Is Open Theism, Arminianism consistently applied or Arminianism come to it's own?

[Apologetic_Warrior]

Is Open Theism or Process Theology, Arminianism consistently applied or Arminianism come to it's own? Why or why not? This is a serious question btw, not rhetorical, not an attack, just curious as to what people think about this. Is Open Theism more consistent with "free will" theology?

As I understand Open Theism, they tend to be of the LFW persuassion, and at least entertain Molinism, while denying God has perfect knowledge of the future. One way I have heard it explained, God has all knowledge of what can possibly be known, but there are some things which cannot be possibly known. This makes it "logically possible" for them to say God is all-knowing, however their definition is quite different from the common understanding and historical view. Please correct me if my understanding is wrong.

 

[ConsumedByHisCall]

As I argued else where I think Determinists make the same error as Open Theist. Neither of them is willing to live with any level of mystery regarding what they have deemed as illogical according to their finite understanding of infinite matters.

Three truths are clearly revealed to us about God in scriptures:

1. God is Sovereign (omnipotent, omniscient, omnipresent)

2. God is Holy (hates sin, doesn't even tempt men to sin, desires obedience etc)

3. God created a world where temptations, sin and disobedience exist.

These concepts can seem at odds from a finite logical view point in that if one believes God hates sin and wants perfection and he is all powerful he would just create a world with perfect people. But, since sin and evil clearly exist a problem with this logic arises. If God doesn't want us to be sinful and He is all powerful then why are we sinful? How do we deal with that problem?

I believe determinists attempt to explain away the statements regarding God's holiness by making up things about "second causes" so as to say that 'God is the ultimate cause of everything' without really saying God is the cause of sin, evil, temptation, etc. I believe they fail in their effort because the ULTIMATE cause is still THE CAUSE in my book and that doesn't seem to be consistent with the biblical author's intent. I can't imagine that James actually believed this when he wrote that "God doesn't even tempt me to sin."

Open Theist make the same mistake but on the other side. They try to explain away God's sovereignty by suggesting God doesn't really know everything etc. Both are biblically unacceptable and inaccurate. I say that we accept both truths and accept the mystery in faith. We do that in regard to the trinity, why not on this matter?

 

[Jpark]

Open Theism takes truth and utilizes it for it's own misinterpretation. While it is true that God can change His mind, that doesn't mean that He lacks Omniscience.

 

[ConsumedByHisCall]

Open Theism takes truth and utilizes it for it's own misinterpretation. While it is true that God can change His mind, that doesn't mean that He lacks Omniscience.

I agree. While it may seem to us that God's omniscience and his "changing His mind" are logically inconsistent, both truths are clearly revealed, so both should be accepted and the mystery accepted in faith.

 

[Skala]

I agree. While it may seem to us that God's omniscience and his "changing His mind" are logically inconsistent, both truths are clearly revealed, so both should be accepted and the mystery accepted in faith.

Why do you accept this, yet not the following:

1) God controls everything

2) yet somehow, man chooses what he desires, honestly and truly, and God holds him accountable/responsible for those choices

 

[ConsumedByHisCall]

Why do you accept this, yet not the following:

1) God controls everything

2) yet somehow, man chooses what he desires, honestly and truly, and God holds him accountable/responsible for those choices

I do accept that, but the way compatibilists describe point 2 is just a restatement of point 1. Let me reword it:

1. God controls everything

2. Yet somehow created men to make free morally accountable choices

Why can't you accept that? Calvinists can only accept this if they define "free" to really mean "God controls it, by determining the nature/desire of the one making the choice," which in reality is just another way of supporting point 1 while dismantling point 2. Granted, defining a "free" and "accountable" choice as being "according to one's desire" does subtly invoke a sense of culpability, because after all they are doing what they want to do. But, in a system where God determines the wants of man from birth, how is what the agent wants in anyway independent of what God wants? What even warrants a second point in this case? Why not just say "God controls everything" as the hard deterministic fatalist would and leave it at that? The reason you even include the second point is because bible is abundantly clear regarding human culpability in making moral choices. So, I turn the question back to you and emphasize the "somehow" in your second point. Could that "somehow" be through libertarian freewill?

 

[Apologetic_Warrior]

As I argued else where I think Determinists make the same error as Open Theist. Neither of them is willing to live with any level of mystery regarding what they have deemed as illogical according to their finite understanding of infinite matters.

I have to kindly disagree, questions like "why doesn't God save everyone?" are still valid, despite views of the knowledge of God and the will of man and God.

Three truths are clearly revealed to us about God in scriptures:

1. God is Sovereign (omnipotent, omniscient, omnipresent)

2. God is Holy (hates sin, doesn't even tempt men to sin, desires obedience etc)

3. God created a world where temptations, sin and disobedience exist.

True

These concepts can seem at odds from a finite logical view point in that if one believes God hates sin and wants perfection and he is all powerful he would just create a world with perfect people. But, since sin and evil clearly exist a problem with this logic arises. If God doesn't want us to be sinful and He is all powerful then why are we sinful? How do we deal with that problem?

Good question, and I think it applies to everyone. Why did God curse man that he is born a sinner? If man is not born a sinner, why do we need Christ, or have all not sinned? If man can choose not to be a sinner, and God is all powerful, why does God not give the grace to all to choose not to be a sinner, if God desires all to be saved?

I believe determinists attempt to explain away the statements regarding God's holiness by making up things about "second causes" so as to say that 'God is the ultimate cause of everything' without really saying God is the cause of sin, evil, temptation, etc. I believe they fail in their effort because the ULTIMATE cause is still THE CAUSE in my book and that doesn't seem to be consistent with the biblical author's intent. I can't imagine that James actually believed this when he wrote that "God doesn't even tempt me to sin."

How is making the Creator/creation distinction "explaining away"? To believe in God and not make first and second cause distinctions is to dabble in eastern religion of Pantheism thought. There are HUGE distinctions in first and second causes. Think about this, before man was created, God was, and before man was created, He caused everything into existence, including time, which does not apply to Him. We have to make distinctions between causes by an infinite God and causes by finite creation, this is Biblical and part of Christianity, and sound Biblical Theology. If there is no distinction in causes, if we're just explaining away, then you cannot honestly make distinctions between anything we do and and what God does, but this is not the position of Calvinism, nor historical Christianity, nor the Biblical position. The "explaining away" stawman is burned away with truth.

Open Theist make the same mistake but on the other side. They try to explain away God's sovereignty by suggesting God doesn't really know everything etc. Both are biblically unacceptable and inaccurate. I say that we accept both truths and accept the mystery in faith. We do that in regard to the trinity, why not on this matter?

No, they would contend God knows everything that can be known...that's the kicker. At least they can easily answer the question, why does God save people, He knows will fall away? Why did God choose to make Israel His special people giving them special revelation and not other nations? He wants everyone to be saved right? Why did He give commandments He knows we cannot follow on our own, or can we by our free will, if we can, why Christ? Why did God the Son take the huge risk of becomming flesh and dying on the cross if his atonement for sin, only accomplished the possibility for salvation? Would it not have been possible that nobody would choose Christ? Poor God lonely old man just cannot seem to get anything right or accomplished, His hands of grace and mercy, justice and wrath seem to be tied by our Sovereign free wills.

 

[ConsumedByHisCall]

I have to kindly disagree, questions like "why doesn't God save everyone?" are still valid, despite views of the knowledge of God and the will of man and God.

I'm not following you here. I don't see how this related to what I said? Sorry.

True

Good question, and I think it applies to everyone.

I agree.

How is making the Creator/creation distinction "explaining away"?

Making the distinction is fine, its drawing conclusions regarding the cause of an evil choice made by the created being directly linked to the creator that I take issue with. For example, saying Jeffery Dahmer chose to commit his heinous crimes voluntarily (because he wanted to) is fine, but when one steps into finite logical speculations to conclude that God logically must have originated the intent (desire) of Dahmer to do evil because God could not have been informed by man (as mere permission would dictate), so every thing that comes to pass (even the evil intent of Dahmer to molest, rape, kill and eat children) originated in the mind of God is clearly unbiblical and unacceptable. I'd rather live with the mystery of not knowing how a created being originates an intent than to concede that finite logical conclusion.

The snag with determinists is that they feel they must answer the question as to what caused that cause. But regardless of where you go eventually we all appeal to mystery. What caused, the cause of the cause. Eventually we get to what caused God's choice and how does a God who has alway known everything make a choice because He already knows what he would choose before making the choice and how can he even originate a thought because that would imply that he didn't know it before he thought it making him not all knowing. It is endless and impossible for our finite minds to even begin to grasp. So, why not stop with man causes his evil choices, period, and leave it at that? Just appeal to mystery as to how a created being originates intent.

No, they would contend God knows everything that can be known..

I understand, I was just simplify their view because you and I both agree that means God doesn't really know all future events according to them...

At least they can easily answer the question

Right, and those who deny the trinity can more easily answer the question regarding the oneness of God, but as we agree, that doesn't make them right. We don't sacrifice truth for convenience, right?

 

[themuzicman]

Is Open Theism or Process Theology, Arminianism consistently applied or Arminianism come to it's own? Why or why not? This is a serious question btw, not rhetorical, not an attack, just curious as to what people think about this. Is Open Theism more consistent with "free will" theology?

First, open theism isn't process theism.

Second, while there are elements of Arminianism that fit into Open theism, Open Theism isn't really a modification of Arminianism. It stands on its own.

As I understand Open Theism, they tend to be of the LFW persuassion, and at least entertain Molinism

Molinism falls into the logically contradictory trap of assuming free will and foreknowledge are compatible.

while denying God has perfect knowledge of the future. One way I have heard it explained, God has all knowledge of what can possibly be known, but there are some things which cannot be possibly known. This makes it "logically possible" for them to say God is all-knowing, however their definition is quite different from the common understanding and historical view. Please correct me if my understanding is wrong.

Open View may adopt God's natural knowledge from Molinism, but rejects God's middle knowledge.

The the view of God being omniscient is correct. Scholars have acknowledged that God does not know things that are not logically possible to know (i.e. how large a rock to make such that HE cannot lift it), so it is logical to say that if the future is logically unknowable, that God cannot know it.

The difference between the "historicaL" view and the open view is that the historical view embraces (and knowingly embraces) the obvious logical contradiction in assuming free will and foreknowledge are compatible.

 

[Apologetic_Warrior]

First, open theism isn't process theism.

Thank you for the clearification, however would it be incorrect to say process theologians tend to be open theists?

From a blog:

"Process Theology and Open Theism are kindred beliefs that begin with the fundamental thesis that reality is changing. All reality. And so, God is changing. There is an interdependance in all of reality and so God is dependant on other reality and must change in response to those other realities. God is in process, processing new situations and knowledge as they come into being.

Those who promote these beliefs say that they do not deny that God is all-powerful and sovereign and that He can ordain and control future events, He just chooses not to do so and leaves the future open to the choice of man. They say God is all-knowing but the future does not exist yet so God cannot know it yet. God, for example only knows all that can be known at the moment. So, God responds and has to change plans due to the changes in history as it unfolds."

Second, while there are elements of Arminianism that fit into Open theism, Open Theism isn't really a modification of Arminianism. It stands on its own.

Perhaps you could explain further?

Molinism falls into the logically contradictory trap of assuming free will and foreknowledge are compatible.

From Wikipedia: "Open theists maintain that some of the classical attributes of God are contradictory and unintelligible.....

...Contradictions in the traditional attributes are pointed out by open theists and atheists alike."

Ok, so Molinism is out of the question for open theists, I misunderstood a point and asked for correction, thank you for the correction. Btw, I started the thread and am asking questions to gain some insight, though time constraints and desired priorities will limit how far I look into things. The purpose is not aimed as an attack on OT, quite the contrary, if anything it is aimed at classical arminianism.

Open View may adopt God's natural knowledge from Molinism, but rejects God's middle knowledge.

Sorry for creating unintended confusion on that point, there are not many open theists here that I know of, and I have stayed clear of the discussion and debate of it in a long time, and not given it much thought in a long time.

The the view of God being omniscient is correct. Scholars have acknowledged that God does not know things that are not logically possible to know (i.e. how large a rock to make such that HE cannot lift it), so it is logical to say that if the future is logically unknowable, that God cannot know it.

Well, at least I got that part right.

The difference between the "historicaL" view and the open view is that the historical view embraces (and knowingly embraces) the obvious logical contradiction in assuming free will and foreknowledge are compatible.

I disagree of course, but compatiblism and whether it is biblical and or a contradiction or paradox isn't the topic up for debate. What I want to know is...

...Open Theism more consistent with "free will" theology than classical Arminianism? If so, on what grounds? How so?

 

[Walter Kovacs]

No, it is not.

 

[Eleiou]

Is Open Theism or Process Theology, Arminianism consistently applied or Arminianism come to it's own? Why or why not? This is a serious question btw, not rhetorical, not an attack, just curious as to what people think about this. Is Open Theism more consistent with "free will" theology?

As I understand Open Theism, they tend to be of the LFW persuassion, and at least entertain Molinism, while denying God has perfect knowledge of the future. One way I have heard it explained, God has all knowledge of what can possibly be known, but there are some things which cannot be possibly known. This makes it "logically possible" for them to say God is all-knowing, however their definition is quite different from the common understanding and historical view. Please correct me if my understanding is wrong.

I don't think we can discuss open theism in any of the orthodox Christian Theology forums brother.

 

[themuzicman]

Thank you for the clearification, however would it be incorrect to say process theologians tend to be open theists?

From a blog:

"Process Theology and Open Theism are kindred beliefs that begin with the fundamental thesis that reality is changing. All reality. And so, God is changing. There is an interdependance in all of reality and so God is dependant on other reality and must change in response to those other realities. God is in process, processing new situations and knowledge as they come into being.

Depends on how you're using "Open Theists." Within the theological world, the term "Open Theism" has become something more than just an open future, and thus would depart from process theism in that respect.

They would be similar in the same way that Islam and Calvinism are the same about God's sovereignty.

Perhaps you could explain further?

Well, previent grace isn't necessary for Open View Theism, for instance. Of course, any theology about foreknowledge wouldn't apply, either.

From Wikipedia: "Open theists maintain that some of the classical attributes of God are contradictory and unintelligible.....

...Contradictions in the traditional attributes are pointed out by open theists and atheists alike."

Correct. Open Theism's goal is to be adently biblical, stay out of the problem of evil, and remain logical.

Ok, so Molinism is out of the question for open theists, I misunderstood a point and asked for correction, thank you for the correction. Btw, I started the thread and am asking questions to gain some insight, though time constraints and desired priorities will limit how far I look into things. The purpose is not aimed as an attack on OT, quite the contrary, if anything it is aimed at classical arminianism.

Which is fine.

Sorry for creating unintended confusion on that point, there are not many open theists here that I know of, and I have stayed clear of the discussion and debate of it in a long time, and not given it much thought in a long time.

Not a problem.

...Open Theism more consistent with "free will" theology than classical Arminianism? If so, on what grounds? How so?

Well, it has been known for quite some time that there is a logical contradiction between free will and foreknowledge. I know Aristotle dealt with the question, and I'm not entirely sure he came up with it.

Both Calvinists and Arminians simply state both sides, sometimes acknowledging the obvious contradiction, and then live in the illogical to hold on to their systematic theologies.

 

[Walter Kovacs]

Well, it has been known for quite some time that there is a logical contradiction between free will and foreknowledge.

What contradiction?

 

[themuzicman]

What contradiction?

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/free-will-foreknowledge/

Using the example of the proposition T, the argument that infallible foreknowledge of T entails that you do not answer the telephone freely can be formulated as follows:

Basic Argument for Theological Fatalism
(1)Yesterday God infallibly believed T. [Supposition of infallible foreknowledge]
(2)If E occurred in the past, it is now-necessary that E occurred then. [Principle of the Necessity of the Past]
(3)It is now-necessary that yesterday God believed T. [1, 2]
(4)Necessarily, if yesterday God believed T, then T. [Definition of “infallibility”]
(5)If p is now-necessary, and necessarily (p → q), then q is now-necessary. [Transfer of Necessity Principle]
(6)So it is now-necessary that T. [3,4,5]
(7)If it is now-necessary that T, then you cannot do otherwise than answer the telephone tomorrow at 9 am. [Definition of “necessary”]
(8)Therefore, you cannot do otherwise than answer the telephone tomorrow at 9 am. [6, 7]
(9)If you cannot do otherwise when you do an act, you do not act freely. [Principle of Alternate Possibilities]
(10)Therefore, when you answer the telephone tomorrow at 9 am, you will not do it freely. [8, 9]
​

The same proof can be modified for "timelessness."

(1)God timelessly and infallibly believes T. [Supposition of infallible foreknowledge]
(2)If E is timelessly and infallibly believed, it cannot be otherwise, thus it is necessary that E occur. [Principle of Necessity]
(3)It is necessary that God believes T. [1, 2]
(4)Necessarily, if God believes T, then T. [Definition of “infallibility”]
(5)If p is necessary, and necessarily (p → q), then q is necessary. [Transfer of Necessity Principle]
(6)So it is necessary that T. [3,4,5]
(7)If it is necessary that T, then you cannot do otherwise than answer the telephone tomorrow at 9 am. [Definition of “necessary”]
(8)Therefore, you cannot do otherwise than answer the telephone tomorrow at 9 am. [6, 7]
(9)If you cannot do otherwise when you do an act, you do not act freely. [Principle of Alternate Possibilities]
(10)Therefore, when you answer the telephone tomorrow at 9 am, you will not do it freely. [8, 9][/quote]

This proof has been in existince at least since Aristotle, with no real objection to its validity.

 

[Walter Kovacs]

Well, there are certainly objections as well as ways of getting around that problem - William Lane Craig has demonstrated that quite forcefully recently via Middle Knowledge. I can post some links if you so like.

However - if DF was a simple case of God knowing what would happen, then fatalism would be quite hard to escape (not impossible, but I'm not going to argue that point). But I don't subscribe to a view of God simply 'knowing what you would do, because He just knows'. I generally take the existential route in this regard. I more or less regard both the Calvinist and Arminian views of foreknowledge to be quite flawed, actually.

 

[themuzicman]

Well, there are certainly objections as well as ways of getting around that problem - William Lane Craig has demonstrated that quite forcefully recently via Middle Knowledge. I can post some links if you so like.

I am familiar with Molinism. Unfortunately, in the end, it only demonstrates that God has free will, in spite of WLC wants to claim.

However - if DF was a simple case of God knowing what would happen, then fatalism would be quite hard to escape (not impossible, but I'm not going to argue that point). But I don't subscribe to a view of God simply 'knowing what you would do, because He just knows'. I generally take the existential route in this regard.

Well, regardless of how God comes to foreknow future decisions, they simply cannot be freely taken in that setting.

 

[Walter Kovacs]

I am familiar with Molinism. Unfortunately, in the end, it only demonstrates that God has free will, in spite of WLC wants to claim.

Not being a Molinist myself, I'm not going to argue that case. I'll simply say that WLC presents a pretty good case for foreknowledge/free will - but I woldn't mind seeing your objections to his case.

Well, regardless of how God comes to foreknow future decisions, they simply cannot be freely taken in that setting.

I'm actually a confused by this - could you rephrase?

 

[themuzicman]

Not being a Molinist myself, I'm not going to argue that case. I'll simply say that WLC presents a pretty good case for foreknowledge/free will - but I woldn't mind seeing your objections to his case.

Well, Molinism essentially states that God knows all possible worlds, and knows how any agent in any of those world would freely choose in any given circumstance. (Natural and middle knowledge)

So, problem #1 is that both foreknowledge ande free will are assumed, and then the Molinist goes about trying to build a system that fits those assumptions. I'm not a real fan of assuming the conclusion and then trying to justify it.

So, God creates a feasible possible world by selecting decisions of free will agents that both achieve His purposes and provide the source of His foreknowledge.

And Molinists say that because they are other possible worlds where any given agent could choose otherwise, (and a large discussion of counterfactuals ensuesm, here) that free will remains in tact.

However, (problem #2) what Molinists miss is who is acting in the contingency. In possible world A, I select chocolate ice cream at 6pm tonite. In possible world B, I select vanilla icre cream at 6pm tonite.

But the difference between which one I choose is God's choice, not mine. Thus, it demonstrates God's free will, not ours.

I'm actually a confused by this - could you rephrase?

For instance, the Calvinist might object that God doesn't just foreknow, but that he is primary cause, and that humans still participate as the secondary cause, and somehow that creates a measure of free will because God doesn't just foreknow, but there is a causal relationship established.

However, it doesn't matter how God foreknows. If the does, then there cannot be free will, as per the proofs above.

 

[Walter Kovacs]

Well, Molinism essentially states that God knows all possible worlds, and knows how any agent in any of those world would freely choose in any given circumstance. (Natural and middle knowledge)

So, problem #1 is that both foreknowledge ande free will are assumed, and then the Molinist goes about trying to build a system that fits those assumptions. I'm not a real fan of assuming the conclusion and then trying to justify it.

So, God creates a feasible possible world by selecting decisions of free will agents that both achieve His purposes and provide the source of His foreknowledge.

And Molinists say that because they are other possible worlds where any given agent could choose otherwise, (and a large discussion of counterfactuals ensuesm, here) that free will remains in tact.

However, (problem #2) what Molinists miss is who is acting in the contingency. In possible world A, I select chocolate ice cream at 6pm tonite. In possible world B, I select vanilla icre cream at 6pm tonite.

But the difference between which one I choose is God's choice, not mine. Thus, it demonstrates God's free will, not ours.

Gotcha. Like I said, I'm not a Molinist, so I don't really disagree too much. But that's a good case against it.

However, it doesn't matter how God foreknows. If the does, then there cannot be free will, as per the proofs above.

I'm very fond of C.S. Lewis's view:

'Suppose God is outside and above the Time-line. In that case, what we call 'tomorrow,' is visible to Him in just the same way as what we call today. All the days are 'ow,' for Him. He does not remember you doing things yesterday; He simply sees you doing them, because though you have lost yesterday, He has not. He does not 'foresee.' you doing things tomorrow; He simply sees you doing them: because, though tomorrow is not yet there for you, it is for Him. You never supposed your actions at this moment were any less free because God knows what you are doing. Well, He knows your tomorrows actions in just the same way - because He is already in tomorrow and can simply watch you. In a sense, He does not know your action till you have done it: but then the moment at which you have done it is already 'Now,' for Him.'

IMO God doesn't know by causing (Calvinism) or simply know theoretically (Arminianism). He knows existentially, on the basis of having ever been the end as well as the beginning, in all, with all, and through all.