Narrative thinking and conspiracy theories

[Michie]

“Just because you're paranoid doesn't mean they aren't after you” is one of the most famous lines from Joseph Heller’s Catch-22. I propose a corollary: Just because they’re after you doesn’t mean you’re not paranoid.here and here), traditionalist Catholic historian Roberto de Mattei offers some illuminating observations about paranoid modes of thinking trending in some right-wing circles, such as the QAnon theory. These are usually criticized as “conspiracy theories,” but as De Mattei points out, that they posit malevolent left-wing conspiracies is not the problem. Left-wing ideas really do dominate the news media, the universities, the entertainment industry, corporate HR departments, and so on. Left-wing politicians and opinion makers really are extremely hostile to traditional moral and religious views, and in some cases threaten people’s freedom to express them. A transformative project like The Great Reset is not the product of right-wing fantasy – it has its own official website, for goodness’ sake. Left-wingers in government, the press, NGOs, etc. have common values and goals and work together to advance them. The “conspiring” here is not secret or hypothetical, but out in the open.

Disordered minds

The problem is rather that the specific kinds of conspiracy theory De Mattei has in mind are epistemologically highly dubious. Now, one way a conspiracy theory might be epistemologically problematic has to do with the structure of the theory itself. For example, I have argued that a problem with the most extreme sorts of conspiracy theory is that they are like the most extreme sorts of philosophical skepticism, in being self-undermining. De Mattei’s focus, by contrast, is on the psychological mechanism by which such theories come to be adopted. He writes:

The characteristic of false conspiracy theories is that they cannot offer any documentation or certainty. To compensate for their lack of proofs, they use the technique of narration, which takes hold of the emotions, more than reason, and seduces those, who by an act of faith, have already decided to believe the far-fetched, propelled by fear, anger and rancor.

De Mattei elaborates on the cognitive mechanism involved in his other article, as follows:

Continued below.
Edward Feser: Narrative thinking and conspiracy theories

 

[chevyontheriver]

“Just because you're paranoid doesn't mean they aren't after you” is one of the most famous lines from Joseph Heller’s Catch-22. I propose a corollary: Just because they’re after you doesn’t mean you’re not paranoid.here and here), traditionalist Catholic historian Roberto de Mattei offers some illuminating observations about paranoid modes of thinking trending in some right-wing circles, such as the QAnon theory. These are usually criticized as “conspiracy theories,” but as De Mattei points out, that they posit malevolent left-wing conspiracies is not the problem. Left-wing ideas really do dominate the news media, the universities, the entertainment industry, corporate HR departments, and so on. Left-wing politicians and opinion makers really are extremely hostile to traditional moral and religious views, and in some cases threaten people’s freedom to express them. A transformative project like The Great Reset is not the product of right-wing fantasy – it has its own official website, for goodness’ sake. Left-wingers in government, the press, NGOs, etc. have common values and goals and work together to advance them. The “conspiring” here is not secret or hypothetical, but out in the open.

Disordered minds

The problem is rather that the specific kinds of conspiracy theory De Mattei has in mind are epistemologically highly dubious. Now, one way a conspiracy theory might be epistemologically problematic has to do with the structure of the theory itself. For example, I have argued that a problem with the most extreme sorts of conspiracy theory is that they are like the most extreme sorts of philosophical skepticism, in being self-undermining. De Mattei’s focus, by contrast, is on the psychological mechanism by which such theories come to be adopted. He writes:

The characteristic of false conspiracy theories is that they cannot offer any documentation or certainty. To compensate for their lack of proofs, they use the technique of narration, which takes hold of the emotions, more than reason, and seduces those, who by an act of faith, have already decided to believe the far-fetched, propelled by fear, anger and rancor.

De Mattei elaborates on the cognitive mechanism involved in his other article, as follows:

Continued below.
Edward Feser: Narrative thinking and conspiracy theories

A tin foil hat is a dubious proposition. But tin foil has other uses. One is to keep your cell phone from tracking you so well. I found that Google Maps had traced my comings and goings in minute detail every day for a few years, my location when I was out for a walk or out driving to a job site, complete with every zig or zag I ever made. I had used them to map out the way to unknown job sites but they had in tern kept track of every motion of my cell phone. I spent hours deleting all of that, but I need to check and see if there is new tracking. And I'm dubious about them not tracking me any more because they're Google. Just because they're after me doesn't mean I'm not paranoid, right?