absence of ontology (which language cannot describe), going from no-thing to the universe-as-it-is is not a "change" in any manner of speaking. In the same way, if God's knowledge of the universe emerges from God's ex nihilo creation of the universe, we can also affirm that God's knowledge has not changed in any way, for God continues to have knowledge of all that exists. To say that a change occurred because God "did not have knowledge of the universe," but now after creation "has knowledge of the universe" misunderstands the nature of ex nihilo creation.

Finally, if we are being philosophically rigorous, we will find that this is really the only "escape hatch" possible for affirming that 1.) God is "other than" creation and that 2.) God has complete knowledge of the universe-as-it-is. If we suggest that God's knowledge of the universe logically precedes the creation of the universe, we must ultimately run aground on the theologically devastating rocks of pantheism, for we will be unable to divorce God's knowledge of the universe (which universe must be ontologically realized in order to be an object of knowledge) from divine self-knowledge.

Wrapping Up

In my final post, I shall respond to any additional questions from my debate partner, and will also address some objections that may seem to contradict the conclusions which I have herein outlined.
 
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elopez

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What exactly do you disagree with? That the universe had a beginning or that it cannot be infinite? The universe most definitely had a beginning, which suggests that it is finite in age, which is ultimately what I meant by saying the universe is finite. The universe is only infinite in extent, which is to say that the density of the universe is very close to critical density; hence the geometry of the universe is that of a flat piece of paper. If this is what you mean by the universe is "infinite," then I would agree, and your disagreement here is only a result of our lack of clarification on this point, which I think may be the case.

I realize that saying God exists prior to time seems flawed, but the main premise that drives that point cannot be avoided: God created the universe. If God created the universe, then He had to have existed "before" the universe. This is only a seeming contradiction because of our language and the incapability of talking about a time "before" time since there is none. The fact of the matter is that God did exist "before" time, or as I have heard it more precisely put God exists atemporally sans creation, or casually prior to. If one disregards the atemporality nature of God, then what is actually being denied is any creative act involved with the universe, time, etc, as well as the eternalness of God. The question here that I pose to my partner is this: Do you believe God is eternal, and if so, timeless? If you think god is eternal yet not timeless, then how are you defining eternal in relation to the existence of god? If you think that god is not eternal, how do you explain the Biblical evidence for such?

Now on to addressing some points that my partner brought up which he feels discredits my position. The first comes in the form of a question and is asked thus: "Does the future exist to be known, or not?" This question can even be broken down to "Does the future exist?" My answer will come in due time upon explaining my view on the ontology of time.

My view regarding the ontology of time is that it is true there are non &#8211; present objects, which is basically to say that objects from the past and future exist in much of the same way that objects in the present do. Notice how I say, "much of the same way," and not, "exactly in the same way." This is not to say that non &#8211; present objects exist in a way that we can currently observe them, or that they are in the same space &#8211; time vicinity as we would be, rather that non &#8211; present objects should be considered things that exist.

To elaborate more I turn to the delineation of "x exists now." In the temporal location sense it is the same as claiming "x is present." In this way, it would be true to say that a non &#8211; present object does not exist as something from the past is obviously not present (George Washington is not currently present). In another sense, however, dubbed the ontological sense of "x exists now," it is meant that x is "now in the domain of our most unrestricted quantifiers, whether x happens to be present, like you and me, or non-present, like Socrates." Thus, temporal location is irrelevant when it comes to the ontology of time as the future can be said to exist in the ontological sense of "x exists now."

This is even more evident as it becomes increasingly clear that there is significance in the dialogue of non &#8211; present objects such as George Washington, Socrates, and the 18th century. If there are no non &#8211; present objects, then any talk of the 18th century seems to be reduced to mostly incoherence.

An event in the future can be said to exist also in a deterministic sense, as a past event determines the future. So, if a future event occurs, it is a result of prior circumstances. For instance, if I call my father and make plans for lunch two days from now, that when I actually go to lunch is a result of all the earlier obtaining conditions (picking up my phone, dialing my dad&#8217;s phone number, making plans with my dad, etc). In this way the future will exist because of the past, which to me means that regardless of the future not actually happening yet, it doesn&#8217;t mean that the future is non existent. It exists, but not yet presently. The future would therefore exist conceptually, not actually. If the future exists conceptually, there is still a way in which it hasn&#8217;t happened yet in reality. For example, we could say that God was aware of Him creating the universe, right? (If not creation seems spontaneous or even accidental, whereas according to Christian theology creation was planned). So God knew He was going to create the universe but having that knowledge did not constitute the actuality of the universe until He kicked off the creative process.

This now brings up my partner&#8217;s claim that "if we say that God has 'knowledge' of the future, we are faced with two very unpalatable options, both of which are extremely illogical." So now we face these two options, considering the ontology of time and determinism above to see if they are credible enough to discredit the idea that God has knowledge of the future.

The first option is that God has knowledge of a potential future. As I suggested above, there is actually no such thing as a "potential" future. If God has knowledge of the future, it is only because that future exists in an ontologically realized manner whereby it might be an object of knowledge. If, therefore, God has knowledge of that which "hasn't happened yet," one is forced to conclude that God does not actually have knowledge about the future (which, if it exists, must necessarily exist in a non-potential, but fully ontologically realized form [e.g., the universe-as-it-is]), but rather has knowledge of no-thing, which is absurd.
Remember, just because the future does not exist as an actuality does not mean it is non existent. Since God created the universe it started an intricate web of cause/effect that relates to creation, and it is this process of cause/effect that God has unlimited, perfect knowledge of. God created the universe, earth came about, man came about, man fell from grace, man fell further from grace, etc, till the incarnation of Christ and beyond that. All of those events stem from God creating the universe, or said differently, none of those things would have happened or happened differently, if God had not created the universe initially. Much in the same way that we know where the bullet is going to go before a gun is fired, God knows what is going to happen when He creates the universe. This perfect, prior knowledge of the universe and all its inhabitants are known because of all the conditions that suffice in the reality of creating the universe that would also suffice in the reality of later events.

The second option is much more alarming. Before continuing, I must stress that I am not insinuating that this is the perspective of the contra position, nor that my counter-part in this debate is purposefully or even unknowingly advocating such. Rather, I merely intend to expound what I understand to be the necessarily logical conclusion of suggesting that God has knowledge of the future.

If we suggest that God has knowledge of the future; and if we accept that the future, in order to be known, must have ontology (for no-thing cannot an object of knowledge); we find a very curious contradiction within the knowledge of God. And this contradiction arises from the fact that we must necessarily posit not only knowledge about the future, but also the future itself (by virtue of the fact that the future, in order to be known, must exist) within the eternal mind of God. That is, if God's knowledge of the universe (present, past or future) does not emerge from God's creation of the universe, but actually logically precedes God's creation of the universe; we have unwittingly made the material co-eternal with God by virtue of its existence within the eternal knowledge of God. Or to put it another way, if we must presume the actuality of the universe-as-it-is in order to affirm its place within the domain of God's eternal and perfect knowledge of all that "is", must we not conclude that the universe itself is eternal whereby it might be the proper object of God's eternal omniscience? And if so, where can the ontological distinction be made between that which God has made and that which is God? Would we not then be placing the universe-as-it-is (e.g., and object of knowledge) on the same ontological plane as very God? In such a scenario, to speak of divine knowledge of the universe would be, unfortunately, akin to speaking of divine self-knowledge. This leaves us with a very subtle, but very dangerous form of pantheism.
There is something key in this second objection which I believe makes the &#8220;contradiction&#8221; dissipate more quickly than my partner may think. It seems that he is saying the future exists in the eternal mind of God, to which I would agree, yet this only reiterates a point I was making earlier, and that is that the future exists conceptually as in what is going to happen not actually as in what is happening in the mind of God. &#8220;Existence&#8221; here does not mean actual, present, but what is going to happen. The material does not actually exist eternally as God does, since God has no beginning, and the events that are foreknown of would have a beginning again starting with the creation of the universe all the way down to where we find ourselves now.

So no, since the universe is not eternal by virtue of foreknowledge as God is eternal, then the universe is still distinct from God, and thus is not placing the universe on a parallel ontological plane as God would be. Therefore, the view that God knows the future is not pantheism.

Additionally then there can be no issue with the so called knowledge of the universe and knowledge of God Himself. Indeed, this may not be an issue for my partner either; however there is one reoccurring problem on his behalf. That of which this "divine emergence" offers to the notion of a perfect, all &#8211; knowing, God we find from the Bible. Like I was getting at earlier, if god&#8217;s knowledge of the universe emerges when he is creating, it would only follow that god would not know he is creating the universe until he is actually in the process of doing so. If god does not know he is creating the universe until he is actually doing it, then creation is unplanned, as any intention of creating would imply the very notion of some type of prior knowledge of creating. And I don&#8217;t think that the distinction of knowledge about the universe and knowledge about god would indicate god has knowledge of him creating, since casually prior to creating god was not creating and thus no knowledge of creation could have emerged. In all, knowledge of creation could not have come from non creation, according to your view, so god had no idea he was even going to create the universe, let alone man. This is the unfortunate conclusion Open Theism proposes for us, and it is something I am personally not comfortable advocating.

Furthermore, if god&#8217;s knowledge occurs out of nothing, then how can it be consistently said that god has knowledge whence he creates? "Nothing" should not be considered creation. Creation is creation, and that is something. You seem to be saying god has knowledge from something, but has knowledge from nothing. On this, Open Theism seems more conflicting.

The main point I was making about the change in god comes in when god is atemporal sans creation (since this cannot be denied per eternalness) and then temporal after creation. At any rate, if god is said to be temporal, then what exactly does this mean? This is something I asked in the first round and still, as I said then, have no satisfactory answer to. I was wondering since it is claimed god is temporal in nature, how would god occupy time &#8211; space being that the immaterial is not of physical matter? Refer to my line of questioning in the first round towards the end if you do not recall.

For now, I hope the outstanding issues can be resolved this time and look forward again to a well thought out, very critical response. In the meantime, peace be with you.


Citations:

Markosian, Ned, "Time", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2010 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.)
 
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rogueapologist

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The universe most definitely had a beginning, which suggests that it is finite in age, which is ultimately what I meant by saying the universe is finite.

In popular thinking, this logic works, but it fails philosophically. If we turn back the clock, so to speak, to "0" on the universe, where exactly are we? Not at "nothingness," surely, for to presume a beginning also presumes a frame of reference for that beginning, which no-thing most assuredly cannot be. The best one can do is to continue to extrapolate "backwards" (or maybe "outwards") from the universe (e.g., brane worlds and nonsense like that), but the end result is the same: we are left with a picture of the universe which is infinite, both in duration and extent (as I mentioned in my last post).

I realize that saying God exists prior to time seems flawed, but the main premise that drives that point cannot be avoided: God created the universe.

It seems flawed because, philosophically, it is flawed. It is an inaccurate way to speak of the relationship between God's existence and that of the universe. To say that God exists "prior" to the universe (whether causally, temporally, or otherwise) is ultimately a materialization of the divine being. I think there is space to speak of God existing logically "before" the universe, but even then we must use extreme caution to avoid temporizing or materializing that priority.

The fact of the matter is that God did exist "before" time, or as I have heard it more precisely put God exists atemporally sans creation, or casually prior to.

As I mentioned in my last post, if we imagine the relationship between God and the creation of the universe as that of causality, then we have effectively "materialized" God. The universe did not "come" from God, and the universe is not "after" God--all of these figures of speech are inaccurate at best, philosophically damaging at worst. The creation of the universe by God is not material, nor causal; this is the mystery of creation. If we make it a relationship of causality, we are advocating either pantheism, materialism, or a an unfortunate hybrid of the two.

Do you believe God is eternal, and if so, timeless? If you think god is eternal yet not timeless, then how are you defining eternal in relation to the existence of god? If you think that god is not eternal, how do you explain the Biblical evidence for such?

Yes, I believe that God is eternal, as well as "other than" that which God has created. "In-time-ness" is only a material attribute of that which is "other than" God; so what the universe is, God is not.

To elaborate more I turn to the delineation of "x exists now." In the temporal location sense it is the same as claiming "x is present." In this way, it would be true to say that a non &#8211; present object does not exist as something from the past is obviously not present (George Washington is not currently present). In another sense, however, dubbed the ontological sense of "x exists now," it is meant that x is "now in the domain of our most unrestricted quantifiers, whether x happens to be present, like you and me, or non-present, like Socrates." Thus, temporal location is irrelevant when it comes to the ontology of time as the future can be said to exist in the ontological sense of "x exists now."

I understand that you're quoting this to try to show that the future "exists" even if it's not "present," but I think it misunderstands the nature of space-time. There is nothing "conceptual, not actual" about the "past" or the "future". Both, along with the "present," are simply pointers to descriptions of universe in some particular constitution. In order to have knowledge about these particular constitutions of the universe, however, these particular constitutions actually have to exist.

Moreover, I think your intention here falls apart in your description of the "determinism" of the future. Making plans about the future does not mean that a "future" exists conceptually. All you have done in your plan-making is to extrapolate knowledge that you already have&#8230;there is nothing "not actual" in your planning whatsoever. Your suggested "conceptual future", then, is nothing more than the sum of what has already happened and is currently happening to you. Nothing that does not already--and actually--exist has been created or is conceptualized.

So God knew He was going to create the universe but having that knowledge did not constitute the actuality of the universe until He kicked off the creative process.

I know this seems like the right answer, but it isn't, and your language betrays the point. Look at the words you use: "knew", "was going to", "having"&#8230;all of these words only operate meaningfully with a space-time bounded domain. Apart from the existence of the universe, there is no sense in which to speak of "knowing" apart from the actuality of the thing. That is, God didn't "know" about the universe "before" God created, for there was no "before" in which this knowledge was meaningful. However, this does not mean that God does not "know" the universe, which is what I've been arguing all along. God's knowledge of the universe emerges from God's creative acts. In this way, God's knowledge of the universe does not precede God's creation of it (for, as I showed above, speaking about a "prior-to" the universe is absurd), nor does it come "from" the universe. Rather, God's knowledge of the universe originates from the very creative act of creation, and in this way God's knowledge is unquantifiably infinite and completely immutable.

Remember, just because the future does not exist as an actuality does not mean it is non existent. Since God created the universe it started an intricate web of cause/effect that relates to creation, and it is this process of cause/effect that God has unlimited, perfect knowledge of. God created the universe, earth came about, man came about, man fell from grace, man fell further from grace, etc, till the incarnation of Christ and beyond that. All of those events stem from God creating the universe, or said differently, none of those things would have happened or happened differently, if God had not created the universe initially. Much in the same way that we know where the bullet is going to go before a gun is fired, God knows what is going to happen when He creates the universe. This perfect, prior knowledge of the universe and all its inhabitants are known because of all the conditions that suffice in the reality of creating the universe that would also suffice in the reality of later events.

I still object to the logic of the first sentence. You have not shown that non-actual futures actually exist, or that futures can exist (e.g., be objects of knowledge) in conception only. You hang part of your argument on this point, but have yet to even begin to demonstrate that this is so.

I would also argue that the universe of which you speak is hardly ex nihilo. Your suggestion sounds more like the god of deism, kicking off a universe via some causal mechanism. Obviously, within such a deterministic system, there would be no question about Gods' knowledge of the "system". But within such a system, there is little to no room for the dynamism of divine intervention, and one would also have to question the curious decisions that such a God has made in deterministically bringing about a creation which, at least from certain perspectives, this God is not tremendously pleased with.

Finally, you have again fallen into the error of speaking of God having "prior" knowledge of the universe before the universe exists. If you are speaking in a strict sense of logical priority, I believe that is acceptable, although still not perfectly accurate.

Originally Posted by elopez
There is something key in this second objection which I believe makes the &#8220;contradiction&#8221; dissipate more quickly than my partner may think. It seems that he is saying the future exists in the eternal mind of God, to which I would agree, yet this only reiterates a point I was making earlier, and that is that the future exists conceptually as in what is going to happen not actually as in what is happening in the mind of God. &#8220;Existence&#8221; here does not mean actual, present, but what is going to happen. The material does not actually exist eternally as God does, since God has no beginning, and the events that are foreknown of would have a beginning again starting with the creation of the universe all the way down to where we find ourselves now.
I'm not personally saying that the future exists eternally in the mind of God. What I said is that if God has knowledge of the future, then the future must necessarily and actually exist whereby it can be an object of divine knowledge. If the future doesn't "actually" exist, then what is it that God foreknows? It can only be something that exists to be known (in this case, only Godself), otherwise, it is no-thing.

You bring up again the notion of "conceptual" vs "actual", but have yet to show what the distinction between the two is, and how such a distinction is actually made in relation to God's knowledge. Moreover, you actually contradict yourself by bringing up the issue of deterministic causality. That is, if God does, in fact, have an exhaustive "pre-knowledge" of precisely how the universe will play itself out, and "then" (weird, tensed notions here&#8230;) creates the universe based on this "pre-knowledge" of what "will be", there is fundamentally no meaningful difference between that which God "knew" (again, weird tensed notion) and that which God created.

But you've actually glossed over the major point. If knowledge (even if we grant the spurious notion of "conceptual existence") of the universe is eternally within the mind of God, you still have not surmounted the ultimate failing of your position. That is, if God has "fore-knowledge" of the universe we must conclude that God's knowledge of this universe 1.) came from something external to God or 2.) is eternally commensurate with the mind and being of God. Obviously you will reject #1, so we must then conclude that God's knowledge of the universe is equally eternal with God's knowledge of Godself. However, if this is so, in what way can we possibly speak of God being "other-than" the universe if, in fact, knowledge of the universe (and, therefore, its existence) is eternally and inextricably a part of the divine being? Whether the existence of the universe is "conceptual" or actual to the divine mind is irrelevant; if it exists eternally alongside divine knowledge of Godself, we must ultimately draw some level of equivalence between God and that which God has made. However, because the "that which God has made" is eternally a part of the very nature of God (by virtue of belong eternally to divine self-knowledge), we still arrive at pantheism.

Originally Posted by elopez
So no, since the universe is not eternal by virtue of foreknowledge as God is eternal, then the universe is still distinct from God, and thus is not placing the universe on a parallel ontological plane as God would be. Therefore, the view that God knows the future is not pantheism.
As I have shown above, this is actually false. Foreknowledge of the universe does nothing to mitigate the conclusion, for any doctrine which places the existence of the universe (whether conceptual or actual) within the eternal knowledge of God is ultimately saying that the existence of the universe is concomitantly eternal with the existence of Godself, whereby it could be an object of eternal divine self-knowledge.

Originally Posted by elopez
That of which this "divine emergence" offers to the notion of a perfect, all &#8211; knowing, God we find from the Bible.
How so? I am arguing for a doctrine of creation ex nihilo, which is thoroughly biblical. Your position, contrarily, is creation out of divine self-knowledge, which is markedly not "from nothing", but rather "out of God."

Originally Posted by elopez
Like I was getting at earlier, if god&#8217;s knowledge of the universe emerges when he is creating, it would only follow that god would not know he is creating the universe until he is actually in the process of doing so. If god does not know he is creating the universe until he is actually doing it, then creation is unplanned, as any intention of creating would imply the very notion of some type of prior knowledge of creating.
But "when" is God creating, and when is God "in the process of [creating]"? You're trying to use an improper domain of action (space-time) to criticize my position. However, I have consistently argued against such a way of looking at God's acts of creation. Obviously, God cannot know that God is creating "until" God is creating, for there is no frame of reference in which "until" is relevant in relation to God.

Originally Posted by elopez
And I don&#8217;t think that the distinction of knowledge about the universe and knowledge about god would indicate god has knowledge of him creating, since casually prior to creating god was not creating and thus no knowledge of creation could have emerged. In all, knowledge of creation could not have come from non creation, according to your view, so god had no idea he was even going to create the universe, let alone man. This is the unfortunate conclusion Open Theism proposes for us, and it is something I am personally not comfortable advocating.
There is no "prior-to"! God's relationship to the universe is not material or causal. Moreover, God's "lack" of prior knowledge about the universe is not the deficiency you make it out to be, precisely because one cannot call a lack of knowledge of no-thing to be a deficiency. The question of omniscience is whether God knows all that there is to know, and whether God's knowledge of all things is immutable. As I have shown, the emergent view of divine knowledge regarding the universe more than satisfies these criteria, while also avoiding the disastrous pitfalls of locating the very existence of all creation within the eternity of the divine being.

Originally Posted by elopez
Furthermore, if god&#8217;s knowledge occurs out of nothing, then how can it be consistently said that god has knowledge whence he creates? "Nothing" should not be considered creation. Creation is creation, and that is something. You seem to be saying god has knowledge from something, but has knowledge from nothing. On this, Open Theism seems more conflicting.
Creation is certainly creation, but it does not come "from something" (causally, as you advocate), but is created mysteriously and by the power of God out of nothing. As God creates, so God's knowledge of that which God creates emerges. In this way, God's knowledge of creation emerges with God's creative acts.

Originally Posted by elopez
The main point I was making about the change in god comes in when god is atemporal sans creation (since this cannot be denied per eternalness) and then temporal after creation. At any rate, if god is said to be temporal, then what exactly does this mean? This is something I asked in the first round and still, as I said then, have no satisfactory answer to. I was wondering since it is claimed god is temporal in nature, how would god occupy time &#8211; space being that the immaterial is not of physical matter? Refer to my line of questioning in the first round towards the end if you do not recall.
I'm not sure I follow--are you saying that Open Theists claim that God is temporal in nature, or simply asking the question from that perspective? Personally, I would say that instead of thinking about God "in time", it's better to think about the Incarnation as the appropriate of creation to the divine. In essence, it is really a microcosm of the creation itself, for in the Incarnation is revealed the ultimate mystery of how the eternal God communes with that which is "other than".
 
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elopez

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On this point my partner is making two of the more damaging mistakes of his position. The first I will explain here and the other shortly. First, the idea that the universe had a beginning is more scientific than it is philosophical, and it is the same science that is used to determine the universe is infinite in extent that is used to determine the universe had a beginning. This is not just ‘popular thinking’ as my partner wants so desperately to play it off as, rather this is modern science backed by evidence that is widely accepted in the scientific community. If it is denied the universe had a beginning and if finite in that respect, neither can it be, according to his position, affirmed that the universe is infinite in extent.

What is not flawed is that God created the universe. Again, that being the case, whether you want to say God existed logically “before” or casually prior to is really not a relevant difference. Without the universe, God was existent in a timeless state. This is something that cannot be avoided if indeed we wish to say that God is eternal and created the universe.

Saying there is a casual relation between God and the universe does not materialize God in any way. That is simply to say that God is the cause of the universe’s existence. Again this not pantheism no matter how hard you try to spin it as I am saying God created the universe, which is to say that He is distinct from the universe which is most assuredly not pantheism.

Now for the second damaging conclusion my opponent must face by stating the universe had no beginning. While advocating that point, he also advocates that god is eternal, yet is “other” than the universe, while this plainly does not seem to be true according to his statements. If the universe had no beginning, then it is in nature eternal like god, since he had no beginning. So to say that the universe is “other than” god or vice versa is disingenuous and as a result it seems that it is his position that represents pantheism more than anything. Not only this, but if the universe had no beginning, how could god have created it? There cannot logically be said to be a creation of the universe if it is in fact eternal. To do so would be even more disingenuous.

My point by quoting is to show that there are non – present objects from the past and future that can be said to exist nearly like the present does. Socrates can be said to exist now in the ontological sense of the word “exist” even though he is not present at this moment. According to this ontological idea of time, that is, claiming non – present objects exist, it is not to misconstrue the nature of space/time. Moreover, nothing of what you said here seems to directly discredit the idea of this ontological idea of time as there is no objection to the idea that non – present objects can and do exist.

For something to exist conceptually would mean that it exists in the facilities of the mind. So when I plan for the future as in lunch with my dad, it can be said to conceptually exist. There is nothing “actual” about the future lunch when I make plans, but when I actually do go to lunch it is because of all the earlier obtaining conditions that lead me to make plans. In this way, the future is determined and must exist necessarily.

Again, that language is a barrier to speak of God is of no importance. We are humans that can only speak of in terms that are familiar with us, but that doesn’t mean they apply to God who is above us in every way possible. Now, I am not saying that god doesn’t know the universe according to your position, but that god doesn’t know he is going to create until he actually does so. On that point I will return to later. For now, let it be understood one last time that which cannot be denied which leads to the conclusion that God exists outside of space/time. God is eternal, to which my partner already agreed to but as a result of other statements seems to be contradicting, which is aside from the point I am going to make yet again. If God is eternal, then He had no beginning, and if God had no beginning, time is not something that could be ascribed to Him as time does have a beginning. Essentially there can be no cause/effect process in an eternal state of existence until the process of creation is caused. God can be said to exist outside of time, and if this is denied, then once more eternalness is denied.

A casual beginning to the universe does not in any way indicate ex nihlio wouldn’t occur. That doesn’t seem sensible at all. Deism offers a god who causes the universe, earth, and man, then leaves it and man to its own devices. What I describe is far from anything like deism, so I’m not really sure that you have a point here at all. Also, determinism doesn’t mean divine intervention is moot, as not all things that are determined are intervened with by God, but that is not to say that God cannot intervene in the things that are determined.

Now I turn to clarify something I believe my partner has missed, perhaps not intentionally but missed nonetheless. It would be correct to say that God’s foreknowledge implies the future will exist necessarily, but that is not the same as saying the future actually exists in the temporal location sense. If the future is known, that only means that God is consciously aware of what is going to happen, not that what He is aware of is actually happening. So, to say the future exists conceptually is to say that God is consciously aware of it, whereas saying the future that is foreknown exists in the temporal location sense is to mean that it exists presently. What God foreknows from eternity does not exist in the temporal location sense. For example, say God foreknows I am going to partake in event x from eternity. I am not actually partaking in x from eternity, rather, God is consciously aware that I am going to do x. That, as I have explained in round two, is the distinction of the future existing as “conceptually” and “actually.” As I have made that distinction already in the second round, to claim that I have not is what I was referring to that you missed.

In relation to this point, my opponent brought up this:
But you've actually glossed over the major point. If knowledge (even if we grant the spurious notion of "conceptual existence") of the universe is eternally within the mind of God, you still have not surmounted the ultimate failing of your position. That is, if God has "fore-knowledge" of the universe we must conclude that God's knowledge of this universe 1.) came from something external to God or 2.) is eternally commensurate with the mind and being of God. Obviously you will reject #1, so we must then conclude that God's knowledge of the universe is equally eternal with God's knowledge of Godself. However, if this is so, in what way can we possibly speak of God being "other-than" the universe if, in fact, knowledge of the universe (and, therefore, its existence) is eternally and inextricably a part of the divine being? Whether the existence of the universe is "conceptual" or actual to the divine mind is irrelevant; if it exists eternally alongside divine knowledge of Godself, we must ultimately draw some level of equivalence between God and that which God has made. However, because the "that which God has made" is eternally a part of the very nature of God (by virtue of belong eternally to divine self-knowledge), we still arrive at pantheism.
This is actually something I haven’t glossed over but did comment on. Now, 1 is not something that I will be denying as you thought so obviously. To make my point I will be turning to an analogy that represents the similarities between that and the foreknowledge of God as it correlates to the universe and humanity.

Imagine a crystal ball that is magical and can ‘look’ into the future. Whatever you want to know of the future, you just imagine it and look at the crystal ball which will reveal the future of the thing you had in mind. Now say you stare at the ball and ‘look’ into the future and see what is going to happen of what you were thinking of. Now, it cannot be by observing the crystal ball and ‘looking’ into the future that we cause what is being ‘looked’ at to happen. On the contrary: the future you ‘look’ at in the crystal ball is caused and brought about by the beings that are being ‘looked’ at.

So, in a sense it is something external (man acting as they want to) that gives way to the foreknowledge of God, but this is not saying man’s actions precede foreknowledge, since by the very definition of “foreknowledge” it is the knowledge that precedes the event. I accept 1 in the way I have explained, which means what I reject is 2 as I did and explained why in round two. The future that is foreknown has a beginning starting with the whole beginning of the universe, and while God is of no origin, an eternal knowledge of creation is not saying the universe or what is going to happen in the universe is eternal as God is. Thus, we do not arrive at pantheism unless it is claimed that the universe had no beginning exactly like you seem to have done in the opening of this round. What you seem to be doing is confusing the actual existence of the universe with the perceived existence of the universe, and since the difference is relevant (conceptual vs. actual) as the two do not mean the same thing, you have not actually shown the claim that “since the universe is not eternal by virtue of foreknowledge as God is eternal, then the universe is still distinct from God, and thus is not placing the universe on a parallel ontological plane as God would be” as being false. It was an attempt, but a hollow one at that.

But "when" is God creating, and when is God "in the process of [creating]"? You're trying to use an improper domain of action (space-time) to criticize my position. However, I have consistently argued against such a way of looking at God's acts of creation. Obviously, God cannot know that God is creating "until" God is creating, for there is no frame of reference in which "until" is relevant in relation to God.
It’s not improper language because it is our language. Any language we most likely are going to use will fall short of really elaborating at the infinite nature of God.

There is no "prior-to"! God's relationship to the universe is not material or causal. Moreover, God's "lack" of prior knowledge about the universe is not the deficiency you make it out to be, precisely because one cannot call a lack of knowledge of no-thing to be a deficiency. The question of omniscience is whether God knows all that there is to know, and whether God's knowledge of all things is immutable. As I have shown, the emergent view of divine knowledge regarding the universe more than satisfies these criteria, while also avoiding the disastrous pitfalls of locating the very existence of all creation within the eternity of the divine being.
God’s relation to the universe is causal being that He created it. God is the First Cause that is un - caused. This is something essential to Christian theology and that has been espoused by any Christian and theologian I have ever encountered. I do not understand your objection to this at all.

In a way your response here is a straw man against what I was actually arguing. It is true that I said god has a lack of knowledge and this makes him imperfect, but this is not what I was arguing here. What I was arguing was that since god does not know he is creating the universe until he actually is creating, then creation is not planned but is spontaneous or accidental. Either of which creation cannot be intended to have been so. That, more than anything I have criticized your position of, is the most non Christian idea I could think of.

What you have not avoided is the contradiction of the change in 1) the knowledge of god as he is unaware of something then aware of it as there is a divine emergence of knowledge of what is happening as it happens, and 2) the nature of god from being atemporal without the universe and temporal with the universe.

When I argue 1 I mean that, as you have even said, god does not know the future. If god does not know the future, there is something god does not know about. The future is ‘something’ because it exists in an ontological sense of “x exists now” as explained in the beginning of round two to which again was not efficiently refuted here in round three. Either way, god’s knowledge of the future would emerge as it happens as you have it, which would mean that he has knowledge of something he previously did not. That is adding knowledge to already the knowledge he has, which again defies immutability.

On 2 I argue that god must experience a change in nature as god must become temporal to experience this divine emergence of knowledge, since that is exactly how we become knowledgeable in things. We are temporal beings, and that is a temporal way of going about attaining knowledge of something. God therefore must be temporal in nature according to the Open Theistic view. But we know that God is atemporal without the universe, and that the Son Christ was incarnated and experienced temporality but since the ascension is atemporal with the Father, so the only person of the Godhead who is temporal is possibly the Holy Spirit since he directly interacts with man. Thus, in what way is god said to be temporal or in time? If there is an emergence of knowledge, this can only come about in a temporal environment since there can be no emergence in a timeless state. I have seen every Open Theist I’ve discussed with claim god is in time or temporal. I have seen it on Open Theistic websites. It logically follows from saying there is a divine emergence of knowledge about the universe. So, are you saying the father occupies time/space, the Son which would then make the incarnation moot, for all the knowledge of the universe could not have emerged from the temporal existence Christ experienced, or the Spirit?

It would not make sense to say it is the father who is temporal and experiences this divine emergence of knowledge since there is only an indication of the Son becoming temporal from Scripture (the incarnation). I am wondering how the ontological existence of god is conceptualized by saying knowledge emerges from creating, since the immaterial cannot occupy time/space and saying there is knowledge that emerges from creating is to say god is temporal and experiences time exactly the way we do.
 
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rogueapologist

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First, the idea that the universe had a beginning is more scientific than it is philosophical, and it is the same science that is used to determine the universe is infinite in extent that is used to determine the universe had a beginning. This is not just ‘popular thinking’ as my partner wants so desperately to play it off as, rather this is modern science backed by evidence that is widely accepted in the scientific community. If it is denied the universe had a beginning and if finite in that respect, neither can it be, according to his position, affirmed that the universe is infinite in extent.

Hmm, it's not desperation at all. To begin, I'm not particularly interested in scientific perspectives on this (my argument is philosophical), but even if we take a scientific perspective, you will find that my claim is, in fact, quite popular in many circles of the new physicists (again, look up brane worlds, and the like). But even if we take your claim about "evidence" from "modern science", the claim you make is way over-reaching. Even the most ardent proponents of a big-bang model will not, when pressed, admit that "evidence" can take them back to the "beginning" of the universe. After all, the notion is quite ridiculous, since the very thing which is the measure of the "beginning" (e.g., space/time) itself emerges with the existence of the universe from nothing. As I mentioned in my last post (and which you decided not to answer), what do we find if we turn back the clock of the universe to the 0-hour? The question is actually absurd, because the answer is no-thing, which is not an answer at all.

Therefore, to speak of a "beginning" is really just a short, and inarticulate way of describing the infinitude of the universe in terms of space/time. A "beginning" to the universe is not, in fact, actually observable, for to observe such an event would require being outside the universe. Again, such a notion is particularly absurd.

What is not flawed is that God created the universe. Again, that being the case, whether you want to say God existed logically “before” or casually prior to is really not a relevant difference. Without the universe, God was existent in a timeless state. This is something that cannot be avoided if indeed we wish to say that God is eternal and created the universe.

I am not arguing that God didn't create the universe. I fully affirm that God created the universe. What I am arguing is that to speak of God's creation of the universe in mechanistic or causal terms is not only a tremendous slight to the mystery of God's creative works, but is particularly careless philosophically, for it runs rough shod over concepts that should be technically and carefully kept in tension, rather than recklessly colluding them.

Saying there is a casual relation between God and the universe does not materialize God in any way. That is simply to say that God is the cause of the universe’s existence. Again this not pantheism no matter how hard you try to spin it as I am saying God created the universe, which is to say that He is distinct from the universe which is most assuredly not pantheism.

You are not seeing the connection because you do not understand the nature of causality. In causality, there is a principle that causes can be inferred by their effects, that by analyzing the nature of "effects," one can reasonably work back to a material cause. The point here, of course, is that causality--properly understood--occurs within particular domains. If we understand the universe to be an "effect" of something, then we should be reasonable in assuming that we can infer from the universe what that cause is, insofar as that cause is within the same domain as the effects. But of course, we cannot do this. The universe is, after all, material. So then, if we understand the material universe to be the "effect" of some "cause," we must seek for the cause within the same domain of the effect, that is, within materiality. If we then say that "God" is the cause of the material universe, by the principle of similar domain we are advocating (even if we don't realize it, as in your case) that God is germane to the domain of the effect whereby God might be inferentially understood as the "cause" of the material universe.

But where your thinking more markedly fails is that in advocating that God is the "cause" of the universe (notwithstanding your philosophical mangling of this concept), you have wholesale jettisoned the principle of creation ex nihilo. By saying that God "caused" the universe, you must necessarily conclude that the universe did not come "from nothing", but rather from some causally identifiable mechanism of divine action, an action which might be perfectly acceptable for divine purposes, but does not align with the Christian understanding of creation ex nihilo.

So despite your protestations, what I am saying about the dangers of pantheism is, in fact, quite pertinent. While I do not for a minute suppose that you consciously advocate pantheism, I do think that your position in inherently prone to such dangers, especially when very loose and imprecise language and concepts are used to defend it.

If the universe had no beginning, then it is in nature eternal like god, since he had no beginning. So to say that the universe is “other than” god or vice versa is disingenuous and as a result it seems that it is his position that represents pantheism more than anything. Not only this, but if the universe had no beginning, how could god have created it? There cannot logically be said to be a creation of the universe if it is in fact eternal. To do so would be even more disingenuous.

Actually, I have not advocated that the universe is eternal, and in fact I mentioned at least once that I think that it is not. There is, in more precise language, a very meaningful difference between the infinity of the universe that I have described and the eternity of God. The universe, after all, is created; it does not have self-existence. This does not mean, however, that it has a "beginning," for the very parameters in which a "beginning" would be meaningful already presume the existence of the universe (e.g., space/time). So then, we find no real contradiction in saying that the universe is infinite and without "beginning" while concomitantly advocating that God is the creator of it. It does require, of course, that one maintain a measure of tension between the nature of God and the "other-ness" of the universe. However, the problems posed by such a tension are considerably less than those which arise when one haphazardly collapses these distinctions and begins to describe God's relationship to the universe in exclusively material terms, as you have done in the defense of your position.

For something to exist conceptually would mean that it exists in the facilities of the mind. So when I plan for the future as in lunch with my dad, it can be said to conceptually exist. There is nothing “actual” about the future lunch when I make plans, but when I actually do go to lunch it is because of all the earlier obtaining conditions that lead me to make plans. In this way, the future is determined and must exist necessarily.

Retreating to the "facilities of the mind" does not, in any way, lend credence to the lack of proof you have provided for differentiating between supposedly "conceptual" reality and "actual" reality. In fact, I would say it disproves your position even more effectively. The reality created in the "facilities of the mind", after all, proceeds from knowledge. But where does this knowledge come from? It is spontaneously created? Does the supposed "future" which you plan suddenly spring into your mind from nothing-ness? Not at all. The plans that you make for the "future" are based on knowledge. But in fact, they are not merely based on it, but are in fact the sum of your knowledge. As I mentioned in my previous response to this line of thinking, there is nothing "conceptual" about what you are doing. Rather, you are merely extending what already exists, as there is nothing which does not exist which is a part of your planning. Therefore, when you finally meet with your dad for lunch, it is not because the conception which your mind constructed determined that this future would exist.

But let's deal with the last comment you made, that the future--by way of mind conceptualization--is necessarily existent. If you really want to say this, then you have completely proven my point about the nature of God's knowledge of the "future" within your model. That is, if your conceptualizing of the future, in fact, determines it, it is not because the planning brought about the future, but because your knowledge of this future was not simply conceptual, but actual. That is, the reason you had the plan in the first place is because, in some mysterious manner that you haven't described, the actualized reality of the future has impinged itself upon your thinking. So in reality, you are not conceiving of a future that "doesn't yet exist," but are rather living out (even in the "facilities of mind") that which has necessary existence, whereby it could be an object of your knowledge to begin with.

Again, that language is a barrier to speak of God is of no importance. We are humans that can only speak of in terms that are familiar with us, but that doesn’t mean they apply to God who is above us in every way possible.

I agree that language is not perfect, and in no way can we encapsulate the divine mystery of God in language. Nonetheless, such a limitation does not mean that we should not strive for the greatest level of precision in our language that is possible and avoid the kind of dilution of language and concepts that has marked this discussion so far.

Essentially there can be no cause/effect process in an eternal state of existence until the process of creation is caused.

This is another example about which I will object to your frequently imprecise use of language. In a technical sense, your statement above is nonsensical. After all, "when", precisely, did God "cause" the universe? If you presume a material mechanism of creation (causality), then you must seriously contend with answering questions about the "timeline" of creation, the "moment" in eternity in which the "until" of your statement is meaningful. Obviously, such answers are absurd, but they also illustrate the absurdity of saying that God "caused" the universe, for it requires that you speak out of one side of your mouth about the "timelessness" of God while out of the other your explicitly deny the same, even if it is because of poor use of language.

It would be correct to say that God’s foreknowledge implies the future will exist necessarily, but that is not the same as saying the future actually exists in the temporal location sense. If the future is known, that only means that God is consciously aware of what is going to happen, not that what He is aware of is actually happening. So, to say the future exists conceptually is to say that God is consciously aware of it, whereas saying the future that is foreknown exists in the temporal location sense is to mean that it exists presently. What God foreknows from eternity does not exist in the temporal location sense. For example, say God foreknows I am going to partake in event x from eternity. I am not actually partaking in x from eternity, rather, God is consciously aware that I am going to do x. That, as I have explained in round two, is the distinction of the future existing as “conceptually” and “actually.” As I have made that distinction already in the second round, to claim that I have not is what I was referring to that you missed.

Actually, it is precisely the same as saying that the future actually exists "in the temporal location sense." Your misunderstanding here is really about the nature of divine knowledge. That is, if God knows something, what is the "something" that God knows? If God knows something exhaustively, what is the extent of that knowledge? In order to maintain that God is omniscient, we must argue that God's knowledge is complete in every way, lacking in nothing. So if God has knowledge of only the conceptual existence of something, is that really the exhaustive extent of that "something"? If God doesn't have actual knowledge of that which exists in the temporal sense, in what way does God actually have knowledge of this "something?" The fact is, if God only has "conceptual" knowledge of the existence of the future (but not the "temporal location sense" existence of it), then God's knowledge is terrifically incomplete.

Moreover, if this is really your view (which I can hardly imagine it is, since it violates principles of omniscience on every level possible), you are also failing in maintaining God's immutability in knowledge. This is a necessary conclusion, for you have advocated that God is expressly unaware of "what is actually happening". Therefore, in order to accommodate this knowledge to God, we must move ourselves into the absurd position of claiming that God supplements what was "previously" only "consciously-aware" knowledge of the future with the "actual-happening-ness" knowledge when the future obtains. In this sense, we see a dramatic change in the nature of God's knowledge about "something" by way of God's conceptual knowledge finally being turned into "realized" knowledge when the future ultimately obtains.

Imagine a crystal ball that is magical and can ‘look’ into the future. Whatever you want to know of the future, you just imagine it and look at the crystal ball which will reveal the future of the thing you had in mind. Now say you stare at the ball and ‘look’ into the future and see what is going to happen of what you were thinking of. Now, it cannot be by observing the crystal ball and ‘looking’ into the future that we cause what is being ‘looked’ at to happen. On the contrary: the future you ‘look’ at in the crystal ball is caused and brought about by the beings that are being ‘looked’ at.

This is not compelling whatsoever. How can one possibly "imagine" the future and have revealed the future of that which was imagined? The only way in which you could begin to "imagine" a future that you want revealed is if, in fact, you have already knowledge of that future; anything else that you could "imagine" would necessarily be limited to that which is already known, e.g., that which exists. So in this sense, you don't actually have knowledge of that which hasn't happened yet (for how can you imagine that which hasn't happened yet…a no-thing), but only of that which has ontologically obtained.

So, in a sense it is something external (man acting as they want to) that gives way to the foreknowledge of God, but this is not saying man’s actions precede foreknowledge, since by the very definition of “foreknowledge” it is the knowledge that precedes the event. I accept 1 in the way I have explained, which means what I reject is 2 as I did and explained why in round two. The future that is foreknown has a beginning starting with the whole beginning of the universe, and while God is of no origin, an eternal knowledge of creation is not saying the universe or what is going to happen in the universe is eternal as God is. Thus, we do not arrive at pantheism unless it is claimed that the universe had no beginning exactly like you seem to have done in the opening of this round. What you seem to be doing is confusing the actual existence of the universe with the perceived existence of the universe, and since the difference is relevant (conceptual vs. actual) as the two do not mean the same thing, you have not actually shown the claim that “since the universe is not eternal by virtue of foreknowledge as God is eternal, then the universe is still distinct from God, and thus is not placing the universe on a parallel ontological plane as God would be” as being false. It was an attempt, but a hollow one at that.

What is hollow is your continued splitting of conceptual and actual existence, even though you have done nothing whatsoever to define how the two are differentiated. What, exactly, is a "perceived" existence of the universe? As I've argued, if God has knowledge, it is of things that exist. If the universe has no actual existence, but is still an object of divine knowledge (this confused "conceptual" existence which you keep claiming), then we still must explain the origin of this knowledge. If God's knowledge of a non-existent universe (no-thing) is, as you claim, still eternally a part of the knowledge of God (commensurate, necessarily, with divine self-knowledge), I see no way around claiming that this knowledge must arise ultimately by virtue of being itself an aspect of divine self-knowledge. Otherwise, we can find no origin for this knowledge (given that the universe doesn't "actually" exist).

It’s not improper language because it is our language. Any language we most likely are going to use will fall short of really elaborating at the infinite nature of God.

I agree, but that is no excuse for not taking as much care as one can with the language one utilizes.

God’s relation to the universe is causal being that He created it. God is the First Cause that is un - caused. This is something essential to Christian theology and that has been espoused by any Christian and theologian I have ever encountered. I do not understand your objection to this at all.

The first statement, "God's relation to the universe is causal", has absolutely no philosophically necessary bearing on the second, "being that He created it." It is only a necessary conclusion if one assumes a material origin of the universe, whereby the effect (the material universe) might be the appropriate end of a cause within the same domain. By conflating God's relationship to the universe as one of causation, you have effectively demonstrated a material, mechanistic relationship between God and creation, a demonstration which not only destroys the notion of ex nihilo creation, but also conflates the existence of God and the universe to that of the same logical and material domain.

What I was arguing was that since god does not know he is creating the universe until he actually is creating, then creation is not planned but is spontaneous or accidental. Either of which creation cannot be intended to have been so. That, more than anything I have criticized your position of, is the most non Christian idea I could think of.

Your thinking here again betrays an improper understanding of the eternity of God. You say that my position undermines God's "planning" of creation, but look again at your loose usage of language. To plan implies duration, contingency. But these categories are only applicable within a material domain where space/time render the concepts meaningful. Apart from these categories, they are inaccurate anthropomorphisms that may sound good in principle, but are ultimately philosophically vacuous.

What you have not avoided is the contradiction of the change in 1) the knowledge of god as he is unaware of something then aware of it as there is a divine emergence of knowledge of what is happening as it happens, and 2) the nature of god from being atemporal without the universe and temporal with the universe.

Actually, I have answered this quite sufficiently, notwithstanding your inability to understand it. As I argued in my very first post, the emergence of divine knowledge from God's creative acts in no way marks a "change" in the nature or extent of divine knowledge, as the supposed "something" of which God is unaware is actually a no-thing, which cannot be considered an object of knowledge. Moreover, your characterization of my position is inaccurate. You cast it in a light to seem as if God's knowledge of the universe emerges "as the universe is happening" , as if knowledge is being appropriated to God by the emergence of the universe. But this couldn't be further from my meaning. Rather than being appropriated from the universe which God creates, divine knowledge about creation emerges from God's very creative acts. So God's knowledge of the universe is not "obtained" from the emergence of the universe, but rather from the divine act of creation. This is an important distinction, for while there is no temporal/spatial relationship or priority between God's creation of the universe and the existence of the universe itself, there is a logical priority insofar as God creates the universe ex nihilo.

When I argue 1 I mean that, as you have even said, god does not know the future. If god does not know the future, there is something god does not know about. The future is ‘something’ because it exists in an ontological sense of “xexists now” as explained in the beginning of round two to which again was not efficiently refuted here in round three. Either way, god’s knowledge of the future would emerge as it happens as you have it, which would mean that he has knowledge of something he previously did not. That is adding knowledge to already the knowledge he has, which again defies immutability.

Unfortunately, this is just a complete muddling of the OT position. The "something" which you characterize God as not knowing is not "something", it is no-thing. By even naming it "no-thing", we have stretched language beyond measure which the no-thing is due. God does not have knowledge of the future because the future does not exist to be known. As non-existent, it is not an appropriate object of knowledge, for how can God know no-thing? Such is an absurd idea.

Regarding the issue of mutability, I will return your attention to my very first post where I more than adequately addressed this. In the paradigm of the emergence of divine knowledge via ex nihilo creation, there is no change in the scope, extent, or content of divine knowledge. God knows, without change, all that is to be known. The emergence of divine knowledge does not signal a change, for what change can be said to happen from "no-thing" to the thing? Such categories are ridiculous, for a change insists upon properties that are measurable from state to another. Since no-thing is not measurable, the movement from no-thing to something (this is even improper to name, but I will for the sake of argument) is not, accurately seen, a real change, but is only so from the perspective of an improper understanding of the nature of existence and God's knowledge of it.

On 2 I argue that god must experience a change in nature as god must become temporal to experience this divine emergence of knowledge, since that is exactly how we become knowledgeable in things. We are temporal beings, and that is a temporal way of going about attaining knowledge of something. God therefore must be temporal in nature according to the Open Theistic view. But we know that God is atemporal without the universe, and that the Son Christ was incarnated and experienced temporality but since the ascension is atemporal with the Father, so the only person of the Godhead who is temporal is possibly the Holy Spirit since he directly interacts with man. Thus, in what way is god said to be temporal or in time? If there is an emergence of knowledge, this can only come about in a temporal environment since there can be no emergence in a timeless state. I have seen every Open Theist I’ve discussed with claim god is in time or temporal. I have seen it on Open Theistic websites. It logically follows from saying there is a divine emergence of knowledge about the universe. So, are you saying the father occupies time/space, the Son which would then make the incarnation moot, for all the knowledge of the universe could not have emerged from the temporal existence Christ experienced, or the Spirit?

I really don't see the logic in your argument here. As creation occurs ex nihilo, there is no sense in which God must necessarily "become temporal" in order to know the universe. As I mentioned above (and several times before), God's knowledge of the universe does not "flow back" (the "becoming temporal" in your thinking) to God, but rather emerges from God's very act of creation. Moreover, because this creation ex nihilo is not the material, causal relationship which your position assumes, there is additionally no need to posit a "temporal environment" in order for creation to occur.

And regarding your other interactions with Open Theists, I'm not particularly interested. If you'd like to argue with the deficiencies in their thinking, there are other forums for that. Admittedly, I do bring a series of expansions and corrections to Open Theism in my rendering of it, but these are in the interests of promoting it as a serious alternative to the flaws in the position that you and others advocate.
 
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elopez

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It is desperation for two reasons. The first is because from a scientific perspective that the universe is about 13.7 billion years old (and thus finite in age), it is purely sound. The age of the universe refers to how much time has elapsed since the Big Bang as according to the Lambda-CDM concordance model. The model is heavily supported by the most current high precision astronomical observations like WMAP. If we extrapolate said model backwards from the earliest well apprehended state, it briskly approaches a singularity, though this has no physical relevance but is merely used to quote times measured since the Big Bang.

It is even more desperate because you seem to be acting like “popularity” (of the new view of physicists) is a factor like this is high school. This is evident because a beginning of the universe is even rooted in the Bible! After all, what do you think Scripture is referring to in Genesis 1:1: “In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth”? “Beginning” here means the starting point of, or more specifically the origin of. The universe had an origin. If you want to deny that which the Bible confirms and take the “popular” view over the word of God that is your prerogative.

When it comes to causality, much clarity is needed here, and for that I turn to Aristotle’s distinction between an efficient cause and a material cause. An efficient cause is described as something that which produces its effect. A material cause is the stuff out of which something can be made. The sculptor is the efficient cause of the sculpture, while whatever material is being used to sculpt the art is the material cause. What you are missing here is that if God creates ex nihilo, then it lacks only a material cause and thus would only need an efficient cause. If the material universe had a material cause it would really have no beginning at all. Thus, the universe must have an efficient cause since it began to exist. On this point I would only question the assumption, which in fact is baseless being you did nothing to support the notion, as to why one would think there must be material cause of a material effect?

You say that advocating a first cause of the universe is unsettling towards a theory of creation ex nihilo when this cannot be further from the truth! The argument to show creation ex nihilo is usually referred to as the First Cause Argument and was espoused by many theologians. To say this is not Christian understanding is not only to distort this understanding in a historical sense, but in a theological sense as well.

The infinity of the universe you have described states there is no beginning to the universe. If there is no beginning, it cannot have been created, since the very meaning of “creation” suggests an origin and being brought into existence. Every theological scale of creation suggests the universe was brought into existence. The universe was non – existent, and then it existed. You can say the universe is not eternal according to your view all you want, which is of no importance to me, but to say that the universe had no begging but was still created is intellectually dishonest. You must somehow, and I seriously question how, think creation can imply no origin?

I’m only going to explain the difference between what I refer to as the conceptual existence of the future and the actual existence of the future one last time. If you miss it again this time, it is your own fault. Conceptual existence of the future refers to what God is consciously aware of from eternity. Actual existence of the future is when what God has been consciously aware of from eternity transpires in the material universe. Again, what God has foreknown of from eternity is not actually taking place from eternity, but is merely consciously perceived. The distinction is so evident to disclaim it is pure absurdity or stubbornness to realize or accept the difference. Also, the plans I make for the future is not solely based off of knowledge but desires and possibly needs as well, and on this point I believe you have misunderstood my position a little. I am not saying that when I meet my dad for lunch that it is a result of my conceptual planning, but rather all the past occurrences that lead me to make plans with my dad, i.e. dialing the phone number on my phone, bringing up the idea of getting lunch, etc. Those conditions in the past are what I am saying that makes the future determined to happen.

To think that I am simply claiming conceptualizing the future will mean it exists necessarily is to either misread what I wrote or intentionally leave what I really said out. I don’t think it is the latter, so again I can only give you the benefit of the doubt. What I said was, since the future is determined to happen as a result of past occurrences, it must exist necessarily, not just that by way of conceptualizing it makes it so. It is not merely the planning of the universe that determines it, but actually creating it that kick starts a chain of cause/effect that suffice for all future happenings.

Another irrelevant point I feel you are hung up on is that of our language. The point is our language will never fully elaborate, in any precise way, the true nature of God. No matter how technical we want to be it really doesn’t matter and will fall short any time. In a more technical sense, your reasoning for thinking that, “your statement above is nonsensical” is self defeating. Again, the atemporal nature of God cannot be avoided if we indeed want to maintain the eternalness of God. In other words, eternalness necessarily implies timelessness. I’ve asked this once before but got no straightforward answer: Do you maintain that God is timeless without the universe? Yes, you have answered that you believe God is eternal, and as I have showed that would only mean you accept the timelessness of God, but according to your statement here you only criticize yourself in maintain the timelessness of God. It’s not as if God created temporally since the temporal universe and world would already have to exist. Therefore God must have started creation from an atemporal state of existence, regardless of the paradoxical nature of such an idea. To say that God existed casually prior to the universe is only intended in a manner of speaking, not to be taken literally since again there is no time ‘before’ time and thus any description of such is not in our language. Your persistent objection to the “imprecise use of language” I am using then is really not considered a reasonable or serious objection.

The temporal location sense of “x exists now” is to say that whatever x is, it is present and can be observed by one. Thus, in the temporal location sense of “my computer exists” I mean I can see the computer, touch and hear it. Now, as I have said foreknowledge means only that God is consciously aware of the future from eternity. So when God foreknows I am going to do x from eternity, I am not presently doing x, but will do x when the time actually comes. The conceptual existence of the future corresponds to the actual existence of the future in that what God foreknows must transpire. God knows what I going to presently do from eternity, but that isn’t the same as saying I am doing x from eternity since I do not actually exist in the temporal location sense (I am not present eternally). Again this difference is too evident to ignore. Thus, my view is not that God doesn’t have knowledge of what is going to be present, but that what God has knowledge of from eternity is not present. There is no “realized” knowledge of what is going to happen, as what is consciously known from eternity is what is going to happen.

Perhaps you view the analogy as not compelling because you plainly misunderstand it. I am not saying that one imagine the future, but imagine something they want to know of the future. For example, say I go up to the crystal ball and think of my girlfriend in relation to marriage. The ball would reveal if I am going to get married or not, and what that is going to look like. Again, it is not by me looking at the ball and seeing the future that constitutes the future; it is the beings that exist that make up the future. Since this minuscule point is clarified, the analogy stands to reason that it is something external of God that gives way to foreknowledge.

What is hollow is your continued splitting of conceptual and actual existence, even though you have done nothing whatsoever to define how the two are differentiated.
Like I said, I cannot make the distinction any more clear than I have just now. If you say the difference is not there it is only because you are willfully ignoring the explanation of the difference, or because you are not grasping it. Neither of which is blame on my end.

What, exactly, is a "perceived" existence of the universe?
Think about it. Perceived means understanding. God understands the existence of the universe and anything that pertains to it.

As I've argued, if God has knowledge, it is of things that exist. If the universe has no actual existence, but is still an object of divine knowledge (this confused "conceptual" existence which you keep claiming), then we still must explain the origin of this knowledge.
And as I’ve argued non – present things do exist. What about the universe not being an actuality must have an origin if it is consciously aware of from eternity? To say it does is only illogical. There is no origin to the knowledge of the universe or anything as it is eternal knowledge. Just as God has always existed He has always known what is going to happen.

Actually, creation has all the casual significance. It is all the matter and energy that is the universe’s material cause, not God, since it is the material cause which is the material of which something consists of. There still needs to be an efficient cause, which would ‘move’ this material into form, in which case would be the universe. My partner earlier said on this point of causality that I do not understand the nature of this principle, however it seems to be him that is guilty of such by disregarding a sound idea of causality that completely dismantles the argument he proposed. Plus, since I am affirming God is timeless, there can no physicality ascribed to Him, hence God is immaterial. If God is immaterial, there can be no same property that the universe and God share. The universe is created; God is not. God is not the universe but distinct from it; the universe is the universe.

Your thinking here again betrays an improper understanding of the eternity of God. You say that my position undermines God's "planning" of creation, but look again at your loose usage of language. To plan implies duration, contingency. But these categories are only applicable within a material domain where space/time renders the concepts meaningful. Apart from these categories, they are inaccurate anthropomorphisms that may sound good in principle, but are ultimately philosophically vacuous.
Let us see whose position really betrays a proper understanding of the eternity of God when we turn to Scripture. If God has eternal knowledge of creation, then He has an eternal purpose or plan for creation. Yes, to plan implies duration, but eternal knowledge implies eternal purpose which doesn’t imply duration of space/time. Forget about this being philosophically sound, it is Biblically sound.

Ephesians 1:4 – “For he chose us in him before the creation of the world to be holy and blameless in his sight...”

Thus God had an eternal plan for creation. However, if God had an eternal plan for creation, that only means God would also have an eternal knowledge of creation. So if it is denied god has eternal knowledge of creation, there cannot be a plan for creation. Again, this is to say creation was unplanned, something that has just been shown to be extraordinarily un – Biblical.

With the divine act of creating would come the emergence of the universe, though, would it not? If not, then what happens as a result of creating at that point?? So it really is whence the universe and man’s life that god, according to your view, is going to be become aware of such. My idea is that while god is creating he is going to know something of which he previously did not know, which is to add new knowledge of what is going to happen to knowledge of what has already happened. You may think you have answered it but then why is unsettling as ever?

The future cannot be nothing or a “no – thing” as you put it precisely because non – present objects exist in relation to time and us, and conceptually as well as eternally for God. The future also exists necessarily as a result of God creating the universe (causal determinism). As the future exists necessarily by way of creating, it is an object of knowledge. God, if perfect in knowledge, would be able to know that which exists necessarily.

Sure, you can say creation occurs ex nihilo, but when you insist things like god obtains knowledge by the very act of creating, all of that language strictly implies a temporal ontological existence. If god “obtains” knowledge, this can only happen in a temporal order. As god creates the knowledge increases, right? This is not to say the knowledge “flows back” but “goes forward” with every act of creating. And this is where your position just completely falls apart. You want to insist there is no temporal environment for creation to occur, so does this mean that there is an atemporal environment? If not, then in what state does god create in?

When you say god obtains knowledge by the act of creating, is that to say that god is still presently creating? If not, then god cannot be obtaining knowledge of creation or anything at all. If so, to say god is presently creating and obtains knowledge means he is with time and experiences it as we humans do. The logic is once again, too obvious to ignore here.

One last thing I want to bring up which neither of us have yet is that of human free will. According to your position, how does the idea of a human free will fit? I would assume that since god is not aware of the future, that such actions remain free, but in what philosophical sense of free will? I would guess libertarianism, but before I want to crituque such a view I'd rather get it straight from you first.
 
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rogueapologist

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It is desperation for two reasons. The first is because from a scientific perspective that the universe is about 13.7 billion years old (and thus finite in age), it is purely sound. The age of the universe refers to how much time has elapsed since the Big Bang as according to the Lambda-CDM concordance model. The model is heavily supported by the most current high precision astronomical observations like WMAP. If we extrapolate said model backwards from the earliest well apprehended state, it briskly approaches a singularity, though this has no physical relevance but is merely used to quote times measured since the Big Bang.

I understand that the "age of the universe" refers to how much time has elapsed since the Big Bang. The point you are missing is that the Big Bang is not the "beginning" of the universe. In terms of the "age" of the universe, of course, we speak loosely of the Big Bang as the beginning. However, from an ontological perspective, these same scientists still posit a singularity "before" the universe (obviously, an incorrect term to use, since there is no "before" the emergence of the criteria [space-time] by which a "before" would be measured). So again, this is not desperation on my part, but merely a result of a misapplication of words and concepts to structures to which they do not apply.

It is even more desperate because you seem to be acting like “popularity” (of the new view of physicists) is a factor like this is high school. This is evident because a beginning of the universe is even rooted in the Bible! After all, what do you think Scripture is referring to in Genesis 1:1: “In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth”? “Beginning” here means the starting point of, or more specifically the origin of. The universe had an origin. If you want to deny that which the Bible confirms and take the “popular” view over the word of God that is your prerogative.

No, it has nothing to do with popularity. The only reason I even brought up the brane-world advocates is because of your prior conflation of the "scientific perspective" with a very narrow, homogenous understanding of the origins of the universe (which, conceptually speaking, are not even themselves accurate). As I mentioned before, what science says about the subject is not particularly interesting to me, as all scientific theories are not able to eclipse the threshold of singularity, brane-worlds, or other material explanations for the origin of the Big Bang. In other words, none of these approaches get to ex nihilo at all, which is entirely my point.

Regarding the Scriptures, I affirm with the Genesis record that the universe was created by God. My argument is that this affirmation, however, need not lead one down a path which materializes the relationship between God and that which God has created by causally and materially linking that which is created to that which is not. Failing to maintain this distinction does not, in any way, force a materialist interpretation of Genesis 1; rather, such a rendering is simply a by-product of an improper view of the relationship between God and creation.

When it comes to causality, much clarity is needed here, and for that I turn to Aristotle’s distinction between an efficient cause and a material cause. An efficient cause is described as something that which produces its effect. A material cause is the stuff out of which something can be made. The sculptor is the efficient cause of the sculpture, while whatever material is being used to sculpt the art is the material cause. What you are missing here is that if God creates ex nihilo, then it lacks only a material cause and thus would only need an efficient cause. If the material universe had a material cause it would really have no beginning at all. Thus, the universe must have an efficient cause since it began to exist. On this point I would only question the assumption, which in fact is baseless being you did nothing to support the notion, as to why one would think there must be material cause of a material effect?

This is an entirely different debate altogether, but I follow the more Humean school of causality which rejects the unnecessary and illusory distinctions between Aristotelian and (later) Scholastic types of causes, and argues that if there are causes, they are only efficient (this is assuming, of course, that causality isn't actualized only psychologically). In such a perspective, your appeal to "efficient" causes is irrelevant, and we still find ourselves at the conclusions I outlined before (and which you seem to tacitly agree with, given your sudden interest to now distinguish between "types" of causes).

Of course, even if we presume the validity of the distinction between Aristotelian/Scholastic categories of causality, the conclusions are really not any different from those I have already outlined. After all, efficient causes are, fundamentally, "producers" of effects; insofar as efficient causes bring about effects, they necessarily presume the "effect" of which they are the cause. But my point all along is the universe is not an "effect", that is not related to God in a causally identifiable way. Shifting from material to efficient causes (which isn't what I was arguing to begin with, and really only underscores your misunderstanding of causality) changes nothing, for you have still not established that the universe is an effect of which there can or needs to be a cause--be it efficient, material, formal or final. And moreover, if we do suggest that the universe is an effect, we still create an inversely necessary ontological relationship between the efficient cause and its effect, and we find perhaps an even stronger argument for pantheism than that which proceeds merely from the analysis of divine knowledge about creation.

But let's get back to your statement. Again, you use tremendously imprecise language when you speak of the universe "beginning" to exist. It is imprecise because a beginning implies a change of state. However, ex nihilo creation involves no change in state, for non-existence is not a state from which a change can said to be made. To even talk about the non-existence of the universe is, fundamentally, to conceptually confuse the issue, but this is precisely what occurs when we speak of the "beginning" of the universe and the universe "beginning" to exist.

You say that advocating a first cause of the universe is unsettling towards a theory of creation ex nihilo when this cannot be further from the truth! The argument to show creation ex nihilo is usually referred to as the First Cause Argument and was espoused by many theologians. To say this is not Christian understanding is not only to distort this understanding in a historical sense, but in a theological sense as well.

You are welcome to your opinion, of course. From my perspective, the goal of theology must ever be to evolve, especially as philosophical paradigms change. I'm not necessarily suggesting that the historical theological renderings of "First Cause" are intrinsically improper--after all, we have to take into consideration the philosophical milieu in which they were formulated. However, given the evolution in human understanding regarding the universe since then, I think it is certainly appropriate and prudent for these theologies to be scrutinized in order that we do not reach illegitimate ends because we have applied a rubric that is based upon assumptions that we no longer make.

The infinity of the universe you have described states there is no beginning to the universe. If there is no beginning, it cannot have been created

I see no convincing reason why one cannot affirm that the universe was created by God while also affirming the infinity of the universe. Your objection ultimately rests upon a linear conception of divine action in creation, but as I've argued again and again, there is no linearity in God's creative acts. Creation is ex nihilo, out of nothing. The necessary philosophical import of this notion is that the "no-thing" of which we speak is not code for "before" the existence of the universe, or even for "a state in which the universe didn't exist." By even naming the "out of nothing", we have betrayed a linear conception of God's existence in relation to the universe, and dissolved the necessary tension we must maintain between the existence of God and that which is "other than" God in order to not devolve into a mindless pantheism.

The universe was non – existent, and then it existed. You can say the universe is not eternal according to your view all you want, which is of no importance to me, but to say that the universe had no begging but was still created is intellectually dishonest. You must somehow, and I seriously question how, think creation can imply no origin?

Surely you can see how improper it is to say that the universe was non-existent!

"The universe was no-thing"

"A == !A".

These are absurd statements, and really betray a fundamental confusion about God's relationship to the universe.

From the perspective of causal relationships, the universe most certainly does not have a beginning or an origin, for it is not an "effect" of which a cause can be presumed. After all, if effects can inferentially lead us back to ultimate causes, we will never actually arrive at "no-thing", for that which does not exist cannot be the cause of that which does. And if we say that God "caused" the universe (be it material, efficient, or some other type of cause), we have actually jettisoned creation ex nihilo, for a regressive analysis of causality will lead us not to "no-thing", but rather "something."

In this way, then, if we abandon creation ex nihilo and advocate some causal beginning to the universe, the ultimate philosophical result must ALWAYS be pantheism, for the inverse relationship of effect (the universe) to the cause (God) will necessarily require that we posit the existence of the effect on a commensurate ontological level with the cause.

I’m only going to explain the difference between what I refer to as the conceptual existence of the future and the actual existence of the future one last time. If you miss it again this time, it is your own fault. Conceptual existence of the future refers to what God is consciously aware of from eternity. Actual existence of the future is when what God has been consciously aware of from eternity transpires in the material universe. Again, what God has foreknown of from eternity is not actually taking place from eternity, but is merely consciously perceived.

My objection to your distinction is not based on me "missing it"--I object because the notion itself is absurd. You continue to suggest that there is a distinction between that which God is "consciously aware of from eternity" and what actually obtains. I get that. What you haven't done, however, is even attempt to explain or defend how this distinction is meaningful.

For example, I will ask again: If God is consciously aware of something "other than" God from all eternity, precisely where did this knowledge come from? If the universe doesn't exist to be known from eternity, how is it that God is consciously aware of no-thing? And, on the other side, if the universe obtains precisely because it is eternally and "consciously" known by God, how can we speak of the universe being "other-than" God at all? As I suggested in my previous response, if God's knowledge of the universe is commensurately eternal with God's knowledge of Godself (which is ultimately what you are arguing), then we must necessarily posit the eternal existence of the universe itself within the very nature of God, for that which God knows (the universe, in this case) is that which is (for God doesn't know no-thing)--to say that God has knowledge of no-thing is patently silly.

Another irrelevant point I feel you are hung up on is that of our language. The point is our language will never fully elaborate, in any precise way, the true nature of God. No matter how technical we want to be it really doesn’t matter and will fall short any time. In a more technical sense, your reasoning for thinking that, “your statement above is nonsensical” is self defeating. Again, the atemporal nature of God cannot be avoided if we indeed want to maintain the eternalness of God. In other words, eternalness necessarily implies timelessness. I’ve asked this once before but got no straightforward answer: Do you maintain that God is timeless without the universe? Yes, you have answered that you believe God is eternal, and as I have showed that would only mean you accept the timelessness of God, but according to your statement here you only criticize yourself in maintain the timelessness of God. It’s not as if God created temporally since the temporal universe and world would already have to exist. Therefore God must have started creation from an atemporal state of existence, regardless of the paradoxical nature of such an idea. To say that God existed casually prior to the universe is only intended in a manner of speaking, not to be taken literally since again there is no time ‘before’ time and thus any description of such is not in our language. Your persistent objection to the “imprecise use of language” I am using then is really not considered a reasonable or serious objection.

And I will continue to suggest that while language will obviously not "elaborate" the true nature of God, this in no way means that we can run roughshod over the language that we use. You say that language "really doesn't matter", and on that point, I agree that you don't think it does, given your frequent contradictory use of the very words you're attempting to use to defend your position. But notwithstanding your imprecise and often contradictory use of language, it is important insofar as communication is concerned. In the course of a debate, the words that one uses--and more importantly--the way which one uses words is extremely important for explicating one's position. If you disagree, than there is really no point in debating as the retreat to "it really doesn't matter" will render the meaningfulness of the discussion moot.

But despite your claims that the words really don't "matter", you are actually a bit dishonest on this point. Throughout this debate (and even in this post, which is humorous), you have appealed to particular words ("beginning", etc.) to establish your point, and in doing so, have relied upon some intended meaning for these words (notwithstanding the imprecision with which you used them). So if they don't matter, why would you make such appeals? Surely you see some level of self-contradiction in that.

Moreover, if you are appealing to concepts (like causality) "only in manner of speaking", in what way am I supposed to understand your position? If you want to advocate that God "caused" (or "started) the universe, but don't want to be held to the standard of what "caused" (or "started") implies, there's little point in discussing the issue with you.

The temporal location sense of “x exists now” is to say that whatever x is, it is present and can be observed by one. Thus, in the temporal location sense of “my computer exists” I mean I can see the computer, touch and hear it. Now, as I have said foreknowledge means only that God is consciously aware of the future from eternity. So when God foreknows I am going to do x from eternity, I am not presently doing x, but will do x when the time actually comes. The conceptual existence of the future corresponds to the actual existence of the future in that what God foreknows must transpire. God knows what I going to presently do from eternity, but that isn’t the same as saying I am doing x from eternity since I do not actually exist in the temporal location sense (I am not present eternally). Again this difference is too evident to ignore. Thus, my view is not that God doesn’t have knowledge of what is going to be present, but that what God has knowledge of from eternity is not present. There is no “realized” knowledge of what is going to happen, as what is consciously known from eternity is what is going to happen.

The point you continue to miss in this discussion is that the "temporal location sense" doesn't mean anything in relation to divine knowledge, even within your own model. If God has knowledge of something, this something must necessarily exist whereby it can be an object of knowledge. If we step away from your obfuscating issue of "temporal sense location", there is no distinction between that which God knows eternally (the past, present, future, within your model) and that which obtains in space/time. After all, if it is an object of divine knowledge, it's ontological obtaining is already presumed in the idea of knowledge of that which obtains, for if it has not ontologically obtained, it cannot be known (since again, God does know no-thing). So then, if God has eternal "conscious awareness" of that which God "will" create (vis-a-vis your unnatural distinction between conceptual and actual existence), we must conclude that that which God creates is essential in nature with Godself, whereby it can exist in such a state that it can be commensurate in eternality with God's self-knowledge.

You have yet to even begin to address this challenge.

Furthermore, I would argue with your point that there is a meaningful distinction between being "known" from eternity and "existing" from eternity. I think that if you actually contemplate the issue, you'll see that the two are, in fact, one in the same. From one's own perspective, of course, it does not appear that one exists from eternity. However, we're not talking about one's own knowledge of one's existence--we're talking about divine knowledge. If God's knowledge of something is eternal, this knowledge presumes the actuality of the object of knowledge. As there is no change in state in God's knowledge (well, there should not be…your perspective actually introduces severe change, but that's another matter), there is no scenario in which God's knowledge of something transitions from conceptual to actual. For example, God does not have only conceptual knowledge of Godself--rather, as God exists, so God knows Godself fully and completely. In the same way, if we posit that knowledge of the universe belongs eternally to the mind of God, we must assume the same: there is no "state" change in God's knowledge of the universe from "conceptual" to "actual". And more to the point of your misunderstanding, there can also not even be a "state" change in that which God has knowledge of. That is, if God has knowledge of the universe from eternity, we cannot conceive of a state in which the universe is not known to God as the universe. If the universe is known to God from eternity, it is not because knowledge of the universe is appropriated to the divine mind via creation (which would negate the premise of God's eternal knowledge of it), but rather because the universe exists in a domain that corresponds to God having eternal, divine knowledge of the universe. As the only domain in which this type of knowledge is possible is that of the divine Self, we must conclude, then, that if God has eternal knowledge of the universe, it is because the universe exists eternally within the domain of the divine self; in other words, the universe exists eternally with (or more appropriately, as) God.

Perhaps you view the analogy as not compelling because you plainly misunderstand it. I am not saying that one imagine the future, but imagine something they want to know of the future. For example, say I go up to the crystal ball and think of my girlfriend in relation to marriage. The ball would reveal if I am going to get married or not, and what that is going to look like. Again, it is not by me looking at the ball and seeing the future that constitutes the future; it is the beings that exist that make up the future. Since this minuscule point is clarified, the analogy stands to reason that it is something external of God that gives way to foreknowledge.

As I pointed out in my previous response to this "analogy", there is nothing of the future which you are imagining. You are simply extending knowledge of "what is". But this doesn't really matter, because your final point (that something "external" of God gives way to foreknowledge) destroys your argument completely. If you are arguing that God's knowledge of the universe is eternal (conceptually or otherwise), but then are also suggesting that this very knowledge is premised on that which is "other than" God, you actually have more fundamental issues to deal with than the inevitable conclusion of pantheism.

Like I said, I cannot make the distinction any more clear than I have just now. If you say the difference is not there it is only because you are willfully ignoring the explanation of the difference, or because you are not grasping it. Neither of which is blame on my end.

I'm not blaming. I'm just stating the fact that you haven't made the distinction whatsoever. It's not that you haven't made it "clear" or that I am ignoring your conclusions. My point is that you haven't even offered an explanation of the distinction yet.

Think about it. Perceived means understanding. God understands the existence of the universe and anything that pertains to it.

I don't necessarily disagree. My point is that if God has knowledge of the existence of the universe (your words), and this knowledge is eternally commensurate with divine self-knowledge, there is no reasonable way in which you can argue that the universe doesn't exist eternally within the very being of God. After all, if God has understanding of the "existence of the universe" (this a something, not a no-thing), God's knowledge of this universe must pertain to something that obtains. So if God has eternal knowledge of that which obtains, that which obtains must obtain eternally whereby it can be an object of God's eternal knowledge of that which obtains.

And as I’ve argued non – present things do exist. What about the universe not being an actuality must have an origin if it is consciously aware of from eternity? To say it does is only illogical. There is no origin to the knowledge of the universe or anything as it is eternal knowledge. Just as God has always existed He has always known what is going to happen.

The point you continue to miss is simple: if God eternally knows "what is going to happen", the "what" must refer to something (not no-thing, which can't even be named), since God doesn't eternally know "not what is going to happen" (which is no-thing, an absurdity). Therefore, as God's knowledge of what is going to happen is eternal (in your view), the "what is going to happen" must also be eternal whereby it can be an object of divine knowledge. If, on the other hand, the "what is going to happen" is not eternal, it cannot be eternally known to God, for it is no-thing, and we would be absurd in saying that God has knowledge of no-thing.

Actually, creation has all the casual significance. It is all the matter and energy that is the universe’s material cause, not God, since it is the material cause which is the material of which something consists of. There still needs to be an efficient cause, which would ‘move’ this material into form, in which case would be the universe. My partner earlier said on this point of causality that I do not understand the nature of this principle, however it seems to be him that is guilty of such by disregarding a sound idea of causality that completely dismantles the argument he proposed. Plus, since I am affirming God is timeless, there can no physicality ascribed to Him, hence God is immaterial. If God is immaterial, there can be no same property that the universe and God share. The universe is created; God is not. God is not the universe but distinct from it; the universe is the universe.

If God is not the universe, and if the universe is not eternal, how can God "move" the universe? Moreover, if the universe is created ex nihilo, exactly what is "moved"? I know you don't think that language matters, but surely you see the absurdity of your position in this case.

The very nature of causality (the "movement" which you suggest) implies changes in states between the agents of cause and effect. But this is absurd. To imply such a change is an affront to divine immutability, and is equally absurd in relation to the universe, as you jettison entirely the concept of creation ex nihilo and substitute in its place an eternality of the universe, whereby the universe can be understood as undergoing a "change" by interaction with its efficient cause. But of course, creation ex nihilo implies no change (since the "move" from no-thing to something is not a "move" or change at all). Therefore, in order to maintain this fundamental doctrine of Christian belief, you'll need to seriously revisit your haphazard application of causality to the creation of the universe.

Let us see whose position really betrays a proper understanding of the eternity of God when we turn to Scripture. If God has eternal knowledge of creation, then He has an eternal purpose or plan for creation. Yes, to plan implies duration, but eternal knowledge implies eternal purpose which doesn’t imply duration of space/time. Forget about this being philosophically sound, it is Biblically sound.

Hmm, I thought words didn't matter? If I'm to take your position that precision in language is of no importance, why should I pay any attention to the "words" that you quote from Scripture? Again, the self-contradictory nature of your argument reveals itself.

Thus God had an eternal plan for creation. However, if God had an eternal plan for creation, that only means God would also have an eternal knowledge of creation. So if it is denied god has eternal knowledge of creation, there cannot be a plan for creation. Again, this is to say creation was unplanned, something that has just been shown to be extraordinarily un – Biblical.

The universe existing eternally in a commensurate way with the very being of God is hardly a "plan". Such would be akin to saying that God has plans for Godself, which is absurd.

But there is really no objection that you can make, for one need not assume "eternal" knowledge of creation in order to allow for God achieving divine purposes within creation. Such an imposition of a linear view of knowledge upon God is not necessitated, either philosophically or biblically.

With the divine act of creating would come the emergence of the universe, though, would it not? If not, then what happens as a result of creating at that point?? So it really is whence the universe and man’s life that god, according to your view, is going to be become aware of such. My idea is that while god is creating he is going to know something of which he previously did not know, which is to add new knowledge of what is going to happen to knowledge of what has already happened. You may think you have answered it but then why is unsettling as ever?

Language! There is no "at that point" in God's creating of the universe. God does not "become aware" of the universe "after" or "as" God is creating it, for these concepts imply a "tensed" relationship of God to creation. As I've maintained throughout, God's knowledge of the universe emerges with God's creative acts. They do not emerge in a retroactive way "from" the existence of the universe "to" God's mind.

Moreover, there is no state in which knowledge of the universe is "added" to what God "previously did not know" because, again, these linear, tensed concepts have no bearing on the existence or acts of God. There is no "addition" to divine knowledge, for God's knowledge necessarily and completely encompasses that which "is". As that which isn't (no-thing) is not an object of knowledge, the domain of what God knows is constantly and unchangingly infinite, encompassing all of that which exists.

I suspect it is unsettling because you know that this is a more accurate way to think about these things than a perspective which would posit the eternal existence of the universe in commensurate relationship with the very existence of Godself.

The future cannot be nothing or a “no – thing” as you put it precisely because non – present objects exist in relation to time and us, and conceptually as well as eternally for God. The future also exists necessarily as a result of God creating the universe (causal determinism). As the future exists necessarily by way of creating, it is an object of knowledge. God, if perfect in knowledge, would be able to know that which exists necessarily.

I agree that the future cannot be a no-thing, for "no-thing" is not something that anything can be. It is a negating way to speak contrarily about that which does exist.
Sure, you can say creation occurs ex nihilo, but when you insist things like god obtains knowledge by the very act of creating, all of that language strictly implies a temporal ontological existence. If god “obtains” knowledge, this can only happen in a temporal order. As god creates the knowledge increases, right? This is not to say the knowledge “flows back” but “goes forward” with every act of creating. And this is where your position just completely falls apart. You want to insist there is no temporal environment for creation to occur, so does this mean that there is an atemporal environment? If not, then in what state does god create in?

I never said God obtains knowledge! This is purely your misunderstanding or misrepresentation of my position. What I said is that God's knowledge of the universe emerges with God's creation of the universe. In this way, the knowledge which God has about the universe does not "come" from anywhere; it is commensurate and essential with God's creative acts themselves.

And NO, God's knowledge does NOT increase. I've made this plain more times than I care to count. God's knowledge is necessarily and exhaustively inclusive of that which exists. As there is no change in state from the "no-thing-ness" of something to the existence of something, God's knowledge of that which God creates is never "added to", for the domain and extent of God's divine and perfect knowledge is still ever and exhaustively encompassing of that which exists.

Moreover, there is no "flowing back" OR "going forward"--again, more of your misunderstanding.

When you say god obtains knowledge by the act of creating, is that to say that god is still presently creating? If not, then god cannot be obtaining knowledge of creation or anything at all. If so, to say god is presently creating and obtains knowledge means he is with time and experiences it as we humans do. The logic is once again, too obvious to ignore here.

I didn't say that God obtains knowledge by the act of creating. I said that divine knowledge about the universe emerges with God's creation of the universe.

One last thing I want to bring up which neither of us have yet is that of human free will. According to your position, how does the idea of a human free will fit? I would assume that since god is not aware of the future, that such actions remain free, but in what philosophical sense of free will? I would guess libertarianism, but before I want to crituque such a view I'd rather get it straight from you first.

As this is (I believe) my final post in the formal debate, I will leave this question unanswered. We can pick it up in the other thread if you'd like.
 
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elopez

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I understand that the "age of the universe" refers to how much time has elapsed since the Big Bang. The point you are missing is that the Big Bang is not the "beginning" of the universe. In terms of the "age" of the universe, of course, we speak loosely of the Big Bang as the beginning. However, from an ontological perspective, these same scientists still posit a singularity "before" the universe (obviously, an incorrect term to use, since there is no "before" the emergence of the criteria [space-time] by which a "before" would be measured). So again, this is not desperation on my part, but merely a result of a misapplication of words and concepts to structures to which they do not apply.
What you should also fathom is that the age of the universe invokes the universe being finite in that respect. Since you affirm that the age of the universe refers to how much time has elapsed since the Big Bang, it would only follow that you affirm there is finite connotations to the universe, something that you actually denied in the last round. Also, I have never even hinted at the Big Bang as the beginning of the universe, so to claim that is something I am missing is way off base.

No, it has nothing to do with popularity. The only reason I even brought up the brane-world advocates is because of your prior conflation of the "scientific perspective" with a very narrow, homogenous understanding of the origins of the universe (which, conceptually speaking, are not even themselves accurate). As I mentioned before, what science says about the subject is not particularly interesting to me, as all scientific theories are not able to eclipse the threshold of singularity, brane-worlds, or other material explanations for the origin of the Big Bang. In other words, none of these approaches get to ex nihilo at all, which is entirely my point.

Regarding the Scriptures, I affirm with the Genesis record that the universe was created by God. My argument is that this affirmation, however, need not lead one down a path which materializes the relationship between God and that which God has created by causally and materially linking that which is created to that which is not. Failing to maintain this distinction does not, in any way, force a materialist interpretation of Genesis 1; rather, such a rendering is simply a by-product of an improper view of the relationship between God and creation.
If you claim the scientific perspectives I brought up are not accurate, then you run into the same problem you did above were you want to deny something scientific then agree with it but only partially to your liking. That is not how science works. You go all the way to the conclusions, and this conclusion (the universe has an age) leads to an idea of a finite universe in that sense. What science says doesn’t have to be interesting to you at all, as long as it is sound and backed by evidence. I wouldn’t like something backed by evidence that destroys my earlier claim either, but there it is demolishing just that.

Regarding the Scriptures, you should also be affirming that not only is the universe created by God, but it also had a beginning as I said and asked of you in the last round and to which you just ignored now. Genesis 1:1 mentions a beginning. You denied a beginning. You are flat out wrong as again the Bible confirms a beginning.
Again, and to which you also left unaddressed, “creation” means “origin of.” The universe had an origin. If the universe had no beginning, it could not have been created. If the universe was not created, there can be no creator. Therefore, if there is no beginning to the universe, there is no creator of it. This conclusion, among many more, is why OT should be regarded as not only mendacious, but absolutely unbiblical as well. I am not saying that god is non – existent according to OT, rather god cannot be logically said to have created the universe being there was no beginning to it as is claimed.

This is an entirely different debate altogether, but I follow the more Humean school of causality which rejects the unnecessary and illusory distinctions between Aristotelian and (later) Scholastic types of causes, and argues that if there are causes, they are only efficient (this is assuming, of course, that causality isn't actualized only psychologically). In such a perspective, your appeal to "efficient" causes is irrelevant, and we still find ourselves at the conclusions I outlined before (and which you seem to tacitly agree with, given your sudden interest to now distinguish between "types" of causes).
Actually, this is only relevant to this debate. To bring up another debate topic when that topic is already being discussed in the already presumed debate is unnecessary. However, if you want to leave this bit out and only claim something with no support, I could easily as say I am aware of the harsh criticisms to the Humean school, which would indeed render the Aristotle understanding of causality the most coherent. Moreover, if the Humean school that you adhere to argues “that if there are causes, they are only efficient” then how can it be argued from the same perspective that a material cause must suffice for a material effect? This is something my partner has also left untouched – the support for why a material cause must abide in order for there to be a material effect. As I said in the last round, such an idea is unwarranted.

Of course, even if we presume the validity of the distinction between Aristotelian/Scholastic categories of causality, the conclusions are really not any different from those I have already outlined. After all, efficient causes are, fundamentally, "producers" of effects; insofar as efficient causes bring about effects, they necessarily presume the "effect" of which they are the cause
This is where you are hung up at. You have not supported the idea that “they necessarily presume the ‘effect’ of which they are the cause.” Think about it. An efficient cause is that which produces an effect. The material cause is that which the effect is composed of. If the sculptor is making a sculpture, the material he uses may not have any of the same properties at all that he has. For example, the sculptor (efficient cause [God]) has no similar properties of the sculpture (material cause [universe]). The sculptor is conscious as he is making the art, while the art is not conscious as it is material and so an unconscious thing. The sculptor is of flesh and bone, while the material may be clay or metal. In this way, the idea that “they necessarily presume the "effect" of which they are the cause” is completely ludicrous.

But my point all along is the universe is not an "effect", that is not related to God in a causally identifiable way. Shifting from material to efficient causes (which isn't what I was arguing to begin with, and really only underscores your misunderstanding of causality) changes nothing, for you have still not established that the universe is an effect of which there can or needs to be a cause--be it efficient, material, formal or final. And moreover, if we do suggest that the universe is an effect, we still create an inversely necessary ontological relationship between the efficient cause and its effect, and we find perhaps an even stronger argument for pantheism than that which proceeds merely from the analysis of divine knowledge about creation.
I understand your point. I just as feel as if you have not grounded it with reason much at all. Allow me to explain why one last time. First, I didn’t say that you were arguing a material cause to efficient cause. That you think I said this is only a display of your misunderstanding of what I have been actually saying, which has nothing to do with a miscomprehension of causality on my part. What I said was that if there is creation ex nihilo then there is only an explanation of an efficient cause missing, since there is no material cause (material to work with as the sculptor has) that is posited. Anything that begins to exist or has an origin must have an efficient cause. There must be an efficient cause, not a material or formal or final but efficient cause of the universe since indeed it began to exist and was created ex nihilo. By now, one thing is clear: the claim my partner has proposed that “they necessarily presume the "effect" of which they are the cause” is baseless as the claim is unsupported. Once again, that being the case, we arrive no where near Pantheism. Pantheism has many forms from near atheistic to theistic. Even the pantheistic theistic view holds that ‘god’ is not personal, while I have advocated a God that has an eternal plan for creation being there is eternal knowledge which is more than personal. For my partner to claim that I am arguing, even implicitly, a form of Pantheism is to fallaciously shift the meaning of Pantheism to what he thinks it is or wants it to be while what he may think it is, is not what Pantheism actually is.

But let's get back to your statement. Again, you use tremendously imprecise language when you speak of the universe "beginning" to exist. It is imprecise because a beginning implies a change of state. However, ex nihilo creation involves no change in state, for non-existence is not a state from which a change can said to be made. To even talk about the non-existence of the universe is, fundamentally, to conceptually confuse the issue, but this is precisely what occurs when we speak of the "beginning" of the universe and the universe "beginning" to exist.
Once again another baseless claim; how does a beginning imply a change of state? The Bible implies a beginning. To say this is imprecise language is to essentially say the word of God uses imprecise language, which is not just unbiblical, but not Christian too. What you’re overlooking again is that if there is creation ex nihilo, then there is nothing. There is no universe when God existed from eternity. You cannot deny that no matter how imprecise you want to say our language on this subject is. Then, out of nothing, there is something. Nothing from something is a change as there is an external difference of the something from nothing, regardless of there being no state of nothingness.

You are welcome to your opinion, of course. From my perspective, the goal of theology must ever be to evolve, especially as philosophical paradigms change. I'm not necessarily suggesting that the historical theological renderings of "First Cause" are intrinsically improper--after all, we have to take into consideration the philosophical milieu in which they were formulated. However, given the evolution in human understanding regarding the universe since then, I think it is certainly appropriate and prudent for these theologies to be scrutinized in order that we do not reach illegitimate ends because we have applied a rubric that is based upon assumptions that we no longer make.
I have no problem with theology changing as long as what is changing makes sense and is backed by Scripture and not just philosophically as you claim. The thing is what we understand now is that the universe had a beginning. We understand the universe is finite in age. It is what was understood back then, and is even more supported now. I have no issue with scrutiny, but the ones you propose are nonsensical.

I see no convincing reason why one cannot affirm that the universe was created by God while also affirming the infinity of the universe. Your objection ultimately rests upon a linear conception of divine action in creation, but as I've argued again and again, there is no linearity in God's creative acts. Creation is ex nihilo, out of nothing. The necessary philosophical import of this notion is that the "no-thing" of which we speak is not code for "before" the existence of the universe, or even for "a state in which the universe didn't exist." By even naming the "out of nothing", we have betrayed a linear conception of God's existence in relation to the universe, and dissolved the necessary tension we must maintain between the existence of God and that which is "other than" God in order to not devolve into a mindless pantheism.
Once again you seem to be distorting what I am actually meaning to convey. I said that one cannot assert that the universe was created by god while saying the universe had no beginning. “Creation” implies an origin of, hence if God created the universe there is a beginning to the universe. So my objection doesn’t really rest on any linear concept of creation, but the actual meaning of creation itself. Therefore, this response is only worth being a straw man.

Surely you can see how improper it is to say that the universe was non-existent!
Actually, I cannot. A nonexistent object is that which does not exist. Although of the insinuating paradox of this view, we accept lots of negative existence statements that are true and sensible. Something like Sherlock Holmes does not exist, or Zeus does not exist.

The vindication to the paradox is to discredit the premise that “If a singular term a denotes something, then ‘a does not exist’ is false.” The aim here is that while the quantifiers “there is” and “something” cover everything, the objects that do exist presently only cover a light portion of that domain. So in this sense it would be false to conclude “a means something” to “a is something that exists.” The statement “Zeus does not exist” merely depicts that Zeus is a nonexistent body. “Zeus” denotes a mythical Greek god and thus is intelligible. So, the whole sentence “Zeus does not exist” is meaningful too. Since it is true that Zeus is not associated to the class of objects that are considered to exist, “Zeus does not exist” is true. This rule could be executed to all negative singular existence statements, such as with the universe.

"The universe was no-thing"

"A == !A".

These are absurd statements, and really betray a fundamental confusion about God's relationship to the universe.
Surely you get my point now, that there is no reason to assume the existence of something in order to deny its existence. That itself is what is absurd. In turn, there is no betrayal of God’s relation to the universe by claiming the universe was non – existent.

From the perspective of causal relationships, the universe most certainly does not have a beginning or an origin, for it is not an "effect" of which a cause can be presumed. After all, if effects can inferentially lead us back to ultimate causes, we will never actually arrive at "no-thing", for that which does not exist cannot be the cause of that which does. And if we say that God "caused" the universe (be it material, efficient, or some other type of cause), we have actually jettisoned creation ex nihilo, for a regressive analysis of causality will lead us not to "no-thing", but rather "something."
Since the universe began to exist, and since everything that begins to exist must have a cause, from a causal perspective the universe does indeed have an origin. The universe is the effect of God’s creative act. God acted in whatever creative fashion, and as a consequence the universe began to exist.

When we are talking creation ex nihilo, we are simply referring to there being no material present firstly for God to create with. In that respect there is nothing. See, creation ex nihilo is in contrast to creation ex materia, which is to certify the idea there was pre existent matter for God to create with. In that respect, there would be something, however since we affirm creation ex nihilo, there is nothing. Yet the fact remains that God existed without the universe in a eternal, atemporal state. In this way, there is “something” without the universe as God existed without the universe and God is “something” since God exists. What I’m saying here is that even affirming creation ex nihilo, there is “something” that will be lead to without the universe according to a regress of causality. On this point, my partner is profoundly confounded on what creation ex nihilo really proposes; as he takes it to essentially mean that god must be considered “nothing.”

In this way, then, if we abandon creation ex nihilo and advocate some causal beginning to the universe, the ultimate philosophical result must ALWAYS be pantheism, for the inverse relationship of effect (the universe) to the cause (God) will necessarily require that we posit the existence of the effect on a commensurate ontological level with the cause.
Again, there is no need to abandon the concept of creation ex nihilo to regard a casual beginning to the universe as explained above. As it has been shown throughout this whole thread, Pantheism is not the result of any such view as it would require one to fallaciously change the context of Pantheism itself. And as I said before, and to which obviously was still not produced, there is no evidence or further argumentation for the idea that a material effect must have a material cause.

My objection to your distinction is not based on me "missing it"--I object because the notion itself is absurd. You continue to suggest that there is a distinction between that which God is "consciously aware of from eternity" and what actually obtains. I get that. What you haven't done, however, is even attempt to explain or defend how this distinction is meaningful.
I have explained this, many of times. This is why I say you have missed it. The question is whether you intentionally or unintentionally missed it. Like I said, I’m giving you the benefit of the doubt.

For example, I will ask again: If God is consciously aware of something "other than" God from all eternity, precisely where did this knowledge come from? If the universe doesn't exist to be known from eternity, how is it that God is consciously aware of no-thing? And, on the other side, if the universe obtains precisely because it is eternally and "consciously" known by God, how can we speak of the universe being "other-than" God at all? As I suggested in my previous response, if God's knowledge of the universe is commensurately eternal with God's knowledge of Godself (which is ultimately what you are arguing), then we must necessarily posit the eternal existence of the universe itself within the very nature of God, for that which God knows (the universe, in this case) is that which is (for God doesn't know no-thing)--to say that God has knowledge of no-thing is patently silly.
There is no need to ask again because I have already answered this question in the previous round. Go back and read it yourself. This is how you have missed my explanation on the difference here. I said that there is no origin of knowledge since it is eternal, and as God always existed God has always known of everything. So, to pose this question is nonsensical. The universe exists necessarily, and something that exists necessarily is that which can be known by God. The universe is other than God because the universe does not presently exist from eternity whence God knew of it, as in when God existed without the universe the universe did not exist. What about that is too difficult for you to understand? What you suggested in your previous response has been shown to be false, which means that it doesn’t make it any truer by simply regurgitating it here. Yet again another shallow attempt to discredit my position.

And I will continue to suggest that while language will obviously not "elaborate" the true nature of God, this in no way means that we can run roughshod over the language that we use. You say that language "really doesn't matter", and on that point, I agree that you don't think it does, given your frequent contradictory use of the very words you're attempting to use to defend your position. But notwithstanding your imprecise and often contradictory use of language, it is important insofar as communication is concerned. In the course of a debate, the words that one uses--and more importantly--the way which one uses words is extremely important for explicating one's position. If you disagree, than there is really no point in debating as the retreat to "it really doesn't matter" will render the meaningfulness of the discussion moot.
First, you argument that I use imprecise language results from a misunderstanding of negative singular existence statements. Second, you’re taking my statements out of context. I never claimed that words do not matter, but when we attempt to describe God our language doesn’t matter because it does not convey the whole nature of God in entirety. That is not the same as saying “words don’t matter” by itself. And again, to which you once again have not refuted, your objection of the contradicting words I am using to describe my position must be shared by your position as well, since God is eternal and therefore timeless and existed “before” time.

But despite your claims that the words really don't "matter", you are actually a bit dishonest on this point. Throughout this debate (and even in this post, which is humorous), you have appealed to particular words ("beginning", etc.) to establish your point, and in doing so, have relied upon some intended meaning for these words (notwithstanding the imprecision with which you used them). So if they don't matter, why would you make such appeals? Surely you see some level of self-contradiction in that.
Again, you’re taking my words out of context. I said that our language will not reveal in entirety the true nature of God, not that “words do not matter.” Now, I have used words like “beginning” but such a word would only be applicable to our finite perspective, not God’s since He has no beginning. So, if “beginning” is really only significant to us, I am not pealing the meaning from said word but giving it meaning by defending the idea, both Biblically and scientifically. More than anything I am not saying that our words to describe our perspective do not matter, but the objection that our language is imprecise to detail an infinite God is as that is given!

Moreover, if you are appealing to concepts (like causality) "only in manner of speaking", in what way am I supposed to understand your position? If you want to advocate that God "caused" (or "started) the universe, but don't want to be held to the standard of what "caused" (or "started") implies, there's little point in discussing the issue with you.
This again will be another example of how my opponent obscures my statements. I didn’t say that concepts like causality are only to be taken in a manner of speaking, rather what I said was the statement “there is no time ‘before’ time” should only be regarded as a manner of speaking and not literally. So, I am not neglecting the implications of God as a first cause, as I have explained what I believe that implies, and as that directly conflicts with your view, there is much point in this discussion. If not, you wouldn’t have responded in much detail as you have been doing.

The point you continue to miss in this discussion is that the "temporal location sense" doesn't mean anything in relation to divine knowledge, even within your own model. If God has knowledge of something, this something must necessarily exist whereby it can be an object of knowledge. If we step away from your obfuscating issue of "temporal sense location", there is no distinction between that which God knows eternally (the past, present, future, within your model) and that which obtains in space/time. After all, if it is an object of divine knowledge, it's ontological obtaining is already presumed in the idea of knowledge of that which obtains, for if it has not ontologically obtained, it cannot be known (since again, God does know no-thing). So then, if God has eternal "conscious awareness" of that which God "will" create (vis-a-vis your unnatural distinction between conceptual and actual existence), we must conclude that that which God creates is essential in nature with Godself, whereby it can exist in such a state that it can be commensurate in eternality with God's self-knowledge.

You have yet to even begin to address this challenge.
The point you are missing is that the temporal location sense of the claim “x exists now” is very relevant, even to your own model. All that is to mean is x exists in a way that we can observe it. Again, if something exists necessarily, it is an object of knowledge. If something exists necessarily, the implications strongly mean that which is going to exist does not presently exist, i.e. what necessarily exists is not observable to us. If I contemplate making a sandwich and what I want on it, such a conceptual understanding does not mean that the contents of the sandwich or the sandwich itself exists presently in the sense that I can see it, smell it, or taste it. When it comes down to it, being conscious of something does not equate to that something being present when consciously thought of. To argue from that point is absurd.

This challenge has been more than addressed. It has been ruined.

Furthermore, I would argue with your point that there is a meaningful distinction between being "known" from eternity and "existing" from eternity. I think that if you actually contemplate the issue, you'll see that the two are, in fact, one in the same. From one's own perspective, of course, it does not appear that one exists from eternity. However, we're not talking about one's own knowledge of one's existence--we're talking about divine knowledge.
Much of this makes sense, though it doesn’t make the idea that conscious awareness of something equates to the actuality of that something. It does not appear that we exist eternally from our experience because we are not actually present from eternity. If we were, since existence implies self awareness, we would be aware that we exist from eternity. And so yes, we are not talking about our knowledge but God’s knowledge, but you are talking about the knowledge of something (us) being the same as actually existing.

If God's knowledge of something is eternal, this knowledge presumes the actuality of the object of knowledge. As there is no change in state in God's knowledge (well, there should not be…your perspective actually introduces severe change, but that's another matter), there is no scenario in which God's knowledge of something transitions from conceptual to actual.
This is wrong. What you have not been able to argue against is the notion that knowledge does not equal out to actuality. I have knowledge of me going to lunch with my dad two days from now, but that event is not an actuality. In conclusion and which cannot be denied: knowledge =/= actuality. This is not to say that when the actuality of what is known comes about, there is a transition, but to say that what is known is presently happening. This does not change any aspect of divine knowledge as there is nothing about an eternal knowledge that could be changed. There is nothing to add to everything being known from past to future, literally all is known at that point.

For example, God does not have only conceptual knowledge of Godself--rather, as God exists, so God knows Godself fully and completely. In the same way, if we posit that knowledge of the universe belongs eternally to the mind of God, we must assume the same: there is no "state" change in God's knowledge of the universe from "conceptual" to "actual". And more to the point of your misunderstanding, there can also not even be a "state" change in that which God has knowledge of. That is, if God has knowledge of the universe from eternity, we cannot conceive of a state in which the universe is not known to God as the universe. If the universe is known to God from eternity, it is not because knowledge of the universe is appropriated to the divine mind via creation (which would negate the premise of God's eternal knowledge of it), but rather because the universe exists in a domain that corresponds to God having eternal, divine knowledge of the universe. As the only domain in which this type of knowledge is possible is that of the divine Self, we must conclude, then, that if God has eternal knowledge of the universe, it is because the universe exists eternally within the domain of the divine self; in other words, the universe exists eternally with (or more appropriately, as) God.
I feel like this is a circular argument now. I have refuted this many times and for the last time in this final round. I am not doing it yet again.

As I pointed out in my previous response to this "analogy", there is nothing of the future which you are imagining. You are simply extending knowledge of "what is". But this doesn't really matter, because your final point (that something "external" of God gives way to foreknowledge) destroys your argument completely. If you are arguing that God's knowledge of the universe is eternal (conceptually or otherwise), but then are also suggesting that this very knowledge is premised on that which is "other than" God, you actually have more fundamental issues to deal with than the inevitable conclusion of pantheism.
I still think you are getting the wrong impression of the analogy. I do not know the future of which I am thinking of, but I am thinking of something I want to know that may happen in the future. For example, say I think of marriage between my girlfriend and I. When I look into the ball, it will reveal whether or not we will get married, what it will look like, and so forth. I do not know what the future holds in that respect, but I want to know so I think of marriage between her and me.

Even without the analogy my point here still stands: the actuality of the future is not brought about by the knowledge of the future, rather the future is brought about by the individuals that engage in action and the events they bring about. Foreknowledge is therefore not a causal factor. You say this “destroys” my point here when in fact you fail at showing how this is so. Basically another baseless claim.

The point you continue to miss is simple: if God eternally knows "what is going to happen", the "what" must refer to something (not no-thing, which can't even be named), since God doesn't eternally know "not what is going to happen" (which is no-thing, an absurdity). Therefore, as God's knowledge of what is going to happen is eternal (in your view), the "what is going to happen" must also be eternal whereby it can be an object of divine knowledge. If, on the other hand, the "what is going to happen" is not eternal, it cannot be eternally known to God, for it is no-thing, and we would be absurd in saying that God has knowledge of no-thing.
There is nothing about this point that would make it hard to grasp. It’s just irrational. Reading it back to myself it really doesn’t even make sense. The “what” that is known is the future as it would necessarily exist, not as in it existing presently from when it is known, but only conceptually. I’ve shown this argument wrong on many fronts. It is weak, short coming, and nonsensical. Whenever it is brought up again it can only be referred to as such as I would be wasting my time repeating what has already been said and that which was nothing said about.

If God is not the universe, and if the universe is not eternal, how can God "move" the universe? Moreover, if the universe is created ex nihilo, exactly what is "moved"? I know you don't think that language matters, but surely you see the absurdity of your position in this case.
God doesn’t “move” the universe per se. God creates the universe, and with the first creative act, the universe began to exist as a result. Again, creation ex nihilo means there is no pre –existent matter for God to create with, so it’s not as if I am saying there exists matter and energy alongside God for Him to create with, rather there is no matter and energy, then out of nothing, since the only being that would have existed is God (without the universe), is something. I believe when I said “move” I used quotations to signify not literally moving as referenced to God but create.

The very nature of causality (the "movement" which you suggest) implies changes in states between the agents of cause and effect. But this is absurd. To imply such a change is an affront to divine immutability, and is equally absurd in relation to the universe, as you jettison entirely the concept of creation ex nihilo and substitute in its place an eternality of the universe, whereby the universe can be understood as undergoing a "change" by interaction with its efficient cause. But of course, creation ex nihilo implies no change (since the "move" from no-thing to something is not a "move" or change at all). Therefore, in order to maintain this fundamental doctrine of Christian belief, you'll need to seriously revisit your haphazard application of causality to the creation of the universe.
If you knew and really thought language was as important as you claim, then you would understand what a manner of speaking is. Apparently you are not aware of language that would indicate a manner of speaking, which strikes me as very odd again being that you made this huge deal about language. I did not mean literally “move” hence my quotations. Once again, you have no supported why there would have to be a change in states. As it is unsupported it lacks sense. Thus, there is no “affront to divine immutability.” My partner wants to act like causality is irrelevant when it comes to the existence, and even more so the creation, of the universe. This thought is central to any Christian concept of the creation of the universe. It is Christian to conclude the universe had a beginning. On that premise alone it would follow that it is proper Christian theology to apply causality to the universe, since whatever begins to exist has a cause. It would follow then, though more unfortunately for my partner, that to deny these Christian understandings is therefore not Christian.

Hmm, I thought words didn't matter? If I'm to take your position that precision in language is of no importance, why should I pay any attention to the "words" that you quote from Scripture? Again, the self-contradictory nature of your argument reveals itself.
I never said words didn’t matter. That is only you twisting what I really had said as what I actually said isn’t what you’re saying I did. Also, I wouldn’t expect a person of your theological background to pay any attention to Scripture, as this is evident from you dodging my question on the beginning of the universe as it is referenced in Scripture.

The universe existing eternally in a commensurate way with the very being of God is hardly a "plan". Such would be akin to saying that God has plans for Godself, which is absurd.
Eternal knowledge of creation would give way to an eternal plan for creation. Again, this is even noted in the verse I mentioned. The Bible mentions that God has chosen us before the creation of the world, and that suggests a divine plan. The Bible does not mention a plan for God that God has, so that objection makes absolutely no sense. You did not even begin to address this verse as it directly conflicts with your position, which is itself absurd.

But there is really no objection that you can make, for one need not assume "eternal" knowledge of creation in order to allow for God achieving divine purposes within creation. Such an imposition of a linear view of knowledge upon God is not necessitated, either philosophically or biblically.
I am not talking simply about divine purposes, but a plan for creation “before” creation. That is Biblical, and is of no I issue of it in a philosophical sense.

Language! There is no "at that point" in God's creating of the universe. God does not "become aware" of the universe "after" or "as" God is creating it, for these concepts imply a "tensed" relationship of God to creation. As I've maintained throughout, God's knowledge of the universe emerges with God's creative acts. They do not emerge in a retroactive way "from" the existence of the universe "to" God's mind.
What exactly does “emerge” mean? This is something you haven’t really defined or brought to light, which makes your position hard to understand, not because of some “intellectual complexity” but rather from a lack of information and support. The only definitions that would even relate to your position are two:

  • to become manifest : become known <new problems emerged>
  • to come into being.

If god’s knowledge of the universe emerges with creative acts, then there is more than one creative act, as again knowledge of the universe would not be complete if there is only one creative act. If there is more than one creative act, then god would have been creating until the universe is “finished” assuming that is something you accept of which I doubt (I assume you think god is presently creating). Either way god would still be considered to be in the process of creating, in a state of constant flux as his knowledge of the universe emerges with each creative act. This is something I asked of you to which you did not answer so now as it just makes even more sense that the above is actually the case, I’ll move forward with my objection which I believe still stands.

If either god’s knowledge of the universe is emerging presently as he would be presently creating, or if god’s knowledge of the universe emerged with the few acts of creation and since then has been finished, each would imply a “tensed” relation to the universe. That being so, god would said to be existent in time and experience time as we do.

Moreover, there is no state in which knowledge of the universe is "added" to what God "previously did not know" because, again, these linear, tensed concepts have no bearing on the existence or acts of God. There is no "addition" to divine knowledge, for God's knowledge necessarily and completely encompasses that which "is". As that which isn't (no-thing) is not an object of knowledge, the domain of what God knows is constantly and unchangingly infinite, encompassing all of that which exists.
You’re missing it. “Acts” as in more than one creative action necessarily means a “linear tensed concept.” “Acts” are such a concept. What about this do you not understand? Therefore, it would be correct to say that as god does not know something of the future, then as he creates and his knowledge of the future emerges, what he is ignorant of is now comprehended, and so added to the knowledge he already has of the past. According to your position, knowledge of the universe emerges when god creates, so when the future finally exists in whatever way it will according to you, knowledge of what is happening “comes into being” as god creates. It is something when it comes into being and is then considered an object of knowledge. It is knowledge once not known, and then it is known, hence a bash to divine immutability, and therefore of Christian theology.

I never said God obtains knowledge! This is purely your misunderstanding or misrepresentation of my position. What I said is that God's knowledge of the universe emerges with God's creation of the universe. In this way, the knowledge which God has about the universe does not "come" from anywhere; it is commensurate and essential with God's creative acts themselves.
Here you said this, “So God's knowledge of the universe is not "obtained" from the emergence of the universe, but rather from the divine act of creation.” By this statement what you seem to be saying is that god’s knowledge of the universe is not obtained from the emergence of the universe, but obtain from creation. You are denying that the knowledge is not obtained through the universe emerging, not specifically that knowledge is obtained is being false. Like I said it in fact appears as if you’re saying knowledge is obtained. If anything this is you not conveying your position in an adequate way.

And NO, God's knowledge does NOT increase. I've made this plain more times than I care to count. God's knowledge is necessarily and exhaustively inclusive of that which exists. As there is no change in state from the "no-thing-ness" of something to the existence of something, God's knowledge of that which God creates is never "added to", for the domain and extent of God's divine and perfect knowledge is still ever and exhaustively encompassing of that which exists.
If god experiences time, which as I have shown to be true, then there is knowledge added to preexistence knowledge of the past. That is how we experience time and the gain of knowledge, and since god would said to be experiencing time on an OT view, he gains knowledge, which violates even more the theological sound doctrine of immutability.

My partner has described Open Theism as he understands it. What follows are the few main criticisms which I feel bury my partner’s position, and to which I also feel were not adequately addressed which only makes them validated remarks. The rest I had to say about his position can be summed up earlier in this final round.

According to him, the universe had no beginning yet is still created. I preserve the claim that this is nonsensical, for the first reason an origin to the universe is found in the very first sentence of the Bible. Secondly, because of the implications of “creation” suggest an origin. If the universe had no beginning, it could not have been created. If the universe was not created, there can be no creator. Therefore, if there is no beginning to the universe, there is no creator of it. This conclusion, among many more, is why OT should be regarded as not only mendacious, but absolutely unbiblical as well. I am not saying that god is non – existent according to OT, rather god cannot be logically said to have created the universe being there was no beginning to it as is claimed.

Furthermore, if there is no prior knowledge of creation or the universe, then there can be no plan for either. Scripture confirms to a plan from God ‘before’ the creation of the world. A plan suggests knowledge, so an eternal plan requires eternal knowledge. If there is no plan, creation is obviously unplanned which is, as I said previously in the last round, extraordinarily unbiblical. An eternal knowledge of creation would mean it is perfect; encompassing all aspects of all there is to be known. This goes back to the existence of time itself and what could be said to exist of and ‘in’ time. Remember, as I have shown, and to which was never refuted, non – present objects exist, not in a temporal location sense as we could see them, but in a sense that means that they simply exist. Not only this, but the future as it is determined by past circumstances exists necessarily. Therefore the future can be said to ‘exist.’ Now, despite the false assumptions my partner is guilty of that the future does not exist, and since the future would therefore be an aspect of “everything there is to be known,” if god does not know the future, he cannot be omniscient. This is yet another unwelcoming conclusion one must greet of Open Theism, which again is why it is established as unfounded and embarrassing to a traditional, Biblical understanding of God’s nature in relation to His omniscience.

Another critique which I said from the very beginning of the debate, is not, and now confirmed to never be answered satisfactory, is that of how it could be that god, whom is supposed to be immaterial, can exist within time/space which is material? The ontology of god would have to be temporal in nature for there to be a divine emergence of knowledge, since to “obtain” knowledge is a temporal action. It wouldn’t seem sensible to say there is an emergence of knowledge with every act of creation since the immaterial cannot occupy time/space. Would it be that god is no longer immaterial as he experiences this divine emergence? Again, that makes the incarnation moot. It is not clear how the ontological existence of god is comprehended according to OT specifically regarding this “divine emergence” only because I would think there is no clear answer, or else it would have been offered. Either way, according to this here, it cannot be consistently maintained that god is immutable -- yet another feat of OT.

These are the tarnished thoughts that result from an Open Theistic view of god, time, and the universe, of which are all consistent and logically flow to their conclusions. The universe had no beginning; the universe could not have been created. God did not know he was creating until the very act of creation; there was no plan for creation. From here I wish to show why this position is erroneous on one last point to which my partner brought up as:

Notice how I have repeatedly portrayed my partner’s position as unbiblical, while this is evidently from the lack of evidence from Scripture on his behalf. Mark how he did not note even one verse to support his view of OT. In this sense, OT is unbiblical too. Rather it was the Traditional view which produced many Scriptures to show that 1) God is eternal and therefore timeless 2) God has an eternal plan for creation and thus eternal knowledge of creation 3) God has perfect knowledge 4) God is immutable 5) The universe had a beginning. Under OT, all five of these Biblical truths are convoluted, made out to be a sham when in fact they are not. Under the Traditional view, these five Biblical truths reach to new conclusions which state, and of which I feel I have supported in the subsequent rounds, that God knows the future and has so from all eternity. One last piece of Biblical evidence to allude to such an idea will be put forth:

Psalms 139​
“You have searched me, LORD,
and you know me.​
You know when I sit and when I rise;
you perceive my thoughts from afar.​
You discern my going out and my lying down;
you are familiar with all my ways.
Before a word is on my tongue
you, LORD, know it completely.
You hem me in behind and before,
and you lay your hand upon me.
Such knowledge is too wonderful for me,
too lofty for me to attain.”​
 
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