- May 16, 2006
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Following up on the cogency (which I had to change because I realized one preceded the other) of the "God" concept, I have to wonder if arguments in regards to the description of its qualities aren't relying on special pleading or other fallacious thinking?
To say "God" is just and loving (sometimes absolutely so for both) creates a particular way you must justify that, in a similar fashion to "God" being sovereign and yet also respecting human freewill (sometimes less effectively than others).
If you have to make so many qualifications in regards to this entity to have it not seem to contradict itself in what is attributed to it, how does this not suffer a similar fate of Antony Flew's Invisible Gardener example? How is the shifting of explanations to fit a rational notion about "God" not just shifting goalposts when it's shown that even in a position where "God" exists, there have to be constraints or the beliefs become worse than superstition?
To say "God" is just and loving (sometimes absolutely so for both) creates a particular way you must justify that, in a similar fashion to "God" being sovereign and yet also respecting human freewill (sometimes less effectively than others).
If you have to make so many qualifications in regards to this entity to have it not seem to contradict itself in what is attributed to it, how does this not suffer a similar fate of Antony Flew's Invisible Gardener example? How is the shifting of explanations to fit a rational notion about "God" not just shifting goalposts when it's shown that even in a position where "God" exists, there have to be constraints or the beliefs become worse than superstition?